This Civil Misc. Second Appeal by the decree-holders is directed against the judgment of learned District Judge, Tripura, dated 12-6-58, by which he ac­cepted tne appeal and reversed the order of learned Sub-Judge, Tripura, dated 26-5-56. (2) The facts leading up to this appeal are as fol­lows: One Sumanta Sarkar brought a Title Suit No. 31 of 1340 T. E. against Chhatang Mag for recovery of khas possession of certain immovable properties after declara­tion of his alleged right and title to the same. The suit was decreed ex parte ort 11-6-53 T. E. The decree was drawn up and signed on the 5th of Chaitra 1353 T. E. The defendant Chhatang Mag filed an application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The date of the filing of that application is not known. But it seems to have been filed in 1354 T. E. as would appear from the number of the connected Misc. Case 1 of 54 T. E. This application was dismissed for default on 22-4-59 T. E. Thereafter, both Sumanta Sarkar and Chhatang Mag died one after another and their legal representatives were brought on the re­cord. The present respondents are the successors of Chhatang while the appellants are the sons and heirs of the decree-holder Sumanta. (3) The present execution Case No. 27 of 52, out of which this appeal arises, was started by the decree-holders in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Agartala on 5-8-52 A. D. The judgment-debtors filed an objection on 3-1-53 A. D. alleging that the execution case could not proceed as it was time barred. Shri U. Gupta, the then District Judge of Tripura, upon hearing the judgment-deb­tors, agreed with their contention and by an order dated 5-1-53 struck off the execution case holding that it was barred by limitation. It appears that the decree-holders were not present on that day and thereafter they filed an application for review of that order on 6-4-53 and the said case was registered as Misc.. Case No. 13 of 1953. On 2-9-54, the decree-holders J filed another application praying to call for the records/of the original Title Suit No. 31 of 1340 T. E. and also the records of Misc. Case No. 13 of 1953. On 2-9-54, the decree-holders J filed another application praying to call for the records/of the original Title Suit No. 31 of 1340 T. E. and also the records of Misc. Case No. 1 of 1354 T. E. But as no process fees were put in by the decree-holders in terms of court's order the said review case No. 13 of 1953 T. E. was struck off by the learned Subordinate Judge Shri C. Sinha by an order, dated 31-8-55. A. D. (4) Thereafter the decree-holders filed a fresh appli­cation for review on 29-9-55. That application was regis­tered as Misc. Case No. 22 of 1955. The judgment-debtors were duly served with notices of that case and therefore, they put in objection. But due to the mistake of the Pleader's clerk, the said petition of objection, instead of being filed in the Court of Subordinate Judge, was filed in the Court of District Judge. This review case No. 22 of 1955 was taken up by the learned Subordinate Judge on 13-2-56 when the judgment-debtors were absent. The learned Subordinate Judge passed the order as follows: "That the Misc. Case No. 22 of 1955 be disposed of, and the execution carried on. The decree-holders must" file requisites within 7 days from this day. Fix for 2-6-56." Against this order dated 13-2-56 the judgment-debtors filed-a petition of objection on 2-4-56, alleging inter alia that the execution case was clearly barred by limitation and, that the above fact should not have escaped the notice of the learned trial court even though the judgment-debtors' did not appear before the Court on the date of hearing, due to the mistake of their Counsel. This petition of objection filed ort 24-56 was heard by the learned Sub­ordinate Judge in presence of parties on 26-5-56. The learned Subordinate Judge found amongst other things that the petition of objection dated 24-56 was not even, signed by the judgment-debtors.. He therefore, over ruled, their contention and held that the execution case was not barred. The learned Subordinate Judge accordingly rejected-the judgment debtors' petition dated 24-56 by an order dated 26-5-56. It was, against this order that the judg­ment-debtors went in appeal to the Court of District Judge and the learned District Judge by his judgment dated 12-6-58 accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the learned Munsiff. The learned Subordinate Judge accordingly rejected-the judgment debtors' petition dated 24-56 by an order dated 26-5-56. It was, against this order that the judg­ment-debtors went in appeal to the Court of District Judge and the learned District Judge by his judgment dated 12-6-58 accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the learned Munsiff. The decree-holders have now come in second appeal to this Court. (5) The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the