BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) A single point was urged in support of this Rule, namely, that opposite party, landlords or the Bargadar petitioner were not entitled to claim eviction of the Bargadar petitioner on the ground that he had failed to deliver share of the produce to landlords opposite party and also claim share of the produce, which the Bargadar had defaulted to deliver and that having had elected to claim share of the produce, the landlords must be deemed to have waived the claim for eviction. ( 2 ) THE circumstances under which this Rule was issued are hereinafter recounted in brief. The opposite party landlords filed B. C. Case No. 242k of 1959, before the Bhag Chas Officer, Keshpur, claiming share of Bhag Produce, for the years 1360 and 1365 B. S. , from the petitioner. They also filed B. C. Case No. 66k of 1959, before the same Bhag Chas Officer, claiming eviction of the petitioner from the land cultivated by him, on the threefold ground of (i) default in delivering share of produce (ii) negligence in cultivation and (iii) bonafide requirement for bringing the land under their personal cultivation. The Bhag Chas Officer heard both the cases analogously and awarded share of produce to the landlords opposite party for the years 1363 to 1365 B. S. only, holding that the rest of the claim was barred by limitation. He also passed an order for eviction of the petitioner from the land on the ground that he had contravened the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, by his failure to deliver the share of the produce to the landlords opposite party. Against the award made by the Bhag Chas Officer in the two cases, the petitioner Bargader filed two appeals before the learned Munsif at Garbeta. The landlord opposite party also filed an appeal before the same learned Munsif against so much of their claim as was dismissed by the Bhag Chas Officer. The learned Munsif heard the appeals analogously and by his judgment, dated July 18, 1961, dismissed both the appeals preferred by the Bargadar but partly allowed the appeal preferred by the landlords opposite party, holding, inter alia, that the claim for share of produce for the year 1362 B. S. was not barred by limitation. The learned Munsif heard the appeals analogously and by his judgment, dated July 18, 1961, dismissed both the appeals preferred by the Bargadar but partly allowed the appeal preferred by the landlords opposite party, holding, inter alia, that the claim for share of produce for the year 1362 B. S. was not barred by limitation. ( 3 ) THE petitioner Bargadar moved this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, against the dismissal of his appeals and obtained this Rule. ( 4 ) MR. Guruprasad Ghosh, learned Advocate for the petitioner, strongly relied on an unreported judgment by P. N. Mookerjee, J. dated November 15, 1960, in Krishnadas Garai v. Ban Behari Pal (Civil Rule No. 3043 of 1958), in which his Lordship observed as follows:-"the petitioner's allegation was that the O, P had made himself liable to eviction under Clause (c) by contravening certain orders of the Board regarding delivery of produce. This, however, strictly speaking, is not by itself a ground for eviction under the new Act, Section 17 (1) (c), although this was one of the grounds of eviction under the older law. Under the present Clause (c), it is necessary to prove contravention of any of the provisions of the Act for purposes of eviction. It is true that the order for delivery of the produce is made by the Board only when there has been a contravention of Section 16 (3) but for that contravention the statute appears to provide two remedies, namely, (i) order of the Board for delivery of the produce and (ii) order of eviction under Clause (c) of Section 17 (1) and when the jotedar has chosen one of the remedies he must be held to have made his election and cannot thereafter fall back upon the other remedy. In this context, when the jotedar has already recovered an order as in the present case, for recovery of produce on account of non-delivery of the same by the Bargadar as contemplated under Section 16, he can no longer urge it as a ground of eviction under Section 17 (1) (c) and in the circumstances this will not be treated as contravention of a provision of the Act for the purposes of that clause. ( 5 ) HE contended that the principle enunciated by P. N. Mookerjee, J. should be applied to the facts of this case also and the claim for eviction must be disallowed. We are unable to uphold the contention of Mr. Ghosh. ( 6 ) EXPLAINING the doctrine of election in the case of Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd. (1921) 2 KB 608, Scrutton, LJ observed:-"a plaintiff is not permitted to 'approbate and reprobate'. The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in our doctrine of election, namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument: