Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in this case is a student studying in the 3rd year B.Com. Class in the Government Victoria College, Palghat. By this petition he prays for the issuance of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ for quashing Ext. P7 order dated 12-8-1964 by which he was suspended from the College for the period from 29-7-1964 to 30-9-1964. The charges against him were: "...(1) That he deliberately disturbed the class frequently during the first hour on 27-7-1964 in spite of repeated oral warnings by the Lecturer then engaging the Class. (2) That he disobeyed the Lecturer's instructions to go away from the class until he was pressed to do so after much pursuasion. This he did with much reluctance and a show of temper murmuring that he would deal with the Lecturer himself afterwards. (3) That at about 3.30 P. M. on the same day (27-7-1964) when he met the same Lecturer just a few feet away from the room occupied by the Professor of Commerce, he threatened the Lecturer using the following abusive words: The utter disregard and disobedience shown by him towards one of his lecturers show his scant regard to his lecturers and tells upon the morale of the Institution." The petitioner was directed to show cause within seven days from the receipt of the memo of charges why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. The petitioner submitted a statement on 30-7-1964, denying the charges. By a memo dated 29-7-1964 Mr. N.A. Erady, Professor of Botany, was directed to conduct an enquiry into the charges against the petitioner with the assistance of the Professor of Economics Sri Joseph Alexander. The petitioner's statement dated 30-7-1964 was also forwarded to the Enquiry Committee. The petitioner was asked to appear before the Enquiry Committee, and the Committee explained to him the facts and materials on which the action has been taken against him. The petitioner totally denied the allegations against him. The Committee thereupon recorded a statement from the Lecturer in Commerce, Mr. Janaranjanadasan, on 5-8-1964. Subsequent to the recording of this statement the petitioner was given an oral hearing by the Committee on 5-8-1964 and during this hearing the Committee explained to the petitioner the allegations against him as corroborated by the statement of Mr. Janaranjanadasan. The Committee thereupon recorded a statement from the Lecturer in Commerce, Mr. Janaranjanadasan, on 5-8-1964. Subsequent to the recording of this statement the petitioner was given an oral hearing by the Committee on 5-8-1964 and during this hearing the Committee explained to the petitioner the allegations against him as corroborated by the statement of Mr. Janaranjanadasan. The petitioner submitted a written statement before the Committee setting out his version of the incidents in question. The Committee also took the statements of some of the students of the 3rd year B. Com. Class who were present during the lecture of the Lecturer in Commerce on 27-7-1964. They also questioned a few of the other members of the staff regarding the general conduct of the petitioner. On a review of the materials before the Committee, they came to the conclusion that the charges against the petitioner had been fully proved. The matter was thereafter placed before the College Council, the administrative body to advise the principal in matters of discipline. The Council considered the charges and the report of the Enquiry Committee in the light of the explanations submitted by the petitioner and recorded a finding that the petitioner was guilty of the charges. As regards the punishment, the Council thought that suspension of the petitioner from the College till 1st October, 1964, would meet the ends of justice and that he could be re-admitted to the College on his giving a written undertaking as to his future good behaviour. On the basis of this decision the Principal passed the order dated 12-8-1964, Ext. P7, which is impugned in this case. 2. The main contentions raised by the petitioner are that the Enquiry Committee failed to observe the principles of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry, and that the Lecturer in Commerce Mr. Janaranjanadasan and the Principal of the College, were actuated by mala fides against the petitioner. In this context, it is alleged that the petitioner was expelled from the College on a previous occasion by the Principal on the basis of a report of the Lecturer in Commerce Mr. Janaranjanadasan and the Principal of the College, were actuated by mala fides against the petitioner. In this context, it is alleged that the petitioner was expelled from the College on a previous occasion by the Principal on the basis of a report of the Lecturer in Commerce Mr. Janaranjanadasan, that the petitioner had filed before this court O.P. 262/1964 to quash that order, that along with that petition he had filed an application to suspend the order of expulsion, and that the writ petition was admitted by this court and an order staying the operation of the order of expulsion was passed. It is further alleged that the filing of the writ petition and the application for stay of the operation of the order of expulsion were taken as defiance of their authority by Mr. Janaranjanadasan and the Principal and that they were waiting for an opportunity somehow to sack the petitioner from the College for some reason or other. 