BHARGAVA J.—This is a second appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for recovery of compensation against the Union of India as representing the Northern Railway. 2. Plaintiffs case was that on first May, 1948 one consignment of a bale of cloth was booked from Ahamadabad for Jodhpur by Messrs. Bherulal Champalal under railway risk note form B. The Railway receipt for this consignment was assigned to the plaintiffs, but the railway administration failed to deliver the consignment to the plaintiff at Jodhpur Railway Station. The plaintiff thereafter preferred a claim under section 77 of the Indian Railways Act but no delivery was given and its claim after some correspondence was finally repudiated on 4th August, 1950. 3. The defendant resisted the suit and inter alia pleaded that it was barred by limitation. 4. Several issues including that of limitation were framed by the trial court. The trial court after considering the evidence of the parties decreed the plaintiffs suit holding that it was instituted within time. This finding was reversed in appeal by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Jodhpur. The learned Judge held that the goods were consigned on 1st May, 1948 and in the ordinary course the delivery ought to have been made at the latest by 1st June, 1948. Besides the railway authorities informed the plaintiff by latter dated 30th June, 1949 that as it was a case of running train theft, the plaintiffs claim for loss was inadmissible. The learned Judge further held that the letter dated 30th June, 1949 (Ex.A1) gave complete information to the plaintiff how the carrier dealt with the goods while in its possession. Therefore, the learned Judge held that the time in this case began to run if not from 1st June 1948 at least from 30th June, 1949 but in either case the suit having been filed after one year, was barred by limitation. 5. There can be no manner of doubt that the present suit is for compensation tor non-delivery of goods and the proper article of limitation applicable to such cases would be Art. 31 of the Indian Limitation Act. Under this Article, the. period of limitation begins: to run from the date on which the goods ought to have been delivered. 5. There can be no manner of doubt that the present suit is for compensation tor non-delivery of goods and the proper article of limitation applicable to such cases would be Art. 31 of the Indian Limitation Act. Under this Article, the. period of limitation begins: to run from the date on which the goods ought to have been delivered. As to What is the meaning of the words when the goods ought to be delivered there was formerly some controversy which has now been set at rest by a judgment of the Supreme Court in Boota Mal vs. Union of India (1) and it has been held that the words when the goods ought to be delivered can only mean one thing whether it is a case of late delivery or of non-delivery. Reading the words in their plain grammatical meaning, they are capable of only one interpretation, namely, that they contemplate that the time would begin to run after a reasonable period has elapsed on the expiry of which the delivery, ought to have been made and the starting point of limitation would be after reasonable time had elapsed in the carriage of goods to the place of destination and this reasonable time generally speaking cannot be affected by the subsequent conduct of the parties. If the subsequent correspondence is only about tracing the goods, that would not be material in considering the question as to when the goods ought to have been delivered. On the other hand if the correspondence discloses material which might throw light on the question of determining the reasonable time for the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination, then it may be open to the court to take into account the correspondence Judged in the light of the above observations, the present suit which was instituted on 2nd August, 1951, would be clearly out of limitation, The goods which were despatched from Ahmadabad on 1st May, 1948 ought to have been delivered at the latest as observed by the court below by 1st June, 1948. There is no correspondence in this case which may throw light on the question of determining the reasonable time for the carrying of goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination. There is no correspondence in this case which may throw light on the question of determining the reasonable time for the carrying of goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination. On the other hand the railway administration by letter dated 30th June, 1949 clearly informed the appellant that the goods were lost in a running train theft and further the railway administration was not liable for any loss occasioned as they were booked at the owners risk. 6. The contention of Mr. Johari learned counsel for the appellant however is that in order to get a decree, the appellant was not only required to show that the goods were not delivered to it but further that they were lost on account of the misconduct of the employees of the railways because the consignor had signed a risk note in form B. It is pointed out that in cases where the consignor signs risk note form B, the railway administration is bound to disclose to the consignor how the consignment was dealt with, through out it was in its possession or control and if necessary to give evidence thereof before the consignor is called upon to prove its contents. It is urged that the railway administration in the instant case supplied the above information only on 4th August, 1950 and until then the plaintiff was not in a position to allege that the loss was due to the misconduct of the railway administration or its employees and therefore the cause of action for instituting the present suit only became completed on the receipt of the above information on 4th August, 1950 from which date the suit was filed within time. In support of the above contention, learned counsel has referred to Surat Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills, Ltd. vs. Secretary of State (2), Dwijendra Narain Roy vs. Joges Chandra De(3), Ram Ranbijay Prasad Singh vs. Mt. Bachia Kauri (4), and India Trades Corporation vs. Union of India, (5). In the first case the Privy Council observed that the obligation to disclose to the consignor how the consignment was dealt with arises at once upon the occurrence of either of cases (a) or (b), and is not confined to the stage of litigation. Bachia Kauri (4), and India Trades Corporation vs. Union of India, (5). In the first case the Privy Council observed that the obligation to disclose to the consignor how the consignment was dealt with arises at once upon the occurrence of either of cases (a) or (b), and is not confined to the stage of litigation. There the railway company failed to submit the evidence of the guard which was a breach of its contractual obligation to give the evidence necessary for disclosure of