Order.- The fourth issue in the suit is "Has this Court jurisdiction to entertain the suit.?" This issue has been argued as a preliminary issue and since it goes to the root of the matter, namely, the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the suit, it has been felt desirable to give a finding on this issue now itself. The plaintiff is one P.S. Anant Narayan and there are two defendants. Both of them are foreign companies, the first Massey Ferguson, Ltd., is incorporated in Toronto Canada; and the second Massey Ferguson (India), Ltd., is incorporated in the United Kingdom. It is necessary to have a brief idea of the plaintiff’s case for the purpose of the issue of jurisdiction. The plaintiff was employed in the Tata Oil Mills Company, Ltd., Bombay. He went over to Canada in 1944 to undergo some training and for higher studies. While there, he came into contact with the foreign company called Massey Harris Co., Ltd., and they employed him as their representative in India. This was in 1945 and according to the plaintiff his employment was on a permanent basis. He of course had his prior appointment with the Tata Oil Mills Company, Ltd., terminated. He returned to India and worked as the representative of Massey Harris Co., Ltd., India, with headquarters in New Delhi till 1954. He was admitted to the pension scheme of Massey Harris Co., Ltd., according to which his normal age of retirement would be 65 years. In August, 1953 Massey Harris Co., Ltd., Toronto had acquired the entire world interest of Harry Ferguson, Ltd., Coventry, England, and for the purpose of convenience added the name Ferguson to their name so that their new name became Massey Harris Ferguson, Ltd., Now Harry Ferguson, Ltd., Coventry had been operating in India through its subsidiary company Harry Ferguson (India), Ltd., Bangalore. When Harry Ferguson, Ltd., Coventry, England was absorbed by Massey Harris Co., Ltd., Toronto, the activities of Harry Ferguson (India), Ltd., Bangalore, were also absorbed by Massey Harris Co., Ltd., that is, Massey Harris Ferguson, Ltd., Toronto. For operational purposes, the trading in India was continued in the name of Massey Harris Ferguson (India), Ltd. Consequent upon this, the New Delhi Office of the representative of Massey Harris, Co., Ltd., Toronto, in India, that is the plaintiff and two others was also transferred from New Delhi to Bangalore. For operational purposes, the trading in India was continued in the name of Massey Harris Ferguson (India), Ltd. Consequent upon this, the New Delhi Office of the representative of Massey Harris, Co., Ltd., Toronto, in India, that is the plaintiff and two others was also transferred from New Delhi to Bangalore. With effect therefore from 1st April, 1954, the plaintiff came to work at Bangalore with Massey Harris Ferguson (India), Ltd. His salary and expenses were paid in Indian rupee by that Company but it was only for administrative convenience and the plaintiff states that Massey Harris Ferguson, Ltd., Toronto was still paying a portion of his salary in Canada adjusting it as his contribution to the pension and insurance scheme at Toronto. According to him his employer was still the Massey Harris Ferguson, Ltd., Toronto, and Massey Harris Ferguson (India) Ltd., was only a representative of Massey Harris Ferguson, Ltd., Toronto. At this stage reference may be made to Exhibit P-58 which is a certified copy of the return made by Massey Harris Ferguson (India), Ltd., to the Registrar under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, under the provisions of section 593 (a) showing that the name of the company was changed from Massey Harris Ferguson (India), Ltd., to Massey Ferguson (India), Ltd., with effect from 1st April, 1958. It further shows that Massey Harris Ferguson (India), Ltd., had its established place of business in India at No. 4, Cunningham Road, Bangalore. This is with reference to the provisions of section 592 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 to which I shall refer in detail presently. Massey Ferguson (India), Ltd., the name of the company as altered is the second defendant in the present suit. The reason why I have thought fit and convenient to refer to Exhibit P-58 at the present stage is that the plaint itself does not clearly mention when and how the name of Massey Harris Ferguson (India), Ltd., was changed as Massey Ferguson (India), Ltd., Bangalore. In fact paragraph 20 reads as though the change had been effected even on 1st April, 1954. Nothing however turns on that so far as the present issue is concerned. In fact paragraph 20 reads as though the change had been effected even on 1st April, 1954. Nothing however turns on that so far as the present issue is concerned. Again it will be noted that the first defendant is the suit is described as Massey Ferguson, Ltd., and there is no express statement in the plaint as to how and when the name of Massey Harris Ferguson (India), Ltd. who according to the plaint is the employer of the plaintiff became altered as Massey Ferguson, Ltd. But it is assumed in the plaint that the first defendant company Massey Ferguson, Ltd., is none other than Massey Harris Ferguson, Ltd. That again is not a point on which anything material turns so far as the present issue is concerned. We must proceed on the basis that according to the plaint the first defendant company is his employer and the second defendant is the representative of the first defendant. In fact that is the averment in paragraph 25 of the plaint. In 1960 due to industralisation policy of the Government of India, it became necessary to start the manufacture of agricultural tractors and farm machinery in India. The Toronto company of which the United Kingdom company was a part evolved a plan to form a new company to be registered in India to manufacture Massey Ferguson products. The company thus formed was Tractors and Farm Equipment (P.) Ltd., briefly known as Tafe. With the exception of the plaintiff and a few others, all the permanent employees of Massey Ferguson (India), Ltd., Bangalore, were absorbed by Tafe but the plaintiff’s services were terminated by notice dated 30th November, 1960 from the Resident Director, Massey Ferguson (India), Ltd., Bangalore with effect from 1st January, 1961. The plaintiff complains that this was a breach of the permanent contract of service entered into by the first defendant company in 1945 and says that the first defendant company is therefore liable for the breach in damages and that the second defendant as the representative of the first defendant and as the person who actually issued the notice is also liable. The suit was filed on 30th November, 1961, claiming a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 as damages. The suit was filed on 30th November, 1961, claiming a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 as damages. Section 592 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956, so far as is material states: “(1) Foreign companies which, after the commencement of this Act, establish a place of business, within India, shall within one month of the establishment of the place of business deliver to the Registrar for registration:- (a) a certified copy of the charter, statutes or memorandum and articles of the company or other instrument constituting or defining the constitution of the company, and if the instrument is not in the English language, a certified translation thereof; (b) the full address of the registered or principal office of the company; (c) a list of the directors and secretary of the company, containing the particulars mentioned in sub-section (2); (d) the name and address or the names and addresses of some one or more persons resident in India authorised to accept on behalf of the company service of process and any notices or other documents required to be served on the company; and (e) the full address of the office of the company in India which is to be deemed its principal place of business in India.” Section 593 of the Act says that if any alteration is made or occurs in, among other things, the principal place of business of the company in India, the company shall deliver to the Registrar a return containing the prescribed particulars of the