3. Mr. Janaranjanadasan has filed an affidavit specifically contraverting the allegations against him in the affidavit in support of the writ petition. Mr. Janaranjanadasan is not a party to this proceeding. In his affidavit, he has stated that he has no reason at all for being prejudiced against the petitioner on account of his having challenged in this court the prior order passed by the Principal and that the incidents which are stated to have taken place on 27-7-1964 were true. The Principal of the College has filed an affidavit and in the affidavit he has stated that he was satisfied from the report of the Enquiry Committee and the proceedings of the Council that the petitioner was guilty of the charges and that he passed Ext. P. 7 order bona fide in the full belief that the petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against him. He further stated that for the purpose of maintaining discipline in the College it was necessary that the petitioner should be punished for his misconduct. 4. I am not satisfied that the petitioner has succeeded in proving that the Principal and Sri Janaranjanadasan were actuated by any extraneous motives. There is no substance in the allegation that Ext. P7 order was passed mala fide and with intent to injure the petitioner. 5. It was submitted by Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, appearing for the Principal, that Ext. 4. I am not satisfied that the petitioner has succeeded in proving that the Principal and Sri Janaranjanadasan were actuated by any extraneous motives. There is no substance in the allegation that Ext. P7 order was passed mala fide and with intent to injure the petitioner. 5. It was submitted by Mr. Balakrishna Eradi, appearing for the Principal, that Ext. P7 order is administrative in character and that this court should not interfere with it under Art.226. Counsel submitted that an order, suspending a student from a College, for maintaining discipline therein, relates to the internal affairs of the College and is not susceptible of being corrected by the issue of a writ of certiorari. In this connection counsel cited before me the cases of Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner Ext parte Parker (1953-1 W.L.R. 1150) and Ex Parte Fry (1954-1 W.L.R. 730). 6. In the first of the cases mentioned above, the Commissioner of Police having become satisfied by the report of Police Constables that the applicant was no longer a fit person to hold a cab driver's licence, assented to the proposal that the applicant should be brought before the licensing committee and confronted with the two police officers, and that the licence should be revoked unless anything transpired before the committee which in their opinion might lead the Commissioner to reconsider his decision to revoke the licence. After the meeting, at which the two constables and the applicant appeared, the Assistant Commissioner informed the applicant that his licence had been revoked. The applicant moved for an order of certiorari on the ground that as he was not allowed to call a witness whom he alleged would have been able to rebut the allegation of the police, there had been a denial of natural justice. It was held that the decision to revoke the applicant's licence by virtue of the power given to the Commissioner, was the decision of the Commissioner himself; and that, as he was not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial function, but was merely acting as a disciplinary authority, an order for certiorari should be refused. In the course of the judgment Lord Goddard C. J., made the following observation at page 1155: "Here, in my opinion, it is impossible to say that the commissioner - if he acted alone - was in a judicial or quasi-judicial position. In the course of the judgment Lord Goddard C. J., made the following observation at page 1155: "Here, in my opinion, it is impossible to say that the commissioner - if he acted alone - was in a judicial or quasi-judicial position. He was in fact exercising a disciplinary authority. Where a person, whether he is a military officer, a police officer or any other person whose duty it is to act in matters of discipline, is exercising disciplinary powers, it is most undesirable, in my opinion, that he should be fettered by threats of orders of certiorari and so forth, because that would interfere with the free and proper disciplinary exercise of the powers that it may be expected he would otherwise use." For a criticism of the reasoning of this decision see D.M. Gordon on'The Cab Driver's Licence Case' in 70 L.Q.R. 203. The learned author referred to Capel v. Child (1832-2 Cr. & J. 558) where a statute which authorised a bishop to remove a vicar for negligence fell for consideration. The provision of the statute in question in that case reads as follows: "Whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction of the bishop, either by his own knowledge, or upon proof by affidavit laid before him." The Court held that the bishop's removal order