Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal arises in a suit for declaration, that the suit property is not attachable in execution of the decree, Ext. B-2 in O. S.658 of 1950, and for specific performance of an agreement by the first defendant to sell her 1/3 share. The property belonged in jenmom to Kunhipathumma, the mother of defendants 1 & 2, and was outstanding on mortgage with Chandu. Later, Kunhipathumma gave a mortgage, Ext. A.-9 with power to redeem the earlier mortgage and after her death, the second defendant gave a puramkadam Ext. A-4, both in favour of the plaintiff who is the appellant. The second defendant then sold his 2/3 share of the property to the plaintiff by Ext. A-5 on the 12th January 1951. On the 5th September, 1951, the first defendant agreed by Ext, A-1 to sell her 13 share to the plaintiff. Defendants 1 and 2 sued the 3rd defendant in O. S.658 of 1950 for alleged trespass on the property and in execution of the decree for costs therein, the 3rd defendant proceeded against the property by attachment and sale. It was then purchased by the 4th defendant, who is the contesting respondent in this appeal. The plaintiff's case so far as the purchase in execution of the first defendant's 1/3 share is concerned is, that the 4th defendant had notice of Ext. A-1 and so acquired no title thereto by his purchase. The 4th defendant had set up various contentions which were negatived concurrently by the two courts; but his plea that he had no notice of Ext. A-1, though rejected by the first court, was accepted by the Subordinate Judge in appeal and survives for decision in second appeal. The decree as it now stands is in favour of the plaintiff for the 2/3 share of the second defendant and for the refund of money received by the first defendant under Ext. A-1. 2. In second appeal, the only point urged, was whether the 4th defendant is a transferee with notice of Ext. A-1 or not. Learned counsel for the plaintiff relied on S.40 of the Transfer of Property Act for contending, that Ext. A-1 is enforceable against a transferee with notice of the agreement for sale. A-1. 2. In second appeal, the only point urged, was whether the 4th defendant is a transferee with notice of Ext. A-1 or not. Learned counsel for the plaintiff relied on S.40 of the Transfer of Property Act for contending, that Ext. A-1 is enforceable against a transferee with notice of the agreement for sale. In the light of S.2 (d) of that Act, the 4th defendant, being a transferee by operation of law in execution of a decree, is no transferee within the meaning of S.40. So the reliance on that provision is misplaced. Learned counsel then relied on S.27 of the Specific Relief Act, the material part of which is in these terms: "Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against (a) either party thereto; (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract." On this issue of notice to the 4th defendant of Ext. A-1, the plaintiff led no evidence. The plaintiff as witness said merely, that defendants 1 to 4 were living in the same locality; this meant nothing. The 4th defendant as dw. 2 denied in chief examination, that he had any information about Ext. A-1, and nothing that was elicited in cross-examination was sufficient to shake his testimony. He said that a Chakku informed him about the intending sale in execution about 8 or 10 days previously, that he did not ask the 3rd defendant about it and made no other enquiry. This is all the evidence in the case on the point. Learned counsel contended, that the burden of proof on this issue is upon the transferee. Under S.27 (b) the Privy Council has held so, in the case of a voluntary transfer, in Bhup Narain Singh v. Gokul Chand Mahton 39 Law Weekly 363. The structure of S.27 (b) is that the first part enacts a general rule and the second part provides an exception to it, the applicability of which has to be proved by the person seeking its benefit. On this principle, the same rule of burden of proof must apply to an involuntary sale also. The structure of S.27 (b) is that the first part enacts a general rule and the second part provides an exception to it, the applicability of which has to be proved by the person seeking its benefit. On this principle, the same rule of burden of proof must apply to an involuntary sale also. The word 'transferee' occurring in S.27 (b) must be understood not in a restricted sense as under the Transfer of Property Act, but in a wider sense so as to include a purchaser at a sale in execution for, in my view, the intention underlying the exception could not have been to exclude such a purchaser, provided he fulfils the other requirements. 