Ker v. Wauchope (1819) 1 Bligh 1 (21): Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby, (1908) AC 224. The doctrine of election is not confined to instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction. " ( 7 ) THE Supreme Court approved of the observations by Scrutton, LJ in Nagubai Ammal v. Shama Rao, AIR (1956) SC 593 (602) and in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh, AIR (1961) SC 1327 (1329 ). ( 8 ) WE need in this context refer also to a judgment of this Court in Mussammat Golab Koer v. Badshah Bahadur, (13 CWN 1197 at p. 1216 - per Mookerjee and Carnduff, JJ.), in which the following observation appears:-"it cannot be affirmed as a general proposition of law that, whenever there are two remedies open to a party aggrieved in respect of any matter he is bound at his peril to make an election and that, if he chooses one remedy, he is necessarily debarred from recourse to the other. Where different remedial rights arise out of the same facts the question whether the party aggrieved is bound to make an election depends upon the circumstance whether the remedies are in their nature inconsistent. " ( 9 ) NOW, keeping in mind what the doctrine of election implies, we need examine the contention of Mr. Where different remedial rights arise out of the same facts the question whether the party aggrieved is bound to make an election depends upon the circumstance whether the remedies are in their nature inconsistent. " ( 9 ) NOW, keeping in mind what the doctrine of election implies, we need examine the contention of Mr. Ghosh that the landlords opposite party were not entitled to claim share of the produce and eviction of the petitioner at one and the same time. Sections 2 (2) and 16 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act provides as follows:-Section 2 (2) -"'bargadar' means a person who under the system generally known as adhi, barga or bhag cultivates the land of another person on condition of delivering a share of the produce of such land to that person. " section 16.- " (1) The produce of any land, cultivated by a bargadar shall be divided as between the bargadar and the person whose land he cultivates - (a) in the proportion of 50:50 in a case where plough, cattle, manure and seeds necessary for cultivation are supplied by the person owning the land, (b) in the proportion of 60:40 in all other cases. (2) The bargadar shall deliver to the person whose land he cultivates the share of the produce due to him within the prescribed period and on such delivery each party shall give to the other a receipt for the quantity of the produce received by him. (3) The bargadar shall store or thresh the produce at such place as may be agreed upon by him and the owner of the land. " ( 10 ) THEREFORE, the condition under which every Bargadar cultivates the land of another person is that the Bargadar shall deliver to such person a share of the produce as prescribed in Section 16 of the Act. That is the price the Bargadar pays for the advantage that he enjoys. If any dispute arises between the Bargadar and the person whose land he cultivates over division or delivery of produce, the same shall be decided by such officer or authority as the State Government may appoint. That is the price the Bargadar pays for the advantage that he enjoys. If any dispute arises between the Bargadar and the person whose land he cultivates over division or delivery of produce, the same shall be decided by such officer or authority as the State Government may appoint. This we find in Section 18 of the Act, which reads:-Section 18 (1) - "every dispute between a bargadar and the person whose lands he cultivates in respects of any of the following matters, namely:- (a) division or delivery of the produce, (b) termination of cultivation by the bargadar, (c) place of storing or threshing the produce shall be decided by such officer or authority as the State Government may appoint. " (2) "if in deciding any dispute referred to in sub-section (1) any question arises as to whether a person is bargadar or not and to whom the share of the produce is deliverable, such question shall be determined by the officer or authority mentioned in sub-section (1 ). " (3) - "the decision of any dispute referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall specify the money value of the share of the produce to be delivered, which shall be payable in default of delivery of such share. " ( 11 ) THE Act also places certain limitations on the termination of cultivation by Bargadar. Those limitations are to be found in Section 17 of the Act, the relevant portion from which is set out below:-Section 17 (1) - "no person shall be entitled to terminate cultivation of his land by a bargadar except in execution of an order, made by such officer or authority as the State Government may appoint, on one or more of the following grounds:- (a) that