alteration in compliance with the provisions of section 592. Massey Ferguson (India), Ltd., had given No. 4, Cunningham Road, Bangalore, as their address, but with effect from 3rdMarch, 1961, it was shifted to No. 12, McLean Street, Madras-1 and the name of the persons resident in India authorised to accept on behalf of the company service of process and other notices or documents required to be served on the company under section 592(1)(d) was mentioned as Messrs. Fraser and Ross, Chartered Accountants, No. 12, McLean Street, Madras-1. This is not disputed. That is why the second defendant is thus described in the cause-title, of the plaint: "Massey Ferguson (India), Ltd., formerly of No. 4, Cunningham Road, Banglaore, now at No. 12 McLean Street., G.T., Madras." Paragraph 3 of the plaint also refers to Messrs. Fraser and Ross at No. 12, McLean Street, G.T., Madras. This is not disputed. That is why the second defendant is thus described in the cause-title, of the plaint: "Massey Ferguson (India), Ltd., formerly of No. 4, Cunningham Road, Banglaore, now at No. 12 McLean Street., G.T., Madras." Paragraph 3 of the plaint also refers to Messrs. Fraser and Ross at No. 12, McLean Street, G.T., Madras. Though the plaint states that both the defendants have given the address under section 592 of the Companies Act, 1956, as that of Messrs. Fraser & Ross, No. 12, McLean St., G. T., Madras-1, the statement is correct only in respect of the second defendant but not in respect of the first defendant. Factually it does not appear that the first defendant as such has furnished any address to the Registrar under section 592 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956. Application No. 2062 of 1961 was filed by the plaintiff seeking leave of the Court to file the suit and leave was granted. The application for leave quoted Clause 12 of the Letters Patent but the affidavit in support of the application does not mention any facts material for obtaining leave. The position in that respect has to be explained further because that is the main contention of the counsel for the defendants on the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. Clause 12, so far as is material, says: "And we do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Madras in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, shall be empowered to receive, try and determine suits of every description if, in the case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property shall be situated or, in all other cases, if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly, or, in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the said High Court, or if the. defendants at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business, or personally work for gain within such limits." With reference to Clause 12, it will be seen that in order to obtain leave of the Court it is necessary to state that the cause of action had arisen in part within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of this Court. The affidavit does not contain such an averment but refers to the plaint. The relevant portion of the plaint relating to the cause of action is para. 27 and it reads: "The cause of action for the suit arose partly in Canada where the contract of service was entered into in November, 1945 and, partly in Bangalore, where the wrongful termination was effected in November, 1960, and partly in Madras, where the first and second defendants have furnished their address for service of process and where the defendants have their registered office from 1st January, 1961." It is a question for consideration whether on the allegations in the plaint any part of the cause of action can be said to have been arisen within the limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of this Court. In fact the whole scope of the contention of the two defendants on the question of jurisdiction as raised in the written statement is that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court and that the obtaining of leave cannot be availed of by the plaintiff to any extent (vide paragraphs 3 and 23 of the written statement of the first defendant and paragraphs 3 and 22 of the written statement of the second defendant). Sri V.K. Thiruvenkatachari, the then Advocate-General, who appeared for the plaintiff along with Sri T.M. Kasthuri and Sri A.K. Sriraman, no doubt faintly relied on the grant of leave, but beyond just mentioning it, he did not argue the point, and Sri T.M. Kasthuri and Sri Sriraman who continued the arguments have not endeavoured to pursue the point. To put it at the least, I doubt very much whether on the allegations in the plaint any part of the cause of action can be said to have arisen in Madras, and that being the case I do not think the grant of leave can avail the plaintiff to any extent. I therefore turn to the main argument for the plaintiff to sustain the jurisdiction of this Court. " The main attempt of the plaintiff’s learned Counsel was indeed to sustain the jurisdiction of this Court not so much on the provisions of clause 12 of the Letters Patent but on the grounds of the Rules of Private International Law relating to foreign companies as defendants. " The main attempt of the plaintiff’s learned Counsel was indeed to sustain the jurisdiction of this Court not so much on the provisions of clause 12 of the Letters Patent but on the grounds of the Rules of Private International Law relating to foreign companies as defendants. They urged that what the plaintiff is keen on is to secure a judgment of this Court which will be recognised as internationally valid, by say the Courts in Toronto and in United Kingdom if it became necessary to enforce this judgment in the respective places of incorporation of the two defendants. Hence they urged that the criteria which must be applied for deciding the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present suit must be judged according to the Rules of Private International Law, and in particular the Rules by which a foreign Court, say, of Canada or United Kingdom, will recognise a judgment of this Court. As a corollary of this it is urged that the criteria which must be applied by this Court on the question of jurisdiction must be those Rules of Private International Law relating to foreign companies figuring as defendants. It is said that there are two such criteria which are relevant as conferring jurisdiction on this Court: (1) the presence of the foreign company within the jurisdiction of this Court at the time of the institution of the suit or the service of summons, and (2) submission by the foreign company to the jurisdiction of this Court. It is urged that both the criteria have been satisfied in the case of each of the defendants. It is said that the existence of jurisdiction in the International sense cannot be excluded by the terms of the limitation of the jurisdiction of this Court contained in clause 12 of the Letters Patent. It is further argued that even if, for the sake of argument, clause 12 of the Letters Patent should be held to be the limiting factor, the criterian of clause 12 has also been satisfied in that each defendant can be said to dwell or carry on business within the limits of this Court. It is further argued that even if, for the sake of argument, clause 12 of the Letters Patent should be held to be the limiting factor, the criterian of clause 12 has also been satisfied in that each defendant can be said to dwell or carry on business within the limits of this Court. The criteria prescribed in Clause 12 of the Latters Patent governing the jurisdiction of this Court are primarily intended to demarcate the sphere of jurisdiction of this Court and the subordinate Courts in this State or of other Courts in this country, and are not directed to the determination of the jurisdiction from the international point of view. Thus, if the cause of action wholly arises within the jurisdiction of this Court, that alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court under clause 12 and that is one of the primary criteria for the jurisdiction of the Court. But in Private International Law the cause of action is irrelevant. In other words, merely because