JUDGMENT M.C. Desai, C.J. - This appeal arises from an order passed by our brother G.C. Mathur refusing to issue certiorari for the quashing of an order purporting to have been passed by a District Magistrate in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Section 7(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Rules. The appellant is the owner of two houses bearing nos. 56-A and 310. Rahat Bai was her tenant in house No. 56-A; her case was that Rahat Bai was a tenant of a portion of the house and that the remaining portion was in her own occupation but it has been found as a matter of fact that the remaining portion of the house was not in the occupation of the appellant and that she was occupying the other house No. 310. She filed a suit for the ejectment of Rahat Bai and a date for final hearing was fixed. Presumably the suit was being contested by Rahat Bai and she continued to be in possession of the accommodation. Before the date fixed for the final hearing she wrote to the District Magistrate that she intended to vacate the accommodation in near future and that it might be allotted to respondent No. 2. The District Magistrate did not summon the appellant and without hearing her passed an order directing her to let the accommodation to the respondent. At the same time Rahat Bai handed over possession of the accommodation to the respondent. It was hen that the appellant came to know of the order passed by the District Magistrate and filed an application before him for its cancellation. She sought cancellation on two grounds, firstly that the accommodation had not fallen vacant before the order was passed and secondly that the provision of Rule 7 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Rules had not been complied with. He refused to cancel the allotment order and the appellant filed the petition for certiorari which has been refused by our brother G.C. Mathur. 2. Rule 7 has no application because the appellant, as found by the District Magistrate, did not occupy a portion of the accommodation. The whole portion that was let to Rahat Bai was an accommodation and the whole of the accommodation was in her occupation. 2. Rule 7 has no application because the appellant, as found by the District Magistrate, did not occupy a portion of the accommodation. The whole portion that was let to Rahat Bai was an accommodation and the whole of the accommodation was in her occupation. The remaining portion of the house was not a portion of that accommodation and further it has not been found in that occupation of the appellant. So this ground on which the cancellation of the allotment order was sought rightly failed. 3. As regards jurisdiction of the District Magistrate to pass the allotment order it could have been passed only under Section 7(2). Taking it to be and order passed under the Provision we find no illegality in it. Section 7(2) itself lays down that an allotment order can be passed when an accommodation is about to fall vacant. Here the District Magistrate presumably found that the accommodation was about to fall vacant; how he found so is a different matter. Sub-Section (1)(a) imposes a duty upon a landlord to give notice of the vacancy of an accommodation to the District Magistrate within seven days of its becoming vacant and sub-Section (1)(b) imposes a duty upon the tenant to give a similar notice to the District Magistrate within seven days of his vacating the accommodation. In the instant case the accommodation had not been vacated and, therefore, no notice was required to be given either by the appellant or by Rahat Bai to the District Magistrate under sub-Section (1). Whatever information was given by Rahat Bai to the District Magistrate was not a notice contemplated by sub-Section (1)(b). Her duty was to give a notice after vacating the accommodation and within seven days of her doing so; she was under no duty to give a notice of mere intention to vacate it. But the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate to pass an order under sub-Section (2) is independent of the notice given to him under sub-Section (1); there is nothing in sub-Section (2) to suggest that a District Magistrate acquires jurisdiction to pass an order under it only on receipt of the notice mentioned in sub-Section (1). But the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate to pass an order under sub-Section (2) is independent of the notice given to him under sub-Section (1); there is nothing in sub-Section (2) to suggest that a District Magistrate acquires jurisdiction to pass an order under it only on receipt of the notice mentioned in sub-Section (1). Actually he can find that an accommodation is about to fall vacant only on the basis of information other than the information acquired through a notice under sub-Section (1) because the notice under sub-Section (1) is to be given only after the accommodation has actually fallen vacant. Therefore, a District Magistrate's jurisdiction to pass an order on the ground that an accommodation is about to fall vacant is not dependant upon compliance with the provisions of sub-Section (1) and it could not be argued that because Rahat Bai was not required to give a notice under sub-Section (1) the District Magistrate could not pass an order under sub-Section (2). His tacit finding that the accommodation was about to fall vacant being one of fact could not be challenged in a petition for certiorari. When the tenant herself informed him that she was going to vacate in near future he could hold that the accommodation was about to fall vacant and pass an order of allotment. Therefore, there was nothing without jurisdiction in the order of allotment. 