the bargadar has without any reasonable cause failed to cultivate the land, or has neglected to cultivate it properly, or has used it for any purpose other than agriculture; (b) that the land is not cultivated by the bargadar personally; (c) that the bargadar has contravened any provision of this Act; (d) that the person owning the land requires it bonafide for bringing it under personal cultivation. " ( 12 ) NON-DELIVERY of share of paddy to the person whose land the Bargadar cultivates is no doubt a contravention of a provision in Act, because Section 16 of the Act says "the Bargadar shall deliver". " ( 12 ) NON-DELIVERY of share of paddy to the person whose land the Bargadar cultivates is no doubt a contravention of a provision in Act, because Section 16 of the Act says "the Bargadar shall deliver". Therefore, for such contravention, the person whose land the Bargadar cultivates may terminate cultivation by the Bargadar, if the Bargadar defaults in delivery of the produce. We are, however, of the opinion that by asking for termination of cultivation by a defaulting Bargadar, the person whose land the Bargadar was cultivating does not forfeit his right to the share of the produce, lawfully due to him. There is no element of election involved in such a case. The two remedies are not repugnant nor mutually exclusive. Otherwise by an extension of sophistry, it may be argued that a learned, under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, may not sue a tenant for eviction and also claim arrears of rent or mesne profits and that such a landlord must be put to election, namely, that he must give up his claim for eviction and sue only for arrears of rent or claim eviction and give up claim for rent or mesne profits. Such an interpretation of the law may create a paradise for all sorts of adventures, who may enjoy other people's property for some time, suffer a decree for eviction and then walk away without any monetary liability for the period of their occupation. ( 13 ) THERE may, however, be cases where a person has, by his conduct, clearly expressed an election. A person who at first merely desires decision of a dispute over delivery of produce against a Bargadar, institutes proceedings under Section 18 of the Act, obtains an order in his favour, takes benefit of the order and realises the share of the produce, may be said to have confined himself to one of the remedies under the Act. Having realised the benefits, in the aforementioned manner he may not be allowed to say thereafter that the Bargadar was once a defaulter (although not so when he decides to terminate his cultivation) and the Bargadar must atone for his past default, although the Bargadar had mended his past contraventions of the provisions of the Act, in the meantime. That is not the case before us. That is not the case before us. We are of the opinion that there is nothing in the scheme of the Act which does not allow the landlord to take action against the Bargadar both for eviction and for realisation of share of produce, not delivered, at one and the same time. If there is anything contrary to the above proposition contained in the judgment of P. N. Mookerjee, J. , in the case of (1) Krishnadas Gorai (supra), we respectfully dissent. ( 14 ) THE only point argued by Mr. Ghosh, therefore, fails and this Rule is discharged with costs 2 Gms. Civil Rule No. 4190 of 1961 the same point as in Civil Rule No. 4189 of 1961 is also involved in this Rule. For the reasons given by us in Civil Rule No. 4189 of 1961 this Rule also must be discharged. We do not however make any separate order as to costs in this Rule. Civil Rule Nos. 1089 and 1139 of 1960 for reasons stated by us in Civil Rule No. 4189 of 1961 these two Rules must also be discharged. We do not, however, make any order as to costs. ( 15 ) D. Basu, J.- I agree with the orders proposed by my Lord in these rules but I would like to state the reasons in a few words of my own. The facts having been stated in my Lord's judgment need not be reiterated. ( 16 ) THE West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 has repealed the West Bengal Bargadars Act, 1950 and has incorporated its provisions, with changes, in one Act containing different provisions relating to land reform. Section 2 (2) of the Act f 1955 defines a 'bargadar' as follows:"bargadar means a person who under the system generally known as adhi, barga or bhag cultivates the land of another person on condition of delivering a share of the produce of such land to that person. . . . " ( 17 ) SECTION 16 deals with the rights and liabilities of the Bargadar and the person whose land he cultivates, as regards the delivery of the share of the produce referred to in Section 2 (2 ). . . . " ( 17 ) SECTION 16 deals with the rights and liabilities of the Bargadar and the person whose land he cultivates, as regards the delivery of the share of the