finding of the learned District Judge to the effect that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, dated 13-2-56, regarding the acceptance of the Re­view Case No. 22 of 1955 and restoration of execution-case is erroneous is not correct as it is not based on facts,. therefore, it should be set aside. (6) Now in order to determine whether the finding of the learned District Judge on this point is correct or not, I shall first examine the review application 22/55. which was filed on 29-9-55. It would appear from this-petition of review itself that what the decree-holders prayed for by way of relief in that case was not the res­toration of the execution case itself, but they only prayed for the revival of the previous review case 13 of 53 which was struck off on 31-8-55. We have also seen at the same time the order dated 13-2-56, passed upon the re­view case No. 22 of 55. The learned Subordinate Judge by his order of that date did not restore the previous review case 13 of 53, but went a step further namely, of reviving the execution case itself. (7) But as a rule, no order reviving the execution case could have been passed without in the first place-1 deciding the point whether the execution case itself was J barred or not. (8) The learned Subordinate Judge, it appears, did not at all apply his mind to this aspect of the case. But he nevertheless directed, by his order dated 13-2-56, that the execution case be carried on. It does not appear that he even considered the order of the learned District Judge, passed on 5-1-53 where he found that the execution could not proceed as it was time barred. It is true that the order was passed ex parte; but nevertheless it was an order of the Court which could not be- by-passed in the above manner. It does not appear that he even considered the order of the learned District Judge, passed on 5-1-53 where he found that the execution could not proceed as it was time barred. It is true that the order was passed ex parte; but nevertheless it was an order of the Court which could not be- by-passed in the above manner. (9) There may be provisions for review against the order .passed on 5-1-53. As a matter of fact such a review case was filed on 64-53, which was registered as misc. case 13 of 53. So the entire matter might have been discussed in that review case No. 13 of 53. In other words, if the misc. case 22 of 55 was allowed it had only the effect of reviving the 1st review case 13 of 53 which was struck off. The proper order in my view would have been to revive, that Misc. Case 13 of 53 where the entire thing could have been examined in its proper place and proportion. (10) I therefore find that the finding of the learned District Judge on this point is correct and calls for no interference. (11) The next contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the finding of the learned District Judge that the execution case of the decree-holders is barred by limitation is erroneous as he failed to appreciate the true meaning of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. Having given to this argument my most careful and earnest consideration, I find that it is without substance and hence it cannot prevail. (12) In this case the title Suit No. 31 of 1340 T. E. was decreed on 11-6-53 T. E. It is true that the decree was drawn up on 5-12-53 T. E. But it need not be stressed that the date of the judgment is the date of the decree for the purpose of limitation as provided for in Art. 182. That article provides a limitation of 3 years from the date of the decree or, where there has been an appeal, from the date of the decree of the appellate Court. That article provides a limitation of 3 years from the date of the decree or, where there has been an appeal, from the date of the decree of the appellate Court. In this case there has been no appeal against the decree passed in Title Suit No. 31 of 1340 T. E. Clause 3 of Art. 182 of the Limitation Act provides that 3 years time is to run from the date of decision passed on the review wher3 there has been a review of judgment. In this case there was no review of judgment, therefore according to Art. 182 of the Limitation Act, the execution case ought to have been filed in the Court within 3 years from the date of the decree. As it was filed after 5/6 years, therefore, it was obviously barred by limitation. (13) The learned counsel for the appellants further averred that in this case the original Defendant Chhatang filed an application in the year 1354 T. E. for review of the judgment and that application was dismissed on 22-4-'59 T.E., therefore, by excluding this period under clause 3 of Art. 182 of the Limitation; Act, the Execution Case No, 27 of 1952 filed in the Court of Subordinate Judge on 5-8-52 was within limitation. This argument too does not help the case of the appellants in any