JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The applicant has been convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, for selling adulterated cow's milk. 2. On 5.4.61 while the applicant was selling milk, the Food Inspector took its sample after complying wit the requisite formalities. The sample was divided into three parts and each part was sealed as required. One part was given to the applicant, another part was sent to the Public Analyst for a report and the third part was retained by the Food Inspector himself. The Food Inspector (Shri. V.N. Singh) stated in his cross-examination that the phial of the sample which was intended to be retained, was handed over by him to the Nagar Swasth Adhikari. 3. In his report dated 5.5.61 the Public Analyst reported that the sample was deficient in non-fatty solids by about 14 per cent. On 16.12.61 a complaint was lodged in court against the applicant. 4. In due course, on 14.11.62 the applicant made an application to the court, stating that his phial of the sample had been broken and that the phial of the sample retained by the complainant, i.e., the Nagar Swasth Adhikari, be called for and sent to the Director, Central Food Laboratories, Calcutta, for test, as provided by Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The court accepted the prayer and directed the complainant to produce the phial of the sample. On 26.12.62 the counsel appearing for the complainant made a statement that the phial of the sample was not traceable and hence it could not be produced in court. 5. Relying on the statement of the Food Inspector and on the report of the Public Analyst, the courts below held the applicant guilty under Section 16(1)(a)(iii) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 6. The applicant's grievance is that the statute confers on him a right of appeal against the report of the Public Analyst and that the statute further entitles the accused to have the sample retained by the Food Inspector sent for examination in order to test the veracity of the report made by the Public Analyst and, if, due to the default of the complainant, the accused is deprived of this right, he should get the benefit instead of being held guilty of the offence and convicted. 7. 7. Section 11(1)(c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, provides that "When a food inspector takes a sample of food for analysis, he shall- (a).......... (b).......... (c) (i) deliver on the parts to the person from whom the sample has been taken; (ii) send another part for analysis to the public analyst; and (iii) retain the third part for production the case any legal proceedings are taken or for analysis by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under sub-Section (2) of Section 13, as the case may be." 8. Section 11 is entitled as "Procedure to be followed by Food Inspectors". It uses the word "shall". Sub-Clause (iii) of Clause (c) of this section directs the Food Inspector to retain the third part. This direction has been made to achieve two purposes. In case legal proceedings are taken, the third part is for production in the case. If an occasion arises for analysis by the Director under Section 13 (2), the third part is to be produced therefor. 9. Under Section 13(2) of the Act the accused and the complainant have both been conferred a right to have both been conferred a right to have the part of the sample delivered to the accused vendor or the part retained by the food inspector sent through the court, to the Director for analysis. Under Sub-Section (3) of Section 13 the certificate issued by the Director supersedes the report given by the Public Analyst. The proviso to sub-sec (5) of Section 13 lays down that the certificate of the Director shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. It is to be noticed that no such finality attaches to the report of the Public Analyst. 10. The whole purport of Section 13 is to get the report of the Public Analyst tested by a superior authority. It, in effect, provides a right of appeal to the accused-vendor as well as to the complainant against the report of the Public Analyst. To make this right effective, Section 11(1)(c)(iii) directs the retention by the food inspector of the third part of the sample. In this provision of Section 11 it is not anywhere hinted that this third part is to be produced for analysis by the Director only if the complainant so desires. To make this right effective, Section 11(1)(c)(iii) directs the retention by the food inspector of the third part of the sample. In this provision of Section 11 it is not anywhere hinted that this third part is to be produced for analysis by the Director only if the complainant so desires. If the court, acting under Section 13(2), so requires, the third part of the sample has to be produced. 11. Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act gives an option both to the accused vendor and the complainant to have either the part of the sample in their respective possession or the part of the sample in possession of the other side sent to the Director. If any of the parties exercises the option, it does not lie with the other to refuse to comply on the ground that the requisitioning party can send to the Director the part of the sample in his own possession. Once an application is made to the court for sending any part of the sample, the court has no option but to send it in accordance with the procedure laid down therein. There is nothing in this sub-Section to indicate that either the court or the other side can pin down the party requiring the sending of the sample to the Director to the part of the sample in possession of that party. 