produce referred to in Section 2 (2 ). Sub-section (1) of Section 16 lays down the proportion in which the produce shall be divided between these two persons and sub-section (2) then lays down the obligation of the Bargadars to deliver the share which he is liable to deliver according to sub-section (1 ). It is in these terms -"the bargadar shall deliver to the person whose land he cultivates the share of the produce due to him within the prescribed period and on such delivery each party shall give to the other a receipt for the quantity of the produce received by him. " ( 18 ) THE next relevant provision is Section 17 (1) (c) which says -" (1) No person shall be entitled to terminate cultivation of his land by a bargadar except in execution of an order, made by such officer or authority as the State Government may appoint, on one or more of the following grounds:- (c) that the bargadar has contravened the provisions of this Act. . . . "section 18 (1) (a) provides:-" (1) Every dispute between a bargadar and the person whose land he cultivates in respect of any of the following matters, namely, (a) division or delivery of the produce. . . . shall be decided by such officer or authority as the State Government may appoint. " ( 19 ) IN the case before us, the Opposite Parties applied before the authority appointed by the Government asking for an order for delivery of their share of the produce for certain years and also for an order for termination of the status of the Petitioner as Bargadar on the ground of default in payment of the bhag share. The Bhagchas Officer dealt with the applications together and gave his order in favour of the Opposite Parties, granting both reliefs and his order has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority. ( 20 ) THE Petitioner challenges the order of the Appellate Authority as being without jurisdiction on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to award both delivery of the share and eviction for non-delivery. ( 20 ) THE Petitioner challenges the order of the Appellate Authority as being without jurisdiction on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to award both delivery of the share and eviction for non-delivery. ( 21 ) IT is not disputed before us - (a) that the Bhagchas Officer has the power under Section 18 (1) (a) to make an order for delivery of the share in respect of which a Bargadar has defaulted; and (b) that Section 17 (1) (c) is wide enough to include a contravention of Section 16 (2) in the matter of delivery of share as required by the statute, so that the Bhagchas Officer has the power, under Section 17 (1) (c), to order termination of the bargadar's right to cultivate the land, for non-delivery of the share in respect of any year. ( 22 ) IT is, however, contended on behalf of the petitioner that the two remedies, namely, under Section 18 (1) (a) and Section 17 (1) (c), are alternative and not cumulative, so that the Officer has no jurisdiction to award both delivery as well as eviction. ( 23 ) PRIMA facie, there is overlapping between the two remedies in so far as they relate to the same substantive liability of the Bargadar to deliver the statutory share of the produce and the corresponding right of the owner of the land to receive the same. When two remedies are offered by a statute for the same wrong or injury, they may be held to be alternative only if the two remedies are inconsistent with each other, or, if the cause of action is exhausted by resorting to one of them and obtaining satisfaction so that nothing remains to be enforced by the other remedy. This is illustrated by the Court of Appeal decision under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in Bennett v. Whitehead, (1926) 2 KB 380, where it was held that the injured workman could not proceed both against his employer as well as against a third party, in cases where the injury gave rise to a legal liability in a third party apart from the employer. In the facts of the case, however, it was held that there was no evidence that the workman had exercised his option to proceed against one of them so as to exclude his right to proceed against the other. In the facts of the case, however, it was held that there was no evidence that the workman had exercised his option to proceed against one of them so as to exclude his right to proceed against the other. The principle upon which the question of law was decided in this case has thus been expressed by Scrutton, LJ. ,"if by statute you have an option to do A or B, but not both, and you have done A, it does not seem to me relevant to say, "i have done A, but I have not elected to do it. " ( 24 ) THIS proposition has been affirmed by Lord Macmillan in the case of Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Ltd. , (1946) AC 163 (179 ). The basis of the proposition is the words of the statute itself to the effect that the person