way. This is a fact that in this case the original Defendant Chhatang filed an application and it was registered as misc. case 1 of 1354 T. E. The application is not however before us, therefore, it cannot be said whether it was for setting aside the ex parte decree or for review of the judgment. But the order Sheet Ext. 1 of that case gives an impres­sion that it was an application for restoration as the ex­pression - "Punaruthapan" has been used by the learned Judge. If it had been a review petition the word "Punaruthapan" would not have been used. Besides that when the defendant did not appear on the date of hearing of the case, the learned Judge, decreed the suit ex parts. In view of these facts, it cannot be said that the appli­cation was a review petition. On the other hand it is clear that it was an application for setting aside the ex parte decree tinder Or. 9 R. 13. In view of these facts, it cannot be said that the appli­cation was a review petition. On the other hand it is clear that it was an application for setting aside the ex parte decree tinder Or. 9 R. 13. When it was an applica­tion for setting aside an ex parte decree, the appellants are not entitled to get the benefit of limitation on that score. As an application under 0. 9 R. 13 C. P. C., is not an application for review within the meaning of clause 3 of Art. 182, an order thereon does not give a fresh start of limitation. I, therefore, find that on the basis of this application given under 0. 9 R. 13 C. P. C. the appellants are not entitled to get the benefit of cl. 3 of Art. 182 of Limitation Act. (14) If for the sake of argument this application for setting aside the ex parte decree be taken as a review petition even then it does not improve the case of the appellants. The words "Where there has been a review of judgment" cover only the cases where the application for review has been allowed and do not cover cases where the application for review has been rejected. When an application for review is granted, the limitation runs from the date of the decree substituted on review and in cases where the application for review is rejected, limitation runs from the date of the original decree. On this point I may refer to the case Bengali Mai v. Baijnath Prasad, AIR 1942 All 338, wherein Yorke J. observed as follows: "In their plain meaning the words "Where there has been a review of judgment" in Art. 182 (3) only cover cases where the review application has been allowed and there has been an actual review or rehearing of the case or appeal. In that case the limitation will begin to run from the date of the new decree. It would begirt to run from the date of the new decree even if the new decree was the same as the dceree in respect of which the application for review had been made and allowed. Article 182 (3) therefore has no application to cases in which the application for review has been rejected. In such cases limitation begins to run from the original decree". Article 182 (3) therefore has no application to cases in which the application for review has been rejected. In such cases limitation begins to run from the original decree". In the instant case, the application was rejected on 22-4-59, therefore, limitation runs from the date of the origi­nal decree namely 11-6-53 T. E. (15) The last contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge dated 26-5-56 was not appealable, but even then the learned District Judge held that it was an appealable order, therefore this finding of the learned District Judge being erroneous should be set aside. (16) I have carefully considered this contention and am of the opinion that it is without substance. From the record, it appears that on 13-2-56, the learned Subordi­nate Judge accepted the review petition and revived the execution case. Against this order the judgment-debtors filed an objection petition on 2-4-56, alleging intar alia that the execution case was clearly barred by limitation. In the heading of the petition nothing has been men­tioned, but from the contents of the same it appears that it was an objection petition under Sec. 47 C. P. C. as the judgment-debtors sought to maintain that the exe­cution could not proceed. As a rule all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which a decree was passed or their representatives and relating to the execu­tion, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. This objection petition was presented in connection with the decision of the execution case; there­fore it is clear that it was filed under Sec. 47 of C. P. C. and hence an order passed thereon was appealable. I, therefore, find that the finding of the learned District Judge, is, on this point, in no way, erroneous. (17) No other point was pressed before me. The result is that there is no force in this appeal and I hereby dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed.