M. U. SHAH, J. M. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) THE two petitioners have been working in the Drawing in Department of the second respondent company as reaches in the second shift and have filed this petition challenging the order passed by the Third Labour Court in Application No. 234 of 1959 dated December 1 1959 and confirmed by the Industrial Court by its order in Appeal (IC.) No. 11 of 1960 dated July 28 1960 ( 2 ) PRIOR to 1947. there was no system of changeover in the different shifts in the textile mills in Ahmedabad. In 1946 however a Submission bearing No. 6 of 1946 between the Ahmedabad Mill owners Association Ahmedabad and The Textile Labour Association. Ahmedabad was made before the Industrial Court at Bombay wherein the Industrial Court by an interim award passed inter alia and the following order:-- we therefore hold that mills should be allowed to work three shifts if they want to with a system of changeover. Ordinarily the period of the three shifts should be as follows- 1 Shift. . . . . . . . . 7 a. m. to3 p. m. 2 Shift. . . . . . . . . 3 p. m. to 11 p. m. 3 Shift. . . . . . . . . 11 p. m. to7 a. m. There should be a recess of half an hour during each of the three shifts. In winter the work may begin at 1-30 a m. instead of 7 with consequent changes in the other shifts. This will be for a period of one year from the 15th of February 1947 at the end of which this matter will be placed again for hearing as to whether the system should be continued or not In the case of mills working two shifts the working period should be as follows:-- 1 7 a. m. to 3-30 p. m. and With half an hours 2 3 p. m. to 12 mid-night. recess in each shift. In both cases of two shifts as well as three shifts working there will be a system of changeover at the end of each month by which the workers of the first shift will go over to the second and those of the second to the third and those of the third to the first in rotation. In both cases of two shifts as well as three shifts working there will be a system of changeover at the end of each month by which the workers of the first shift will go over to the second and those of the second to the third and those of the third to the first in rotation. If the case of the two Shifts working the day shift and the night shift workers will change in rotation at the end of every month. Thereafter the Ahmedabad Mill owners Association made an application being Application No. 29 of 1947 under rule 64 of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Rules for the interpretation and clarification of the award made on February 7 1947 in the said Submission No. 9 of 9946 and the clarification that was asked for was as to whether that part of the award pertaining to change-over in the three shifts applied to the mills which worked the third shift partially on some of the machines in a department. In clarification of its award the Industrial Court in its order dated April 30 1947 stated that:-- at the time when that matter ( Submission No. 9 of 1948 ) was argued there were no arguments as to what should take place when the 3rd shift worked partially and the dispute was argued on the basis of three shifts being worked wholly and not partially. It was in such a case of complete working of three shifts that changeover directed in the award was to be applied. The case of partial working of third shift is not covered by the award. The result therefore is this. The change-over in three shifts is to be effected where full number of machines in a department are worked Where the third shift is working partially the change-over is to be effected between the first and the second shifts only. In the case of full working of three shifts the hours of work will be 7 1/2 hours in each shift with half an hour recess. In the case of partial working the hours of work will be 8 8 and 6 1/2 with half an hours recess. But in the latter case the change-over shall be restricted to first two shifts only. In the case of partial working the hours of work will be 8 8 and 6 1/2 with half an hours recess. But in the latter case the change-over shall be restricted to first two shifts only. Since the award as clarified was only intended to operate for one year another application being Miscellaneous Application No. 2 of 1948 was brought before the Industrial Court. In that Application the Industrial Court in partial modification of the original award dated February 71947 directed that:- -. . . . there shall be a change-over between the first and the second shift only and there shall be no change-over in the case of the third shift. ( 3 ) THE two petitioners who have been working as aforesaid as reaches in the second respondent company alleged that prior to November 1 1958 they had been working in the first shift that they had been assigned work in the second shift as from November 1 1958 that they had not been given the benefit of the change-over by rotation in accordance with the aforesaid award and that contrary to the said award they had been permanently assigned work in the second shift. They alleged that the second respondent company had thus committed an illegal change as also a breach of the said award and consequently filed the aforesaid application No. 234 of 1959 for a declaration that the second respondent company had committed an illegal change and for a direction for the withdrawal by the second respondent company of the said alleged illegal change. In defence the second respondent company relied upon an award dated February 24 1958 made by two private arbitrators under a Submission made to them by the Textile Labour Association of the one part and the second respondent company of the other part in which the said arbitrators in para 3 of their award had declared as follows:-- as the second shift is to work partially there shall be no change-over between the first and the second shift workers. The