MEHROTRA, C. J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Subordi­nate Judge, Lower Assam Districts at Gauhati on appeal against the decision of the Sadar Munsiff, Shillong. (2) Briefly the facts are that the plaintiff respon­dent brought a suit in the court of the Munsiff, 6hillong under section 77 of the Indian Registration Act (herein­after called 'the Act') for a direction that the document be registered. One Ka Klitibon Myrthong of Laban, Shillong was the absolute owner of a certain immoveable property described in the plaint. On the 24th Oc­tober 1956, she is alleged to have executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, the sale consideration of the property described in the plaint being Rs. 19,000/-. Ka Klitibon Myrthong could not present the sale deed for registration personally within the prescribed period! of four months. She died on the 27th February, 1957. On the 6th May 1957 the deed was presented by the piaintiff for registration before the Sub-Registrar, Shillong. The document was accepted on payment of requisite fee and penalty. The Sub-Registrar then issued notice to the various parties. Two out of the three heirs of Ka Klitibon Myrthong, namely Ka Emo and Ka Nasilda Mar-thane -defendants 2 and 3 admitted the due execution of the document by the deceased. But Ka Plinis Myrthong defendant No. 1 denied the execution of the document. The case was then referred by the Sub-Registrar to the District Registrar, who by his order dated 27th December, 1957 refused to register the sale deed. On refusal of the District Registrar to register the sale deed, the plaintiff brought the present suit for the reliefs already refer­red to in this judgment. (3) The defence taken was that Ka Klitibon Myr­thong herself is not the absolute owner of the property in suit and she had no right of alienation of the aforesaid property, as it was the ancestral property of the clan. The execution of the deed by Ka Klitibon Myrthong was also denied. The plea of fraud was also taken up by the defendant. (4) Both the courts below decreed the suit. The finding of the lower appellate court is that the docu­ment was duly executed by the deceased. The execution of the deed by Ka Klitibon Myrthong was also denied. The plea of fraud was also taken up by the defendant. (4) Both the courts below decreed the suit. The finding of the lower appellate court is that the docu­ment was duly executed by the deceased. As to the right of the deceased to execute the deed and the ques­tion of fraud, the court below observed that the title of the executrix to the property could not be inquired Into in a suit under section 77 of the Act. (5) In appeal before us it is conceded that th9 finding of the court below that the deceased duly execu­ted the document is a finding of fact and cannot b» challenged in the second appeal. It is also admitted; that the question as to whether the deceased had tills to the property and was competent to execute the sale deed could not be raised in the suit under section 77 of the Act. (6) Three points, however, have been urged. Firstly it is contended that under section 35 of the Act, once the execution is denied, the Registrar is not com­petent to register the deed and as the Registrar himself was not competent to register the deed the court in a suit under section 77 of the Act could also not direct the registration of the document. The court in a suit under section 77 of the Act cannot have higher power than that of the Registrar. It is in effect an appeal on the order of the Registrar refusing to register a document. Second­ly it is contended that no proper court fee was paid and the valuation of the suit was arbitrarily put at Rs. 100/- though the valuation of the suit should have been Rs. 19000/-, the consideration of the sale deed. If the proper valuation had been put in the plaint the Munsiff could not try the suit and the proper court to try the suit is the Subordinate Judge. 100/- though the valuation of the suit should have been Rs. 19000/-, the consideration of the sale deed. If the proper valuation had been put in the plaint the Munsiff could not try the suit and the proper court to try the suit is the Subordinate Judge. Lastly it is urged that the property being situate at Laban, Shillong which is that part of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills District which is known as the Administered Area of Shillong and the sale dead having been executed within that area, the Sub-Registrar of Shilloag had no jurisdiction to register the sale dead and as the Sub-Registrar Shillong had no jurisdiction to register the sale deed, the Munsiff, Shillong is not com­petent to entertain the suit under section 77 of the Act. (7) The relevant provision of section 35 of the Act is as follows:- "35. (3) (a) If any person by whom the document purports to be executed denies its execution, or (b) If any such person appears to the regis­tering officer to be a minor, an idiot or a lunatic, or (c) If any person by whom the document purport to be executed is dead, and his representative or assign denies its execution, the registering officer shall refuse to register the document as to the person so denying, appearing or dead : Provided that, where such officer is a Registrar, he shall follow the procedure prescribed in Part XII:" Section 72 of the Act provides for an appeal to the Registrar from orders of Sub-Registrar refusing registra­tion on ground other than denial of execution. Section 73 provides for making an application to the Registrar by any party aggrieved when the Sub-Registrar refuses to register on the ground of denial of execution. When an application is