how the consignment was dealt with. It was therefore, held that: "The court was entitled to presume in terms of S. 114(g), that the guards evidence if produced would have been unfavourable to the Railway company and that, in consequence, misconduct by complicity in the theft, of some servants of the company, might fairly be inferred from the companys evidence. This case only explains the obligation of the railway administration to disclose how the consignment was dealt with both before the institution of the suit as well as after it during the course of litigation and in case it is not done the court is empowered to draw adverse inference against the railway administration. The other cases referred to by the learned counsel only say with reference to the particular facts of those cases as to when the cause of action accrued in those cases. No decision having a direct bearing on the question raised has been cited to me. The question, therefore, is whether in cases where the consignor signs a risk note in form B the period of limitation begins to run only after the railway administration gives information how the consignment was dealt with throughout the time it was in its possession. Section 72 defines the responsibility of the railway administration as a carrier of animals and goods and says that "the responsibility of the railway administration for the loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods delivered to the administration to be carried by railway shall, subject to the other provisions of this Act, be that of a bailee under sections 151, 152 and 161 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872." Formerly risk notes were signed under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 72 which has now been repealed. Sub-section (2) provided the execution of special agreement whereby the responsibility of the railway administration was limited. Sub-section (2) provided the execution of special agreement whereby the responsibility of the railway administration was limited. Risk note in form B contained terms of special agreement whereby the consignor paying a lower rate than he would otherwise be bound to pay in consideration of such lower charge agreed and undertook to hold the railway company harmless and free from all responsibility for any loss, destruction or deterioration of or damage to the goods. In other words signing of a risk note in form B by the consignor relieved the railway administration for loss except on proof of mis-conduct of their servants. But this immunity was subject to this condition that in case of non-delivery of the whole or part of the consignment they were bound to give evidence how the consignment was dealt with throughout the time it was in its possession or control. If the railway administration failed to discharge the above obligation it is open to the Courts to infer even in the absence of proof that loss was caused by the misconduct of their servants. In the absence of a risk note the liability of a railway is governed by sections 151 and 152 of the Contract Act. Risk note is a special agreement under sub-section (2) of section 72 Railways Act and gives rise to independent rights and obligations namely immunity of the railway administration for the loss in the absence of proof of misconduct by its servants, and the right of the consignor to ask for information as to how the consignment was dealt with and on the railway administration to supply such information to hold the railway administration liable for the loss. But it does not mean that on the non-delivery of goods within a reasonable time no cause of action accrues to a consignor for an action against the railway administration. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant frankly admits that if there had been no risk note in form B in the present case his case would have been fully covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court. It is only because of risk note in form B that the learned counsel contends that the cause of action was not complete until the railway administration gave information as to how the consignment was dealt with throughout the time it was in possession or control of the railway. 8. It is only because of risk note in form B that the learned counsel contends that the cause of action was not complete until the railway administration gave information as to how the consignment was dealt with throughout the time it was in possession or control of the railway. 8. In my view the contention is not tenable. The period of limitation under Art. 31 begins to run from the time the goods ought to be delivered which means the reasonable time within which the goods ought to have been delivered and the running of time cannot remain suspended on the ground that the railway administration failed to discharge its obligation to supply information to the consignor as to how the consignment was dealt with. The obligation of the railway administer action as a carrier should not be mixed up with the other agreement which only limits its responsibility as such, for the loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods. As stated earlier the two contracts give rise to independent obligations. I am, therefore, of the view that even though the consignor had signed the risk note in form B in the present case the limitation would still start running from the date the goods ought to have been delivered to it. If the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, then the period of limitation in such cases would fluctuate according to the time when the information is sought and supplied by the railway administration. There might also be cases where the railway administration may not supply the required information at all, then what would be the starting point of limitation in such cases ? To that there is no satisfactory answer. 9. There is another ground against the plaintiff as remarked by the court below in this case that the railway administration by its letter dated 30th June, 1949 had informed the consignor that the loss of consignment was due to running train theft any as the goods were booked at the owners risk in form B it exonerated the railway from all responsibility for any loss, destruction or deterioration of or damage from any cause whatever, and further that its claim for compensation was not admissible. The letter dated 4th August, 1950 does not give any further information than what is contained in the letter dated 30th June, 1949. The letter dated 4th August, 1950 does not give any further information than what is contained in the letter dated 30th June, 1949. For all these reasons I do not find any force in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant and hold that the suit has been rightly dismissed by the first appellate court on the ground that it was barred by limitation. 10. This appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed with cost. Learned counsel prays for leave to appeal which is refused.