was invalid when made without having heard the vicar affected, even though the bishop was quite conversant with the facts and even though the bishop was exercising his disciplinary jurisdiction in the church. And as regards the question whether a person or body could function effectively, if its decision were subject to certiorari, the learned author referred to the case in R. v. Cambridge University (1723-1 Str. 557) where the same reason was given for a claim that University's suspension from membership could not be examined in courts. In that case Pratt, C.J., said: "The University ought not to think it any diminution of their honour, that their proceedings are examinable in a superior court. I am sure this court which is superior to the university, thinks it none; for my own part I can say, it is a consideration of great comfort to me, that if I do err my judgment is not conclusive of the party, but my mistake will be rectified, and so injustice not be done." 7. I am sure this court which is superior to the university, thinks it none; for my own part I can say, it is a consideration of great comfort to me, that if I do err my judgment is not conclusive of the party, but my mistake will be rectified, and so injustice not be done." 7. In the second case (1954-1 W.L.R. 730) Lord Goddard, C.J., made the following observations at page 733: "It seems to me impossible to say that a chief officer of a force which is governed by discipline, such as a fire brigade is, in exercising disciplinary authority over a member of the force, acting either judicially or quasi judicially, any more than a school-master is when he is exercising disciplinary powers over his pupils.". At the same page he made these further observations: "That is an entirely different thing from saying that this court can interfere with the discipline of police forces, fire brigades or similar bodies which, in their nature, must be generally known as disciplined services, and where the chief officer is simply acting as an officer in the matter of discipline. In such cases this court ought not to exercise control by means of the writ of certiorari". In that case a fireman, on being ordered to clean the uniform of an assistant divisional officer of a fire brigade, refused to do so. Thereupon he was suspended from duty and charged under the Fire Services (Discipline) Regulations, 1948 with disobedience to orders. The chief fire officer heard the matter and held that the applicant was guilty of disobedience to orders and punished the offence by a caution. On application for leave the Divisional Court refused leave, holding that a chief officer of a force governed by discipline, such as a fire brigade, in exercising the disciplinary authority over a member of the force, was not acting judicially or quasi judicially. "The judgment provokes several comments: First, a court can find, among the multitudinous cases on certiorari, authority for classifying as judicial almost any order directly affecting individual rights, if it is so minded. Secondly, in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board (1953-2 Q. B.18), the Court of Appeal held a disciplinary function to be judicial; there the remedy sought was a declaratory judgment, but this was irrelevant to the classification of the power. Secondly, in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board (1953-2 Q. B.18), the Court of Appeal held a disciplinary function to be judicial; there the remedy sought was a declaratory judgment, but this was irrelevant to the classification of the power. Thirdly, although there may be no authority to the effect that certiorari will go to military disciplinary bodies other than courts martial, or to police tribunals, the present writer is unaware of any decision that it will not; and the conduct of such bodies has been reviewed in other forms of proceedings without any evident injury to the public interest. In Heddon v. Evans (1919-35 T.L.R. 642), an action for false imprisonment, the exercise of summary powers by a commanding officer was carefully examined. In Cooper v. Wilson (1937-2 K.B. 309), an action for a declaration, the conduct by a watch committee of an appeal against a disciplinary decision made by a police officer was successfully impugned. Fourthly, in so far as the judgment flatly rejects the possibility of issuing certiorari in this type of dispute, it may have unfortunate consequences. If no appeal is provided against the imposition of a severe disciplinary penalty, the courts must still, apparently, refuse to intervene even though carefully prescribed procedural safeguards have been violated. It is hard to see why the maintenance of discipline in the public services should demand this measure of judicial forbearance." (See S.A. De Smith -17 Modern Law Review 375). 8. The decision in Board of High School v. Ghanshyam (AIR. 1962 SC. 1110), cited for the petitioner, turned upon the question whether the statute which fell for consideration there required a quasi-judicial approach. It has nothing to do with the problem, namely whether an order suspending or dismissing a student is administrative or quasi-judicial in character. 