second respondent companys case was that as the second shift in its mills was working partially it was not bound to carry out the changeover between the first and the second shift workers as provided in the said award given by the Industrial Court by reason of the arbitrators award dated February 24 1958 The contention of the petitioners before the Labour Court was that the arbitrators award dated February 241958 was illegal and void as the said arbitrators had no jurisdiction to modify the award passed by the Industrial Court and that it would be the Industrial Court only under section 116a of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 which had the jurisdiction to effect any change or modification therein. The Labour Court was of the view that as section 116 (2) of the Act applied only to an award, which was in terms of an agreement and not to an award by the Industrial Court the award passed by the Industrial Court could not be modified by private arbitration. The Labour Court however held that the award passed by the arbitrators had not in any way modified the award passed by the Industrial Court but only clarified the same and dismissed on that basis the application of the petitioners. Aggrieved by that order the petitioners filed an appeal before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court held that the said award by the arbitrators dated February 24 1958 being an award given under a Submission to which a representative union was a party was valid and binding upon the petitioners. The Industrial Court was of the view that after the award was passed by the Industrial Court a dispute as to its interpretation and effect arose between the second respondent company and the representative union and such a dispute could be referred to arbitration under the provisions of section 66 of the Act and an award made under such reference was valid and binding on the parties. The Industrial Court was also of the view that even if the arbitrators award was not valid and binding the petitioners were not entitled to a change-over as the award passed by the Industrial Court never contemplated a change-over in shifts which were not fully worked but only partially worked. The Industrial Court was also of the view that even if the arbitrators award was not valid and binding the petitioners were not entitled to a change-over as the award passed by the Industrial Court never contemplated a change-over in shifts which were not fully worked but only partially worked. The petitioners have challenged these orders on the ground inter alia that they are inconsistent with and opposed to the provisions of secs. 116 and 116a of the Act. ( 4 ) MR. Vyas who appears for the petitioners raised three contentions:-- (1) that an award passed by the Industrial Court cannot be altered or modified by means of private arbitration (2) that the provisions of sections 116 and 116a when read together constituted a bar to such modification by private arbitration and (4) that the award passed by the Industrial Court created a right in the petitioners to have a change-over by rotation every month even though the second shift was not working fully and only partially. Mr. Patwari appearing for the second respondent company on the other hand refuted these contentions and in support of the impugned orders argued that there was nothing in the provisions of secs. 116 and 116a which would preclude parties to an award passed by the Industrial Court from referring to private arbitration any industrial dispute arising from such an award. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate these rival contentions it would be necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Act. Clause (3) of sec. 3 defines arbitration proceeding as (a) any proceeding under the Act before an arbitrator and (b) any proceeding before a Labour Court a Wage Board or the Industrial Court in arbitration. Clause (4) defines arbitrator as one to whom a dispute is referred for arbitration under the provisions of the Act and includes an umpire. Clause (6) defines an award as meaning any interim final or supplementary determination in an arbitration proceeding of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto. Under clause (17) of sec. 3 industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between an employer and employee or between employers and employees or between employees and employees and which is connected with any industrial matter. Under clause (17) of sec. 3 industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between an employer and employee or between employers and employees or between employees and employees and which is connected with any industrial matter. Industrial matter within the meaning of clause (18) ox that section means any matter relating to employment work wages hours of work privileges rights or duties of employers or employees or the mode terms and conditions of employment and includes inter alia all matters pertaining to any right or claim under or in respect of or concerning a registered agreement or a submission settlement or award made under the Act. Chapter VIII of the Act deals with changes and sec 42 therein inter alia provides that if any employer intends to effect any change in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule II he shall give notice of such intention in the prescribed form to the representative of employees. Similarly sub-sec. (2) provides that an employee desiring a change in respect of an industrial matter not specified in Schedule I or III shall give notice in the prescribed form to the employer through the representative of employees etc. Section 44 deals with an agreement regarding change and lays down that if within seven days from the date of service of a notice under sec. 42 or an intimation or special notice under sec. 43 or within such further period as may be mutually fixed by the employers