JUDGMENT : This Second Appeal arises out of the decision of the learned Additional District Judge, Manipur, in Civil Appeal No. 76 of 1962 by which he allowed the said appeal and decreed the plaintiffs suit by reversing the judgment passed by the learned sub-Judge, in favour of the present appellant in Title Suit No. 4/6 of 1960. 2. The facts necessary and relevant for the disposal of the present appeal are simple and fall within a narrow compass and can succinctly be stated as follows : 3. The plaintiff Laibi Devi brought the suit ort 13-7-1959 in the court of Sub-Judge, Imphal for 24 pots of paddy as arrears of her maintenance for 2 years preceding the suit and 12 pots of paddy a year as her future maintenance with a prayer that the maintenance, be made s charge on 2 paris of lou and home-stead land of the defendant with the allegations that she is the legally married wife of the defendant. After her marriage with, defendant Toningthou Singh, they lived together very Happily and she gave birth to a son named Sanajao Singh. Sometime after that the defendant married a second wife. After his marriage with another wife he began to ill-treat her, but anyhow she tolerated it and continued to live with them. But about 1956-57 the defendant treated her very cruelly and endangered her personal safety and ultimately turned her out of the house with a threat to kill her if she would attempt to return to his house. On being turned out she started living separately, and demanded maintenance but he refused to give her any maintenance, therefore, she had no other alternative but to bring this suit. 4. The defendant in his written statement traversed the claim of the plaintiff and inter alia pleaded that they lived together as husband and wife and she gave birth to a son out thereafter all of a sudden she left the house in his, absence and began, to live with one L. Mani Singh of Lourembam Leikai. When she was approached with a request to return and live with him she refused to come back to the house and thereupon divorce was effected. Thereafter she remarried to Mani Singh. Now, after the death of Mani Singh she has brought this suit by concealing the fact of her re-marriage. When she was approached with a request to return and live with him she refused to come back to the house and thereupon divorce was effected. Thereafter she remarried to Mani Singh. Now, after the death of Mani Singh she has brought this suit by concealing the fact of her re-marriage. As she was divorced and re-married therefore she is not entitled to get any decree against him. 5. As the defendant traversed the suit so the trial Court framed as many as 6 issues. After recording the evidence of both, the parties it was held by the trial court that these were ordinary quarrels between the husband and wife which did not amount to any cruelty as to endanger her personal safety. There is also no reasonable ground to believe that she was ever turned out of the house of the defendant or divorced. But as she is living apart from her husband so she is not entitled to any maintenance. She should go and start living with her husband. In the case of refusal by her husband to take her back only then she can be entitled to demand maintenance. 6. Aggrieved by this decision of the learned Sub-Judge, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the court of District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge, to whose Court the appeal was transferred for disposal, reversed the judgment of the learned Sub-Judge and decreed the plaintiffs suit. The defendant has now come in Second Appeal to this Court against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that from the evidence on the record the factum of divorce and remarriage was amply proved but both the courts below committed a serious error of law in, holding that the appellant failed to prove the question of divorce and re-marriags of the respondent with Mani Singh. This finding of the lower courts being manifestly perverse and palpably erroneous should be set aside. 8. The counsel for the respondent in order to controvert this argument vehemently urged that this argument cannot be entertained as Ss. 100 and 101 C.P.C. taken together distinctly prohibit second appeal on questions of fact, unless in the process of arriving at a finding of fact the court has committed an error of law or a substantial error of procedure. The counsel for the respondent in order to controvert this argument vehemently urged that this argument cannot be entertained as Ss. 100 and 101 C.P.C. taken together distinctly prohibit second appeal on questions of fact, unless in the process of arriving at a finding of fact the court has committed an error of law or a substantial error of procedure. In this case there is a concurrent finding of the two courts below that the appellant miserably failed to prove the question, of divorce and remarriage of Laibi Devi with Mani Singh. This is a finding of fact which is fully binding on this court in second appeal. In support of his argument he relied upon the case Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya, AIR 1959 SC 57 , wherein the Honble K. Subba Rao, J. observed as follows : "The provisions of S. 100 are clear and unambiguous. There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. Nor does the fact that the finding of the first appellate court is based upon some documentary evidence make it any the less a finding of fact. A judge of the High Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact given by the first appellate court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. (The practice of some! judges of the High Court disposing second appeals as if they were first appeals deprecated.)" 