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1964 DIGILAW 316 (ALL)

Ram Sumer v. Narain

1964-09-25

D.S.MATHUR

body1964
ORDER D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a revision u/s 115, CPC by Ram Sumer against the order of the District Judge of Jaunpur, dismissing his appeal and thereby maintaining the order of the Civil Judge, making the award of the Arbitrator the rule of the Court. 2. The orders of the District Judge and also the Civil Judge are challenged on the ground that the reference made to the Civil Judge u/s 12(4) of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act was illegal and did not confer any jurisdiction in the Civil Judge to give his finding on the question referred to him. It was contended that u/s 12(4), the Consolidation Officer could refer the question of title to the Civil Judge for decision only if such question had not already been determined by a competent court. In the litigation between the parties commenced before the start of the consolidation operations, the Munsif had given a judgment in favour of the Applicant, Ram Sumer, but that judgment was challenged in appeal; and in view of the consolidation operations the hearing of the appeal was stayed. It was urged that the Munsif had al ready determined the question of title though his decision had not become final and as his was a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to refer the question of title to the Civil Judge and the reference, wrongly made, could not confer any jurisdiction in the Civil Judge. Reliance was placed upon the difference in the wording of Sections 12(4) and 22(1) of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. In Section 12(4) the word used is "determined", while in Section 22(1) the words used are "finally determined". Reliance was also placed upon a decision of this Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 3564 of 1958, decided on 20--4-1962. 3. The above question was not raised before the lower courts and if it is found to be a mixed question of law and fact, it cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in the revision. 4. 3. The above question was not raised before the lower courts and if it is found to be a mixed question of law and fact, it cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in the revision. 4. Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the determination of the question of title, contemplated by Section 12(4), is the adjudication of the question by the trial court of competent jurisdiction and not necessarily an adjudication which has become final after the parties had an opportunity, or had challenged the order before the higher courts, the adjudication must be one which is enforceable and hot one, the operation of which has been stayed or which has, in some other litigation been set aside. It is not unusual for a party to challenge a decree in a separate suit and at occasions the decree passed is set aside, or is declared unenforceable as far as the Plaintiff of the subsequent suit is concerned. In certain circumstances, the decree, though set aside against the Plaintiff, shall be ineffective. In other words, it can easily happen that a decree duly passed, which is binding on the parties to the decree, is ineffective and unenforceable as a result of a decision in another suit. The earlier adjudication, even thought it amounts to final determination of a matter in issue by a competent Court, cannot be treated as such and has to be disregarded in determining the rights of the parties. 5. The same can to said where the losing party is challenging a decree in appeal and has obtained an order staying the operation of that decree. In such circumstances, there would be on the record a decree of a competent Court, but it is unenforceable and cannot determine the rights of the parties. 6. To put it differently, the decree and judgment of a competent court, if the operation thereof has been stayed or set aside, do not and cannot be deemed to determine the rights of the parties and even though such a decree or judgment exists on the record, it shall not take away the jurisdiction of the Consolidation Officer to refer the question of title to the Civil Judge for determination. 7. 7. The only material on record is that the Munsif as trial court had given a judgment in favour of the Applicant and the appeal preferred against that judgment and decree has been stayed. It has not come oh the record whether any stay order was issued by the appellate court and the operation of the decree had or had not been stayed. Without additional evidence it shall thus not be possible to record a finding on the question of law raised by the learned Advocate for the Applicant for the first time in the revision. The revisional court has no jurisdiction to record additional evidence and consequently, it is not possible to record any finding on the question sought to be raised for the first time in the revision. This Court can, therefore, refuse to exercise the revisional jurisdiction though making it clear that the Applicant can raise the question of jurisdiction in another proceeding if the proceeding taken by the Civil Judge was in the eye of law a nullity. Naturally, in this revision no opinion has been expressed on any of the points mentioned above. 8. The revision is hereby dismissed, though it shall be open to the Applicant to seek such other remedy as he may be advised. Costs on parties. The stay order is vacated.