9. No rules of the College regulating the procedure in disciplinary matters were brought to my attention. The question is whether the proceedings of the Head of a College in relation to the exercise of his disciplinary jurisdiction and resulting in the dismissal or suspension of a pupil should be preceded by notice and hearing. The difficulty of identifying the peg on which the aggrieved could hang a justiciable claim need not deter me from holding that the investigation into the charges must be conducted in conformity with natural justice. The difficulty of identifying the peg on which the aggrieved could hang a justiciable claim need not deter me from holding that the investigation into the charges must be conducted in conformity with natural justice. It is true that it is difficult to find any consistent principle for determining the situations in which a duty to observe the rules of natural justice will be held to arise by implication. Nevertheless the governing principle ought to be that authorities empowered to make decisions detrimental to the liberty, proprietary rights, livelihood, status or reputation of individuals should be required to give prior notice and an opportunity of being heard to those who are directly affected especially when the adjudicative facts are in controversy unless the imposition of such duties would be impracticable or manifestly injurious to public interest. The key is not the characterization of the proceeding as quasi-judicial or administrative, but whether a finding on adjudicative facts is necessary for a decision which affects a person in relation to his property, status, livelihood or reputation. Normally adjudicative, as distinguished from legislative facts, ought not to be found without allowing a party a chance to explain and rebut. It is therefore difficult to accept the contention of counsel that the order impugned being passed in the exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Principal, is purely administrative, and is not liable to be corrected by certiorari. Even if the ultimate decision is administrative in character, the process for arriving at that decision required a quasi-judicial approach at some stage, and if there is failure to conform to the principles of natural justice at that stage, then this court certainly has got the right and the duty to interfere with the decision. 10. In C.D. Sekkilar v. Krishnamoorthy (AIR. 1952 Madras 151) Subba Rao, J., had to consider the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 in relation to orders passed in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction by the head of a College. The learned judge said that the maintenance of discipline in a college is primarily entrusted to the Principal or other officers of the institution and that the High Court will not interfere with the discretion of such an authority unless it is clearly established that the authority concerned has not honestly exercised the discretion, actuated by some motive extraneous to the purpose committed to their discretion. He however, added that the High Court will interfere, if it is satisfied on a consideration of the entire material placed before it that the action of the authority concerned is arbitrary, or is due to a mala fide exercise of discretion actuated by extraneous circumstances. In support of his conclusion the learned judge relied on the observations of Bond, C.J., in Woods v. Simpson (39 American L.R. 1016). A more advanced view on the subject has been propounded by an eminent scholar. "Private schools and colleges sometimes desire to take on such a military form, and exert autocratic powers over their students and teachers, including the right of summary dismissal. It is doubtful whether the students, parents and teachers contemplate such authority as inherent in the nature of an educational institution. Consequently the ordinary principles of natural justice might well be applied even if the rules of the organisation are expressly contrary. However, the Pennsylvania courts have declared that a college may dismiss a student suspected of theft, without preferring charges and holding a trial, and the New York courts have refused to set aside a dismissal of a college student without cause when this was expressly permitted by the rules. Similar summary proceedings have sometimes been adopted in practice in the dismissal of teachers, whose contracts with the institution are usually very informal. It is easy to understand how educational authorities believe that they will secure efficiency and desired standards through the possession of absolute powers. However, an institution which professes to prepare youth for life in a democracy might wisely give them an example of fair play when it is conducting its own affairs." (See Zechariah Chafee Jr. - "The International Affairs of Associations Not for Profit" in 43 Harward Law Review 993, at 1026.) 11. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner, that the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Committee in recording the statement of certain persons behind the back of the petitioner was in violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner's case was that Mr. Janaranjanadasan and certain students of 3rd year B.Com. Class gave statements before the Enquiry Committee behind his back and those statements were taken into consideration by the Committee in arriving at the conclusion that he was guilty. The petitioner's case was that Mr. Janaranjanadasan and certain students of 3rd year B.Com. Class gave statements before the Enquiry Committee behind his back and those statements were taken into consideration by the Committee in arriving at the conclusion that he was guilty. The petitioner's contention was that these persons should have been examined in his presence and that he should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine them. In the affidavit of the Principal, it is stated that the Enquiry Committee informed the petitioner of the purport of the statement made by Mr. Janaranjanadasan, and that the petitioner filed a statement before the Committee after he was appraised of the contents of that statement. The case of the petitioner that the statements made by some of the students in 3rd year B.Com. Class as regards the incident in the class on 27-7-1964, were made behind his back and that these statements were not shown to him nor was he given an opportunity to cross-examine these students, appears to be true. But what follows? It was argued that this is a violation of the principles of natural justice. But do the principles of natural justice go to that extent when applied to the head of an educational institution when exercising his disciplinary jurisdiction ? The rules of natural justice are not rigid norms of unchangeable content. Tucker, L.J., in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk (1949)-1 All E.R. 109,118) said: "There are in my view no words which are of universal application to every kind of enquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth." In Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd., (1958-1 W.L.R. 762 at 784) Harman, J., observed: "What then are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind ? First I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. First I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. I do not myself think that there really is anything more." In this connection the decision of the Privy Council in University of Ceylon v. Fernando (1960-1 All E.R. 631) may be referred to. In that case the University statute provided that where the Chancellor was satisfied that a candidate for examination had obtained prior knowledge of the contents of any examination paper he could suspend the candidate from the examination or remove him from any pass list, and was to report the matter to the Board of Residence and Discipline. Upon receipt of such a report the Board was empowered, inter alia, to suspend the candidate from any university examination. The respondent, Fernando, sat for the final examination for the B.Sc. degree of the university, and obtained marks that would have given him first-class honours. After the examination was over, however, Miss Balasingham a fellow-student, made allegations against Fernando, pointing to his having had previous knowledge of a passage in German which had to be translated in one of the papers. The Vice-Chancellor set up a commission of enquiry, consisting of himself and two other persons. The commission questioned several persons, including Miss Balasingham, in the absence of Fernando. Fernando was invited to appear before the commission and did appear before it on two occasions. The commission found the allegations against Fernando proved and reported him to the Board, which suspended him indefinitely from all university examinations. Fernando thereupon brought an action against the University, claiming a declaration that his suspension was wrongful and for other reliefs. His principal contentions were that he had been given neither adequate notice of the charges against him nor an adequate opportunity of meeting them, so that his suspension was contrary to natural justice. His action was dismissed by the court of first instance, but he succeeded on appeal to the Supreme Court of Ceylon. The Privy Council allowed the University's appeal and restored the decree of the court of first instance. His action was dismissed by the court of first instance, but he succeeded on appeal to the Supreme Court of Ceylon. The Privy Council allowed the University's appeal and restored the decree of the court of first instance. In answer to the contention before the Privy Council that rules of natural justice were violated in that Fernando was given no opportunity of cross-examining Miss Balasingham, the Judicial Committee said that principles of natural justice did not require the Vice-Chancellor to tender Miss Balasingham for cross-examination in the absence of a request for the same by Fernando who had the opportunity to make a request between his first and second interviews. The Judicial Committee further observed that the objection to the procedure adopted might have been stronger if such a request had been made and refused, and that Fernando might have fared better if the charge against him had been tried in accordance with the more meticulous procedure of a court of law. In answer to the contention that Miss Balasingham and other witnesses were questioned, but none of them in the presence or hearing of the plaintiff, the Privy Council said that the Vice-Chancellor was not bound to treat the matter as a trial but could obtain information in any way as he thought best, and that it was open to him if he thought fit to question witnesses without inviting the plaintiff to be present, but that it was necessary that a fair opportunity must have been given to the plaintiff to correct or contradict any relevant statement to his prejudice. 