affected and the representative of the employees affected an agreement is arrived at in regard to the proposed change a memorandum of such agreement signed by the employer or employers as well as by the representative of employees shall be forwarded in the prescribed manner to the Chief Conciliator the Registrar and the Labour Officer. Section 44 thus contemplates a change in an award and such an agreed change is made binding thereunder upon the parties when the Registrar under sub-section (2) thereof enters the agreed change in the register. Section 46 prohibits an employer from making any change in any standing order settled under Chapter VII without following the procedure prescribed therefore in the Act. Sub-sec. (2) thereof also provides that no employer shall make any change in any industrial matter mentioned in Schedule II before giving notice of the change as required by sec. 42 or within the period provided for in sub-sec. Sub-sec. (2) thereof also provides that no employer shall make any change in any industrial matter mentioned in Schedule II before giving notice of the change as required by sec. 42 or within the period provided for in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 44 unless an agreement is arrived at or where no agreement is arrived at before the completion of conciliation proceedings and during the period of ten days thereafter or where no settlement is arrived at after two months from the date of the completion of the proceedings before the Conciliator or in cases where there is a registered submission or in which the dispute has been referred to arbitration before the date on which the award comes into operation etc. Section 46 thus contemplates a change in any of the industrial matters set out in Schedule II either by agreement or settlement or by a registered submission or a reference to arbitration. Chapter XI contains provisions with regard to arbitration and section 66 empowers any employer or a representative union or any other registered union which is a representative of employees to agree by a written agreement to submit present or future industrial dispute or class of such disputes to arbitration of any person. Sub-sec. (2) of that section provides that such submission may provide that the dispute shall be referred to arbitration of a Labour Court or the Industrial Court. Section 66 thus contemplates both private arbitration as also the arbitration of a Labour Court or the Industrial Court through a submission by an employer or a representative union or any other registered union representative of employees. These provisions clearly envisage a change either by agreement or settlement or by an award through arbitration and provide for the solution of an industrial dispute through a reference to arbitration. ( 6 ) SECTION 114 days down the binding character of a registered agreement or a settlement submission or award and provides that a registered agreement or a settlement a submission or an award shall be binding upon all parties who are parties thereto. Prima facie therefore a submission to arbitration under sec. ( 6 ) SECTION 114 days down the binding character of a registered agreement or a settlement submission or award and provides that a registered agreement or a settlement a submission or an award shall be binding upon all parties who are parties thereto. Prima facie therefore a submission to arbitration under sec. 66 and an award made by an arbitrator thereon would be binding on workmen in cases where a representative union has been a party to a submission and to arbitration proceedings taken in pursuance thereof by reason of this section having conferred binding effect to a registered agreement settlement submission or award upon persons who are parties thereto. the Legislature then provides as to when and how they cease to have effect and when they can be changed or modified. For that purpose the Legislature enacted sec. 116 find provided thereby that a registered agreement or a settlement or an award shall cease to have effect on the date specified therein or if no such date is specified therein on the expiry of the period of two months from the date on which notice in writing to terminate such agreement settlement or award as the case may be is given in the prescribed manner by any of the parties thereto to the other party. Sub-sec. (2) however enables the terms of a registered agreement or a settlement or in the case of an award, which is in terms of an agreement being changed or modified by mutual consent of the parties affected thereby and provides that the registered agreement settlement or award shall be deemed to be changed or modified accordingly. Sub-sec. (5) thereof then provides that if a registered agreement or a settlement or award is terminated under sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (3) or if the terms of a registered agreement or a settlement or an award are changed or modified by mutual consent notice of such termination change or modification has to be given by the parties concerned to the Registrar and the Labour Officer and the Registrar thereupon has to enter the notice of such termination change or modification in a register Accept for the purpose. The Explanation provides that the parties who shall be competent to terminate a registered agreement or a settlement or award or to change or modify the terms of a registered agreement or settlement or an award and who shall give notice of such termination change or modification under sub-section (5) shall be the employer who has signed the agreement or settlement or who is a party to the award or the heirs successors or assigns of such employer in respect of the undertaking concerned and the representative of the employees affected by the agreement settlement or award. Section 116 which was inserted in the Act by Bombay Act 74 of 1948 provides for modification of an award and the