JUDGMENT : Gajendragadkar, CJI. The industrial dispute between the appellant, the management of Powai Tea Estate, and the respondents, its workmen, which has given rise to this appeal by special leave, centered round the question as to whether the appellant was justified in terminating the services of three of its employees D. Barthakur, D. Bora, and L.K. Gohain. The respondents contended that the termination of the services of the said three employees was unjustified, and that they were entitled to reinstatement with back wages. The appellant, on the other hand, urged that the dismissals in question were fully justified, and that the employees were not entitled to any relief. This dispute was referred to the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Gauhati, by the Assam Government, and the Labour Court has held that the dismissal of D. Barthakur and D. Bora was justified, with the result that the said two employees were entitled to no relief in the present proceedings. In regard to Gohain, however, it came to the conclusion that his dismissal was not justified, and so, the appellant was ordered to reinstate him with continuity of service. Against this order, the appellant moved the High Court of Assam under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, and urged that the impugned order passed by the Labour Court was illegal and should be set aside. The High Court rejected the appellant's contention and dismissed the writ petition filed by it. The appellant then moved the High Court for a certificate to appeal to this Court, but the said application was rejected. Thereafter, the appellant applied for, and obtained special leave from this Court. That is how the appeal has come to this Court. 2. The main point which Mr Setalvad for the appellant has urged before us, is that in dealing with the case of Gohain, the Labour Court has purported to exercise appellate jurisdiction in relation to the conclusion reached by the Enquiry Officer who held a domestic enquiry against Gohain. It appears that on the 12th June, 1957, Mr Allison. the Divisional Manager of the appellant, served a charge-sheet on Gohain in which it was alleged that Gohain was guilty of three items of misconduct. It appears that on the 12th June, 1957, Mr Allison. the Divisional Manager of the appellant, served a charge-sheet on Gohain in which it was alleged that Gohain was guilty of three items of misconduct. "It has been brought to my notice", says the charge-sheet addressed to Gohain, "that you have been taking money from labourers at the time of payment of their wages and also from assisted emigrant labourers when they want to sign "J" Forms and also from non-workers in the lines". The charge-sheet further added that Mr Allison had checked on the information furnished to him against Gohain and had been satisfied that Gohain had been guilty of the said misconduct. Gohain was, therefore, called upon to offer his explanation why action should not be taken against him for taking bribes from labour on the estate. The charge concluded with suspension of Gohain with immediate effect. 3. This charge, no doubt, is not happily worded and the expressions used in it would seem to indicate that Mr Allison had already made up his mind that Gohain was guilty of the misconduct set out in the charge. In the circumstances of this case, however, we do not propose to base our decision on this infirmity in the charge. We will assume that the charge merely intended to say that Mr Allison was prima facie satisfied that a case for enquiry had been made out against Gohain. We would only like to emphasise that such incautious and loose language in the charge ought to be avoided, because it is likely to create an apprehension in the mind of the employee charge-sheeted that the person issuing the charge has already decided the case against him. 4. After this charge-sheet was served on Gohain, he forwarded his explanation on the 15-6-1957. In this explanation, Gohain denied all the three items of the charge and added that he had nothing to do with the 'J' Forms, because it was not his duty to deal with those forms. He contended that since notice after notice was being served on him, it appeared that the appellant was determined to victimise him, and so, he requested that the order of suspension passed against him should be withdrawn. 5. Mr Allison then held an enquiry against Gohain. He contended that since notice after notice was being served on him, it appeared that the appellant was determined to victimise him, and so, he requested that the order of suspension passed against him should be withdrawn. 5. Mr Allison then held an enquiry against Gohain. At this enquiry, Jagannath Tanti stated that Gohain had taken Rs 15 from him in order to allow his wife to work on the tea garden, and he added that Chabi Tanti and Chaitto Tanti had witnessed the said payment. Chabi Tanti supported Jagannath Tanti's evidence, but Chaitto Tanti did not. Gohain denied the charge. That is how the evidence adduced in this case stands. 