made under Section 73 the procedure which the Registrar has to follow is given in Section 74. Section 74 provides: "74. Section 73 provides for making an application to the Registrar by any party aggrieved when the Sub-Registrar refuses to register on the ground of denial of execution. When an application is made under Section 73 the procedure which the Registrar has to follow is given in Section 74. Section 74 provides: "74. In such case, and also where such denial as aforesaid is made before a Registrar in respect of a document presented for registration to him, the Registrar shall, as soon as conveniently may be, enquire- (a) whether the document has been executed; (b) whether the requirements of the law for the time being in force have been complied with on the part of the applicant or person presenting the document for registration, as the case may be, so as to entitle the document to registration." Section 74 clearly lays down the ambit and scope of the Registrar's power both in cases where an application is made under section 73 to him on the refusal of the Sub-Registrar to register a document on the ground of the denial of the execution and also when the denial is made before the Registrar himself. Reading section 35 and section 74 together, it will be clear that section 35 9 a complete bar to the Sub-Registrar registering the docu­ment if the execution has been denied by the heirs of the deceased executants. But there is no such restriction to the powers of the Registrar when an application Is made to him under S. 73 and also when the denial is made before him, as according to section 35 it­self if the denial is made before a Registrar, lie has to follow the procedure laid down in part XII. The denial of execution before the Sub-Registrar gives the party aggrieved a right to approach the Registrar. If the denial itself was a complete bar to the registration of a document, then there was no question of giving any power to the Registrar either when the denial is made before him or when an application is made before Km under (section 73 to inquire about the due execution of the document. If the denial itself was a complete bar to the registration of a document, then there was no question of giving any power to the Registrar either when the denial is made before him or when an application is made before Km under (section 73 to inquire about the due execution of the document. The powers of the Registrar in case of denial before him are also embodied in section 74 and the only two things which the Registrar is to inquire into under these circumstances are whether the document has been duly executed and whether the requirements of the .law have been complied with on the part of the petitioner or person presenting the document for regis­tration. Section 75 (1) lays down that if the Registrar finds that the document has been executed and that the said requirements have been complied with, he _ shall order the document to be registered. On the finding that the document has been duly executed and the re­quirements of law have been complied with, the Regis­trar is bound to register the document. Under section 76 in case of refusal the Registrar has to prepare an order of refusal end thereupon under sec­tion 77 a right is given to the party to file a suit. In a suit under section 77, it cannot be doubted that the power of civil court cannot be larger than that of the Registrar and if under section 75 on the finding that the document was duly executed and the requirements have been complied with, the Registrar could not refuse registration, the court under section 77 cannot refuse registration on similar findings. As I have already indi­cated, section 35 does not debar the Registrar from re­gistering the document on the denial of the heirs of the executant. Unless it can be said that S. 35 is a complete bar to the Registrar registering the document, the execution of which has been denied by the represen­tative, it cannot be said that the court can also refuse registration as soon as the court finds that the execution has been denied. (8) Reliance is placed on rule 71 of the rules fram­ed under the Indian Registration Act. (8) Reliance is placed on rule 71 of the rules fram­ed under the Indian Registration Act. This rule provides: "If some of the heirs of a deceased executant ad­mit execution and the others do not appear, or, having appeared, do not admit execution of a document, registra­tion thereof shall be refused." This rule in the context lays down the power of the regis­tering officer, but cannot override the provisions of the Act. This rule only embodies the provisions of sec­tion 35 and cannot go beyond that section. (9) At this stage it will be convenient to refer to some of the authorities cited by the counsel for the appellant. (10) Reliance is placed on the case of 'Abdul Aziz Khan v. Mt. Kaniz Fatima, AIR 1933 All 302. The case arose out of a suit between the plaintiff-respondents for possession of a half share of the property which they claimed as the heir of their father, mother and deceased brother and for a declaration that the deed of wakf alleged to have been executed by their deceased father was not genuine and was not executed by him. In the appeal the main question was whether the wakf deed was a genuine document and was executed by their father. The finding of the High Court in first appeal was that the wakfnama must fail on three grounds, namely (1) that the execution was not proved, (2) that it was not properly registered and (3) that it does not bear any signature or thumb impression of the alleged executant. The question thus which the High Court considered in this case