Judgment :- 1. These writ applications can be disposed of by a common judgment since the questions involved are identical and the petitioner in these cases is the same individual. The first of these relates to the contention that there is no manufacturing process involved in the making of fermented toddy for sale by a licensed abkari contractor. "Manufacture" is such a wide term that it would, I think, take in any changes, adaptations or modifications etc. that may be introduced, or effected in an article. In that wide concept of manufacture, it is clear that there is certainly adaptation taking place when sweet toddy is converted into fermented toddy for sale. These two are different in qualities. The fact that this process of change is effected without the help of machinery or even without the help of human agency, I think, is immaterial, for in Ardeshir H. Bhiwandiwala v. State of Bombay (196111 L.L.J. 77), it has been held that letting sea-water into pre-prepared pans and allowing the same to evaporate under sun light and thus obtaining the salt involve a manufacturing process. Similarly abkari contractors may collect toddy from the trees and allow that to ferment. Even so, I think, there is a manufacturing process involved. 2. Counsel on behalf of the petitioner has invited my attention to the definition of the word "toddy" in the Abkari Regulation IV of 1073 under subsection (5) of S.3 which reads : " "Toddy" means fermented or unfermented juice drawn from a coconut, palmyra, date or any other kind of palm tree." 3. The contention is that toddy can either be fermented or unfermented but in either case, it is the juice drawn from the trees mentioned in the definition. The argument is that fermented or unfermented toddy can be drawn from the trees. I do not think this is correct.. It is the juice that is drawn from the trees. This may be 'Toddy' under the definition. But the fermentation takes place after it is drawn from the trees. 4. It was then contended that the application moved before the Payment of Wages Authority was barred by limitation. The application was moved on 4-4-1961 claiming certain amounts payable for the year 1960-61 which ended on 31-3-1961. The argument proceeded on the basis that wages had fallen due at various stages during the year 1960-61. 4. It was then contended that the application moved before the Payment of Wages Authority was barred by limitation. The application was moved on 4-4-1961 claiming certain amounts payable for the year 1960-61 which ended on 31-3-1961. The argument proceeded on the basis that wages had fallen due at various stages during the year 1960-61. The claim has actually been made on the basis of the agreement which was produced before the authority and marked here as Ext. P-1. This agreement provided that the payments towards the various items mentioned in the agreement were to be made on or before the 20th March 1961. If that be so, these amounts can be said to have become due only on the 20th of March, 1961 and the application having been made within one month from that date, is within time, and the proviso to S.15(2) provides that "every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be." 5. Then the short question is whether there was an agreement Ext. P-1 which is binding on the petitioner. The fact that there is an agreement, is not disputed. The contention is that the agreement was signed by and on behalf of the association of Abkari contractors and the representatives of the workmen, and that the petitioner was not a member of the association and therefore the agreement Ext. P-1 is not binding. This aspect of the question has been dealt with by the Payment of Wages Authority under Point No. 3 where he has stated: "It must be noted that Ext. P-1 agreement was entered into by the representatives of all Abkari contractors in the State and the unions representing the workers in all toddy shops in the presence of the Labour Minister and the Revenue Minister and the representatives of the Abkari contractors agreed on behalf of all contractors including the opposite party to grant certain allowances and amenities to workers working in the several toddy shops." Earlier it was stated: "It is also evident from the several reports of the proceedings of conference, sent by the Assistant Labour Officer that the opposite party was agreeable to pay the dues as per the terms of Ext. P-4 agreement but that he would not agree, to the number of trees claimed to have been tapped by each worker and that the parties could not reach an amicable settlement on that account." Again it is seen that the petitioner attended the conference along with the Secretary of the association. 6. It is in the light of these materials that the Payment of Wages Authority came to the conclusion that the petitioner too had agreed to the payments contained in Ext. P1. This is a finding purely on a question of fact and I am not prepared to say that the view taken by the Payment of Wages Authority was not one of the possible views on the evidence that was available. This being so, I do not think, I am entitled to sit on judgment on that finding. 7. Counsel on behalf of the petitioner then urged the point which he had not taken either before the Payment of Wages Authority or before the Appellate Authority as it was placed before me. The contention is that the Payment of Wages Authority has no jurisdiction to decide the question as to the existence of the contract which is the basis of the claim. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the ruling of the Bombay High Court reported in Aboobaker Dawood v. Potdar (1963 I-L.L.J. 398). Counsel on behalf of the respondents however has brought to my notice two decisions; one of the Supreme Court reported in Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. S.B. Bhatt (19611-L.L.J. 1) and the other of this Court reported in Mary Chacko v. Ouseph & others (1961 KLT. 423). These decisions relied on by the respondents seem to lay down that all questions incidental to the main question to be decided can also be determined. In fact in the latter case it is said that the question as to whether there is an employer-employee relationship can be decided by the Payment of Wages Authority. I do not think I should enter into a fuller discussion of this issue since this point as such has not been raised before the authorities concerned; I negative this contention as well. 8. In the result, these writ applications have to be dismissed and I do so. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.