12. Whether the reasoning of the Privy Council that because Fernando did not demand for permission to confront Miss Balasingham, his right of cross-examination and confrontation is gone is a matter on which there may be difference of opinion: "With all respect, the least convincing passage in the judgment is that which draws attention to the respondent's failure to ask for permission to confront Miss B. before the Commission. If he had been told by the Commission that he could have questioned her before it, he would have had no ground for complaint. Similarly, if he ought to have known that he would have been permitted to put questions to her, his failure to ask leave to do so could be construed as an implied waiver of his rights. If he had been told by the Commission that he could have questioned her before it, he would have had no ground for complaint. Similarly, if he ought to have known that he would have been permitted to put questions to her, his failure to ask leave to do so could be construed as an implied waiver of his rights. But it is very doubtful whether such knowledge ought to be imputed to a student placed in the respondent's position; hi might well have thought that to make such a request would do him more harm than good in the eyes of the Commission." (See S. A. De Smith in'University Discipline and Natural Justice'-23 Modern Law Review 430) It must be stated that in the case in hand the petitioner never demanded for an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Janaranjanadasan or the students who gave statements before the Enquiry Committee. The contents of the statement of Mr. Janaranjanadasan were mentioned to the petitioner and the petitioner had also filed a statement after he was made acquainted with the contents of that statement. Denial opportunity to cross-examine does not always mean a denial of reasonable opportunity to defend. Whether it is a denial of reasonable opportunity to defend depends upon the nature of the inquiry, the subject-matter, the rules under which the authority is acting, and other circumstances which it is not expedient to attempt to lay down fully and exhaustively. Although University or College authorities are bound to follow the principles of natural justice when exercising their disciplinary functions, it does not mean that the hearing they conduct must have all the characteristics of judicial proceedings. Cross-examination may be the best method of shaking an unreliable witness. But, "The courts have never laid down the rigid rule that oral hearings before administrative and domestic tribunals must inevitably provide for the right of cross-examination; a tribunal composed of responsible and experienced persons who have no personal involvement in the issues before them can normally be expected to do justice by following inquisitorial methods of investigation; and there may be disadvantages in encouraging students to believe that the courts will readily accept invitations to find fault with the internal procedures of the universities. The scales are therefore tilted against the assertion of a general right of cross-examination in such cases, but only by a fine margin." (See S. A. De Smith in'University Discipline and Natural Justice'-23 Modern Law Review 431). Referring to the question of the right of confrontation of witnesses and cross-examination privileges in this context, Warren A. Seavey says: "The universities and the courts would have done far better to adopt the stand-point of an early Pennsylvania county-court case which held that the burden is on the institution to prove that the student committed the acts charged, and that this burden can be met only if the student is given a decent opportunity for rebuttal by meeting the witnesses. This is in accordance with the language of the Chief Justice Pratt in a case directing Cambridge University to restore to a master an academic degree of which he had been deprived... Although the formalities of a trial in a law court are not necessary, and although the exigencies of school or college life may require the suspension of one reasonably thought to have violated disciplinary rules, it seems fairly clear that a student should not have the burden of proving himself innocent. The fiduciary obligation of a school to its students not only should prevent it from seeking to hide the source of its information, but demands that it affords the student every means of rehabilitation. If it has not done so, this opportunity should be given by the courts." (See Warren A. Seavey in 'Dismissal of Students: Due Process'-70 Harward Law Review 1406 at 1409). A more comprehensive review of the American view point is seen in the following passage: "Cases involving expulsion of students from