was the due execution and the genuineness of the document and in considering the question of due execution, the improper registration was also taken into consideration. Hut this case does not lay down that in a suit under Section 77 once the court finds that the execution is denied, it has no power to order registration even though it finds due execution of the document proved. (11) The next case is Mahaliram Singhanla v. Upendra Nath Pande, AIR 1960 Pat 470 . This case arose out of art application for a direction to the Sub-Registrar to pass an order refusing the registration. The document was presented for registration, the executant was dead and some of the representatives denied the execution. (11) The next case is Mahaliram Singhanla v. Upendra Nath Pande, AIR 1960 Pat 470 . This case arose out of art application for a direction to the Sub-Registrar to pass an order refusing the registration. The document was presented for registration, the executant was dead and some of the representatives denied the execution. The Sub-Registrar, however, postponed passing orders till the valuation of the document was inquired into by the Deputy Magistrate. It was against this order that a number of petitions were tiled before the High Court, the High Court held that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to inquire into the correct valuation of the property which was the subject matter of the transaction. The High Court further held that once the execution was denied by the representative of the deceased executant, the Sub-Registrar was bound to refuse registration and thus a direction was Issued to the Sub-Registrar to pass an order refusing the registration. This case also does not decide the question of the power of the civil court in a suit brought under section 77 of the Act and that sec­tion 35 is a complete bar to the court ordering registration as soon as the execution is denied by the heirs of the deceased executant. (12) In the case of Saiyed Matimud v. Mu'hamimd Zubair' IIR 31 All 523 in a suit under section 77 of the Registration Act, the registration was refused on the ground that the document contained no description of the property. Section 21 of the Registration Act is obliga­tory and it lays down that no document which does not contain sufficient description of property can be accepted for registration. (13) Reliance is then placed on the case of S. Suravyya v. K. Kondamma AIR 1950 Mad 239 . In this case the executant stated that she had affixed her thumb impression to a blank paper, in order to enable the plain­tiff's husband to file a petition before the Tahsildar to get the contribution to the War Fund reduced and it was held that this constitutes a denial of execution of the document and not an admission of execution. The registering authority had refused to register the deed on the ground of denial and the contention was that it constituted an admission of execution and thus the regis­tering authority was bound to register it. This conten­tion was negatived. The registering authority had refused to register the deed on the ground of denial and the contention was that it constituted an admission of execution and thus the regis­tering authority was bound to register it. This conten­tion was negatived. In this case reference was made to the case of Ramaswami Chettiar v. Srinivasa Pill.al AIR 1934 Mad 113 and it was observed as follows: "It was a case in which the execution of the docu­ment was admitted and no difficulty arose regarding its registration. The learned Judges pointed out that Ihe jurisdiction of the Court under S. 77 being analogous to that of the Registrar functioning under the Registra­tion Act, it was not open to the Court to go into those questions and it should confine its attention only to the question of the execution of the document. No excep­tion can to taken to this judgment and we do not think that that decision throws any light or supports the con­tention of the appellant." These observations show that the jurisdiction of the courts under section 77 of the Act is analogous to that of the Registrar and if the Registrar cannot refuse the registration on the mere denial of the execution but has to order registration on the finding that it was duly execu­ted, then the court cannot have greater power than that of the Registrar. (14) The next case referred to is Purna Chandra v. Kiran Bala AIR 1948 Cal 53. This case has been cited by both the parties. What it lays down is that in 'effect the civil suit filed under section 77 of the Act Is of the nature of an appeal against the decision of the registration authorities. The section does not merely give an abstract right of suit on the happening of certain events: it provides for a further stage of proceedings, of which the previous course has been dealt with by the previous sections. No objection can be taken to this proposition. But the only question is whether the Registrar himself was bound to refuse the registration only if the execution has been denied. (15) Mr. Goswami for the respondent refers to the case of Abdul Gafur v. Badial Hague, AIR 1932 Cal 588. This case does not go beyond the express language of section 74 of the Act. But the only question is whether the Registrar himself was bound to refuse the registration only if the execution has been denied. (15) Mr. Goswami for the respondent refers to the case of Abdul Gafur v. Badial Hague, AIR 1932 Cal 588. This case does not go beyond the express language of section 74 of the Act. In a suit under section 77 the court has the power analogous to that of the Registrar and under section 74 the registrar has firstly to inquire whether the document