aggrieved must not have both remedies. In the absence of such negative words, express or implied, in the statute itself, the remedies cannot be held to be inconsistent to each other so as to be alternative. This is laid down by the House of Lords' decision in Lissenden v. Bosch Ltd. , (1940) 1 All ER 425, where it has been held that in accepting the arrears of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, the workman does not lose his right of appeal against the award of compensation, for the two rights were independent, namely, "the legal right to be paid what was admittedly due to him", and the "independent legal right to claim that the award should be reversed or varied in part, because it did not give the further relief to which he claimed to be entitled" (p. 441 ibid. ). The principle underlying the theory of 'alternative' remedies is that the two remedies are 'mutually exclusive', as Lord Wright explained in this case (p. 441, ibid. ). It is to be noted that while the relevant provisions relating to statutory compensation in the Act which was dealt with the Young v. Bristol made it clear that the workman was not entitled to both compensation and damages, there was no such thing in the relevant statute relating to the right of appeal as explained in the House of Lords' case, just referred to. In this case Lissenden v. Bosch, ibid, Lord Atkin observed:-"that a workman who has been entitled to some compensation withheld from him in the past should not be entitled to exercise his statutory right of appeal so as to ask for more without foregoing the receipt of the compensation admittedly and undoubtedly due until his appeal is heard would, I think, appear to most people a rule unjust and entirely opposed to the scheme of the Act. " ( 25 ) THE question whether two statutory remedies are cumulative or exclusive arises not only when both are provided by the same statute but also when they are provided by two different statutes, and the same test of 'inconsistency' is applied to determine whether the later statute may be said to have impliedly repealed the earlier one [in re Berry, (1936) 1 Ch. 274], so as to substitute the remedy provided by the earlier one [michell v. Brown, (1859) 28 LJMC 55; A. G. v. Lockwood, (1842) 9 M and W 278 (391)]. The same test of inconsistency is also applied where the question arises whether a common Law remedy has been displaced by a statutory remedy [o'flaherty v. M'dawell, (1857) 6 HLC 412]. I have referred to this branch of the law, only to emphasise that the test in all cases where two remedies have been held to be exclusive or alternative is the same, namely, that the two remedies are inconsistent with each other and that they cannot stand together. In Middleton v. Crofts, (1736) 2 Atk. 650, Lord Hardewick observed that negative words in the statutes are required to predicate inconsistency and where the two remedies are provided by affirmative words, there is no inconsistency. ( 26 ) IN the statute before us, there are no negative words in Sections 17 (1) and 18 (1) from which it may be said that the owner of the land shall not have both remedies for default in delivering the share. Even if it be conceded that a negative implication may be made by construction, I do not find anything in these two sections from which such negative implication can necessarily be deduced. Sub-section (2) of Section 16, read with sub-section (1), thereof, lays down the substantive liability of the Bargadar to deliver the share of produce, as specified by the section. Sub-section (2) of Section 16, read with sub-section (1), thereof, lays down the substantive liability of the Bargadar to deliver the share of produce, as specified by the section. Section 18 (1) merely lays down the machinery as to how the owner shall have to enforce his right, namely, that he must resort to the administrative authority and not to the Courts. If we refer to the Preamble of the West Bengal Bargadars Act, 1950 which the W. B. Land Reforms Act, 1955 replaces, it is abundantly clear that the liability of the bargadar to deliver the bhag share as stipulated by his contract with the owner, was a common law right which existed independently of the statute. The right or liability was not first created by the statute. The statute merely sought to "regulate" those rights and liabilities, in the public interest, and this regulation was sought to be effected by placing a substantive ceiling upon the share which the owner may recover as well as by imposing procedural limitations subject to which only he may enforce his rights. In this state of affairs, the owner has, under the Act of 1950 as well as the present Act of 1955, a substantive right to recover his share of the produce for the year in which the land has been already cultivated by the bargadar, subject only to the procedural limitation that he must resort to the administrative machinery