JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - Kamta Prasad and others, who have filed this second appeal, filed a suit claiming to be the bhumidhars of a plot of land. They prayed for a declaration that the defendants in the suit, Raja Ram and Sita Ram, had no rights in the plot. The aforesaid defendants also filed a suit against Kamta Prasad claiming the plot as their own and praying for the ejectment of Kamta Prasad. The two suits were connect ed and heard together, the evidence in one being treated as evidence in the other. The trial court held that Kamta Prasad and another had established their title as bhjimidhars and decreed the suit. For the same reason the suit of Raja Ram and Sita Ram for ejectment of Kamta Prasad was dismissed. On appeal the learned Civil Judge admitted certified copies of the relevant Khasra relating to the plot which the trial court refused to admit on the ground that they had been tendered at a late stage. After a review of the entire evidence, including the Khasras filed before him, the learned Judge disagreed with the view of the trial court as regards Kamta Prasad's title and held that he and the other plaintiffs were not the bhumidhars of the land. He further held that Raja Ram and Sita Rain had established their title as sirdars and were entitled to a decree for the ejectment of Kamta Prasad and others. Accordingly he dismissed the suit of Kamta Prasad and others and ordered their ejectment. They have come to this court in second appeal from both the decrees of the appellate court. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the lower appellate court acted illegally in admitting the documentary evidence at the stage of appeal. He relied on the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code as amended by this court and contended that an appellate court has no jurisdiction to admit additional evidence unless the party tendering it satisfies the court that it could not have been tendered before the trial court in spite of due diligence. The flaw in this argument is that the documents were not tendered before the appellate court for the first time but produced before the trial court who refused to take them. The flaw in this argument is that the documents were not tendered before the appellate court for the first time but produced before the trial court who refused to take them. Therefore the appellate court was competent to consider whether the rejected documents were so material that they should have been admitted by the trial court in spite of the delay in producing them. 3. Learned counsel then argued that the appellant's evidence in support of their title consisted of Bhumidhari sanads which were binding on all courts unless and until they were cancelled. Counsel contended that the defendants in the suit filed by Kamta Prasad could not attack the bhumidhars sanad in this suit as they had taken no steps to have these documents cancelled. But learned counsel had to admit that the defendants were not parties to the proceedings by which Kamta Prasad managed to obtain bhumidharssanad by paying ten times the rent sanad is binding on a person who was not a party to the proceedings leading to its issue in favour of another person. It is a document by which the Government acknowledges the right or title of the holder, but cannot bind others. If learned counsel's argument is accepted a bhumidhari sanad will have a higher status than a decree of the court which is never binding on any one except the parties to the suit. Learned counsel conceded that there is no provision in the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act providing that a sanad is conclusive evidence of its contents against the whole world. In my opinion it was open to the appellate court to weigh the evidentiary value of the sanad against that of the entries in the khasra and then decide which party had established its title. 4. The appeal is dismissed.