JUDGMENT J. Sahai, J. - In these special appeals the same questions of law and fact arise. They have been heard together and we are disposing them of by a common judgment. 2. The holding in respect of which there is a dispute between the parties was jointly held by Khurchan Khan, Mukki Khan and Sabit Ali Khan, father of Qamruddin, Badruddin, Shaukat and Hoshildar, the plaintiff-appellants. Some time in the year 1937 or 1938 a suit for partition under Section 37 of the Agra Tenancy Act was filed by Khurchan Khan. The preliminary decree was passed on 21.12.1938 and the final one on 30.3.1939.The plots were divided in three sets-one going to Khurchan Khan, the other to the father of the plaintiff-appellants Sabit Ali Khan and the third to Mukki Khan. The zamindars were parties to the suit but they expressed their unwillingness to be bound by the partition and, therefore, in the decree passed there was a note to the effect that so far as the zamindars were concerned, they were not bound by the decree. After the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the `Act') came into force, Khurchan Khan deposited ten times the rent and became Bhumidhar of the land in his possession i.e., the ?rd of the entire holding. Mukki Khan also did the same thing. Later on Khurchan Khan and Mukki khan transferred their rights to the defendants first set i.e., Pakhandi Khan, Badrulduza, Iqbal Ahmad and Mst. Ghurani. The plaintiff-appellants thereupon filed the two suits giving rise to these special appeals, inter alia, on the ground that the holding being a joint one Khurchan Khan and Mukki Khan could not acquire sole Bhumidhari rights and in any case not in respect of their ?rd shares and, therefore, the transfers made by them were not effective as against other co-sharers i.e., the plaintiff-appellant. They claimed a declaration that those transfer deeds were void. The defence, inter alia, was that there was a division under the provisions of Section 37 of the Agra Tenancy Act, that Khurchan Khan and Mukki Khan remained in exclusive possession of the plots coming to their shares in the partition and that as a consequence of the final decree passed there was no longer co-tenancy between the co-tenants inter se though as against the landlords the partition was not binding. The learned Munsif granted the declaration and decreed both the suits. The lower appellate court reversed both the decrees on the finding that there was a partition in fact between the co-tenants inter se and that each one of the co-tenants who had separated was entitled to deposit ten times the rent of his share and to become the Bhumidhar of the plots coming to his share in the partition. Dissatisfied with the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge in appeal, the appellants filed second appeals in this Court which were dismissed by V.D. Bhargava, J., on 15.1.1959. It is against those decrees that the instant special appeals have been filed. 3. The simple question that requires our consideration is whether under the provisions of Section 134 of the Act, Khurchan Khan and Mukki Khan could have deposited ten times the rent payable in respect of their share in the holding or the plots assigned to them in the partition and thereby have acquired Bhumidhari rights. Section 134 of the Act, so far as relevant for our purposes, reads:- "134(1). If a sirdar belonging to the class mentioned in Clause (a) of Section 131 pays or offers to pay to the credit of the State Government an amount equal to ten times the land revenue payable or deemed to be payable on the date of application for the land of which he is the sirdar, he shall, upon an application duly made in that behalf to an Assistant Collector, be entitled, with effect from the date on which the amount has been deposited, to a declaration that he has acquired the rights mentioned in Section 137 in respect of such land: *** Explanation I.- In this sub-section "land" includes share in land. Explanation II - For the purpose of this section the land revenue payable shall- (a) in respect of land referred to in the proviso to Clause (a) of sub-Section (1) of the Section 246, be an amount arrive at after all the increases have been given effect to; and (b) in respect of land to which the proviso to Section 247, applies, be an amount determined at hereditary rates under that section." 