JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a tenant's second appeal from the concurrent decisions of the courts below decreeing the landlord's suit for his ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent from him. The facts are these. The defendant appellant Charanjit Singh is the tenant of an accommodation in Bareilly in which he carries on business under the name and style of Messrs 'Military Stores and of which the plaintiff respondent Ram Lal Kohli is the owner and landlord. The agreed rent is Rs. 35/- per month. Tile plaintiff alleged in his plaint that the appellant Charanjit Singh had taken the shop on rent on 15th November 1959 on monthly tenancy and paid the rent till December 1959, but nothing after that date; that on 22-3-1961 he served a notice on the appellant demanding payment of the arrears of rent but the latter made no payment; that on 8-5-1961 the plaintiff served another notice demanding payment of rent and simultaneously terminating the tenancy and asking the appellant to vacate the accommodation within one month; that the appellant neither paid the rent nor vacated the accommodation; hence the suit for his ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent from him. 2. The appellant resisted the suit and denied that he had committed any default in payment of rent. He alleged that rent had regularly been paid to the plaintiff. During the trial of the suit the appellant conceded that the accommodation ill; dispute was not governed by the pro. visions of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 3. During the hearing the defendant led evidence to prove that he had paid the arrears of rent to the plaintiffs wife. He gave evidence himself and produced one or two witnesses who deposed that the wife visited the shop regularly and received payment from the appellant in their presence. The plaintiff objected to this evidence on the ground that the appellant had not stated in his written statement that he had paid the rent to his wife and must not be allowed to put up a new case at the trial. The trial court upheld the objection and rejected the evidence alleging payment to the plaintiff's wife. The plaintiff objected to this evidence on the ground that the appellant had not stated in his written statement that he had paid the rent to his wife and must not be allowed to put up a new case at the trial. The trial court upheld the objection and rejected the evidence alleging payment to the plaintiff's wife. It disbelieved the appellant's story and held that he had committed default in payment of rent, and also rejected his plea that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy was invalid. On appeal the learned Civil Judge upheld the view of the trial court that the evidence disclosing payment to the wife was inadmissible. He examined this evidence on merits but did not give any clear finding whether he believed it, though his observations indicate that he was not impressed by it. He also held that the notice terminating the tenancy was valid and confirmed the decree of the trial court. The appellant Charanjit Singh has conic to this Court in second appeal. 4. Two points were urged in support of this appeal by Mr. Brijlal Gupta. First, he contended that the finding of the learned appellate Judge that the appellant had committed default in payment of rent is vitiated because he did not apply his mind to the evidence led by the defendant in support of his case that he had regularly paid rent to the landlord's wife. Learned counsel contended that this evidence was wrongly rejected on the ground that the,appellant had created a new case Which was outside his pleadings. Secondly, Mr. Gupta argued that the notice terminating the tenancy is invalid as it is conditional. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Gupta that the evidence in support of the appellant's story that he had regularly paid rent to the landlord's wife was not inadmissible. I do not agree with the view of the courts' below that the appellant was trying to create a new case during the trial. This view is based on a misapprehension of the meaning of the phrase "creating a new case." If the tenant alleges in his written statement that he has paid rent to the Landlord, that is his case, and he need not give details of the time and manner of payment. This view is based on a misapprehension of the meaning of the phrase "creating a new case." If the tenant alleges in his written statement that he has paid rent to the Landlord, that is his case, and he need not give details of the time and manner of payment. He is entitled to prove facts relating to these details. In the present case, when the appellant led evidence to prove that rent had been paid regularly to the wife, he was not creating a new case but explaining the manner and details of the payment. It would have been creating a view case, if I may give an illustration. If he had tried to prove that the landlord had purchased goods at his shop and he was entitled to adjust the price against rent. To prove the details and manner of pay-merit after pleading that payment had been made is not creating a new case. 6. If this were the only point in the case. I would have allowed this appeal and remanded the case for a clear finding on this issue by the lower appellate court. But I think a remand would not be justified for two reasons. It is riot desirable that the final decision in this case should be delayed, and secondly, the observations of the learned Civil age give some indication of his opinion of the evidence led by the defendant. I, therefore, request learned counsel to read out the entire evidence relating to the story of payment of rent by the appellant to the landlord's wife. I am inclined to endorse the attitude of the learned Judge who appears to have regarded this evidence as unreliable though he did not formally say so. This was however a technical omission and I am not inclined to disagree with his decision on this ground. The appellant brought out the story of payment to the wife for the first time when he entered the witness box. There was no mention of it in his reply to the notice sent by the landlord. In cross-examination he was unable to give any explanation for this omission though he conceded that he had informed his counsel that he had been paying rent to the wife. There was no mention of it in his reply to the notice sent by the landlord. In cross-examination he was unable to give any explanation for this omission though he conceded that he had informed his counsel that he had been paying rent to the wife. If his story had been true, his counsel would not have failed to mention in his reply to the notice the somewhat unusual manner of payment of rent through the wife. The story is an afterthought and was rightly rejected by the trial court. 7. The next question is whether the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy is invalid. Mr. Gupta's argument is that a conditional notice is not permitted under Section 106. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent did not agree that the notice in dispute was conditional. He relied on the following words (translated in English): "Your tenancy in respect of the aforesaid shall be terminated in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act," and pointed out that they contain no condition. But a notice like any other document has to be read and interpreted as a whole towards the end of the notice, the Landlord stated that if rent was not paid within one month, he would file a suit for the recovery of arrears and for the ejectment of the appellant. This implied that there would be no suit for recovery of rent or ejectment if the rent was paid within a month. It appears to me that the counsel who drafted this notice was under the impression that the accommodation was governed by the provisions of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act and, therefore, he sent the usual notice which is required under Section 3(1) (a) of that Act. I have to consider its legal effect. 8. Mr. Gupta contended that a conditional notice of this kind is not permitted under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and is ineffective. I cannot agree. That section merely states that a lease from month to month is "terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice." No particular words are prescribed. 8. Mr. Gupta contended that a conditional notice of this kind is not permitted under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and is ineffective. I cannot agree. That section merely states that a lease from month to month is "terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice." No particular words are prescribed. But it is well settled that the notice to quit should indicate with reasonable clearness and certainty an intention on the part of the person giving it to terminate the existing tenancy at a certain time. Transfer of Property Act by D. F. Mulla 4th edition, p. 619. A notice, therefore, must not be vitiated by uncertainty or vagueness with regard to the intention of the person giving it. A conditional notice is invalid only if the condition contains this element of uncertainty or vague-Hess. Mulla has cited several cases in which the notice was held to be invalid because of uncertainty or vagueness. A notice to determine a tenancy unless a tenant employs a large number of workmen, or a notice by the tenant that he will quit when he can get another situation, is bad because of this uncertainty with regard to the intention of the person giving it. Mulla appears to have thought that these cases establish that a notice under Section 106 must not be conditional. But with respect, they only lay down that it must not be uncertain or vague with regard to the intention of the person giving it. This is clear from another case cited by Mulla, Kika Bhai v. Kalu, (1898) I.L.R. 22 Bom. 241, in which a notice terminating tenancy unless the tenant within o days of the receipt of the notice creased the rent and gave a gal writing was held to be a valid notice. Thus a condition attached to the notice is not necessarily fatal to its validity. It is only the condition is of such a nature that it makes the intention of tic person giving it vague or uncertain that the notice is rendered invalid. 9. Mr. Gupta drew my attention to paragraph 1174 in Halsbury's a was of England 3rd edition volume 23 in which it is said, "A notice to quit must be clear and certain in its terms. 9. Mr. Gupta drew my attention to paragraph 1174 in Halsbury's a was of England 3rd edition volume 23 in which it is said, "A notice to quit must be clear and certain in its terms. It is bad if it is expressed so has to take effect on a contingency; such as a notice to quit given by the landlord if a breach of covenant shall be committed, or by the tenant when he can get another situation". The cases mentioned in this paragraph were not cited by learned counsel. I think that the quotation from Halsbury is consistent with the principle enunciated by me. I agree that a notice would be bad if it is to take effect on a contingency but a contingency is different from a condition which is certain and clear. For example, if the landlord writes to the tenant, "Your tenancy shall stand terminated at the end of this month if my brother returns from abroad as he will need a residence of his own", this is a contingency which makes the intention of the landlord uncertain. But if the landlord writes to the tenant, "if you do not pa y the arrears of rent with-in a month, your tenancy shall stand terminated", this is a valid notice because it terminates the tenancy subject to the right of the tenant to save it by paying the rent within a month. See Landlord and Tenant by of a, 6th edition, p. 677-78; also Wood fall's Landlord and Tenant, 12th edition, pp. 318-319. 10. The difference between a notice based on an uncertain contingency and a notice terminating the tenancy unless the tenant pays up the arrears of rent is base on principles of equity and justice. The former type of notice places the tenant in know, on the receipt of the notice, the precise fate of his tenancy and would be faced with the difficult problem of staying of finding accommodation elsewhere. But a notice terminating the tenancy unless he pays the rent does not depend upon any event or contingency out side the control of the tenant. It is entirely within his power to make the notice infructuous by promptly paying the rent. But a notice terminating the tenancy unless he pays the rent does not depend upon any event or contingency out side the control of the tenant. It is entirely within his power to make the notice infructuous by promptly paying the rent. A notice stating that the tenancy shall stand terminated unless the tenant pays arrears of rent within the prescribed period is really a proviso in the tenant's favour that it shall stand automatically waived on payment of rent. I do not see how a tenant can object to the validity of a notice which leaves nothing uncertain but gives him an option to treat the notice as waived on payment of rent. I an therefore, inclined to the view that a notice stating that the tenancy shall stand terminated if the tenant does not pay rent within one month of its receipt is valid under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 11. I would like to add that there are numerous decisions of this Court holding that a combined notice demanding rent under Section 3, (1) (a) of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act and terminating the tenancy unless the rent is paid is valid. Mr. Gupta pointed out that in all these cases the main question in issue was the validity of the notice of demand and not of the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. But even if this were so no cases were actually cited before me the fact remains that a combined notice of this nature contains a conditional notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and this Court has held such a notice to be valid. 12. No other point was urged. The appeal is dismissed with costs.