ORDER C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. In this revision Mr. V. R. Venkatakrishnan, learned Vaid counsel for the petitioner, challenges the two orders passed by the subordinate courts annulling an order of adjudication made at the instance of the first respondent in I.A. No. 2174 of 1960. 2. It is seen that the petitioner claimed to be a creditor of the insolvents-respondents 2 and 3 in I. P. No. 2 of 1958, Subordinate Judge's Court, Palghat for adjudicating those respondents as insolvents under the Insolvency Act, 1956. 3. Actually those persons were also adjudicated-insolvents on 8th August 1958. The first respondent herein then filed I.A. No. 2174 of 1960 under section 36 of the Insolvency Act to annul the order of adjudicating the respondents 2 and 3 as insolvents on the ground that the petitioner is not a creditor of the insolvents and that he has no right to maintain an application under section 9 of the Insolvency Act. 4. What are acts of insolvency is enumerated in section 6 and the circumstances under which, a creditor can file an application to adjudicate a party as insolvent are also mentioned in section 9 of the Act. 5. The application, namely I.A. No. 2174 of 1960 filed by the first respondent was under section 36 of the Insolvency Act on the ground that there was absolutely no debt owing by the alleged insolvents to the creditor, namely, the revision petitioner, and therefore that was a case where the debtor ought not to have been adjudged insolvent and on that ground he prayed for annulling the order of adjudication. 6. Section 36 of the Act provides for the court annulling the adjudication of an order passed by it earlier where, among other circumstances, it is established that a debtor ought not to have been adjudged insolvent and section 36 also provides tor the persons who can apply to the court tor annulling an order adjudicating a party as insolvent. 7. The effect of an order passed annulling an order adjudicating a party as insolvent is also specified in section 38 of the Act. 7. The effect of an order passed annulling an order adjudicating a party as insolvent is also specified in section 38 of the Act. In short, while upholding as valid all sales and dispositions of property and payments made, the said section provides that unless the court passes an order vesting the property in such person as it appoints, this shall revert to the debtor to the extent of his rights or interest therein and the court also is given the power to impose any conditions as it deems fit. 8. The application filed by the first respondent no doubt was opposed by the parties who had been adjudicated as insolvents. 9. Both the lower courts have gone into the question about the genuineness of the debt on the basis of which the revision petitioner had filed I. P. No. 2 of 1958 and got respondents 2 and 3 adjudicated as insolvents. The view of both the courts is that the revision petitioner who is a neighbour of respondents 2 and 3 was got at for falsely putting in a petition for adjudicating them as insolvents and that filing of the insolvency petition itself is an abuse of the process of the court. 10. No doubt the trial court has ultimately annulled the order of adjudication not under section 36 but under section 44 because it refers to the fact that the order of adjudication provided for the insolvents applying for the discharge within six months from the date of the order namely 8th August 1958. As they had not filed an application for discharge within that time, section 44, according to the lower court, applies and on that basis annulled the order of adjudication. 11. This order of the learned Subordinate Judge was challenged by the revision petitioner before the learned District Judge, Palghat. The learned District Judge starts by saying that I.A. No. 2174 of 1960 is one filed under section 36 of the Insolvency Act but winds up the judgment by holding that the order of the lower court annulling adjudication under section 44 is perfectly justified. The learned Judge has also quoted section 37 which, in my opinion, has no bearing at all, but records a finding regarding what is contained in section 36 of the Act. The learned Judge has also quoted section 37 which, in my opinion, has no bearing at all, but records a finding regarding what is contained in section 36 of the Act. Unfortunately it is rather regrettable that such serious mistakes should find a place in a judgment rendered by a learned District Judge. But, ultimately, the learned District Judge's view appears to be that the finding of the trial court regarding the bogus nature of the debt on the basis of which the revision petitioner filed I. P. No. 2 of 1958 and got respondents 2 and 3 adjudicated insolvents has to be sustained. 12. Ultimately, the learned District Judge no doubt refers to an aspect that appears to have been raised before him namely that, even if there is to be annulment under section 36, nevertheless the court must exercise its discretion under section 38 and give directions to the effect that the properties are to be vested in a person appointed for that purpose. 