the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court’s judgment cannot be expected to be recognised in a foreign Court. It is indeed well settled that such criteria as cause of action which are good determinants of the jurisdiction of the Court from the domestic or local point of view may not be valid to give international efficacy to the judgment of the Court. The criteria which determine the international efficacy of the judgment of a Court are different. Now, so far as it will be necessary for the plaintiff to secure a judgment which can be expected to be recognised by foreign countries like Canada or United Kingdom, it seems to me he is justified in asking the Court to hold that if this Court can pronounce a judgment which can be expected to be recognised by these foreign Courts under the Rules of Private International Law, it has jurisdiction to try the suit irrespective of the criteria prescribed under clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Further, in so far as jurisdiction can be derived with reference to the relevant provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1956, it would seem to be a valid ground for the existence of jurisdiction in view of clause 44 of the Letters Patent Clause 14 runs: "And we do further ordain and declare that all the provisions of these Our Letters Patent are subject to the Legislative powers of the Governor-General in the Legislative Council, and also of the Governor-General-in-Council under section 71 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and also of the Governor-General in cases of emergency under section 72 of the Act, and may be in all respects amended and altered thereby." Now, in the place of " Legislative powers of the Governor-General in the Legislative Council" we may substitute "the powers of Parliament under the Constitution of India, List 1 of the Union List, VII Schedule, under Article 246 of the Constitution. The Companies Act, 1956, is a valid Act passed under the provisions of the VII Schedule, in particular under Item 16 (foreign jurisdiction) and Item 44 (Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations whether trading or not with objects not confined to one State, but not includiug universities), Section 596 of the Companies Act says that: “any process, notice or other document required to be served on a foreign company shall be deemed to be sufficiently served if addressed to any person whose name has been delivered to the Registrar under the foregoing provisions of this part and left at or sent by post to the address which has been so delivered.” If the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, sections 592 to 596, are sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court with respect to either or both of the two defendants, the existence of jurisdiction derived from such provisions will be saved by Article 44 of the Letters Patent from the limiting provisions of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. I shall therefore concentrate on the question whether, according to the Rules of Private International Law, this Court has jurisdiction against the two defendants. It will be convenient to take up first the case of the second defendant. I shall therefore concentrate on the question whether, according to the Rules of Private International Law, this Court has jurisdiction against the two defendants. It will be convenient to take up first the case of the second defendant. As already stated the second defendant had before the date of the filing of the suit given to the Registrar under the Companies Act the name and address of Fraser &38; Ross, No. 12 McLean Street, Madras-1, for the purpose of section 592(d)and(e). Thus in Exhibit P-55 dated 23rd March, 1961 Fraser & Ross write back to the plaintiff thus: “We have to inform you that we have been appointed as the persons authorised to accept service of process and documents on behalf of the company under section 592(1)(d) of the Companies Act. In these circumstances, any notices which you may wish to send to the company may be addressed to us if you so desire, and we will then pass the same on to the company in England for its attention.” Exhibit P-57 is a certified copy issued by the Registrar of Companies to the plaintiff showing the list of places furnished by the second defendant to the Registrar pursuant to section 594(3) and that mentions the principal place of business, as No. 12, McLean Street, Madras-1, and the persons authorised under section 592(1)(d) as Fraser and Ross in the above premises. Now this shows two things. The first is that under the companies Act, 1956,the second defendant stated that No.12, McLean Street, Madras-1, was his principal place of business and secondly that it mentioned Fraser and Ross, No. 12, McLean Street, Madras-1, as the persons authorised to accept on behalf of the company service of process and any notice or other document required to be served on the company. I have already drawn attention to section 596 which says that any process, notice or other document required to be served on the foreign company shall be deemed to be sufficiently served if addressed to the person whose name has been delivered to the Registrar under the foregoing provisions. Now, that was the address which the plaintiff utilised for service on the second defendant. Now, that was the address which the plaintiff utilised for service on the second defendant. But apart from the fact, the very furnishing of that address under section 592(e) and the name Fraser and Ross under section 592 (d) is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court according to the Rules of Private International Law so far as the second defendant is concerned. This conclusion can be reached from two lines of approach though in essence the two lines of approach are really two different aspects of the same thing. The first line of approach is to consider what for instance the High Court in England would do, if it were asked to try a suit such as this against a foreign company, that is, a company not incorporated in England and say incorporated in Germany or France. The second line of approach is whether the Courts in England would recognise the judgment given by this Court against the second defendant if and when the plaintiff seeks to enforce that judgment in the Courts in England. So far as the second defendant is concerned, whichever line of approach is pursued, the answer is in favour of the plaintiff. It may be useful to point out that the leading text books on Private International Law like Cheshire’s Private International Law or Dicey’s Conflict of Laws also treat the subject from these two lines of approach. Thus in Cheshire’s Private International Law, Chapter IV, section B the competence of English Courts to entertain cases that involve some foreign element is discussed. (Pages 104 to 121, Fifth Edition, 1957, pages 106 to 127 of the Sixth edition, 1961). That is the first line of approach. In Chapter XVII relating to foreign judgments in Part III, ‘Actionability of Foreign Judgments’ under the heading “Pre-requisites of actionability” the competence of the foreign Court is discussed (pages 608 to 626 of 5th edition and pages 640 to 658 of the 6th edition) and the opening sentence is revealing: “The first overruling essentia] for effectiveness of a foreign judgment in England is that the adjudicating Court should have had jurisdiction in the international sense over the defendant.” That is the second line of approach. Similarly in Dicey’s Conflict of Laws, 7th edition, 1958, the first line of approach relevant for us, namely, jurisdiction of the English Court over a foreign defendant in actions in personam is discussed in Rules 23, 25 and 26 and the international validity of foreign judgments recognised in England is discussed in Chapter 29, Rule 189. Taking the first line of approach, Cheshire has redrafted the first few pages of Chapter IV, section-B in his sixth edition, but for our present purposes it may be taken that there is no substantial difference. He emphasised that there are two principles governing the jurisdiction of the English Court to entertain cases involving a foreign element; the first, the principle of effectiveness and the second, the