prescribed by the Act. ( 27 ) SECTION 17 is not a provision to enable the owner to enforce his right to recover the statutory share, as explained above. The object of Section 17 (10 is to secure the Bargadar from wanton eviction by the owner. Prior to the Act of 1950, there was no legal limitation upon the right of the owner in this behalf and that is why a provision limiting the right of the owner to evict on certain specified grounds was introduced by legislation. It is to be noted that the grounds for eviction under Section 17 (1) of the present Act are four in number, and that grounds (a), (b) and (d) have nothing to do with the right of the owner to recover his share of the produce for the year or years in which the land has already been cultivated by the Bargadar. Even clause (c) is not confined to that right; it is a widely drafted clause to include contravention of any of the provisions of the statute by the Bargadar, and the provisions of the statute relate to many things besides mere non-delivery of the share of the produce in whole or in part. Hence, it cannot be said that Section 17 (1) (c) provides a remedy for the right of the owner to recover his due share. It is also to be noted that in the one section, there is no reference to the other section. In the words of Lord Atkin, [lissenden v. Bosch, ibid. ], to which I have referred earlier, there is nothing in "the scheme of the Act" from which we can make the implication that the object of both Sections 17 (1) and 18 (2) is to enforce the right owner of the land to recover the arrears of the bhag share. ( 28 ) MY lord has also pointed out now absurd the result would be if the two provisions were so interpreted as to be exclusive and this is an additional ground, in the words of Lord Atkin [lissenden v. Bosch, ibid. ], to reject the contention that the remedies are exclusive or alternative. Thus, if the landlord were confined to his remedy by way of eviction, the adventurous Bargadar would try his luck with a new owner every year and carry away his booty of the golden crops at the end of every year, under statutory support. Nor is the result happier if the owner were restricted to recover the arrears of the crops only. If the Bargadar, without any lawful justification, fails to deliver the owner's share and forces the innocent owner to resort to harassment and proceeding before the Tribunal, should we hold that the Legislature intended that even such a Bargadar should be thrust upon the owner even for the next year? There is no warrant to impute such patently unjust and unreasonable intention to the Legislature. ( 29 ) I, therefore, agree that it cannot be held that the authorities under the Act before us have no jurisdiction to order both delivery of the arrears and eviction. There is no warrant to impute such patently unjust and unreasonable intention to the Legislature. ( 29 ) I, therefore, agree that it cannot be held that the authorities under the Act before us have no jurisdiction to order both delivery of the arrears and eviction. That suffices to dispose of these Rules, and I do not consider it necessary to come to a definite finding on the further question whether the doctrine of election or waiver would have applied, if, instead of seeking the two remedies simultaneously, the owner had first resorted to one of the remedies and then applied to the authority for the other. I may only refer to the observations of the House of Lords in Lissenden v. Bosch that the question of election of remedies, which rests on the maxim that a person cannot both approbate and reprobate, does not arise unless the two remedies are first held to be mutually exclusive of the statute. ( 30 ) THERE may possibly be cases where the doctrine of estoppel in pais may be invoked on the ground that there has been alteration in the situation after the person has taken an earlier course (1860) 3 Maco. 827 (929) HL], or that the party who invokes its aid has acted upon the assurance implied in the earlier course of action [comba v. Comba, (1951) 1 All ER 767 CA]. But we are not concerned with such a situation in the cases before us, because in these cases the owner of the land prayed for the two reliefs simultaneously. We need not, therefore, examine the conditions and limitations for the application of the proposition asserted by P. N. Mookerjee, J. in Krishnadas v. Ban Behari (CR 3043 of 1959 ). But we should not be understood to assent to the broad proposition as asserted by his Lordship -"in this context, when the jotedar has already recovered an order as in the present case, for recovery of produce on account of non-delivery of the same by the Bargadar as contemplated under Section 16, he can no longer urge it as a ground of eviction under Section 17 (1) (c) and in the circumstances this will not be treated as contravention of a provision of the Act for the purposes of that clause. "rule discharged