9. This argument of the learned counsel for the respondent carries a good deal of force. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining second appeals has been considered by several High Courts in India as well as the Privy Council on numerous occasions, and the true, legal position, in that behalf is not at all in doubt. 10. It is well known that as early as 1890, the Privy Council had occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in Mt. Durga Chowdhrani v. Jawahir Singh Chowdhri, 17 Ind App 122 (PC). 10. It is well known that as early as 1890, the Privy Council had occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in Mt. Durga Chowdhrani v. Jawahir Singh Chowdhri, 17 Ind App 122 (PC). In that case, it was urged before the Privy Council, relying upon the decision of the Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts in Futtehnia Begum v. Mohamed Ausur, ILR 9 Cal 309 and Nivath Singh v. Bhikki Singh, ILR 7 All 649 (FB), respectively that the High Court would be within its jurisdiction in holding that where the lower appellate Court has clearly misapprehended what the evidence before it was, and has been led to discard or not give sufficient weight to other evidence to which it is not entitled, the High Court can interfere under S. 100. This contention was rejected by the Privy Council and it was observed that an erroneous finding of fact is a different thing from an error or defect in procedure, and that there, is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be. Their Lordships added that nothing can be clearer than the declaration in the Code of Civil Procedure that no second appeal will lie except on the grounds specified in S. 584 (corresponding to S. 100 of the present Code), and they uttered a word of warning that no court in India or elsewhere has power to add to or enlarge those grounds. Since 1890, this decision has been treated as leading decision on the question about the jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with questions of facts in second appeals. 11. It is necessary to remember that S. 100(1)(c) refers to a substantial error or defect in the procedure. The defect or error must be substantial - that is one fact to remember; and the substantial error or defect should be such as may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits that is another fact to be borne in mind. The error or defect in the procedure to which the clause refers is, as the clause clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with, or relating to, the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merits. The error or defect in the procedure to which the clause refers is, as the clause clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with, or relating to, the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merits. That is why, even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure. On the other hand, if in dealing with a question of fact, the lower appellate Court has placed the onus on a wrong party and its finding of fact is the result, substantially, of this wrong approach, that may be regarded as a defect in procedure; if in dealing with questions of facts the lower appellate Court discards evidence on the ground that it is inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible, that may introduce an error or defect in procedure. If the lower appellate Court fails to consider an issue which had been tried and found upon by the trial Court and proceeds to reverse the trial Courts decision without the consideration of such an issue, that may be regarded as an error or defect in procedure; if the lower appellate Court allows a new point of fact to be raised for the first time, before it, or permits a party to adopt a new plea of fact, or makes out a new case for a party, that may, in some cases, be said to amount to a defect or error in procedure. But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court, however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court, because, as the Privy Council has observed, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, there is no jurisdiction under S. 100 to correct that error. 12. In this connection, I may also refer to the case Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1097 wherein Honble Gajendragadkar, J. (the present C.J. of SC) observed as follows : "In Second appeal the High Courts jurisdiction is confined to questions of law. 12. In this connection, I may also refer to the case Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1097 wherein Honble Gajendragadkar, J. (the present C.J. of SC) observed as follows : "In Second appeal the High Courts jurisdiction is confined to questions of law. When all the questions at issue had to be tried in the light of oral evidence and surrounding circumstances, if the appellate Court recorded definite findings it is not open to the High Court to attempt to re-appreciate that evidence." 13. In second appeal I cannot, therefore, interfere in the matter of mere appreciation of oral evidence on question, of fact unless it is shown to me that such appreciation, was perverse. I am not in a position to say that in error may seem to be. Their Lordships added that nothing the instant case the appreciation of evidence by the lower Courts is perverse. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant next urged can that the respondent utterly failed to make out the, case of cruelty but even then the learned Additional District Judge held that the respondent was ill treated and forcibly turned out of the house. This finding being contrary to the facts on the record should be set aside. From the perusal of the evidence on the record I find that this argument is without any merit, in this case the respondent in order to prove the question of ill-treatment examined two other witnesses, besides herself. 15. The respondent in her statement deposed that the appellant after banging in his second wife in the house started rebuking and beating her, and thereby made her life miserable, but somehow she managed, to live with him. But about 1956-57 he turned her out of the house, and threatened to kill her if she would attempt to return to his house. The P.W. 2 Sanajao Singh, who is the son of the appellant fully corroborates her testimony. P.W. 3 the Tombi Singh also vouchsafes her testimony. There is no rebuttal of this evidence from the side of appellant, the evidence led by the respondent, it is amply clear that the appellant not only ill-treated her but he forcibly turned her out of the house. I, therefore, find that the finding of the first appellate court on this point is correct and calls for no interference. 16. There is no rebuttal of this evidence from the side of appellant, the evidence led by the respondent, it is amply clear that the appellant not only ill-treated her but he forcibly turned her out of the house. I, therefore, find that the finding of the first appellate court on this point is correct and calls for no interference. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the respondent is entitled to maintenance under Sec. 18(2)(B) and (D) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (Act 78 of 1956) which has been extended to this part of the territory from the date of its publication in the Gazette, that is, 25-12-1955, irrespective Of cruelty, desertion as the appellant has married a second wife who lives with him. 17. There is a good deal of force in this arguments and hence it must prevail. 18. Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides : "(1) Subject to the provisions of this section a Hindu wife whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her life time. (2) A Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance." xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (d) if he has any other wife living; xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 19. This Act came into operation from 25-12-1956. Under the specific provision of this section there is no. doubt that the plaintiff respondent is entitled to maintenance from 25-12-1956 though she is living separate from her husband as admittedly defendant appellant married again and is living with the second wife. This proposition is not seriously challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant. No doubt, there is a decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of Ram Parkash v. Smt. Savitri Devi, AIR 1958 Punj 87 (FB), in which his Lordship, Bhandari, C.J. observed. "It is undoubtedly an established rule of law that a case should be decided in accordance with the law as it exists at the time of the decision by the appellate Court, but this rule is applicable only where the statute changing the law is intended to be retrospective in its effect. "It is undoubtedly an established rule of law that a case should be decided in accordance with the law as it exists at the time of the decision by the appellate Court, but this rule is applicable only where the statute changing the law is intended to be retrospective in its effect. It neither of these two conditions concur or if it appears that the Legislature did not intend that the rights which were acquired before the enactment of the new law should be taken away, the case cannot be regulated by the law which has intervened during the pendency of the appeal but by the law which was in force when the original judgment was delivered. There is nothing in, the Act, of 1956 to indicate that it was intended to operate retrospectively or to deprive husbands of the rights which had been acquired by them before its enactment. It provides merely that after this Act comes into force a Hindu wife shall be entitled to separate residence and maintenance in certain circumstances and that she will forfeit her right to separate residence and maintenance in certain other circumstances." 20. But the concluding portion of his judgment was to the effect that a Hindu wife is not entitled to claim residence and maintenance under the Hindu Married Womens Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946 on the ground that her husband had married a second wife when the second marriage took place before the passing of the Act. This was the question referred to the Full Bench and it was directed by the Full Bench by the judgment of the learned Chief Justice with whom the other learned Judges agreed, that an appropriate answer be returned to the Division Bench as stated above. The observation quoted above, therefore, of the Honble Chief Justice cannot be taken in my view as a decision on the effect of the Act of 1956 to pending litigation. In the case of Jaggamma v. Satyanarayanamurthi, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 582 a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held : "There can be little doubt that the Act can be applied to pending proceedings as the Court should take into consideration the subsequent legislation which has altered the rights of the parties. In the case of Jaggamma v. Satyanarayanamurthi, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 582 