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1964 DIGILAW 344 (ALL)

Gaon Samaj Land Management Committee v. Jhamman Lal

1964-10-19

S.S.DHAVAN

body1964
JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a second appeal filed by the Gaon Samaj Land Management Committee of village Chandpur Jogian. district Bareilly, from the decree of Mr. T. N. Chatter Additional Civil Judge Bareilly which he reversed the decree of the Munsif of Haveli and granted the plaintiff-respondent a declaration that a certain order of the Tahsildar was without jurisdiction and illegal. The facts are these. The Chairman of the Land Management Committee, the appellant, filed an application under rule 115-C of the U. P. Z. A. & L. R. Rules, alleging that the plaintiff-respondents Jhamman Lal and Thakur Das had installed a flour mill on the land belonging to the Gaon Samaj without its consent. The appellant prayed for the recovery of rent at the rate of Rs. 7/- p.m. from the plaintiff respondent. The respondents opposed the application and alleged that they were not liable to pay any rent as they had paid nazrana to the Land Management Committee. The Tahsildar held an inquiry and found that the respondents' version was false and they had installed the flour mill without the consent of the appellant. He directed the respondent to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 7/- p.m. Thereupon the respondents filed the present suit for a declaration that the order of the Tahsildar was without jurisdiction and illegal. The trial court held that the impugned order was illegal as the rule under which it was passed had been declared by this court to be ultra vires but it also held that the plaintiffs suit was barred under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act as he had not asked for any declaration of a legal character or of any legal right to property. It also held the suit incompetent for want of a proper notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly it dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned Civil Judge concurred in the finding that the order of the Tahsildar was without jurisdiction but did not agree that the suit was barred or incompetent. He allowed the plaintiff-respondents' appeal and granted him a declaration that the Tahsildar's order was illegal. The Land Management Committee has come to this court in second appeal. 2. I think this appeal must be allowed. The judgment of the learned civil Judge was pronounced on the 10th of November, 1961. He allowed the plaintiff-respondents' appeal and granted him a declaration that the Tahsildar's order was illegal. The Land Management Committee has come to this court in second appeal. 2. I think this appeal must be allowed. The judgment of the learned civil Judge was pronounced on the 10th of November, 1961. He was not aware that the law had been changed by the U. P. Land Laws (2nd) Amendment Act (XXVIII of 1961) which added Section 122-B with retrospective effect. By this section the powers of the Land Management Committee and the Collector were enlarged and it was empowered to take steps to recover compensation for any wrongful occupation of its land by any person. The section does not specify the nature of steps or proceedings for the recovery of such compensation, but sub-Section (2) empowers the Collector to take steps on the application of the Chairman if the Land Management Committee fails to take action within a specified period. Reading all the sub-sections together it appears that the Collector is the proper authority for entertaining an application by the Land Management Committee. In the present case the application was filed by the Chairman of the Land Management Committee. It is not known whether he filed this application on behalf of the committee under sub-Section (1) or on his own initiative under sub-Section (2). In either case, he had the authority to do so and the proceedings were not ultra vires. 3. Mr. Sambhu Prasad learned counsel for the appellant argued that the proceedings were within Jurisdiction for an additional reason namely, because rule 115-C was validated by the Amending Act of 1961 with retrospective effect. But I have some doubt whether the legislature has the power to validate with retrospective effect a Government made rule after it has been declared ultra vires by the court. The legislative function includes the power to select any date for the commencement of a statute in other words, to make a law prospective or retrospective in effect. But a rule made by the Government is not an act of the legislature, and I have some hesitation in accepting the argument that the legislature can give retrospective effect to a rule made by the executive after it has been declared invalid by the court. But a rule made by the Government is not an act of the legislature, and I have some hesitation in accepting the argument that the legislature can give retrospective effect to a rule made by the executive after it has been declared invalid by the court. However, I need not decide this point as Section 122-B itself empowers the land Management Committee to take action in case of wrongful occupation of its land and the Collector to take proceedings. 4. The learned Civil Judge did not apply his mind to the other two questions in the suit namely, whether it was barred by Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. He made a bare observation that the suit was not barred but gave no reasons for disagreeing with the view of the trial court. However I need not decide these questions as the plaintiffs' suit fails on merits. 5. I allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the learned Civil Judge and dismiss the plaintiff-respondents suit.