Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by the 3rd plaintiff in a suit to set aside the final decree and execution proceedings in a prior suit. 2. The facts are thus: The suit properties belonged to Gomez, the maternal grandmother of the 1st defendant. She sold them in 1087 to Manuel Pereira, who assigned to Appolonius Rozario, who executed a settlement (gift) (copy, Ext. D) on Medom 26,1122 (May 9,1947) in favour of her sons, the plaintiffs 1 and 2. The appellant is the wife of the 1st plaintiff. In O.S. No. 1585 of 1100 on the file of the Munsiff, Trivandrum, the sale deed of 1087 executed by Gomez was impugned by the mother of the 1st defendant Ext. A is the preliminary decree in that suit, passed by the High Court, setting aside the sale in regard to her one-fourth share, directing separation of that one-fourth by a final decree in the suit, declaring the annual mesne profits of that share at fanams 2 cash 10, and ordering payment of fanams 790 cash 2 as compensation for improvements to Appolonius Rozario. Ext. B is the final decree passed by the Munsiff, on July 16, 1948. It awarded mesne profits at Rs. 10 - from the date of suit and made no mention of compensation for improvements. Through guardian, the 1st defendant executed the final decree for the monies due under it, purchased in court sale the plaint B schedule property on March 20,1951, and took possession thereof on October 20, 1951. Plaintiffs 1 and 2, who were in Malaya, challenge the vires of the final decree in so far as it is not in conformity with the preliminary decree and of the execution proceedings had thereon, and seek to recover possession of the plaint B schedule property with mesne profits, past and future, praying that the decree may be made in favour of the 3rd plaintiff. The Munsiff decreed the suit; but the Subordinate Judge has reversed it. Hence this second appeal. 3. Counsel for the appellant contended that in so far as rate of mesne profits has been varied and compensation for improvements has not been mentioned, the final decree is not in conformity with the preliminary decree and is therefore beyond jurisdiction and void. The Munsiff decreed the suit; but the Subordinate Judge has reversed it. Hence this second appeal. 3. Counsel for the appellant contended that in so far as rate of mesne profits has been varied and compensation for improvements has not been mentioned, the final decree is not in conformity with the preliminary decree and is therefore beyond jurisdiction and void. I do not think that a direction for payment of compensation for improvements made in absolute terms in the preliminary decree should necessarily be repeated in the final decree. Even if that ought to have been done, its omission cannot make the decree a nullity. 4. In so far as the final decree has varied the rate of mesne profits fixed in the preliminary decree, the question is of some nicety. Counsel contends that the Court has no jurisdiction to vary in its final decree any of the findings in the preliminary decree; and that the final decree, to the extent it does so, is a nullity. I cannot agree. That the Munsiff ought not to have varied the finding in the preliminary decree is undoubted. But the question here is not whether the Munsiff was right or has erred, but whether the final decree passed by him is a nullity for want of jurisdiction. If the defect be an error, however grave it may be, it is a matter for correction in appeal or revision in the same proceeding, and if it is not so corrected the decision will stand. The Privy Council as well as the Supreme Court has declared that a'court has jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly'; that is to say, an error in a judgement cannot affect the vires of the decision. But, if the defect be a total want of inherent jurisdiction, the decision will be a nullity and can be challenged even in a collateral proceeding. It is often said that the Court passing a final decree has no jurisdiction to vary any of its findings or directions made in the preliminary decree. Likewise, it is said that the executing court has no jurisdiction to vary the decree. I am afraid the word 'jurisdiction' is used then in a limited sense only. It is often said that the Court passing a final decree has no jurisdiction to vary any of its findings or directions made in the preliminary decree. Likewise, it is said that the executing court has no jurisdiction to vary the decree. I am afraid the word 'jurisdiction' is used then in a limited sense only. Where 'a decree directed a sale of the mortgage right on a property, but the executing court sold the property itself the Supreme Court held that the sale cannot be treated as a nullity in another suit. (See AIR 1956 S. C. 87). When a court acts beyond its jurisdiction, the same consequences do not always follow. It is notorious that the want of local or pecuniary jurisdiction does not nullify a decree of court; but lack of inherent jurisdiction does nullify it. The fact is that the meaning of many a word or phrase depends on the context in which it is used. See A. I. R.1958 S. C. 419. It does not signify the same import always, as a mathematical symbol does. As pointed out by Maxwell "In the enactment