13. The learned District Judge observes in his judgment that the trial court has considered this aspect and declined to appoint any person for the purpose of such vesting. So far as I could see, the trial court has not touched upon this aspect at all and that again is a mistake found in the judgment of the learned District Judge. 14. But leaving apart what has been stated by the learned District Judge, the question ultimately comes to this namely as to whether the order of annulment passed under section 36 of the Insolvency Act after holding that the petitioning creditor's claim is a bogus one is to be accepted by this Court or not. 15. Whatever errors there may be in the provisions of law quoted and the reasons given, especially by the learned District Judge, for rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner, there are two concurrent findings by both the subordinate courts that the petitioner's debt is a bogus one. If that is so, the position in law will be that the debtor cannot be considered to have committed any one of the acts of insolvency enumerated in section 6 of the Act. It also follows that the revision petitioner will not be entitled to file an application under section 6 of the Insolvency Act. If that is so, the position in law will be that the debtor cannot be considered to have committed any one of the acts of insolvency enumerated in section 6 of the Act. It also follows that the revision petitioner will not be entitled to file an application under section 6 of the Insolvency Act. If so, in my view, as a corollary it will follow that the debtor in this case namely respondents 2 and 3 ought not to have been adjudged insolvents as those expressions occur in section 36 of the Act. 16. Mr. V.R. Venkatakrishnan urged that in an application filed under section 36 of the Act, it is not enough if the court comes to the conclusion that the petitioning creditor's claim is a bogus one and as such he is not entitled to file an insolvency petition, but the court must go further and find that the debtor or debtors have not conmitted any act of insolvency and that no other debts are also payable by them on the date of adjudication. In support of this contention, no doubt, Mr. V. R. Venkatakrishnan has relied upon the observations of Mr. Justice Kunhiraman reported in Gopu China Firm v. Satyanarayana A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 151. At page 152, no doubt, the learned Judge says that merely because it is held that on the date when a creditor files an application to adjudicate a party as insolvent, that creditor's debt is not a genuine debt, an annulment should be made under section 35 ipso facto cannot be accepted. The learned Judge also states that but for the petition filed by such a creditor, adjudication would not have been made but inasmuch as adjudication has taken place, all the creditors of the debtor are interested in the matter. The learned Judge also states that a party challenging the order of annulment passed under section 35 of the Provincial Insolvency Act Central Act V of 1920 corresponding to section 36 of our Insolvency Act, must also show that the debtor did not owe any other debts or that the debtor was not really insolvent at the time when the order of adjudication was made. This decision of the learned Judge need not detain me further because, as pointed out by Mr. This decision of the learned Judge need not detain me further because, as pointed out by Mr. C M. Devan, learned counsel for the first respondent, the matter has been considered by a Full Bench of three Judges of the Madras High Court in the decision reported in Periakaruppan v. Arunachalam A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 375(F.B.) 17. Before the learned Judges, the particular proposition laid down by Mr. Justice Kunhiraman and referred to by me earlier, was relied upon by the parties concerned. The learned Chief Justice, speaking on behalf of the court in the Full Bench decision, after adverting to these observations, states that these observations of the learned Judge cannot be accepted as a correct statement of the law. The learned Chief Justice also states that when an adjudication has taken place under the Provincial Insolvency Act and it has been shown that no act of insolvency has been committed, the Court has no discretion in the matter and it must annul the adjudication. The learned Chief Justice also refers to the use of the word " shall " occurring in section 35 of the Central Act which corresponds to section 36 of our Act. 18. I am in respectful agreement with the reasoning of the Full Bench ; and if I may say so with respect, I am not inclined to agree with the observations of Mr. Justice Kunhiraman in the decision reported in Gopu China Firm v. Satyanarayana A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 151. In my view, there is no warrant or justification for such a proposition in the wording of the section or by any of the provisions of the statute itself. If no act of insolvency as enumerated in section 6 of the Act has been committed by a debtor, it goes without saying that such a debtor ought not to have been adjudged insolvent. 