ORDER The revision proceeding involves a short ground of the propriety of a direction made by court under S. 250, Cri. P.C. for payment of compensation of Rs. 250 to the accused in the case by the complainant, who is the President of a Village Panchayat Board. The facts are that the complainant (revision petitioner) first made a complaint to the police with regard to the alleged cutting and theft of certain trees by the respondent, which were, according to him, situate on poromboke land and were in the possession of the Panchayat Board. The police investigated the case, and referred it as a mistake of fact. The complainant then pressed the case as a private complaint. After a certain number of witnesses were heard, the learned Magistrate discharged the accused under S. 253(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that no prima facie case had been made out. The learned Magistrate then proceeded to ask the President of the Panchayat Board (P.W. 1) to show cause why he should not be directed to pay compensation for preferring a false and vexatious complaint. After hearing the submission of the President (revision petitioner), the learned Magistrate made an order directing the complainant to pay Rs. 250 as compensation to the accused. 2. It appears to me to be vary clear that this order has been made, infringing the principles applicable to a situation of that kind. The principles have been set forth by Ramaswami, J. in Natesa Udayar v. Kanagasabai Udayar, 1953 Mad WN Cri. 93 : ( AIR 1954 Mad 279 ), where the learned Judge has collected and referred to all the precedents exhaustively. As observed by the learned Judge : "Where the complainant's case is not an improbable one, and lie is merely unable to prove his case, or there is nothing to show that it is wilfully false or that there is any perversion or exaggeration of evidence, if is not proper to hold the complaint false and vexatious. Similarly, the fact that the complainant and the accused are on bad terms is not a sufficient ground for holding that the complaint is a false one." In the present case, there is, no doubt, evidence of certain previous proceedings between the complainant and the accused (respondent), resulting in ill-will between the parties. Similarly, the fact that the complainant and the accused are on bad terms is not a sufficient ground for holding that the complaint is a false one." In the present case, there is, no doubt, evidence of certain previous proceedings between the complainant and the accused (respondent), resulting in ill-will between the parties. But, dearly, that would be an unsafe and dangerous criterion to adopt, in the context of a contemplated exercise of the power of the court under S. 250, Cri. P.C. A man may have cause for ill-will against another, and that very ill-will may motivate him to prefer a criminal complaint; notwithstanding' this, he may be genuinely acting under the impression that the complaint was well-founded. It would simply be the difference between a situation where an aggrieved person feels an impetus to pursue his remedy, to the disadvantage or injury of a respondent, and a situation where an aggrieved person is willing to drop the matter, and not to proceed further. The real test is, can if be said that the trees that were felled were not on poromboke belonging to the Panchayat at all, that they were actually situate on the land of the accused (respondent) to the knowledge of the president (complainant), and that the complainant was thus, in effect, abusing his powers in order to wreak private vengeance ? I am quite unable to see how this could be claimed, on the facts of the present case. It is sufficient for me to observe that, quite irrespective of the available evidence upon title to the trees, it has at least not been established by any irrefutable evidence that the trees are not on poromboke, that they do not form the property of the Panchayat, and are thus only trees within the private property rights of the accused. In this context, it is also relevant to observe that barely a half of the evidence which the complainant sought to adduce, has been heard by the learned Magistrate, who tried this case. What the rest of the evidence was, and what precisely its effect would have been, are matters merely for speculation. Further, the complainant was not acting in a personal capacity, but he was acting in a representative capacity. What the rest of the evidence was, and what precisely its effect would have been, are matters merely for speculation. Further, the complainant was not acting in a personal capacity, but he was acting in a representative capacity. He might have been authorised in the performance of his act and this is not a case in which a man is prosecuting another for a strictly private injury, or wrong committed against him personally. For all these reasons, I am of the view that S. 250, Cri. P.C. was quite inappropriate to the facts of the present case, while I certainly do not dissent from the finding of the court below that the respondent was liable to be discharged upon the charge of theft of the trees. The revision is accordingly allowed, and the proceeding under S. 250, Cri. P.C. set aside. The compensation amount, if paid over, to the accused, must be refunded to the complainant.