JUDGMENT : P.B. Gajendragadkar, CJI. In this appeal by special leave which has been brought to this Court by the appellants, the workmen of the Assam Match Co. Ltd., Dhubri, against the respondent, their employer, the management of the Assam Match Co. Ltd., Dhubri, the only point which has been raised for our decision is about the legality and the validity of the order passed by the Tribunal directing that K.K. Dutt should not be reinstated in service, but should be granted relief in the shape of compensation only. The Tribunal has found that the domestic enquiry which was held by the respondent against Dutt for his alleged misconduct was unfair and invalid. It has also found on the merits that the charges framed against Dutt at the said enquiry were baseless and the findings recorded at the said enquiry in respect of the said charges were wholly unjustified and could be characterised as perverse. Even so, the Tribunal took the view that it was clear from the charges framed against Dutt "that there may not be any cordial relationship between the parties if Dutt be reinstated" and on that ground alone, the Tribunal refused to direct the reinstatement of Dutt. The appellants contend that this order is plainly erroneous in law and must be set aside. 2. Dutt was serving as a motor vehicle foreman under the management of the respondent for nearly 11 years on a monthly emolument of Rs. 400. It is not disputed that throughout his career, there had been no blemish on his character and that he had been discharging his duties faithfully and honestly to the satisfaction of the respondent. On the 2nd of February, 1959 Dutt received a letter from the respondent calling upon him to offer his explanation in respect of the different items of misconduct alleged to have been committed by him. It is this letter which ultimately led to the framing of the relevant charges against Dutt and a domestic enquiry followed. As a result of the findings recorded at the said enquiry, Dutt was dismissed from service on 27th February, 1959. This order of dismissal became the subject-matter of an industrial dispute between the appellants and the respondent and it was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal against whose award the present appeal has been preferred. 3. Three charges were framed against Dutt at the domestic enquiry. This order of dismissal became the subject-matter of an industrial dispute between the appellants and the respondent and it was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal against whose award the present appeal has been preferred. 3. Three charges were framed against Dutt at the domestic enquiry. The first charge was in relation to the theft of 8 gallons of petrol alleged to have been committed by another employee, Tazamal Hussain, who was also charge-sheeted along with Dutt. The second charge consisted of two parts; charge 2(a) related to the allegation that Dutt had sent out Tazamal Hussain twice with a lorry which had been given to Dutt and his friends for going on a picnic according to the practice prevailing in the undertaking of the respondent for a purpose other than that for which the use of the lorry was permitted. Charge 2(b) was in respect of the taking of a new battery for the lorry without the requisite permission. The third charge was in regard to the tampering with the road permit alleged to have been committed by Dutt. It is common ground that according to the usual practice, the employees of the respondent, including Dutt and Hussain, had gone on a picnic to Deosri. Hussain was the driver of the lorry that drove the party on the occasion of this picnic. As we have already indicated, the Tribunal has made findings in favour of Dutt on the two main issues which arose before it. The first question which arose was whether the domestic enquiry was properly conducted. The Tribunal answered this question against the respondent. The second question was whether on the merits, the respondent satisfied the Tribunal that the charges framed against Dutt were proved. This question has also been answered against the respondent. The same answers have been rendered by the Tribunal in respect of the charges framed against Hussain. In the case of Hussain, the Tribunal has directed that he should be reinstated in service and has ordered the respondent to pay him his wages from the date of his dismissal until the date of reinstatement. The same answers have been rendered by the Tribunal in respect of the charges framed against Hussain. In the case of Hussain, the Tribunal has directed that he should be reinstated in service and has ordered the respondent to pay him his wages from the date of his dismissal until the date of reinstatement. A similar order of reinstatement was, however, not passed in the case of Dutt, because the Tribunal thought that Dutt's reinstatement would not lead to cordial relations between the parties; and so, the only question which we have to consider is whether the sole reason on which the Tribunal has based its decision not to direct the reinstatement of Dutt is valid in law. 4. In our opinion, the answer to the question raised by the appellants must unhesitatingly be given in their favour. It is well-settled that where in an industrial dispute arising out of a dismissal of a workman, it is established that the impugned dismissal was unjustified, the normal rule is that the dismissed workman should be reinstated. In regard to disciplinary actions which the employers are entitled to take against their employees, the position in law is no longer in doubt. The employer can hold an enquiry against his employee wherever the employer feels that the employee has committed misconduct as a result of which he should be dismissed from service. If the enquiry is properly conducted and the conclusion reached at the enquiry does not appeal to be perverse the impugned order of dismissal cannot be successfully challenged before the Tribunal. On the other hand, if the enquiry is not properly conducted or the findings recorded at the said enquiry appear to be perverse in the sense that they are not justified by any evidence whatever, the Industrial Tribunal can examine the question about the alleged misconduct of the employee on evidence which may be adduced before it by the employer and decide whether the employer is entitled to dismiss the employee. These principles have been laid down by this Court in several decisions, and both the parties have argued the present appeal before us on the basis of these principles. 5. The learned Solicitor-General who has appeared for the respondent has, however, invited our attention to certain relevant facts which, according to him, would justify the order passed by the Tribunal. These principles have been laid down by this Court in several decisions, and both the parties have argued the present appeal before us on the basis of these principles. 