Judgment :- 1. The suit that has given rise to this second appeal by the 4th defendant was to set aside a sale deed Ext. B, executed by all the adult members of the main tarwad of the plaintiffs, defendants 5 to 10 and others, governed by the customary marumakkathayam law. The properties in suit, two in number, belonged to that tarwad. There was an udampady Ext. A. in the tarwad in the year 1088, by which its properties were grouped in four schedules, schedule A comprising properties allotted to Krishnan, and schedules B, C, and D comprising properties allotted to the three tavazhies of the tarwad represented by his three sisters, the plaintiffs and defendants 5 to 10 being the members of the tavazhi which took the properties in schedule D. The suit properties are among those allotted to Krishnan for maintenance, subject to the provision, that on his death they would be taken by the tavazhies. Pursuant to -a power conferred by Ext. A Krishnan gave a mortgage Ext. III for item 1 of the suit properties in the year 1109, for Rs. 98/-. On the 18th Medom, 1116, the adult members of the tarwad gave Ext. B in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and of the deceased father of defendants 3 and 4, for the suit properties and another property, for Rs. 1034/-, of which Rs. 144/- was paid to one of the members of the tarwad, Rs. 98/- was reserved for redemption of Ext. III, and Rs. 792/- was reserved for the payment of Rs. 264/- to each tavazhi for acquisition of properties with the stipulation, that interest at 3% per annum on the amount reserved for each tavazhi shall be paid to Krishnan until acquisition of properties, when the properties, themselves shall be taken possession of by Krishnan for maintenance. On the same day, affirming Ext. B, and excluding the properties sold thereby, the adult members of the tarwad also entered into a partition deed Ext. I, dividing its properties between the tavazhies absolutely. In pursuance of Ext. B, the vendees redeemed Ext. III, and paid the amounts reserved for the other two tavazhies, and a sum of Rs. 51/- to the 5th defendant out of the amount reserved for plaintiff's tavazhi and also paid a sum of Rs. 52/- odd to Krishnan by way of interest on the amount reserved. Alleging that Ext. In pursuance of Ext. B, the vendees redeemed Ext. III, and paid the amounts reserved for the other two tavazhies, and a sum of Rs. 51/- to the 5th defendant out of the amount reserved for plaintiff's tavazhi and also paid a sum of Rs. 52/- odd to Krishnan by way of interest on the amount reserved. Alleging that Ext. B is lacking in consideration and necessity, and on the footing that the tarwad has become divided into three tavazhies, the plaintiffs have sued to cancel Ext. B to the extent of the 1/3 share of their tavazhi in the suit properties. The 4th defendant contested the suit. The court of first instance holding Ext. B to be supported by consideration and necessity dismissed the suit, and the appellate court finding it to be unsupported by consideration so far as the plaintiff's share was concerned except to the extent of Rs. 98/- decreed the suit, for partition and recovery of the 1/3 share on payment of Rs. 32.66 and the value of improvements. 2. The first contention of learned counsel for the 4th defendant was, that Exts. B and Ext. I must be considered to be parts of a family arrangement entered into by all the adult members of the tarwad on that day, and so Ext.B must be viewed differently from a sale deed simpliciter by the members of a tarwad untrammelled by any of the statutory provisions applicable to certain communities governed by marumakkathayam law. Though it cannot be said that the courts below have viewed the case in this perspective, this approach seems justified by the averments in Para.9 to 11,17 and 25 of the written statement of the 4th defendant and the provisions of Exts. B and I and cannot be ruled out. 3. The provisions of Ext. A could not necessarily lead to the inference that the tarwad became divided thereby; it was nothing more than an allotment for maintenance. Nevertheless, as recited in Ext. I, one of the tavazhies purported to sever itself from the tarwad by an udampady No. 507 of 1115, quite contrary to the provision in Ext. A, which required that no such arrangement ought to be made except with the junction of all the members of the tarwad. Clearly this act of secession as it were, of that tavazhi was against the spirit and provisions of Ext. A, which required that no such arrangement ought to be made except with the junction of all the members of the tarwad. Clearly this act of secession as it were, of that tavazhi was against the spirit and provisions of Ext. A. As for Krishnan's right of maintenance, it was stated in Ext. B, that the suit properties did not yield sufficient income. Exts. B and I must be viewed against the above background. The object of Exts. Band I, so far as the tarwad was concerned, was to make other suitable provisions for Krishnan's maintenance and to avoid any dispute between the tavazhies which may arise as a result of the unilateral udampady of 1115, by superseding it with common consent and without loss of time, by a partition of the tarwad itself into the three tavazhies. On the above premises it is obvious, that Exts. B and I were inextricably connected and were parts of the same transaction, which undoubtedly was in the nature of a family arrangement. Perhaps the arrangements under Exts. B and I might well have formed one document, executed and registered as such. It appears to me that there is nothing objectionable in the creation of subsidiary interests within the frame work of a family arrangement, not necessarily between the family members, if the object of that arrangement rendered it necessary. As an instance, the case in Krishnan Velu v. Narayanan Velu (25 T. L. J. 1183) may be referred to, in which, as part of a family arrangement, two gift deeds were executed in favour of strangers to the tarwad, the validity of which was upheld. 