principle of submission. The principle of effectiveness is the more dominant principle where there is a conflict between the two principles. The principle of effectiveness means that a Judge is not competent to pronounce a judgment if he cannot enforce it within his own territory. Power in this connection signifies physical power that exists when the property which is the subject-matter of the suit is in England or when the defendant is present in England at the time of the service of the writ. So far as actions in personam are concerned, what matters is the presence of the foreigner. If he is served with the King’s writ when he is present in England, the Court can compel him subsequently to submit to the decree and will have jurisdiction. Cheshire has criticised this criterion as suffering from the infirmity that a foreign Court is not likely to respect a judgment founded on such transitory presence of the foreigner in England. But Cheshire himself recognises that that is the law in England and that unless the matter is altered by statute, there is no escape from the proposition that mere transient presence of the defendant in England, however short his stay may be, renders him amenable to the jurisdiction of English Courts (vide page 109 of fifth edition). But Cheshire himself recognises that that is the law in England and that unless the matter is altered by statute, there is no escape from the proposition that mere transient presence of the defendant in England, however short his stay may be, renders him amenable to the jurisdiction of English Courts (vide page 109 of fifth edition). Perhaps the juristic justification for this rule in England is that when a writ or notice is served while the defendant is in England, the action itself could be tried forthwith and the defendant could be asked to obey it and therefore the defendant cannot avoid that result merely because he is permitted to return to his country after being served with the writ. With respect to the other principle of submission, Cheshire expressly refers only to what may be called advance submission, that is, even a foreigner may contract explicitly or implicitly to submit to the jurisdiction of a Court to which he would not otherwise be subject. Thus in the case of an international contract, it is a common and extensive practice that the parties, one or even both of whom, some resident abroad, do agree that any dispute arising between them shall be settled by the English Court or by an arbitrator in England. The party to such a contract having consented to the jurisdiction cannot afterwards contest the binding effect of the judgment (vide pages 108 and 109 of sixth edition and page 106 of fifth edition of Cheshire). Cheshire then points out that the basic principle of English law that no action in personam will lie against a defendant unless he has been served with the writ while present in England or unless he has submitted to the jurisdiction, often precludes the plaintiff from enforcing a claim in what under the circumstances is the most proper forum. For instance, the fact that a tort is committed in England or that a contract has been made and broken in England does not alone render the English Court competent even though the defendant is domiciled and ordinarily resident in the country, he cannot be served with the writ in England or he does not submit to the jurisdiction. For instance, the fact that a tort is committed in England or that a contract has been made and broken in England does not alone render the English Court competent even though the defendant is domiciled and ordinarily resident in the country, he cannot be served with the writ in England or he does not submit to the jurisdiction. Even an English debtor can escape abroad before the issue of the writ and in such a case the judicial machinery of England cannot be put in motion and the only remedy of the aggrieved party in such a case is to follow the wrong-doer to his place of residence in accordance with the maxim actor sequitur forum rei. (The plaintiff follows the Court). Owing to considerations of this nature an entirely new kind of jurisdiction, generally called assumed jurisdiction, was introduced by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, which gave the Courts a discretionary power to summon absent defendants, whether English or foreign. The exercise of this jurisdiction is now governed by Order 2, of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Order 2, Rule 1(e), for instance, provides for such power where the action is brought to enforce, rescind, dissolve, annul or otherwise affect the contract or to recover damages or other relief for or in respect of breach of contract in the cases specified there, one of which is where the contract is made in England or where the action is in respect of breach which has in fact been committed in England or a contract wherever made. Similarly Order 11, Rule 1 (ee) speaks of a case where action is founded on tort committed within the jurisdiction (of England); Order 11, Rule 1 (g) speaks of a case when any person out of jurisdiction is a necessary or proper party to an action properly brought against some other person duly served within the jurisdiction. Taking Dicey we have the following general principles 3 and 4 at page 171: “3. The Courts of any country are considered by English Law to have jurisdiction over (i.e., to be able to adjudicate upon) any matter with regard to which they can give an effective judgment, and are considered by English Law not to have jurisdiction over (i.e., not to be able to adjudicate upon) any matter with regard to which they cannot give an effective judgment. 4. 4. The Courts of any country are considered by English Law to have jurisdiction over any person who voluntarily submits to their jurisdiction.” Rule 23 stated by him is: “The Court has jurisdiction in an action where any person who has by his conduct precluded himself from objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court.” This is on the principle of submission. Illustrations 3 and 4 therein may be referred to. Rule 25 states: “When the defendant in an action in personam is at the time for the service of the writ in England, the Court has jurisdiction in respect of any cause of action in whatever country such cause of action arises, subject however in the case of actions under Carriage by Air Act, 1932, or in respect of claims to which section 4 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1956, applies and the limitation therein respectively contained.” Under this rule (pages 177 and 178) under the heading “ Where the defendant is a corporation” the author refers to the provisions of sections 407 to 414 of the English Companies Act, 1948, corresponding to sections 592 to 596 of the Indian Companies Act and points out that where service is effected in accordance with such provisions it is a valid service against the foreign corporation, and it is observed: “ The ground of this rule is that the establishment of business means submission to English jurisdiction.” Three cases are quoted in support and they will be discussed in due course by me. Then he states Rule 26 thus: “When the defendant in an action in personam is, at the time for the service of the writ not in England, the Court has (subject to the exceptions hereinafter mentioned) no jurisdiction to entertain the action.” The exceptions are generally those mentioned in Order 11 Rules 1 and 2 (a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Thus in effect both Dicey and Cheshire agree on the general principles and circumstances under which the English Court will have a jurisdiction in actions in personam over a foreign defendant. Reference may also be made to the special chapters relating to Corporations in the two books (Cheshire’s Book, Chapter 7, Part 7, pages 193 to 202 of fifth edition, pages 199 to 209 of sixth edition and in Dicery’s book, Chapter 16, in particular pages 476 and 477). Reference may also be made to the special chapters relating to Corporations in the two books (Cheshire’s Book, Chapter 7, Part 7, pages 193 to 202 of fifth edition, pages 199 to 209 of sixth edition and in Dicery’s book, Chapter 16, in particular pages 476 and 477). I stated