JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - The four petitioners in this case challenge an order passed by the Nayaya Panchayat of Majiyar Sain (district Garhwal) on 24.4.1960, convicting them for an offence under Section 426, I.P.C. and finding them Rs. 2/- each, as well as the subsequent order of the S.D.M., Landsome dated 29.6.1960, maintaining the conviction and enhancing the fines to Rs. 8/- each. 2. The findings of fact arrived at by the Nyaya Panchayat when convicting the petitioners were that they had taken their wives to a certain field and had got their wives to cut and damage the leaves of some `bhimal' trees, which belonged to the complainant Ram Sharan (opposite-party no. 3). An attempt has been made to argue that there was no evidence to support these findings, because the Panchayat rejected the testimony of the witness Gopal Singh produced by the complainant. From the impugned judgment it appears, however, that the Panchayat relied on the testimony of the complainant himself (in part, at any rate) and also on the statement of one Raghunath Prasad, a retired Deputy Ranger, who was a co-tenant of the accused; so it cannot be said that the findings were unjustified or patently erroneous. 3. It has further been argued that the conviction of the petitioners under Section 426, I.P.C. was illegal because they themselves had not committed mischief but had at the most instigated and abetted their wives in committing the offence. Section 52 of the Panchayat Raj Act, however, empowers Nyaya Panchayats to try the abetment of an offence under Section 426 as well as the primary offence itself; and the fact that the conviction in the present case was recorded under Section 426 simpliciter instead of under Section 426/109 or Section 426/114, I.P.C. amounts to a mere irregularity, which would obviously be curable. No prejudice seems to have resulted to the accused-petitioners thereby, since they were fully aware of the precise allegations levelled against them and were in no way misled by the form of the charge. 4. No other point has been urged in respect of the impugned decision of the Nyaya Panchayat and I am satisfied that judgment is basically sound and calls for no interference by way of writ. 5. 4. No other point has been urged in respect of the impugned decision of the Nyaya Panchayat and I am satisfied that judgment is basically sound and calls for no interference by way of writ. 5. The main grievance of the petitioners, however, is with regard to the S.D.M.'s decision, whereby the fines imposed on them by the Nyaya Panchayat have been enhanced from Rs. 2/- each to Rs. 8/- each. Their contention is that the S.D.M. had no power to enhance the sentence when disposing of a revision under Section 89 of the Panchayat Raj Act. Clause (2) of Section 89 empowers the S.D.M. to modify the Nyaya Panchayat's order; but it is argued that the word `modify' used in this context implies only reducing the sentence, not enhancing it. In this connexion the petitioner relies on a case of the Patna High Court, Rameshwar Dass v. Tildhari Das A.I.R. 1958 Patna 313, in which it was held that the word `modify' used in the Bihar Gram Kutchery Rules meant `to make less severe' or `to tone down' and did not include the idea of enhancement. But, with the utmost respect, I cannot accept this in interpretation as correct. The basic meaning of `modify' is merely `to change' or `to alter'; and a sentence may be `modified', i.e. altered, either by making it less or by making it more. I am fortified in this view by the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Poona A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 586, in which it has been held that the word `modify' used in Section 60 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act implies either reduction or enhancement; and by the ruling given in Baleshwar Prasad v. Managing Committee of Mahabodhi Higher Secondary School Sarnath,Varanasi 1961 A.L.J. 722, in which a learned single Judge of this Court interpreted the word `modify' in Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act as including the notion of enhancement. Modification of a sentence, therefore, would, in the absence of any limiting clause, mean either increasing or lessening the fine or period of imprisonment. When the ordinary meaning of the word `modify' includes both reduction and enhancement, there seems to be no reason why the word should be restricted to reduction alone, unless there is some definite indication in the statute to the contrary. When the ordinary meaning of the word `modify' includes both reduction and enhancement, there seems to be no reason why the word should be restricted to reduction alone, unless there is some definite indication in the statute to the contrary. And in the present instance, the wording of Section 89 of the Panchayat Raj Act shows that the S.D.M. is invested with powers of the widest amplitude, for Clause (1) of that section lays down that "if it appears to him that injustice or material irregularity has occurred he may make such order in the case as he thinks fit." It seems to me therefore that when deciding revisions under Section 89, the S.D.M. has full power not only to reduce the sentence but also to enhance it in appropriate cases. 6. One further question remains to be decided. It is contended that even if the S.D.M. had power to enhance the sentence, he could not do so without serving a notice on the petitioners calling upon them to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced. I note, however, that in Section 423 (1-A) of the Criminal Procedure Code a specific provision has been included, restraining the High Court from enhancing a sentence "unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement; and the absence of any similar clause in Section 89 of the Panchayat Raj Act clearly suggests that in proceedings under that section no such notice is necessary. An attempt has been made to argue that the principles of natural justice demand that such a notice should be given to the accused; but I see no force in this contention, except perhaps in those rare cases where the S.D.M. may choose to interfere with the sentence suo motu without any revision application having been filed by either party. When a convicted accused files a revision (as in the present case), notice is automatically issued to the opposite-party; and then the whole case is brought before the S.D.M., to be discussed in the presence of both parties with a view to deciding whether there should be any modification or alteration firstly in the conviction and secondly in the sentence. When a convicted accused files a revision (as in the present case), notice is automatically issued to the opposite-party; and then the whole case is brought before the S.D.M., to be discussed in the presence of both parties with a view to deciding whether there should be any modification or alteration firstly in the conviction and secondly in the sentence. In such circumstances I see no fundamental necessity for any specific notice to the accused regarding enhancement of sentence; and I am satisfied that in the present case no rule of natural justice has been violated. 7. This petition thus fails on all the points raised and is accordingly dismissed.