5. The learned Solicitor-General who has appeared for the respondent has, however, invited our attention to certain relevant facts which, according to him, would justify the order passed by the Tribunal. He contends that the award in question was pronounced on the 15th of July, 1961 and since then nearly three years have elapsed, and that, he argues, is a factor which we ought to take into account in considering whether Dutt's reinstatement should now be ordered. It appears that after the award was pronounced, the appellants moved High Court of Assam under Article 226 of the Constitution on 18th December, 1961. The High Court, however, summarily rejected the said application on 19th December, 1961. Thereafter the appellants moved the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court, but the said application was dismissed on 4th July, 1962. The appellants then came to this Court for special leave on 24th August, 1962 and special leave was granted to them on 3rd October, 1962. The appellants had also applied for special leave to appeal against the award itself on 24th August, 1962. This application was made after considerable delay, and so, notice was issued to the respondent to show cause why the said delay should not be condoned. After hearing the parties, the said delay was condoned and special leave was granted on 5th November, 1962. It appears that the respondent had also moved this Court for special leave against the award and its application also had been filed after considerable delay. The delay committed by the respondent was, however, not condoned by this Court and its attempt to move this Court by special leave failed. Basing himself on these facts, the learned Solicitor-General contends that it would be inappropriate to direct Dutt's reinstatement at this late stage. 6. We are not impressed by this argument. As we have repeatedly pointed out, if an employer is shown to have dismissed his employee without justification, and the decision of the dispute resulting from such illegal dismissal takes time, it cannot be urged by the employer that by reason of passage of time, reinstatement should not be ordered. 6. We are not impressed by this argument. As we have repeatedly pointed out, if an employer is shown to have dismissed his employee without justification, and the decision of the dispute resulting from such illegal dismissal takes time, it cannot be urged by the employer that by reason of passage of time, reinstatement should not be ordered. One of the objects which industrial adjudication has to keep in mind is to assure industrial employees security of tenure. There is no doubt that security of tenure for industrial employment tends to create harmonious relations between the employer and the employee, and so, this Court has consistently held that in cases of wrongful or illegal dismissal, the normal rule is that the employee who has been illegally or wrongfully dismissed should be reinstated. We are, therefore, satisfied that the contention raised by the Solicitor-General against reinstatement on the ground of passage of time cannot be accepted. 7. It is then urged that the Tribunal was justified in taking into account the fact that having regard to what has happened in the present proceedings, it should be held that the respondent has lost confidence in Dutt and that would be a ground for refusing reinstatement to him. This argument is plainly misconceived. We do not think it would be possible to accept the contention that even if an employer is shown to have dismissed his employee wrongfully and without justification, the fact that he has adopted such a course should be taken into account while determining whether reinstatement should be ordered or not. It would, we think, be unfair to allow an employer in such a case to urge that though the charge framed against his employee was not justified, the fact that a domestic enquiry was held against him on such a charge, has led to a loss of confidence in the mind of the employer, and so, the employee should not be reinstated. If this contention were to prevail, the industrial employees who are illegally or unjustifiably dismissed, would never get the relief of reinstatement. Cases may conceivably arise where the plea of loss of confidence may and can be entertained, but we have no doubt that the present case does not fall under that category. 8. If this contention were to prevail, the industrial employees who are illegally or unjustifiably dismissed, would never get the relief of reinstatement. Cases may conceivably arise where the plea of loss of confidence may and can be entertained, but we have no doubt that the present case does not fall under that category. 8. Beside, we cannot overlook the fact that on the finding of the Tribunal, the record of Dutt for 11 years in the employment of the respondent has been without a blemish. Dutt is, therefore, entitled to claim reinstatement with the respondent when he is shown to have served the respondent for 11 long years, and it appears that ordinarily, he is entitled to look forward to another long spell of service with the respondent. It is remarkable that though Hussain was similarly charge-sheeted by the respondent and was ordered to be dismissed, on the findings recorded by the Tribunal his reinstatement has been ordered. We see no distinction between the case of Hussain and that of Dutt. The fact that Dutt was a Foreman in charge of the motor vehicles of the respondent and Hussain was a driver of one of these vehicles, cannot make any difference to the decision of the question with which we are concerned. 9. The learned Solicitor-General also attempted to argue that the Tribunal has not considered the evidence led before it by the respondent to show that the charges framed against Dutt were proved. It is true that in the course of its award, the Tribunal has not elaborately referred to the evidence which was led before it. It does appear that apart from the proceedings of the domestic enquiry which were tendered before the Tribunal, evidence was led by both the parties on the merits and the Tribunal has considered the evidence led at the domestic enquiry as well as the evidence led before it. The discussion of the evidence led before the Tribunal is not very elaborate, but on reading the award, we are satisfied that the Tribunal did take into account the said evidence. Therefore, we do not think the Solicitor-General is justified in contending that the award suffers from the infirmity that the Tribunal completely failed to consider the evidence led before it by the respondent. Therefore, we do not think the Solicitor-General is justified in contending that the award suffers from the infirmity that the Tribunal completely failed to consider the evidence led before it by the respondent. Besides, we cannot overlook the fact that the attempt made by the respondent to move this Court for special leave with a view to challenge the correctness of the findings recorded by the Tribunal, has failed inasmuch as the application made by the respondent in that behalf has been dismissed; and so, the present appeal must be dealt with on the footing that the findings recorded by the Tribunal both in regard to the nature of the domestic enquiry and as to the merits of the charges framed against Dutt, are correct. 10. The result is, the appeal is allowed and the respondent is ordered to reinstate K.K. Dutt in its service and to pay him his wages from the date of his dismissal until the date of reinstatement. The appellants would be entitled to the costs of this appeal from the respondent. 11. As we have already mentioned, the appellants have also been granted special leave against the order passed by the High Court dismissing summarily the writ petition filed by them challenging the validity of the impugned award. In view of the fact that we have allowed the appeal preferred by the appellants against the impugned award itself, it is unnecessary to make any order on the appeal filed by them against the decision of the High Court.