above that Dicey has referred to three cases at page 178 (note 12) of his book with reference to the position of foreign corporation as defendants in England. Those cases are Employers Liability Assurance Corporation v. Sedgwick Collins &38; Co.1, Sebatier v. The Trading Co.2 and The Madrid3. Of these three cases it is necessary to refer in detail to the first case because it is a case decided by the highest authority in England, the House of Lords, and is very useful for the case before us. The facts were these. A Russian Insurance Company (called the Russia Insurance Co.) having its principal office at Petrograd and a branch office in London in accordance with section 274 of the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908 (corresponding to section 407 of the Act of 1948 and section 592 of the Indian Act) filed with the Registrar of Companies in England the name of one Collins as its authorised representative to accept service of process on its behalf. By a series of decrees passed in 1918 the Soviet Government purported to put all Insurance Companies in Russia into liquidation and to appropriate their property. In the spring of 1923 Collins sent a notice to the Registrar that the company which he represented had ceased to exist and at his request the notice was placed upon the file. But his name was not removed. In the summer of the same year Sedgwick Collins &38; Co., Ltd., (respondents before the House of Lords) brought an action against the Company by specially endorsed writ for payment of a sum of money claimed to be due to them in respect of certain insurance transactions. The writ was served upon Collins. He protested that he had no power to act for the Company but the protest was not heeded and the judgment was signed in default of his appearance. The writ was served upon Collins. He protested that he had no power to act for the Company but the protest was not heeded and the judgment was signed in default of his appearance. In 1924, Sedgwick Collins & Co., Ltd., in execution of the judgment, obtained a garnishee order nisi attaching the liability of debts due from Employer’s Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., (the appellant before the House of Lords) to the judgment-debtors (Russian company). The Employer’s Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., took out summons against Sedgwick Collins & Co., to have the judgment (in the action against the Russian Company) set aside, and the respondents (Sedgwick Collins &38; Co. Ltd.), applied to have the garnishee order nisi made absolute or an issue directed as to whether the debts were really due from the appellant to the Russian Company. The Master, and on appeal, Fraser, J. dismissed both the applications. Shortly after that an order was made for winding up of that Company in England. The Court of Appeal, after ascertaining from the liquidator that he did not propose to question the judgment which had been obtained by the respondents against the Russian Company, refused to set aside the judgment, and, as regards the garnishee proceedings, they directed an issue as to whether as contended by the Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., no debt was due from them to the judgment-debtors. The Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., preferred the appeals which came up before the House of Lords. All the five Lords agreed that the appeals should be dismissed. But while four of the Lords were in agreement on the points now relevant for us, the fifth, Lord Blanesburgh differed on the short ground of the fact of the winding up order. It is necessary to explain in detail the ground of the decision of the several Lords. Viscount Cave, L.C., pointed out in the first place that the decrees in Russia did not have the effect of dissolving those insurance companies but only put them into liquidation. The difference was thus explained. A company which has been dissolved no longer exists as a corporate entity capable of holding property or being sued in any Court, but a company in liquidation, although the administration of its affairs has passed to the liquidators, retains its corporate existence. The difference was thus explained. A company which has been dissolved no longer exists as a corporate entity capable of holding property or being sued in any Court, but a company in liquidation, although the administration of its affairs has passed to the liquidators, retains its corporate existence. If the liquidation should be annulled, the company will resume its title to any property and in the meantime it retains its title to any property not taken away from it, including, in the particular case, the property and rights of the company in countries foreign to Russia which were not effectively taken from it by the Russian legislation, so that the decrees of Russian Courts did not constitute an impediment to the validity of the judgment obtained against them by the respondents. It was contended by the appellants that the judgment was defective as having been obtained under a writ served upon Collins after the Russian Company had ceased to carry on business in England and after the notice of 27th March, 1923 had been sent to the Registrar and entered in the file. Viscount Cave repelled this ‘contention’ on two grounds. The first is that the name of Collins still remained upon the file as representing the Russian Company at the time the writ was served upon them and secondly, long after the Russian Company had ceased to carry on business in England and had been put into liquidation Collins was conducting correspondence on behalf of that Company. Viscount Cave proceeded to point out that there was a further answer in that the liquidator appointed after the liquidation in England had stated that he was not contesting the validity of the judgment obtained by the respondents against the Russian company and that put the matter beyond controversy. As against that, the appellants urged that that was not enough to free them from risk so far as Russia was concerned because the Russian Government might not recognise the validity of the judgment and might still ask the appellants to pay over to the Russian Company or its successor amounts due from the appellants. Viscount Cave repelled this argument, observing that under the Rules of International Law which the Russian Government could be expected to recognise, the judgment was valid on the ground of express or implied submission to the jurisdiction of the Court in England. Viscount Cave repelled this argument, observing that under the Rules of International Law which the Russian Government could be expected to recognise, the judgment was valid on the ground of express or implied submission to the jurisdiction of the Court in England. He observed: "......The Russian Company, having in accordance with the Companies Act, put upon file the name of a person authorised to accept on its behalf service of any process, thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of the English Courts and is bound by the Judgment obtained in those Courts.' Lord Shaw agreed with Viscount Cave. Lord Sumner, after stating that the Russian Insurance Company was doing both original insurance business and reinsurance in England, employing Collins as their agent, and that to satisfy the requirements of section 274 of the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908, Collins had registered his name, observed that that in itself constituted complete submission to the jurisdiction of the High Court revocable only by the Company’s own act. At page 108 he observed: ".....having submitted to the jurisdiction before and at the commencement of the proceedings, the company must be deemed, in the absence of any provision to the contrary, to continue to submit to the jurisdiction throughout, and that this judgment, signed after due service in default of appearance, is one which is binding on the foreign company and ought to be regarded in all foreign civil jurisdiction." At page 110 he observed that the service on Collins was valid. At page 112 he reiterated that there was effective submission to the jurisdiction of the English Court on the part of the defendants and it could therefore be assumed that the Russian Courts would recognise the judgment. Lord Parmoor emphasised two reasons why in his opinion the judgment was valid ; (1) that the service on Collins who had been named by the Russian Company under section 274 amounted to the presence of the Russian company at the time of the service of that writ and (2) that the Russian Company by filing with the Registrar of Companies the name and address of Collins submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of English Courts and on that account could not subsequently be heard to object to such jurisdiction. Incidentally, with reference to the first point, he pointed out that the main object of section 274 was to take away any difficulty in the service of writ on foreign companies carrying on business in England, and in effect to place a foreign corporation for that purpose on the same footing as an English company and liable to the service of writ under a similar form of procedure. At page 116 he pointed out that so long as the name of Collins remained on the register, service on him was equivalent to service on the Russian company. He further observed that the Russian Insurance Company having taken advantage of the municipal law in England in order to secure business footing in England, the Government of Russia would recognise the conditions upon which alone its national, that is the Insurance Company, had obtained that advantage. Lord Blanesburgh, however, differed from this last mentioned reason, observing that the purpose of section 274 of the Companies Act, 1948, as well as of its predecessor, section 35 of the Act of 1907 when it first appeared in statutory form, was not to lay down the conditions on which the foreign company might establish itself for business purposes in England in the sense that failure to comply with such conditions would result in termination of the business of the foreign Company. In the opinion of Lord Blanesburgh, the only consequence of non-compliance with the provisions of section 274 would be the penalty of fine indicated in the Act and otherwise the foreign Company would not be restricted in the exercise of any lawful activity or hindered in the vindication of any of its rights. Lord Blanesburgh made these preliminary remarks so that the question might be considered without being influenced by such considerations. He then proceeded to observe that the service on Collins was not effective service and would not amount to submission because on the facts of that case it was known to Sedgwick, Collins &38; Co., that Collins had sent a letter to the Registrar stating that the company had ceased to exist according to the decrees of Russia. He then proceeded to observe that the service on Collins was not effective service and would not amount to submission because on the facts of that case it was known to Sedgwick, Collins &38; Co., that Collins had sent a letter to the Registrar stating that the company had ceased to exist according to the decrees of Russia. But in the opinion of Lord Blanesburgh the subsequent proceedings of the winding up of the company in England by Romer, J. in the course of which the liquidator affirmed the correctness and validity of the judgment which had been obtained previously by Sedgwick, Collins &38; Co., had international validity which would be recognised in Russia also. It was on that limited ground that he agreed that the appeals be dismissed. Now Viscount Cave, Lord Shaw, Lord Sumner and Lord Parmoor agreed in this, that the Russian Company, having given the name of Collins under section 274 of the Companies Act, 1908, submitted to the jurisdiction of the English Court and that the service on Collins was good service. Lord Parmoor puts it on an additional ground, namely, that at the time of service of the writ, the Russian Company was present in England. This case was followed by Clauson, J. in Sebatier v. The Trading Co.1and by Bucknill, J. in The Madrid2. Historically it may be pointed out that even before the enactment of the statutory provision in section 35 of the English Companies Act of 1908 (corresponding to section 592 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956) the position was the same even at Common Law.-See Higgin v. Comptoir D’ Escompte De Paris3, referred to by Lord Blanesburgh in Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation v. Sedgwick, Collins &38; Co.4. On this line of approach it must be held that the second defendant company, having furnished the name of Fraser and Ross, No. 12 McLean Street, Madras-1, in compliance with the provisions of section 592(d) and (e) and section 594(3), thereby indicating Madras as their principal place of business and Fraser and Ross as the persons authorised to accept service of process on behalf of the company, has in advance submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court and such submission would clothe this Court with jurisdiction in the international sense so as to be recognised by Courts in England where the second defendant is incorporated. I shall now take the second line of approach and discuss the ground on which judgments of foreign Courts are usually recognised. So far as the second defendant is concerned, the question will be the circumstances under which a judgment given by this Court against the second defendant will be recognised in England where that company is incorporated. As already stated, the subject is discussed in Chapter 17 of Cheshire on Foreign Judgments, in particular in section 3-A; and Chapter 29, in particular Rule 189 in Dicey. There are statutory enactments (Judgments Extension Act, 1863, Administration of Justice Act, 1920, Foreign (Judgments Reciprocal Enforcement Act 1933) under which foreign judgments can be registered in England to have the same efficacy as a judgment obtained in England. But apart from such cases, the categories of cases of foreign judgments which will be recognised in England indeed seem to be well settled as laid down in Emanuel v. Symon5 by Buckley, L.J. and in Rousillon v. Rousillon6 by Fry, J. Buckley, L.J. said: “In actions in personam there are five cases in which the Courts of this country will enforce a foreign judgment: (1) where the defendant is a subject of the foreign country in which the judgment has been obtained; (2) where he was resident in the foreign country when the action began; (3) where the defendant in the character of plaintiff has selected the forum in which he is afterwards sued; (4) where he has voluntarily appeared; and (5) where he has contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the judgment was obtained.” Cheshire points out that the last four cases given by the learned judge are covered by the two elements, presence and submission, and so far as the first case is concerned he expresses his own doubt about the juristic justification of the rule. But we are not concerned with that now. The treatment in Dicey also, though it is primarily from the point of view of the provisions of the Foreign Judgment Reciprocal Enforcement Act, 1933, also ultimately leads to the same results. But we are not concerned with that now. The treatment in Dicey also, though it is primarily from the point of view of the provisions of the Foreign Judgment Reciprocal Enforcement Act, 1933, also ultimately leads to the same results. Now it will be seen that, in so far as the second defendant, has, in compliance with the provisions of sections 592 to 596 of the Companies Act, submitted returns mentioning No. 12, McLean Street, Madras-1, as their principal place of business, and Fraser and Ross at that address as persons authorised to receive summons etc. on their behalf, it is a case where the second defendant will come under the fifth of the cases laid down by Buckley, L.J., namely, the defendant has contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the judgment was obtained. This is really a case of advance submission and does not offer any great difficulty. It would seem that in addition, the case of the second defendant would fall under the fourth of the cases laid down by Buckley L.J., namely, where the defendant has voluntarily appeared. That is because the second defendant has not merely stopped with protesting the jurisdiction of this Court (under clause 