4. A family arrangement is an arrangement made for the benefit of the family and entered into by the family, one of the objects of which is the avoidance of disputes or litigations or the settlement of doubtful claims. "The entire object of the family arrangement is to resolve or settle either some doubtful or disputed rights, either existing or likely to arise or for the maintenance of peace and harmony and preservation of the property." See Tarkeshwar Prasad v. Nanhku Prasad Singh (A.. I. R.1959 Patna 523). It is not necessary for the validity of a family arrangement, that a dispute should already have commenced. I. R.1959 Patna 523). It is not necessary for the validity of a family arrangement, that a dispute should already have commenced. The law governing family arrangements is stated thus in 17 Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, page 216, Art.357: "Family arrangements are governed by principles which are not applicable to dealings between strangers. The court, when deciding the rights of parties under family arrangements or claims to upset such arrangements, considers what in the broadest view of the matter is most for the interest of families, and has regard to considerations which, in dealing with transactions between persons not members of the same family, would not be taken into account. Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements." It seems to me that it was on this principle, that the gift deeds to strangers were upheld in Krishnan Velu v. Narayanan Velu (25 T. L. J. 1183) cited above. As held in Rajavarma Thampan v. Mathai (1955 K. L. T. 265) it is open to the minor members to prove that the arrangement was the result of some fraud or that the arrangement was so detrimental to the interests of the tarwad. I do not think this has been proved. That the price fetched under Ext. B was adequate at that time of the day, has been found by the first court and cannot be doubted; that the garden part was not quite yielding is apparent from Ext. A itself. But the 4th defendant, who now stands in the place of the vendees and contests the suit has to fulfil the obligation undertaken by them in Ext. B, by paying the consideration reserved with them. A sum of Rs. 51/-was paid to the 5th defendant, but this was of no avail, being no payment for acquisition of properties. It may be, that the balance was not paid because the plaintiffs were not minded to receive it, but that did not preclude the vendees from making a tender, which it was their duty to make and as to which there is no satisfactory proof. The validity of Ext. It may be, that the balance was not paid because the plaintiffs were not minded to receive it, but that did not preclude the vendees from making a tender, which it was their duty to make and as to which there is no satisfactory proof. The validity of Ext. B is subject to the performance on the part of the vendees, of their obligation to make this payment with interest at the rate prescribed for payment to Krishnan and this, the 4th defendant has in any case to be directed to fulfil, as condition precedent to a decree in his favour. Krishnan died on the 20th Kanni, 1119. If the amount still remaining unpaid is not paid, it would result in gross detriment to the plaintiffs. 5. If the validity of Ext. B depends on the simple issue as to consideration and necessity, it has to be held, for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, that it was supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 51/- and unsupported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 213/-; the vendees had atleast a duty to call upon the vendors to acquire property and in the event of such acquisition to make payment. Necessity has to be judged with reference to that of the tarwad which gave Ext. B, though the plaintiffs are competent to impeach it only to the extent of their interest in consequence of their divided status.. However that be, even the payment of Rs. 51/- was not supported by necessity. As observed by me, the validity of Ext. B has to be judged on considerations adverted to earlier in this judgment; so judged, Ext. B has to be held to be valid and binding, subject to the condition to be imposed presently. 6. The result is, that on deposit by the 4th defendant in the court of first instance, the sum of Rs. B has to be judged on considerations adverted to earlier in this judgment; so judged, Ext. B has to be held to be valid and binding, subject to the condition to be imposed presently. 6. The result is, that on deposit by the 4th defendant in the court of first instance, the sum of Rs. 264, - with interest at 3 per cent per annum for 12 years preceding the date of suit and at the same rate up to the date of deposit for payment to the plaintiffs, the decree of the appellate court shall stand set aside and the decree of the first court shall stand restored and this second appeal shall stand allowed, without costs in this and the lower appellate courts; on default in making the deposit as aforesaid, this second appeal shall stand dismissed with costs. The second appeal is disposed of as above. Leave to appeal prayed for; leave granted.