Anantanarayanan, J.- On 17th November, 1941, the petitioner before us, Sri V. P. Chakravarthi, was struck-off the Rolls of Advocates by a Full Bench of this Court consisting of Leach, C.J., Mockett and Kuppuswami Ayyar, JJ., in R.C. No. 34 of 1941. Admittedly the proceedings related to an amount of Rs. 1,775 (this is the figure furnished by learned Counsel) delivered by the judgment-debtor to the legal practitioner, for payment over to the decree-holder, which amount was not so delivered, either by gross negligence or otherwise ; the retention of the moneys, thereby amounting to gross professional misconduct. Subsequent to this removal of the petitioner from the Roll of Advocates, there were, admittedly certain criminal proceedings in which he sustained convictions under sections 409 and 467 Indian Penal Code. But the case of the petitioner is that all this was 23 years back, and that, since then, he has atoned for his past misdemeanour by a prolonged period, of suffering and punishment. He has also been of good behaviour, and, subsequently, he has conformed to the ideals of rectitude, and turned over a new leaf. There are two certificates of character in his favour granted by senior counsel of the Madras Bar, namely, Messrs. K. Rajah Ayyar and K. S. Champakesa Ayyangar. In brief, the petitioner prays for review or rescinding of the previous order and restoration to the Rolls, by virtue of our powers under section 12 (6) of the Indian Bar Councils Act. Ordinarily, the exercise of our jurisdiction would have occasioned no difficulty, and the case itself would merely have to be dealt with on the merits. But, in the present context of the supersession of the Indian Bar Councils Act by the Advocates Act XXV of 1961, there is a question of our jurisdiction and also of the effect of the exercise of our jurisdiction, if it still exists. This question has necessarily to be clarified first, before we proceed to the merits. For this reason, we have had the benefit of full arguments from learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri V. Thiyagarajan and the learned Advacate-General. The matter can be quite tersely stated as follows: The effect of section 50 of the Advocates Act, 1961, is to repeal prior enactments, in the manner provided for by that section, and as the relevant parts of that enactment came into effect. The matter can be quite tersely stated as follows: The effect of section 50 of the Advocates Act, 1961, is to repeal prior enactments, in the manner provided for by that section, and as the relevant parts of that enactment came into effect. Admittedly, the power of review is vested in us under section 12 (6) of the prior Act, which itself is liable to be repealed by the coming into force of Chapter V of the Advocates Act, 1961. Now, according to the learned Advocate-General, Chapter V came into force on 1st September, 1963 ; the situation is not in dispute that, thereby, section 12 of the prior Act stood repealed on the date on which the petitioner sought redress at our hands, which was on 27th March, 1964. The question is, whether, notwithstanding this, our power of review is saved either by any express provision of the new statute, or by any doctrine of inherent jurisdiction, or upon any other principle recognised by law. On an analysis of the relevant provisions, this would appear to be an instance of a causus omissus as far as Act XXV of 1961 is concerned. For, the only saving provisions are to be found in section 58-B of that Act, and the First Proviso to section 58-B (2) relates to the finding of a tribunal constituted under section 11 of the Bar Councils Act, and the exercise by the High Court of its powers under section 12 in respect of certain proceedings. The Second Proviso to section 58-B (2) relates to a case where the High Court has referred back any case for further enquiry under sub-section (4) of section 12. With regard to the First Proviso, a proceeding of the present character would appear to be saved, at the first blush ; but, further scrutiny reveals that this is not the case. For, as section 58-B (1) specifies, the proceeding itself has to be in respect of a disciplinary matter, “in relation to an existing Advocate of a High Court.” Admittedly, the petitioner is not an ‘existing Advocate’ and the First Proviso will not save the present proceeding, nor confer on us jurisdiction under section 12 (6) of the Bar Councils Act. For, as section 58-B (1) specifies, the proceeding itself has to be in respect of a disciplinary matter, “in relation to an existing Advocate of a High Court.” Admittedly, the petitioner is not an ‘existing Advocate’ and the First Proviso will not save the present proceeding, nor confer on us jurisdiction under section 12 (6) of the Bar Councils Act. We are of the view that this power is indisputably saved, assuming that the case is not provided for in the new Act, by virtue of section 6, clauses (c) and (e), of the General Clauses Act, 1897. We do not think it can be disputed, for a moment, that the power embodied in section 12 (6) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, is not merely a power vested in us, but is also a remedy in favour of the affected party, and this is very clear from the wording and structure of the several clauses of section 12. But, if an application for review is a power in the affected party, such power would, undoubtedly, be saved, upon the general principle of section 6 (c) and also section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act. The learned Advocate-General concedes this, and also concedes that this is a matter with reference to which our power is not taken away by any express provision of the superseding statute. Consequently, we are of the view that, even apart from the amplitude of our inherent jurisdiction, which also the learned Advocate-General would appear to concede, we have the power to entertain this application and to dispose it of, as though the Indian Bar Councils Act were in full force and effect to-day. Upon the merits, we are of the view, after a very careful consideration of the facts of the record, that the order may be rescinded, and that the petitioner may now be restored to the position that he originally occupied, namely, as a qualified legal practitioner entered in the Roll of Advocates, and entitled to practise his profession. Upon the merits, we are of the view, after a very careful consideration of the facts of the record, that the order may be rescinded, and that the petitioner may now be restored to the position that he originally occupied, namely, as a qualified legal practitioner entered in the Roll of Advocates, and entitled to practise his profession. We agree with the submission of learned Counsel on his behalf that, considering the very long period that has since elapsed, the condign punishment undergone by the petitioner for his sins of omission and commission, and the subsequent rectitude which he has satisfactorily exhibited in his life, as borne out by the certificates of senior counsel this is a fit case in which we may exercise the discretion vested in us, to review and rescind the order and direct that the petitioner be restored to his profession, and to the Roll of Advocates. The learned Advocate-General submits that, if this is under section 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act, which stands unrepealed by Act XXV of 1961 to-day,the petitioner will have a right to practice, as a right flowing from a valid enactment in force to-day. We note this argument, and leave matters there. The actual details, of the procedure that the petitioner may have now to adopt, with reference to the Bar Council, for formal admission of his name to the Rolls, do not concern us in this proceeding. The petitioner would not appear to be an “existing Advocate” and the procedure provided for that case may not apply to him. But he may seek the remedy of such other procedure as is available to him for having his name formally inscribed in the Rolls. With these observations the proceeding is allowed. No costs. R.M. ------------ Petition allowed.