3. What is the quantum of proof to be expected in the case of a purchaser at an execution sale. In Nur Mahommed Paerbhoy v. Dinshaw Hormasji Motiwalla AIR. 1922 P. C. 393 at 396 Lord Dunedin observed, that "judicial sales would be robbed of all their security, if vague references to antecedent contracts could be held to invalidate the buyer's title." In that case, the statement made by a Kirtikar, a pleader who was acting on behalf of the plaintiff, relied on as evidence of notice of the prior contract was held to be "far short of such unequivocal notice as ought ...to have been given in the case of a Court-sale." Even in the case of private sales, the decisions which have considered the point as to the quantum of evidence, seem to hold one way. In Kirtarath Bai v. Srinat Rai AIR. 1928 Allahabad 307, Sulaiman, J., as he then was, observed thus: "In this view of the matter it is correct to say that the burden of proving want of notice, in the first instance, lies on the defendant transferee. But this he can do by merely denying the fact on oath, and, therefore, the question of burden of proof loses much of its importance." In Lekh Singh v. Dwarka Nath AIR. 1929 Lahore 249, Shadi Lal, C. J. said, that the onus of proof of absence of notice is ordinarily discharged by a denial and by negative evidence, and referred to an earlier case decided by the Calcutta High Court in Hem Chandra De Sarkar v. Amiyabala De Sarkar, AIR. 1925 Calcutta 61. 1929 Lahore 249, Shadi Lal, C. J. said, that the onus of proof of absence of notice is ordinarily discharged by a denial and by negative evidence, and referred to an earlier case decided by the Calcutta High Court in Hem Chandra De Sarkar v. Amiyabala De Sarkar, AIR. 1925 Calcutta 61. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Banwari Lal v, Syed Muctida Khan ILR. (1953) I Allahabad 675 in which Ghulam Hassan, J. as be then was, relying upon Kirtarath Rai v. Srinat Rai AIR. 1928 Allahabad 307 & Lekh Singh v. Dwarka Nath AIR. 1929 Lahore 249 expressed the view, that the onus is ordinarily discharged by a denial in court and by negative evidence. Learned counsel for the plaintiff relied upon Bhun Narain Singh, v. Gokul Chand Mahton 39 Law Weekly 363 and Varden Seth Sam v. Lucknathy Royjee Lallah 9 M. I. A. 307 for contending, that the Privy Council has laid down no such rule. The question as to the nature or the quantum of evidence to be adduced in a case like this was not raised before the Privy Council or decided. I am therefore of the opinion, that the onus on the transferee is ordinarily discharged by a denial and by negative evidence. 4. Judging from the position which the 4th defendant occupied, it is not proper to insist upon a high degree of proof. He was a stranger-auction-purchaser and was in no way related to the plaintiff or to defendants 1 and 2; the suggestion made in cross-examination as regards some business relation, ship with the 3rd defendant was repudiated by the 4th defendant. There is no point in the argument that the encumbrancer register was not looked into, for Ext. A-1, which is a mere unregistered agreement for sale, can find no mention in that register. Nor do I think that any inference as to notice of Ext. A-1 can be drawn adversely to the 4th defendant, from the fact that his contentions as regards the alleged sham and inoperative character of Exts. A-4, and A-5 were negatived. Generally speaking, there was nothing to put the 4th defendant on enquiry as to a possible agreement for sale with respect to the property proceeded against in execution. For these reasons, I hold that the 4th defendant was a transferee without notice of Ext. A-1. A-4, and A-5 were negatived. Generally speaking, there was nothing to put the 4th defendant on enquiry as to a possible agreement for sale with respect to the property proceeded against in execution. For these reasons, I hold that the 4th defendant was a transferee without notice of Ext. A-1. There was no question before me as to his good faith; a term which has to be understood as denned in S.3 (22) of the General Clauses Act. 5. In the result, the decree under appeal is confirmed and the Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.