Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff is the appellant. He claimed the entire land acquisition compensation awarded for the acquisition of a part of the plaint property. This property was outstanding on mortgage with the appellant under Ext. P1 dated 31-11-1102. This mortgage was executed by the then owners of the property one Neelakantan Madhavan. On his death, the property devolved on his heirs in accordance with the provisions of S.16 of the Ezhava Act, III of 1100. A partition was entered into by certain persons mentioned in the partition deed, Ext. P3, on 27-11-1114, and the plaint property was allotted to one Kunjupennu Panikkathy. She executed Ext. P. 4 sale deed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff on 22-3-1119. It is by virtue of Exts. P3 and P4 that the appellant lays claim to the equity of redemption of the plaint property and, therefore, to the entire amount awarded as compensation. This claim of the appellant was resisted by the respondents on the ground that on the death of the said Neelakantan Madhavan his property had devolved on his thavazhi and that the respondents are some members of that thavazhi, that Kunjupennu Panikkathy cannot have any exclusive right to the property, that the partition deed, Ext. P3, cannot affect their rights and that the sale deed, Ext. P4, was incompetent. The court below held that the property belonged to the thavazhi of the respondents, that the sale deed, Ext. P4, cannot bind the respondents, that there is no bar of limitation in challenging the validity of the deed in the petition that was moved by the respondents before the court below and therefore held that the appellant is entitled only to the mortgage money and that the amount payable towards the value of the equity of redemption must go to the respondents. These findings are challenged in this appeal. In fact this was challenged by two of the sons of the appellant, Krishnan Madhavan, who had preferred the appeal. He died and only two of his sons were impleaded as the legal representatives of the deceased appellant at that time. I disposed of the appeal after hearing counsel for the two sons of Krishnan Madhavan additional appellants 2 and 3 by my judgment dated 6-11-1962. Thereafter a petition, C.M.P. No. 8567 of 1962, was filed for setting aside the abatement of the appeal. I disposed of the appeal after hearing counsel for the two sons of Krishnan Madhavan additional appellants 2 and 3 by my judgment dated 6-11-1962. Thereafter a petition, C.M.P. No. 8567 of 1962, was filed for setting aside the abatement of the appeal. It was said that the appeal had abated because all the legal representatives of the deceased, original appellant, were not brought on record. It was also prayed that the judgment may be set aside and the appeal re-heard. I allowed these prayers and the appeal has again come up before me for hearing. 2. The first question to be considered is whether on the death of Neelakantan Madhavan the property had devolved on the tavazhi of Neelakantan Madhavan. When I say 'tavazhi' I refer to the term as it is defined in sub-sections (3) and (4) of S.4 of Act III of 1100. These definitions run thus: "4(3). "Tavazhi of a female' means a group of persons consisting of that female and her issue how low-so-ever in the female line, or such of that group as are alive. (4). 'Tavazhi of a male' means the tavazhi of his mother." 3. It is necessary to refer to these definitions in view of Explanation II to S.19 reading "Explanation II. The expression 'children' in the case of an intestate male and the expression 'Tavazhi' in the case of an intestate female shall, for-the purpose of Part IV of this Regulation, include the issue of such intestate male or female how-low-so-ever." 4. It is the contention of counsel for the appellants that it is this Explanation that should apply and if the Explanation is applied it is impossible to conceive of a tavazhi consisting of the children of brothers and sisters, and it must therefore be taken that the heirs of Neelakantan Madhavan took the property as tenants-in-common. If the Explanation applied this is the position. A Full Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in the decision reported in Divakaran v. Nani [1954 KLT. 812 F.B.) has held that in cases where the explanation is attracted the heirs took the property as tenants-in-common. But the question to be considered is whether the Explanation applied to this case. Explanation II to S.19 as I read it, has imported a special meaning to 'children' and to 'tavazhi'. 