procedure to be followed thereof and sub-sec. (3) of that section provides that on an application being made for such modification the Industrial Court the Labour Court or the Wage Board as the case may be may after hearing the parties and talking such evidence as it thinks fit modify the award. Thus under sec. 116 an award ceases to have effect by afflux of time or by termination Sub-sec. (2) enables parties to modify or change an award if such award is one in terms of an agreement instead of going through the procedure of termination. Thus three remedies are provided for to the parties in the case of an agreement settlement or an award namely (1) cesser by afflux of time (2) termination and (3) change by mutual consent but such a change could be made only in the case of an award, which is in terms of an agreement. The Legislature appears to have felt a lacuna in sec. 116 for that section only provided for the termination of an award if any one of the parties thereto was dissatisfied with it or if the parties at here to felt any difficulty in working it out as it was only an award which was one in terms of an agreement which under sub-section (2) of section 116 could be changed by mutual consent of the parties. It was with a view to provide against such a lacuna that section 116a appears to have been introduced in the Act and the Legislature therefore provided machinery for the modification of an award where the parties could not agree to a change or a modification of such an award even where it was in terms of an agreement and all other awards where the parties there to or either of them desired a modification instead of having recourse to its termination. Thus an award may be affected or put an end to (1) by afflux of time (2) by termination (3) by changing with mutual consent in the case of an award which is one in terms of an agreement and lastly (4) by making an application for its modification. ( 7 ) BUT the contention of Mr. Vyas was that once there is am award by an Industrial Court that award cannot be changed or modified except by a fresh submission to the Industrial Court or by an application for modification under section 116a but not by a submission to a private arbitrator even if agreed to by one employer and the representative union. The learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the State argued that section 66 which provides for arbitration is a general provision whereas sections 116 and 116a are special provisions providing for a change or modification in an award passed by an Industrial Court and that therefore the latter would prevail over the former. In our view on a plain reading of the various sections and the scheme of the Act these contentions cannot be accepted. To accept Mr. Vyas contention would virtually mean to nullify the provisions of section 66 which enables an employer and a representative union to settle their dispute by means of a reference to arbitration and to stultify the very object of the Act namely to promote industrial peace and harmony of relations between employers and employees. The principle of construction, which the learned Assistant Government Pleader relied upon, can only arise if there is any conflict between section 66 on the one hand and sections 116 and 116a on the other. The principle of construction, which the learned Assistant Government Pleader relied upon, can only arise if there is any conflict between section 66 on the one hand and sections 116 and 116a on the other. The two sets of provisions deal with different subjects and occupy distinct fields and there is no conflict or repugnancy between the two for one deals with arbitration and the other provides machinery for termination cesser and modification of an agreement settlement or an award. Besides there is nothing in sections 116 and 116a indicative of any legislative ban against a reference to arbitration under section 66 where parties are agreed to refer their disputes to arbitration by having recourse to that section. ( 8 ) WHETHER a party has a right to changeover from one shift to another or not would certainly be an industrial matter as it affects conditions of his employment and a dispute regarding such a matter would be an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 3 (17) and (18 ). If after an award is made by the Industrial Court differences arise as to its interpretation and effect between an employer and a representative union such differences would constitute an industrial dispute. As stated earlier there is nothing in section 116 or section 116a which precludes such parties to go to arbitration of persons agreed to by them by resorting to the provisions of section 66. After that is done an award made on such submission would be binding on the employer and the employees. The Industrial Court therefore was right in holding that the award was valid and binding on the petitioners and the petitioners were not entitled to file this special civil application as the second respondent company after the award dated February 24 1958 was not bound to effect a change-over to the workmen working in the second shift. ( 9 ) THIS would dispose of the petition but since Mr. Vyas has also argued at some length on the other finding of the Industrial Court it is but fair that we should deal with that aspect also. That of course would arise only if our construction of sections 66 116 and 116a is not a correct construction. ( 9 ) THIS would dispose of the petition but since Mr. Vyas has also argued at some length on the other finding of the Industrial Court it is but fair that we should deal with that aspect also. That of course would arise only if our construction of sections 66 116 and 116a is not a correct construction. The view of both the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court was that the award dated February 24 1958 did not alter or modify the decision of the Industrial Court