schools raise special problems because of these institutions' distinctive organizational structure and purpose. The professionally trained and presumably impartial faculty and administrators are expected to deal with everyday problems of discipline, and court-room procedures would generally seem inappropriate for these matters. In expulsion cases, however, the material damage suffered by the student involved is likely to be quite severe, and consequently a large degree of procedural protection has often been damanded...Yet few courts have seen fit to impose complex formal requirements. The most liberal definition of a fair hearing appears in the early Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. Me Cauley...There a college student was accused of participating in a campus disturbance. The most liberal definition of a fair hearing appears in the early Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. Me Cauley...There a college student was accused of participating in a campus disturbance. The student was allowed to appear and testify before a faculty meeting where he denied his participation; but he was expelled on the basis of hearsay testimony taken in his absence. While the expulsion proceeding might have been overturned for want of notification of the specific charges and want of time to prepare a defence, the court made a more sweeping pronouncement of the applicable rule: (The student) was entitled to know what testimony had been given against him, and by whom it had been delivered, and that the proofs be made openly and in his presence, with a full opportunity to question the witnesses and to call others to explain or contradict their testimony. ........................................................................................................................................................... Denial of cross examination privileges has been justified, as in State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp .... on the ground that there is no authority in the faculty to compel the attendance of witnesses or to force them to testify. Other courts, however, have indicated that schools are among the few associations which possess the power to compel testimony; the sanctions of suspension and expulsion have been upheld against students refusing to testify or giving false testimony before school officials investigating the conduct of another pupil. Another argument against allowing cross-examination was advanced in State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman.... involving the expulsion of two medical students for selling examination questions to other students. An open investigation into the matter was conducted by the student council, which heard witnesses including the accused and recommended expulsion. The faculty then investigated the matter, presented the accused students with the gist of the evidence against them, and informed them of the names of the principal witnesses, but afforded them no right to question these witnesses. The court found the proceedings to be in order and noted that "honourable students do not like to be known as snoopers and informers against their fellows... "(See 'Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations'-76 Harward Law Review 983, at 1031). The court found the proceedings to be in order and noted that "honourable students do not like to be known as snoopers and informers against their fellows... "(See 'Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations'-76 Harward Law Review 983, at 1031). In Anmol Singh v. Registrar, Osmania University (A.I.R.1963 A.P. 83) the following observation of Lord Jenkins in 1960-1 All E.R. 631 was quoted: "But as no special form of procedure is prescribed, it is for him (the Vice-Chancellor) to determine the procedure to be followed as he thinks best ...subject to the obvious implication that some form of inquiry must be made, such as will enable him fairly to determine whether he should hold himself satisfied that the charge in question has been made out." And then the Court said: "Beyond that, there does not appear to be any obligation on the part of the University to have witnesses examined in the presence of the student so as to enable him to cross-examine them." See also Babulal v. State of Rajasthan (A.I.R.1962 Rajasthan 103), Rana Pratap v. Vice-Chancellor (A.I.R. 1960 Allahabad 579) and Trilochan Singh v. Director, S.I.S. Institute (A.I.R.1963 Madras 68). 13. The submission of the petitioner's counsel that the contents of the statements made by the students in the third year B. Com. class should have been revealed to the petitioner by the Enquiry Committee and an opportunity given to him to contradict those parts of the statements to his prejudice, is not entitled to much weight. I think the Enquiry Committee was justified in refusing to disclose the contents of those statements as that would have created disharmony among the students of the class. 14. I cannot therefore hold that in the circumstances of this case the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Committee was in violation of the principles of natural justice. In the result, I dismiss the writ petition, but make no order as to costs. Dismissed.