19. Before closing the discussion on this aspect, it is also necessary to refer to certain observations made in a judgment of the Travancore-Cochin High Court report Ramayyan v. Devaki Amma A.I.R. 1952 T-C. 234 which have been relied upon by Mr.V.R .Venkatakrishnan in support of his contention that the propositions laid down by Mr. Justice Kunhiraman in the decision- referred to above have found acceptance at the hands of the Travancore-Cochin High Court. 20. Justice Kunhiraman in the decision- referred to above have found acceptance at the hands of the Travancore-Cochin High Court. 20. I do not find any such statement of the law in the Travancore-Cochin decision accepting the proposition laid down by Mr. Justice Kunhiraman. In fact, it will be seen that, in the Travancore-Cochin decision, the learned Judges have categorically stated that the creditor's petition in that case should have been, dismissed in limine and when once that creditor's petition is dismissed, it is a clear case where the debtor ought not to have been adjudicated as insolvent at all under section 35 of the Central Act. 21. In fact, the learned Judges were dealing with the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. No doubt in the concluding part of the judgment there is a stray observation, if I may say so with respect, where the court has observed that when a debtor was not personally liable for the debt due to a petitioning creditor and when there is no evidence of any other debt being in existence when the sale deed in favour of the first respondent was executed, it can on no account be treated as an act of insolvency. Mr. V. R. Venkatakrishnan in particular relied upon the observation ' when there is no evidence of any other debt being in existence ' occurring in the above extract to support his contention that the learned Judges were of the view that an annulment order can be passed under section 35 of the Central Act only when two conditions are satisfied namely that the petitioning creditor was not entitled to file an application and when there is no evidence that there are other debts outstanding by the debtor. In the main body of the judgment, I do not find any discussion or reference to the existence or otherwise of any debts owed by the debtor. Therefore those observations, m my view, do not in any way support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner nor _can they be considered to have given the stamp of approval to the principles laid down by Mr. Justice Kunhiraman in Gopu China Firm v. Satyanarayana . 22. Mr. Therefore those observations, m my view, do not in any way support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner nor _can they be considered to have given the stamp of approval to the principles laid down by Mr. Justice Kunhiraman in Gopu China Firm v. Satyanarayana . 22. Mr. V. R. Venkatakrishnan next urged two other contentions namely, that before passing an order of annulment, the court should have issued notice to the other creditors who have already been included in a schedule prepared by the court and secondly that the court should have considered the question as to whether it should pass an order directing the vesting of the property even after annulment in such person as it appoints as it has jurisdiction to do under section 38 of the Insolvency Act. 23. So far as I could see when once the petitioner's debt has been held to be a bogus one and it has also been, held that no act of insolvency has been committed by the debtor, I fail to see what further interest the petitioner can have in urging this claim before this Court. No other creditor or even debtors, so far as I could see, have come up with a grievance challenging the order of annulment passed under section 36 of the Act. Nor have anybody placed a grievance that the court should exercise its discretion under section 38 of the Act. In the absence of those circumstances, in my view, it is futile to embark upon a consideration as to whether the court should or should not have issued notice to the other creditors or should have given certain directions under section 38 of the Act. But one thing is clear namely that unless after passing an order of annulment, the court directs under section 38 the vesting of the properties in such person as it appoints, the natural result will be that there is an automatic vesting of the properties under that section in the debtor. 24. But one thing is clear namely that unless after passing an order of annulment, the court directs under section 38 the vesting of the properties in such person as it appoints, the natural result will be that there is an automatic vesting of the properties under that section in the debtor. 24. Therefore, the revision fails and, in my view as the petitioner has no justice to come to this court in the face of the concurrent findings of both the subordinate courts that the debt is bogus debt and that he has practically played a fraud on the court by filing I. P. No. 2 of 1958, the C. R. P. will stand dismissed with costs of the first respondent in this court.