12. Section 11(1) uses the word "shall". It is urged for the complainant that the provisions of Section 11 are not mandatory but are directory and that, if the food inspector does not retain or produce the third part in contravention of Section 11(1)(c)(iii), no penal consequences have been contemplated by the statute and as such the accused should be get any benefit. 13. It is well established that the word "shall" is normally to be construed as mandatory, that is, as "must" and not as directory, that is, as "may". But, the use of the word "shall" is not conclusive for determining whether the provision is mandatory or directory. It depends on the true intention of the legislature. 13. It is well established that the word "shall" is normally to be construed as mandatory, that is, as "must" and not as directory, that is, as "may". But, the use of the word "shall" is not conclusive for determining whether the provision is mandatory or directory. It depends on the true intention of the legislature. The "practical bearing of the distinction between a provision which is mandatory and one which is directory is that, while the former must be strictly observed, in the case of the latter it is sufficient that it is substantially complied with (Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque 1955 S.C.R. 1104 (1126). The relevant provisions of Section 11 and Section 13 require that the third part shall be produced and, on the application of the accused, the court shall send it to the Director. The question is can this object of the legislature be achieved by substantial compliance. There can be no degrees of compliance so far as the production is concerned and that, in my opinion, clinches the matter to show that the provision is mandatory. Normally, if nothing is stated regarding the consequence or effect of non-compliance with the requirement of the statute, the indication is that the provision is directory; but this rule does not apply where either the Public Justice or private rights call for the exercise of the duty vested in a public official. In the latter case, even if the language used is "may", it is construed as "must". Where an act affects private rights, the prescribed formalities must be strictly performed. The provisions are in such cases, mandatory. 14. Even if it be assumed as was argued, that the duty to produce the third part of the sample is discretionary since it has ben conferred upon him for the convenience and benefit of the accused and in order to effectuate the right of appeal conferred upon him, the discretion would, in law, be coupled with a duty to exercise it when the occasion arises, namely, when a demand is made for its production. It is a duty which cannot to shirked or shelved or evaded. See Frederic Guilder Julius v. The Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of Oxford; The Rev. Thomas Thellusson Carter (1879-80) 5 A.C. 214; Commissioner of Police Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 16 p. 28. It is a duty which cannot to shirked or shelved or evaded. See Frederic Guilder Julius v. The Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of Oxford; The Rev. Thomas Thellusson Carter (1879-80) 5 A.C. 214; Commissioner of Police Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 16 p. 28. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1918 : 1963 A.L.J. 617 the Supreme Court held: "It is also clear that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word 'may' which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command." 15. In Section 11 the word used is "shall" the normal connotation of which is "must". There is no reason why it should not be given its natural and normal meaning. 16. The direction given in Section 11(1)(c)(iii) is intended to be a command. It is in nature mandatory. 17. Admittedly, the complainant failed to produce the sample. The learned Session Judge has found that the third part of the sample was not available due to carelessness to the office of the Nagpur Swasth Adhikari in retaining it. The part of the sample given to the accused vendor was not available as, according to the accused, the bottle had broken up. To my mind, that is not conclusive to deny the applicant a right of appeal to the Director which, under Section 13 is unfettered and, for availing, it, the accused can legitimately demand the production of the third part of the sample retained by the food inspector. If it is not produced, the right of appeal is taken away. The report of the Public Analyst may not suffer from any infirmity by not having ben superseded by a certificate of the Director. But since the applicant has been denied the right to get it tested by the Director, it will not be safe to hold the accused guilty of the offence. The proper thing to do would be to give the accused the benefit of doubt. 18. In the result, the revision succeeds. The conviction and sentence of the applicant are set aside. He is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are discharged. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded to the applicant.