and that the only thing that the award did was to clarify the original decision of the Industrial Court. In other words the contention by the second respondent company was that even under the award of the Industrial Court as modified in 1948 no absolute right of change-over was given to the employees working in the second shift irrespective of the fact whether that shift worked fully or not on the other hand the argument of Mr. Vyas was that such a right was conferred at least so far as workman in the second shift were concerned and the only change that was made in 1948 was with regard to the third shift. Reliance was placed by Mr. Vyas on the observations made in the first decision where it has been stated that in both cases of two shifts as well as three shifts working there would be A system of change-over at the end of each month. Mr. Vyas argued that there was some dispute regarding the interpretation of these words and that on an application made by the Mill owners Association for clarification the Court then interpreted its award and held that the change-over in three shifts was to be effected where the full number of machines in a department were worked and that where the third shift worked partially the change-over was to be effected between the first and the second shifts only. It was argued that the Industrial Court then was concerned only with a modification in its order as regards the third shift and not as regards the second shift and therefore the company was bound to effect the change over in the first and the second shifts irrespective of the fact whether the second shift worked fully or not. Mr. It was argued that the Industrial Court then was concerned only with a modification in its order as regards the third shift and not as regards the second shift and therefore the company was bound to effect the change over in the first and the second shifts irrespective of the fact whether the second shift worked fully or not. Mr. Vyas then relied upon the decision of the Industrial Court in Pirbhai Galubhai and others v. Ahmedabad New Textile Mills Co. Ltd. No. 1 Ahmedabad in Appeal No. 35 of 1949 decided on April 6 1949 ( 1949 I. C. R. 855 ). The respondent company there had stopped the practice of change-over of shifts which used to occur every month under the award dated February 7 1947 After the Industrial Court as aforesaid had held that the award did not cover cases of partial working of the third shift the respondent company stopped the change-over between the first and the second shifts on the ground that the second shift was being partially worked and that the award dated February 7 1947 did not apply to such a case. The Industrial Court there held that on the facts of the case there were not sufficient reasons for the management to act as if the Court had made no direction regarding change-overs at all and therefore they must be deemed to have technically committed an illegal change. We may state that the Industrial Court there expressed doubt whether the first award intended to cover the right of change-over absolutely irrespective of whether any particular shift worked fully or not but held against the company there on the ground that if a right of change-over was given in favour of the employees the Court would not take it away or whittle it down. We are however somewhat doubtful whether that was a correct approach and in any event the learned Judge did not give any reasons for his conclusion. If the award dated February 7 1947 as amended in Miscellaneous Application No. 2 of 1948 were to be closely examined it is evident that when the first order providing for a change-over was made it was not considered as to whether it should be applied or not to an employer in whose concern the shift was not working fully. If the award dated February 7 1947 as amended in Miscellaneous Application No. 2 of 1948 were to be closely examined it is evident that when the first order providing for a change-over was made it was not considered as to whether it should be applied or not to an employer in whose concern the shift was not working fully. When the clarification was asked for the Court in so many words stated that- at the time when that matter ( Submission No. 9 of 1948 ) was argued there were no arguments as to what should take piece when the third shift worked partially and the dispute was argued on the basis of three shifts being worked wholly and not partially. The Court then observed that- if It was in such a case of complete working of three shifts that change-over directed in the award was to be applied. It is true that in the decision given in 1948 the change-over was restricted to the first and the second shifts and was lifted from third shift where it worked partially but that was because the contention then was confined to the third shift where it did not work fully. But it is clear that the intention of the Court was to apply the change-over only in cases where the third shift was being worked wholly. this is quite clear from what the Court stated in its order in the application for clarification under rule 64 of the Industrial Disputes Rules namely It was in such a case of complete working of three shifts that change-over directed in the award was to be applied. These words would not have found their place in that order of clarification if the Industrial Court had intended that the change-over was to be effected even if 8 shift did not work fully. That being the position the Industrial Court was right in holding that the said award did not confer absolutely the right of change-over to workmen working in a particular shift irrespective of whether such a shift worked fully or not. It is thus not possible for us to accede to either of the two contentions urged before us on behalf of the petitioners. ( 10 ) THE result therefore is that the petition must fail and must be dismissed. Rule discharged with costs. .