812 F.B.) has held that in cases where the explanation is attracted the heirs took the property as tenants-in-common. But the question to be considered is whether the Explanation applied to this case. Explanation II to S.19 as I read it, has imported a special meaning to 'children' and to 'tavazhi'. When this Explanation talks of an intestate male, it refers only to 'children' and not to 'tavazhi'. When the Explanation refers to an intestate female, it mentions 'tavazhi' but does not mention 'children'. Reading the Explanation so far as it applies to an intestate male, it would run thus: "The expression 'children' in the case of an intestate male shall, for the purpose of Part IV of this Regulation, include the issue of such intestate male how-low-so-ever." So read, it is clear that for the purpose of Part IV wherever the term 'children' occurs, it must be read as the issue of a male how-low-so-ever. Counsel for the appellants wants me to read not only this, but also that it will mean ‘the thavazhi' as it is understood by virtue of the Explanation in the case of an intestate female. I am unable to accept this contention. My attention was invited to the definition of the term 'tavazhi', which I have extracted above, and it was urged that the thavazhi of a male is the thavazhi of his mother and, therefore, whatever applies to a female must be applied to a male also. For one thing the definition of the term 'tavazhi' as contained in Sub-sections (3) and (4) of S.4 is different in its connotation and its implications and consequences from that contained in Explanation II. 'Tavazhi' as it is normally understood in Marumakkathayam Law and as it is defined in Sub-sections (3) and (4) of S.4, can only comprise of a female's issue how-low-so-ever in the female line, but the 'tavazhi' as it is indicated and defined in Explanation II takes in the issue how-low-so-ever not only in the female line but also in the male line. The two are, therefore entirely different and I am unable to import into the Explanation what is not said there or give it a wider meaning as contended. 5. I therefore negative the first contention urged by counsel on behalf of the appellants. 6. The two are, therefore entirely different and I am unable to import into the Explanation what is not said there or give it a wider meaning as contended. 5. I therefore negative the first contention urged by counsel on behalf of the appellants. 6. Secondly it is urged that there is no iota of evidence to show that Kunjupennu Panikkathy at the time of the partition, Ext. P3 in 1114 had any issues. It is not said that any such contention was raised at any relevant time. I do not find any mention before the court below, nor do I find any raised in the grounds of appeal. Normally I would, therefore, have rejected this argument without further consideration. On a reference to the sale deed executed by Kunjupennu Panikkathy in 1119, Ext. P4,1 find that she was 65 years of age at that time. This means that she was round about 60 at the time of the partition deed. Two of her children have come forward (respondents 2 & 6) and the other respondents are the grand children of Kunjupennu Panikkathy. I find it difficult to think that this woman gave birth to children after she was 60. I therefore also feel that there is no substance in this contention. For these two reasons I do not think there is any necessity to send the case back for a further enquiry regarding this. 7. Finally the argument that was stressed before me, in fact the only argument that was put forward, is that there is a bar of limitation and that the claim as is now urged by the respondents cannot be heard at this distance of time. This contention was slightly different from that stressed at the time of the earlier hearing. This time the argument is that nobody having challenged the partition deed, Ext. P3, within twelve years of its execution, it cannot now be said by the respondents that the property belonged exclusively to Kunjupennu Panikkathy. If there were members in the tavazhi at the time of Ext. P3 partition deed and we have to take it that there were such members - the partition deed, Ext. P3, will not be binding on those members, and as I understand it, it is unnecessary for those members to set aside the partition deed or impeach its validity. If there were members in the tavazhi at the time of Ext. P3 partition deed and we have to take it that there were such members - the partition deed, Ext. P3, will not be binding on those members, and as I understand it, it is unnecessary for those members to set aside the partition deed or impeach its validity. It is not suggested that the plaint property came to the exclusive possession of any member of the tarwad as a result of the partition deed. If such a thing had happened, it is possible that the property having been exclusively in the possession of one member, she or he had acquired ownership by adverse possession. The property in dispute, long before the execution of the partition deed, was in the possession of a mortgagee, and there cannot, therefore, be any adverse possession. Even the dealing with the equity of redemption occurred only in the year 1119 and the claim has been put forward within twelve years of Ext. P4. As I said in my judgment of the 6th November 1962, the matter seems to be covered by the decision of this Court in Mathew v. Ayyappankutty (1962 KLT. 61 (F.B.) and I, therefore, reject this contention as well. 8. In the result, this appeal has to be dismissed and I do and direct the appellants to pay the costs of the respondents. Dismissed.