Judgment:- Plaintiffs 1, 2 and 4 to 8 are the appellants in this appeal. They are some of the hereditary Muthavallis of the Ameensha Thaika, the other muthavallis being the respondents in the case. The 2nd defendant in the suit himself also a hereditary muthavalli gave a permanent lease Exhibit B-1 in the case in 1946 in favour of one Peer Mohideen as though he was the sole huqdar and entitled to lease the property at his discretion. The legal representatives of the lessee assigned the lease in favour of the 1st defendant and the 1st defendant now purports to be in possession. The suit was filed for recovery of possession of the suit property with future mesne profits on the basis that a permanent lease was void and cannot bind the institution. The Courts below have upheld this contention that the permanent lease was void and the finding is not, as it cannot be challenged before me by the learned Counsel appearing for the 1st defendant. While the trial Court decreed the suit in its entirety granting future mesne profits to be determined under Order 20 rule 12 Civil Procedure Code, the lower appellate Court modified the decree in favour of the 1st defendant, the alienee from the original lessee, and provided for his being compensated for the value of the buildings constructed on the suit property under the lease agreement Exhibit B-1. The lease recited that the property was in a very bad condition and that the lessee should improve existing buildings and put up new ones and pay an annual rent of Rs. 60 per annum to the 2nd defendant and the future muthavallis. It purported to be a permanent lease It is settled law that a lease for more than one year of property belonging to Thaika is void unless sanction of the Kazi had been obtained. There was no plea in the written statement filed on behalf of the 1st defendant claiming relief in respect of improvements and pleading that there were equities in his favour entitling him to equitable relief.. The 20th defendant in the case had pleaded that he had constructed certain buildings on the property, but it was found by the trial Court that apart from the pleading there was no evidence and the finding was not challenged. The 20th defendant in the case had pleaded that he had constructed certain buildings on the property, but it was found by the trial Court that apart from the pleading there was no evidence and the finding was not challenged. The learned Subordinate Judge referred to the contention of the 1st defendant in his written statement for relief under the City Tenant’s Protection Act and the claim for the value of the improvements, in case he was found liable to be evicted under that Act. Purporting to follow the decision of this Court in Alagirisami Kone v. Andhoni1, a decree has been passed providing that the present value of the buildings constructed after the lease Exhibit B-1 will be determined in executing and the plaintiffs will be allowed to recover the property only on deposit of the value of the improvements ascertained in execution. The 1st defendant is made liable for mesne profits only from the date of the deposit. Learned Counsel appearing for the Thaika contends that the lower appellate Court ought not to have in the absence of a specific plea permitted the 1st defendant to raise the plea of equitable estoppel and claim value of improvements. Secondly, it is pointed out that that principle will not apply to the facts of this case and it is contended further that, in any event, the direction reserving the determination of the compensation payable to execution proceedings is tantamount to permitting the 1st defendant to continue in possession endlessly, as he may not move at all in the matter. The learned Subordinate Judge has failed to appreciate that the principle of permitting compensation to a tenant who has made improvements is based on the law of equitable estoppel, which has been developed by Courts by Equity and follows that rule laid down in Ramsdon v. Dyson1. The principle is summarised in the Headnote in Alegerisami Kone v. Andhoni1, as follows:- The doctrine of ‘equitable estoppel’ familiarly known as the rule in Ramsdon v. Dyson2, is outside the statutory provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and its applicability is not excluded by section 51 of the said Act. The foundation upon which reposes the right of equity to intervene is either contract or the existence of some facts which the legal owner is estopped from denying". The foundation upon which reposes the right of equity to intervene is either contract or the existence of some facts which the legal owner is estopped from denying". It is clear therefore that the basis is estoppel and it needs no authority for the position that estoppel can bind only parties and privies. Reference may also be made in this connection to the observations of the Judicial Committee in The Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. The King3, where it is observed: There is a doctrine which is sometimes alluded to under the name of ‘equitable estoppel’ Whether there can be any estoppel which is equitable as distinct from legal and whether ‘equitable estoppel’ is an accurate phrase, their Lordships do not pause to enquire. The foundation upon which reposes the right of equity to intervene is either contract, or the existence of some fact which the legal owner is estopped from denying. In this connection learned Counsel appearing for the appellants referred also to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Beni Ram v. Kundan Lal4. It is sufficient to refer to the Headnote therein which is as follows:- "A lessor is not restrained by any rule of equity from bringing a suit to evict a tenant, the term of whose lease has expired, merely by reason of that tenant’s having erected permanent structures on the land leased, such building having been within the knowledge of the lessor, and there not having been any interference on his part to prevent it. To raise an equitable estoppel against the lessor precluding him from suing, on the determination of the tenancy possession, the tenant should show facts sufficient to justify the legal inference that the lessor has by plain implication contracted that the right of tenancy should be changed into a right of permanent occupancy. Acquiescence by the lessor in this case was a legal inference to be drawn from such facts as were found. The onus of establishing sufficient cause for an equitable estoppel had not been discharged by the tenant in this instance”. It will be apparent from these citations that to grant relief on the basis of equitable estoppel, not only should there be pleadings, but there should be evidence on which foundation can be laid for raising the plea. As already stated, there is no-plea and naturally no evidence that has been let in. It will be apparent from these citations that to grant relief on the basis of equitable estoppel, not only should there be pleadings, but there should be evidence on which foundation can be laid for raising the plea. As already stated, there is no-plea and naturally no evidence that has been let in. The learned subordinate Judge has gone on presumptions and has overlooked that any act of the 2nd defendant in excess of his powers would not bind the Thaika or trust. There is no pleading and no evidence that the trustee or muthavallis as a body made any representations or by their acquiescence allowed the 1st defendant to incur expenditure on the property. Again a religious trust like the Thaika in the present case will not be estopped by any act or conduct of the trustees committed in breach of trust. The lower appellate Court has not considered any of these aspects. The result therefore is that the relief which the learned subordinate Judge has granted cannot stand and the Second Appeal has to be allowed. However, taking into consideration the fact that the 1st defendant’s predecessor had been prevailed upon by the 2nd defendant to take up the lease with a view to improve and benefit the Thaika and incidentally also profit himself and as it is stated that considerable expenditure has been incurred on the property, I consider this a fit and proper case where some time must be granted to the 1st defendant to remove the buildings and constructions he might have erected on the property. I consider this is a case where six months’ time from this day may be granted for vacating and surrendering vacant possession. The decree of the trial Court which is restored will be modified accordingly. The parties will bear their own costs throughout. No leave. V.K. ------------- Appeal allowed.