has been executed and secondly to inquire whether certain requirements of the law as to presentation for registration in due time to the pro­per office and in the manner generally prescribed by the Registration Act have been complied with by the person, presenting the document for registration. In such a suit the court is not competent to go into the validity of the document. (16) The next case referred to is Krishnaswaml Naicker v. Walla Gounder AIR 1945 Mad 309 wherein it has been laid down that section 74 (a) of the Act gives greater power to the District Registrar than to the Sub-Registrar. The Sub-Registrar cannot register a docu­ment if a party denies execution, while the District Registrar can do so. (17) In my opinion, therefore, it cannot be said that because one of the heirs denied the execution, the Registrar was not competent to register it even though the finding is that the document was duly executed, and if Section 35 of the Act is no bar to the Registrar inquiring into the question of due execution, ten court in a suit under S. 77 can inquire into the due execution of the docu­ment and grant a decree to the plaintiff. Section 35 does not debar the court from refusing a decree (sic) to the plaintiff If he had succeeded in pro­ving that the document has been duly executed. (18) The next point urged is that the suit should have been valued on the consideration of the sale deed. The point was never taken before any of the courts below. Under Sec. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, the point about the undervaluation of the suit has to be raised at the first instance. Mr. (18) The next point urged is that the suit should have been valued on the consideration of the sale deed. The point was never taken before any of the courts below. Under Sec. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, the point about the undervaluation of the suit has to be raised at the first instance. Mr. Lahiri contends that on the allegations made in the plaint and on admitted facts the suit was undervalued and this court can in second appeal go into that question. In the case of 'Kiran Singh v. Chamart I'aswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 it was held that the words unless the over-valuation, or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits' must be directly attributable to over-valua­tion or under-valuation and an error in a finding of fact reached on a consideration of the evidence cannot possi­bly be said to have been caused by over-valuation, or tinder valuation. Reliance is placed by the counsel for the appellant in the case of 'Rajalakshmi Dassee v. Katyayani Dassee' ILR 38 Cal 639. That was a case where the suit was intentionally undervalued and if the suit had been pro­perly valued, the appeal would have been filed before the High Court and as a consequence of the under-valua­tion the appeal was filed before the District Judge who decided the appeal. It was held that if the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation, its judgments and orders are mere nullities and not only voidable but void. We do not think that the point can be allowed to be raised at this stage as no prejudice has been caused to the appellant. The argument of the coun­sel for the appellant that on the face of it the suit was under-valued, cannot be accepted. (19) The last point urged was that as the property is situate within the administered area of Shiilong, the District Registrar of Shiilong had no jurisdiction to re­gister the document. This question was never raised be- fore the courts below and unless the different notifica­tions were examined, it cannot to said on the face of it that the District Registrar, Shillong had no jurisdiction to register the document. If the point had been raised be­fore the courts below, the matter would have been exa­mined by the courts. This question was never raised be- fore the courts below and unless the different notifica­tions were examined, it cannot to said on the face of it that the District Registrar, Shillong had no jurisdiction to register the document. If the point had been raised be­fore the courts below, the matter would have been exa­mined by the courts. The document was presented to the Registrar whose office is located within the jurisdiction of the Munsiff of Shillong and under Sec. 77 of the Act it Is only the Munsiff of Shillong who was thus competent to entertain the suit. It is not denied by the appellant that the office of the Registrar before whom the docu­ment was presented for registration, is situate within the Jurisdiction of the Munsiff and thus if the plaintiff asks for a direction to the Registrar of Shillong, the only court which was competent to try the suit was the Munsiffs court of Shillong. If ultimately the document is registered by the authority which has no jurisdiction, such a docu­ment may be a nullity. But the point not having been taken in the courts below, at this stage the appellant cannot be allowed to raise that point. In effect the argument of the appellant is that the order of the Registrar re­fusing registration can be supported also on the ground that the Registrar will have no jurisdiction to register it and this court in a suit under Sec. 77 of the Act will not direct the Registrar to do a thing which he is not competent to do. The decision on this question will depend upon the decision as to whether the Registrar of Shillong was or was not competent to register the document. This being a. mixed question of law and fact, cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage. In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed with cost. Appeal dismissed.