12 of the Letters Patent) but has gone on to plead on the merits of the case. Now it is well settled that so far as England is concerned, a judgment which may be rendered by this Court against the second defendant in such circumstances will be internationally valid and will have recognition in England. Whether the defendant can be held to have voluntarily appeared is in the last resort, a question depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. But for the purpose of the case against the second defendant, it is sufficient to emphasise that there is unanimity of opinion that where as in this case, the defendant has besides entering protest against the jurisdiction of this Court, gone on to plead on the merits of the case, he must be held to have voluntarily appeared and submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court, which submission itself will give jurisdiction to this Court in the international sen e to proceed to try the case against the second defendant and render a judgment which would be effective in international law and recognised as such in England. In Dicey, Rule 189 states thus "Subject to the provisos to this Rule, a Court of a foreign country has jurisdiction to give judgment in personam capable of enforcement in England in the following cases: First Case-If the judgment-debtor being a defendant in the original Court, submitted to the jurisdiction of that Court by voluntarily appearing in the proceedings otherwise than for the purpose of protecting, or obtaining the release of property seized or threatened with seizures, in the proceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction of that Court. ******* At page 1021 there is the following commentary ; "The first case-Appearance-This case rests on the simple and universally admitted principle that a litigant who has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of a Court by appearing before it cannot afterwards dispute its jurisdiction. Where such a litigant, though a defendant rather than a plaintiff, appears and pleads to the merits, without protesting the jurisdiction, there-is clearly a voluntary submission. This is held to be such also where he does indeed protest the jurisdiction but nevertheless proceeds further to plead to the merits." Four cases are quoted in support of the last sentence. They are Boissiere v. Brockner1 , Guiard v. De Clermont2, Richardson v. Allen3and Luke v. Mayoh4. Of these two alone are available in the High Court library, namely Boissiers v. Brockner1 and Guiard v. De Clermont 2and they support the proposition laid down. It is unnecessary to discuss the facts of those cases in detail. It may perhaps be, however, of interest to note that at one time the extreme view appears to have been held in England that even in cases where the defendant appears merely to protest against the jurisdiction of the Court but does not plead on merits, that itself would be a case of voluntary appearance. But according to later judicial opinion, the tide is setting in the opposite direction: See In re Dulles’ Settlement (No. 2) Dulles v. Vidler5, explaining the earlier case of Harris v. Taylor6. So far as the second defendant is concerned, it is relevant to note that even in this later case, In re Dulle’s Settlement (No. 2) Dulles v. Vidler1, there are clear observations to the effect that where, in addition to protesting against jurisdiction, the defendant pleads on the merits of the case, it will amount to voluntary submission. So far as the second defendant is concerned, it is relevant to note that even in this later case, In re Dulle’s Settlement (No. 2) Dulles v. Vidler1, there are clear observations to the effect that where, in addition to protesting against jurisdiction, the defendant pleads on the merits of the case, it will amount to voluntary submission. The principle is simple namely, thatone of the elements conferring jurisdiction from the international point of view is submission to the foreign Court, and where, in spite of the defendant being under no obligation to appear before the foreign Court, he chooses to do so for reasons best known to himself and pleads on the merits, it must be held that he has submitted to the jurisdiction and cannot afterwards object to the exercise of the jurisdiction against him by the foreign Court. Very often there may be some underlying motive for such appearance and pleading on merits, though it may not be apparent on the surface. For instance, the defendant may have the chance of acquiring some assets in the foreign country or his business may take him there and he may want to avoid proceedings against such assets or against his person and may on account of that reason think it worthwhile to contest the suit in the foreign Court on the merits and obtain a decision in his favour: where he takes the chance of such decision in his favour, he cannot afterwards turn round and say that the Court had no jurisdiction against him. The decision of the foreign Court rendered in such circumstances creates a legal obligation on him to obey that judgment. Though, so far as the second defendant is concerned, the enquiry may be primarily confined to the question as to how far the Courts in England will recognise a judgment rendered by this Court and therefore we need have to consider only the circumstances under which the foreign judgment will be recognised in England, still it will not be out of place to note that in India too, according to the decided cases, foreign judgments will be recognised under precisely the same circumstances as in England. The list of five categories of cases given by Buckley, L.J., has been adopted without dissent in two decisions of this Court: Ramanathan Chettiar v. Kalimuthu Pillai2and Rama Ayyar v. Krishna Pattar3. The list of five categories of cases given by Buckley, L.J., has been adopted without dissent in two decisions of this Court: Ramanathan Chettiar v. Kalimuthu Pillai2and Rama Ayyar v. Krishna Pattar3. These are cases where the judgment in a foreign Court was recognised by this Court. Another case which may be referred to is Subramania Ayyar v. Annaswami Ayyar4. Even according to the principles laid down in these cases, the fact that the second defendant has pleaded on the merits of the case will be a circumstance which will give jurisdiction to this Court against him. It may be added that in addition, the second defendant has given a power-of-attorney to Fraser and Ross, dated 26th June, 1962 to defend the suit not merely in this Court but also in any further appeals and in the stages of execution. That only confirms the intention of the second defendant to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court. Sri V. Tyagarajan appearing for the second defendant, however, urges that the principle of the validity of a foreign judgment in a case where the defendant has voluntarily appeared and submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court cannot be invoked by this Court because according to the Counsel he has argued the question of jurisdiction before the trial has commenced and this Court has not yet delivered the judgment on merits, whereas in the case of the foreign judgment it would be a case of judgment having actually been rendered and the question would only be whether it should not be recognised on the grounds of submission. There is one preliminary difficulty in this submission, namely, that Mr. Tyagarajan is not right in saying that the trial has not even begun, because several exhibits were marked on the plaintiff’s side on the merits of the case and comments were made by the defendant’s Counsel with respect to these documents and the defendants have for their part marked at least one exhibit, namely, Exhibit D-1 on the merits of the case. Thus it cannot be said that the trial has not commenced on the merits. Thus it cannot be said that the trial has not commenced on the merits. But this apart, to constitute submission in international law, it is not necessary that the defendant should actually participate in the trial and it is enough if he has pleaded on the merits of the case because thereby, he disclosed an intention to take the chance of a decision on the merits of the case. If that is the principle involved