which makes it felony for anyone, being married, to marry again while the former marriage is in force the same word has obviously two different meanings, necessarily implying the validity of the marriage in the one case and as necessarily excluding it in the other." That, in the suit, the Munsiff has inherent jurisdiction to fix the annual mesne profits of the properties is not disputed. The contention is that the mesne profits having been fixed in the preliminary decree by the High Court, the Munsiff had no jurisdiction to refix it in the final decree passed by him. That a matter having been determined in the preliminary decree should not have been re-determined in the final decree in the same suit is a matter of judicial propriety rather than of inherent jurisdiction. It is akin to the plea of res judicata which "does not affect the jurisdiction of the court but is a plea in bar which a party is at liberty to waive" (A. I. R.1929 Cal. 163). It is akin to the plea of res judicata which "does not affect the jurisdiction of the court but is a plea in bar which a party is at liberty to waive" (A. I. R.1929 Cal. 163). In this respect, the fact that the preliminary decree was one passed by the High Court is immaterial; it is the conclusive ness of the findings in the preliminary decree that really matters and that does not depend on the fact whether the preliminary decree was by the court of first instance or of the last resort. Reliance was placed by counsel for the appellant in Bum Narain v. Bam Das (A. I. R.1929 All. 65) where a sub-division in the final decree of property directed to be divided by the preliminary decree was, in a direct appeal from the final decree, held by the Allahabad High Court to be beyond jurisdiction or legal competency. Apart from my disagreement with the ratio of that decision, I do not see how that decision is relevant here. Considerations in a direct appeal from a decree are different from those in a fresh suit where a decree in a prior suit is challenged as a nullity. Kusodhaj Bhukta v. Braja Mohan Bhukta (I. L. R.43 Cal. 217) cited by counsel for the respondents appears to be more in point with the present case. There, the plaintiff claimed, and the preliminary judgment gave him, 1/3 share in the suit properties, but the final decree gave him one-half of the properties. Dismissing a suit to declare the final decree as void for want of jurisdiction, Jenkins, C. J., with the concurrence of Holmwood, J., observed that a decree in a previous suit might be set aside on the ground of fraud "of the required character" but not on the ground of mistake; and that the case was one of 'mistake of the Court' which will not give a'cause of action' to any party. A mistake of Court can be rectified only by an appeal to a superior Court; it cannot be made the subject of another litigation. The facts being similar, the ratio of that case is apt to govern the controversy in this suit. Counsel contended that the fixation of mesne profits in the preliminary decree, not being liable to be varied in the further stages of the suit, was final in the suit. The facts being similar, the ratio of that case is apt to govern the controversy in this suit. Counsel contended that the fixation of mesne profits in the preliminary decree, not being liable to be varied in the further stages of the suit, was final in the suit. I may agree with him; but the consequence is not as counsel would have it. If in different stages of the same suit, or in different suits between the same parties, the same question happens to be decided differently, the later decision must be deemed to have superseded the earlier. The court below has held the plaintiffs to have failed to prove their title to the property claimed. They claim the property under a settlement or gift under Ext. D in their favour which is not shown to have been accepted by them before the impugned court-sale thereof. In Para.8 of the plaint, they averred that they have been in possession of the properties from the date of Ext. D (1947); but that statement has been challenged by the defendants in Para.7 of the written statement of defendants 1 and 3, and Para.11 of the written statement of the 2nd defendant. The 3rd plaintiff, examined as pw.1 has testified that the possession of the properties continued with the donor till her death, which was in September 1952 only. No other mode of acceptance of the gift under Ext. D is pleaded or proved. Admittedly, the donor had not even passed the deed of gift, Ext. D, to the donees. Till the donees have accepted a gift, it cannot be held to have come into effect. The court-sale was on March 20,1951, and its confirmation on May 17,1951. Appolonius Rozario was the owner of the properties on those dates. She died in September 1952, after her right to set aside the court-sale became barred under Art.12 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The plaintiffs, getting title to the properties after their donor's right of suit was barred, cannot have a fresh cause of action. It follows that the Subordinate Judge's finding that the plaintiffs have not made out their right of action in this suit is correct. 5. The appeal fails, and is dismissed hereby, with costs. Dismissed.