6. Thereafter, on the 19-6-1957, Mr Allison served an order of dismissal on Gohain in which he stated that at the enquiry held against Gohain on the 15-6-1957, he had been found guilty of illegally taking money from labourers. This order of dismissal was passed under Section 10(a)(3) of the standing orders. It is this dismissal which is the subject-matter of the present appeal. Mr Setalvad contends that in coming to the conclusion that the dismissal of Gohain was not justified, the Labour Court has, in substance, reappreciated the evidence led at the domestic enquiry, as well as the evidence led before it, and that, he argues, was beyond the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The enquiry in this case has been properly conducted. Gohain was given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him, and the enquiry officer came to the conclusion that the charges had been proved. In such a case, says Mr Setalvad, the Labour Court cannot sit in judgment over the propriety or correctness of the findings recorded at the enquiry, and inasmuch as the Labour Court has purported to re-appreciate the evidence, it has acted without jurisdiction. 7. Prima facie, there is substance in the contention raised by Mr Setalvad. The true legal position about the jurisdiction and powers of the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court dealing with disputes arising from dismissal of industrial employees, is no longer in doubt; and if the decision reached by the Labour Court could not have been sustained on the ground to which we will presently refer, the criticism made by Mr Setalvad would have justified our interference with the order passed by the Labour Court. But it appears from the record that the decision reached by the Labour Court can be justified on another ground to which the Labour Court has not referred, but which patent on the record. 8. It is clear that after Mr Allison held the enquiry on the 15-6-1957, he did not make any report at all; all that he did was to issue the order of dismissal on the 19-6-1957. In other words, the enquiry officer held the enquiry and straightaway proceeded to issue an order of dismissal. We have repeatedly held that though domestic enquiries held by employers in dealing with cases of misconduct alleged against their employees need not conform to all the requirements of judicial proceedings, they must justify the essential requirements of natural justice; and since industrial adjudication attaches considerable importance to the findings recorded by the enquiry officer holding a domestic enquiry in such cases, it is essential that the officer should make a brief report indicating clearly his conclusion and reasons in support of it. It is, of course, not necessary that the report should be elaborate; but however brief it is, it should indicate in a broad way the conclusion of the officer and his reasons; otherwise when the legality or propriety of the dismissal which follows such a report, is put in issue before an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court, it would be impossible for the Tribunal or the Court to consider whether the conclusion reached by the enquiry officer was perverse or not. Judicial decisions have established the proposition that if the conclusion reached by the enquiry officer in a domestic enquiry is shown to be perverse in the strict legal sense, that would justify industrial adjudication to examine the merits of the dispute between the parties for itself. Now, how can industrial adjudication deal with the merits of the respondent's argument in the present case that the order of dismissal is illegal unless it is possible to ascertain what the enquiry officer decided after the enquiry was held. It is necessary to emphasise that domestic enquiries held against industrial employees must conform to the basic requirement of natural justice, and one of the essential requisites of a proceeding of this character is that when the enquiry is over the officer must consider the evidence and record his conclusions and reasons therefor. It is necessary to emphasise that domestic enquiries held against industrial employees must conform to the basic requirement of natural justice, and one of the essential requisites of a proceeding of this character is that when the enquiry is over the officer must consider the evidence and record his conclusions and reasons therefor. The fact that the officer who holds the enquiry against a delinquent employee is competent to dismiss him, cannot possibly help to dispense with the making of the report. The report is a document which will have to be closely examined by the Industrial Tribunal when a dispute, such as the present, is brought before it for its adjudication. This question has been considered by this Court in Khardah and Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (1963) 2 LLJ 452 as well as in the Management of Balipara Tea Estate, Lokra, Assam v. Gopal Chandra Goswami, Civil Appeal No. 872 of 1962 decided on 11-11-1963. In view of the fact that no report has been made by Mr Allison in the present case, it was competent to the Labour Court to consider the evidence for itself. It is true that the Labour Court .has not referred to this aspect of the matter; but as we have already indicated, the infirmity in question is patent on the record, and so it is not open to Mr Setalvad to challenge successfully the course adopted by the Labour Court in dealing with the evidence for itself. 9. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.