a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held : "There can be little doubt that the Act can be applied to pending proceedings as the Court should take into consideration the subsequent legislation which has altered the rights of the parties. Where, therefore, during the pendency of appeal against the dismissal of a suit by a wife for recovery of maintenance, the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, was passed, the wife could invoke the provisions of Sec. 18(2)(d) of the Act for claiming maintenance on the ground that her husbands first wile was living although this right was not available to her at the time of the institution of the suit." To a similar effect is also a decision of the Patna High, Court in the case of Sarbo Gopain v. Anta Lal Gope, AIR 1958 Pat 613 , in which their Lordships alter referring to a number of English decisions on the point and dissenting from the decision of the Punjab High Court cited above held : Even if not in express terms the words wife living by necessary intendment show that the Legislature intended this clause to be of a declaratory character and not merely remedial. Section 18 is retrospective in operation and will apply to the pending litigations also." 21. Inasmuch as this proposition was not seriously challenged by the counsel for the appellant, I, therefore, do not think it necessary to go into this question in detail. In my opinion, the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956 is retrospective in operation to the extent that it applies to pending litigations. I would consequently hold that the plaintiff is entitled to maintenance, though she is living separately, and separate residence from the date on which the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956 came into force, that is, 25-12-1956. 22. The learned counsel for the appellant strongly urged that the respondent having abandoned her husband about 15 years ago due to cruelty or otherwise could not with any justification ask to be maintained by her husband. She had forfeited that right before the Act came into force and the Act could not revive a right that had already been extinguished. 23. She had forfeited that right before the Act came into force and the Act could not revive a right that had already been extinguished. 23. The learned counsel for the respondent in order to meet this argument contended that there is not an iota of evidence to infer that the respondent left the appellant about 15 years ago, If for the sake of argument it is assumed that she left her husband with or (without ?) any reason even then according to Hindu Law the husband is bound to maintain his wife. In the instant case the respondent was prepared to live with the appellant, but he not only ill-treated her but turned her out of the house, and since then she is living separately and leading a moral life, therefore she is entitled to maintenance even if she resides separately from her husband. This argument of the counsel for the appellant carried a good deal of force. According to Hindu Law when a husband for reason of his own chooses to put his wife away from him or the wife lives away from her husband for justifiable reasons she is entitled to separate maintenance. In case the wife quits her husband for no justifiable reasons but not for immoral purposes her right to be maintained is only suspended but not forfeited. It is always open to her to come back and claim to be maintained as her home is in her husbands house. So long as she chooses to live apart from her husband without sufficient cause the right to be maintained is kept in abeyance. A separate living without justifiable cause but with no corrupt motives would not operate to extinguish that right of maintenance. Therefore, there is no question of the new enactment reviving the right. It was open to the wife to return to her Husband before this enactment was passed though till then her separate maintenance was suspended but without incurring any forfeiture. 24. This is a circumstance to be taken into account in fixing the amount of maintenance. A less liberal rate will be awarded where the wife leaves her husband without due cause. For these reasons, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to live separately without forfeiting her right within the meaning of Sec. 18(2) of the Act. 24. This is a circumstance to be taken into account in fixing the amount of maintenance. A less liberal rate will be awarded where the wife leaves her husband without due cause. For these reasons, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to live separately without forfeiting her right within the meaning of Sec. 18(2) of the Act. This view of mine gains support from Surampalli v. Surampalli, ILR 31 Mad 338, Vasuntharadevi v. Ramakrishna, 1947-2 Mad LJ 544 : AIR 1949 Mad 100 and Dharmarao v. Venkatamahalakshmamma, ILR 1947 Mad 387 : (AIR 1947 Mad 96.) 25. The last question which is to be considered is with regard to the rate maintenance to be awarded to the respondent. 26. In. this case the, learned Additional District Judge has fixed 12 pots of paddy per year for the maintenance of respondent Regarding the reasonableness of the amount of maintenance there is no dispute between the parties and I too feel that it is enough to meet her bare necessities of life. 27. No other argument was raised before me. 28. In view of the reasons mentioned above, I am fully satisfied that the conclusion to which the Court at the 1st Appeal came in this case is perfectly sound and calls for no interference at the hands of this Court. 29. In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.