4. It was certainly most imprudent on the part of the District Magistrate to pass an order under sub-Section (2) on such information as was given in this case by Rahat Bai. She was presumably defending the suit for her ejectment and had not vacated the accommodation. She could surrender possession only to the appellant and had not done so. It was not known when she was to vacate the accommodation. She was not required by any law to inform the District Magistrate of her intention to vacate and she had absolutely no right to nominate a person to whom the appellant might be required by the District Magistrate to let the accommodation. The District Magistrate should, therefore, have taken no notice of the information given to him by Rahat Bai. Even if he wanted to act on it and pass an order under sub-Section (2), as a prudent and cautious person he should have asked the appellant, the landlord, what she had to say. The District Magistrate should, therefore, have taken no notice of the information given to him by Rahat Bai. Even if he wanted to act on it and pass an order under sub-Section (2), as a prudent and cautious person he should have asked the appellant, the landlord, what she had to say. It was improper on his part to act ex parte against the appellant had sued her with his permission it was all the more necessary for him to hear him before passing the order under sub-Section (2). If he had permitted her to sue Rahat Bai because she required the accommodation for own use, he acted inconsistently and unreasonably by directing her to let it to another person. The Court has come across several cases in which a tenant against whom a suit for ejectment was pending quietly wrote to the District Magistrate direct saying that he wanted to vacate the accommodation and that the landlord might be directed to let it to a particular person and the District Magistrate without any enquiry passed an order directing the landlord to let it to that person. A tenant who fights a suit for ejectment and without delivering possession to the landlord and secretly informs the District Magistrate does not act honestly at all and it is surprising that the District Magistrate accepts his recommendation and directs the landlord to let the accommodation to the person nominated by him. A tenant has absolutely no right to nominate any person and when he nominates one it is a collusive proceedings between him and the person nominated. A District Magistrate is expected not to allow such a manoeuvre to succeed but we have come across instances in which it has succeeded. This brings the administration of the Act into disrepute. 5. However imprudent the District Magistrate might have acted by passing the order it cannot be said that he committed a manifest error of law and his order could not be quashed merely on the ground that it was imprudent or improper. 6. The appellant complained against the respondent's act of taking possession of the accommodation without entering into a contract of tenancy with her and direct from Rahat Bai. 6. The appellant complained against the respondent's act of taking possession of the accommodation without entering into a contract of tenancy with her and direct from Rahat Bai. The order on the basis of which the opposite party took possession of the accommodation was an order neither addressed to her nor authorising her to take possession of the accommodation; it was an order addressed to the appellant requiring her only to give the accommodation to her. The only right that the respondent acquired under it was a lease of the accommodation from the appellant and her duty was to approach her and enter into a contract of tenancy with her. Unless she entered into a contract of tenancy with her she had no right to take possession of the accommodation. If the appellant refused to enter into a contract of tenancy with her, i.e. to let it to her she would be liable to be punished for disobedience of the order but the respondent would not get the right to enter into possession of the accommodation. It does not appear that the respondent approached the appellant at all for a contract of tenancy and, therefore the appellant never refused to let the accommodation to her. She could not possibly have any right to take possession without her even asking the appellant to let it to her. But we are not concerned in this appeal with this act of the respondent, however unlawful it may be, done subsequently to the impugned order. It may be open to the appellant to treat her as a trespasser and to sue her as such. It may also be open to her to make an application under Section 7-A(1) to the District Magistrate contending that the respondent has occupied the accommodation in contravention of the order under Section 7(2) by occupying it without its being let to her. She cannot get any relief against the act of the respondent in this appeal. 7. In the result we hold that our learned brother rightly refused certiorari and dismiss the special appeal.