in submission, there can be no juristic objection to this Court trying the suit and no distinction can be made between a case where a foreign Court has actually rendered judgment and a case like the present where I am asked to decide the question of jurisdiction before trying the case fully on the merits and pronouncing judgment. We should not forget that the criteria of jurisdiction in the international sense are different from the criteria of jurisdiction in the domestic sense and submission is a recognised source of jurisdiction in the international sense whereas cause of action is not. We need not be startled by the fact that once the defendant has pleaded on the merits the Court gets jurisdiction to try the case on the merits from the international point of view. It was after all open to the second defendant to have avoided this result by abstaining from pleading on the merits. There are indeed a few cases decided in England itself where on account of submission to jurisdiction, without jurisdiction previously existing, the English Courts have recognised the judgments given by those Courts and have refused to set aside those judgments when later the defendants appeared and moved to set them aside. The cases are Boyle v. Sacker1 Re Orr Ewing2. See also Western National Bank of New York v. Perez3and Manitoba etc., Corporation v. Allan4. These are quoted in Dicey under Rule 23, Illustration 4 as Footnote. It is worthy of note that even Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation v. Sedgwick, Collins &38; Co.5, was a case where the Russian Company did not appear but still the judgment obtained against it was held good in international law because service had been properly effected in England. So far as India is concerned, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff has referred me to the decision in Dibyaswari v. Lin Kumari6. So far as India is concerned, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff has referred me to the decision in Dibyaswari v. Lin Kumari6. Hence so far as the second defendant is concerned whether it is the first line of approach or second line of approach, this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. The grounds briefly are that according to the rules of Private International Law and the provisions of sections 592 to 596 of the Companies Act and on account of the returns submitted by the second defendant company mentioning No. 12, McLean Street, Madras-1, as their principal place of business in Madras, and Fraser and Ross, No. 12 McLean Street, Madras-1 as the persons authorised to receive summons etc., on their behalf, they are present here and they have submitted in advance to the jurisdiction of this Court. A further reason is that by pleading on the merits also, they have submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court. I do not think it necessary to discuss the cases cited by Sri Tyagarajan because they are all cases from the point of view of clause 12 of the Letters Patent and do not deal with the question from the international point of view as I have done. I stated at the outset that Sri V.K. Thiruvenkatachari appearing for the plaintiff submitted that even for the purpose of clause 12, the second defendant could be said to dwell within the jurisdiction of this Court on account of having given No. 12, McLean Street, Madras-1, as their principal place of business and Fraser and Ross, No. 12, McLean Street, Madras-1, as the persons authorised to receive summons, etc., on their behalf. In my opinion that submission also has a lot of force, but I prefer to rest my judgment more on the ground of jurisdiction of this Court from the international point of view. So far as the first defendant is concerned, the plaintiff does not have the benefit of any return submitted by the first defendant under sections 592 to 596 of the Companies Act, but there are reasons why in my opinion this Court has jurisdiction against the first defendant also from the international point of view. So far as the first defendant is concerned, the plaintiff does not have the benefit of any return submitted by the first defendant under sections 592 to 596 of the Companies Act, but there are reasons why in my opinion this Court has jurisdiction against the first defendant also from the international point of view. The first reason is that the suit has been properly brought against the second defendant from the international point of view in this Court and the liability of the first defendant as set out by the plaintiff is so mixed up with the liability of the second defendant that, for a proper adjudication of the claim of the plaintiff, it is necessary to have the presence of the first defendant also. Indeed the plaintiff alleges that though it was the second defendant who issued the notice of termination of his services, they are only the agents of the first defendant and the first defendant is liable to damages to the plaintiff. In such a case if the situation had arisen in England the Court there would undoubtedly have held that it would have jurisdiction against the first defendant as well. The principle had indeed found statutory recognition in Order 11, Rule 1 (g) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. The rule lists out the cases in which an application for service out of jurisdiction of a writ summons or notices of a writ summons may be allowed by the Court and one such case is “when any person out of the jurisdiction is a necessary or proper party to an action properly brought against some other person duly served within the jurisdiction.” The cases in which the above provision has been applied are collected by Dicey under Rule 26, Exception 8. Reference may, however, be made in particular to Messey v. Heynes1. The cases of course lay down that the plaintiff should not resort to the devise of impleading nominally a party present in England in order to secure jurisdiction against the foreigner under this rule. Reference may, however, be made in particular to Messey v. Heynes1. The cases of course lay down that the plaintiff should not resort to the devise of impleading nominally a party present in England in order to secure jurisdiction against the foreigner under this rule. The defendant in England who is impleaded must himself be substantially liable and should not be a mere dummy impleaded for the sake of getting jurisdiction against the foreigner; but no such difficulty arises here, because so far as the second defendant is concerned, the suit has been properly brought against that defendant on the substantial ground that it was the second defendant who actually issued the notice of termination. For a proper trial of the case the presence of the first defendant is clearly necessary and it cannot be said that the invoking of jurisdiction against the first defendant in the international sense will be strained or unjustified. The second reason why I would say that this Court has jurisdiction against the first defendant in the international sense is that they also pleaded on the merits of the case besides protesting the jurisdiction of this Court (under clause 12 of the Letters Patent) on the ground that no part of the cause of action has arisen here. It is not necessary to repeat the reasoning on this part of the case which I have indicated in the case of the second defendant. Similarly the first defendant also has given power-of-attorney to Messrs. King & Partridge on 19th June, 1962, for defending the suit not merely in this Court but also in any appeal therefrom and in execution, thereby disclosing a clear intention to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court. As I pointed out they also participated in the trial to some extent when the exhibits on the plaintiff’s side were marked and Exhibit D-1 was filed as a common exhibit for both the defendants and in fact the Counsel are the same. Here again it is unnecessary to discuss the cases cited by Sri V. Tyagarajan under clause 12 of the Letters Patent because I have proceeded on the ground of Private International Law. I hold therefore that this Court has jurisdiction against the first defendant as well. In the result Issue 4 is answered in the affirmative. P.R.N. ----- Order accordingly.