4. Mr. P.M. Verma, learned counsel for the appellants has invited our attention to Clause (26) of Section 3 of the Act which reads:- "(26). Mr. P.M. Verma, learned counsel for the appellants has invited our attention to Clause (26) of Section 3 of the Act which reads:- "(26). Words and expressions land-holder, permanent tenure-holder, the kedar, permanent lessee in Avadh, grove, grove-holder, rent, cess, sayar, sir, tenant, hereditary tenant, khudkasht, fixed-rate tenant, rent-free grantee, ex-proprietary tenant, occupancy-tenant, non-occupancy tenant, sub-tenant, holding and crops, not defined in this Act, and used in the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, shall have the meaning assigned to them in that Act;" 5. Section 3 Clause (7) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, defines a holding and reads:- "(7). "Holding" means a parcel or parcels of land held under one lease, engagement or grant, or in the absence of such lease, engagement or grant under one tenure and in the case of a thekedar includes the theka area;" Mr. Verma contends that the word "land" as used in Section 134 of the Act has been used in the sense of "holding" and that inasmuch as the "holding" means a parcel or parcels of land held under one lease, engagement or grant, and since the zamindars did not accept the partition, the word "holding" in Section 3 of the Tenancy Act and the word "land" in the Act would mean the entire land and not the partitioned unit of each co-tenant. To show what the word "land" means Mr. Verma places reliance upon Section 19 of the Act which provides:- "19. To show what the word "land" means Mr. Verma places reliance upon Section 19 of the Act which provides:- "19. All land held or deemed to have been held on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting by any person as- (i) a tenant holding on special terms in Avadh, (ii) an ex-proprietary tenant, (iii) an occupancy tenant, (iv) a hereditary tenant, (v) a grantee at favourable rate of rent, (vi) a non-occupancy tenant of tea estates notified as such in a notification issued under sub-Section (5) of Section 30 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, (vii) a sub-tenant-referred to in sub-Section (4) of Section 47 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, and (ix) all land referred to in Section 17 held on the said date by any person on Patta Dawami or Istamrari, shall, save in cases provided for in Clause (d) of sub-Section (1) of Section 18, be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such person, who shall subject to the provisions of this Act, be entitled, except as provided in sub-Section (2) of Section 18, to take or retain possession as a sirdar thereof." Mr. Verma contends that the use of the word "held" occurring in Section 19 of the Act shows that the word "land" has been used in the sense of "holding". We are unable to agree. All land in the occupation of a person in the capacity of a tenant is said to be "held by him" and it is not proper to confuse the word "held" as occurring in Section 19 of the Act with the word "holding" as defined in the Tenant Act. Consequently, the chain in the argument of Mr. Verma has broken as Section 19 of the Act does not provide the required link. That "land" should not be confused with "holding" would be apparent from the following circumstances: 6. Firstly, if the legislature intended to use the word "land" in the sense of "holding" as defined in the Tenancy Act, it would have said "holding" and not "land", and, secondly, Explanation I to Section 134 provides that in sub-Section (1) of Section 134 "land" includes share in the land. Consequently, the word "land" has been used not as a synonym for "holding" but to distinguish it from "holding" in the technical sense in which it is used the Tenancy Act. Consequently, the word "land" has been used not as a synonym for "holding" but to distinguish it from "holding" in the technical sense in which it is used the Tenancy Act. The use of the words "deemed to be payable" in Section 134 of the Act would also clearly suggest that the idea was not to use the word "land" in the sense of "holding" because if that was so, the expression ten times the "land revenue payable" alone would have been used and there would have been no necessity of the word "deemed". The legislature has deliberately used two expressions (1) "land revenue payable" and (2) "deemed to be payable." The expression "deemed to be payable" has obviously been used in order to meet cases where there was an actual division of the holding but the rent had not been spitted up. Consequently, we are of the opinion that Khurchan Khan and Mukki Khan were entitled to deposit ten times the amount of land revenue due in respect of plots assigned to them in the partition and held by them separately. 7. For the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion that the submissions made by Mr. Verma are without any force. We, therefore, affirm the decrees passed by the learned Single Judge and dismiss these appeals with costs.