ORDER This revision is directed against an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge of Kanpur in a case under Sec. 302 I.P.C. 2. The incident which was the subject-matter of Criminal Sessions Trial No. 272 of 1961 before the learned Sessions Judge had taken place on the 21st of October, 1961 at about 6.30 P.M. in Rani-ka-baghicha in the city of Kanpur in which Tulsi deceased was said to have been stabbed and two persons, namely, Laxmi Narain and Shyam Lal, were sent up for trial under Sec. 302 I.P.C. for having committed that offence. 3. In support of its case the prosecution has mainly relied on the testimony furnished by five eye-witnesses of the occurrence and on the dying declaration which was supposed to have been recorded at the hospital by Dr. S.C. Agarwal who was examined to prove the same. In corroboration of the testimony of the eye-witnesses reliance was also placed on the report lodged with the police which was supposed to have been dictated by the deceased himself. 4. After weighing the evidence furnished by the eye-witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge was of opinion that "taking this evidence as a whole it is difficult to give a Judicial finding that the assailants were actually seen by the witnesses making the assault." About the probative value of the dying declaration the learned Judge, after discussing the circumstances in which it was alleged to have been made, has observed as follows :- "When the entire evidence relating to the dying declaration and what happened at the hospital is taken into consideration, I find it difficult to rely on, the dying declaration supposed to have been recorded in these circumstances........... In the circumstances, the dying declaration also could as well as be doubted as being genuine." Having assessed the value of other evidence produced in the case, the learned Judge was of opinion that "the evidence is not free from suspicion from beginning to end. The statements of the eye-witnesses are discrepant. The authenticity of the dying declaration is doubtful and the so-called confession by Laxmi Narain of having stabbed someone also does not appear to have been proved by reliable evidence," and, therefore, acquitted the accused. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the applicants. The statements of the eye-witnesses are discrepant. The authenticity of the dying declaration is doubtful and the so-called confession by Laxmi Narain of having stabbed someone also does not appear to have been proved by reliable evidence," and, therefore, acquitted the accused. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the applicants. It is no doubt true that a cold blooded-murder having been committed in the heart of the city of Kanpur at about sunset has gone unpunished. But there appears to be no help. Sitting as a court of revision, even if I am of the view that the findings given by the learned Sessions Judge are not reasonable and that his appreciation of evidence is not in accord with the accepted tests for weighing oral evidence, I am unable to interfere with those findings. 6. The law regarding the powers of a court of revision against an order of acquittal are well-settled. In the case of Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal, AIR 1951 SC 316 it was held that "though Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 439 authorises the High Court to exercise, in its discretion, any of the powers conferred on a Court of appeal by Sec. 423, Sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 439 specifically excludes the power to "convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction." This does not mean that in dealing with a revision petition by private party against an order of acquittal, the High Court can, in the absence of any error on a point of law re-appraise the evidence and reverse the findings of facts on which the acquittal is based, provided only it stops short of finding the accused guilty and passing sentence on him." 7. In the case of Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788 it was observed that "it is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring-defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice." 8. None of the conditions mentioned in the aforesaid decisions for causing an interference in an order of acquittal are satisfied in the present case. 9. In the instant case, the learned Judge has not committed any illegality or irregularity of procedure. He has recorded a finding of acquittal on appreciation of evidence led in the case. It may be that some other Judge might have appreciated the evidence in some other manner, but the mis-appreciation of evidence has never been held to be a ground for interference with an order of acquittal in revision. 10. This revision is, therefore, dismissed. Revision dismissed.