Judgment :- 1. In this Second Appeal Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel for the appellants, namely defendants 2 and 3 challenges no doubt the decrees of the subordinate courts directing the eviction of the appellants from the properties concerned. But the point that has been pressed before us by the learned counsel is the one based upon the provisions of S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 - Act 1 of 1964 hereinafter to be referred to as the Act. 2. In order to appreciate the contentions that have been taken before us by the learned counsel on both sides it is necessary to indicate the circumstances under which the suit was filed, as well as the findings recorded by both the courts. 3. The plaintiff instituted the suit as against the first defendant as well as the appellants-defendants 2 and 3 for eviction from the property concerned. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant had taken a vacant site on lease under Ext. A-1 for the purpose of putting up a shop-building in connection with the business. There is no controversy that the first defendant appears to have actually put up a building and later on he has also sub-leased the properties in favour of the appellants-defendants 2 and 3, who also, after demolishing the original building put up by the first defendant have put up a fresh building on the site in question. 4. No doubt, the suit for eviction was resisted by all the parties. The first defendant in fact claimed independent title in himself; but both the courts have rejected the claim made by the first defendant of having independent title to the properties and have also held that the plaintiff has got title to the properties and is entitled to ask for eviction. 5. In the trial court a claim for value of improvements was made by defendants 2 and 3 on the ground that the building that now exists on the property and which has to be surrendered to the plaintiff in pursuance of the decree for eviction belongs to them and they should be awarded the value of improvements in respect of that building. 6. 6. The trial court did not accept this plea of the appellants but straightaway passed a decree for eviction as against all the defendants on condition of the plaintiff paying the value of improvements to the first defendant alone. 7. The first defendant no doubt challenged the decree of the trial court declining to accept his claim regarding title before the appellate court. Defendants 2 and 3 on the other hand, challenged the decree of the trial court disallowing their claim for award to them of the value of improvements in respect of the building. 8. The learned Subordinate Judge in appeal has accepted the finding of the trial court recognising title in the plaintiff. Therefore, the first defendant's claim, was not accepted. 9. But so far as the claim made by defendants 2 and 3 for payment of value of improvements is concerned, the appellate court, accepted the findings of the trial court, that after demolishing the building that was originally put up by the first defendant after taking the property on lease under Ext. A-1, the existing building which has to be surrendered to the plaintiff in pursuance of the decree for eviction is the one put up by defendants 2 and 3. But differing from the view expressed by the trial court that defendants 2 and 3 are not entitled to claim value of improvements, the learned judge, on the other hand, accepted their claim for payment of value of improvements. 10. But nevertheless, the appellants have come up to this court challenging the decrees of both the courts directing eviction as against them. 11. On the findings recorded by the trial court so far as we could see the only question that arises for consideration is the one that has been now placed before us which is based upon the provisions contained in S.106 of the Act. 12. According to Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer, notwithstanding that the decree for eviction has been passed by both the courts inasmuch as the findings of both the courts are to the effect that the land in question has been leased for a commercial purpose and in view of the further finding that defendants 2 and 3 have constructed buildings prior to 18th December 1957 and they are in possession of the properties, they cannot be evicted from the land in view of S.106 of the Act. The utmost that the plaintiff-landlord can claim, may be the rent payable under the contract of tenancy, which no doubt may be varied in the manner indicated in sub-section (1) of S.106 of the Act. 13. The learned counsel raised two contentions namely that the lease of the land under Ext. A-1, having due regard to the purpose mentioned therein namely for the purpose of putting up a shop-building for carrying on business and in view of the specific averment in Para.3 of the plaint that the site in question was leased out for the purpose of putting up a shop-building, it clearly follows that this is a lease for commercial purposes. That condition is satisfied in order to attract the provisions of S.106(1) of the Act. 14. The learned counsel also urged that inasmuch as the appellants, though they may be sub-lessees under the first defendant who has no doubt accepted the decree for eviction passed by the two courts nevertheless, as persons in possession of the property as lessees, are entitled to the protection conferred under sub-section (1) of S.106 of the Act. 15. Mr. Y. Bhaskaran Nambiar, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has stated that he is not contesting the case of the appellants in this court that the original lease evidenced by Ext. A-1 is a lease of land for commercial purpose. In view of the stand taken by the learned counsel for the respondent, it becomes unnecessary for us to consider further as to under what circumstances, the lease of a land can be considered to be for a commercial or industrial purpose as those expressions occur in S.106 of the Act. 16. But the more serious contention that has been taken by Mr. V. Bhaskaran Nambiar is that whatever may be the position so far as the first defendant is concerned in relation to the landlord namely the plaintiff in this case, those considerations do not come into the picture and the protection conferred under S.106 of the Act cannot be availed of by sub-lessees. The learned counsel no doubt drew our attention to the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Rupchand v. Raghuvanshi (Pvt.) Ltd., (AIR. The learned counsel no doubt drew our attention to the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Rupchand v. Raghuvanshi (Pvt.) Ltd., (AIR. 1964 S. C. 1889) where their Lordships have taken the view that a decree obtained by a landlord making only his tenant a party without the sub-tenants on the party array is binding on the sub-lessees also notwithstanding that they are not parties to the decree. It is also seen that the Supreme Court has observed that the object of the landlord in filing a suit for eviction as against his tenant is also with a view to evict sub-lessees who are in possession of the land on the basis of the sub-lease from his tenant and a decree passed in such a suit even without the sub-lessees on the party array would bind the sub-lessees also. 17. The learned counsel also invited our attention to certain decisions of the Madras High Court wherein the Madras High Court has considered the question as to how far a protection given in a particular statute to a tenant can or cannot be availed of by the sub-tenant. That is according to the learned counsel those decisions will clearly show that having due regard to the statute, that the learned judges, had to consider all those cases, they have come to the conclusion that the sub-tenant is not entitled to the same protection that has been recognised by the statute in question in favour of the tenant. 18. Based upon that analogy the learned counsel drew our attention to the provisions contained in Chapter II relating to exemptions of certain types of lease from the provisions of that Chapter. In particular, the learned counsel pointed out that under S.3 (iii) of the Act it is made clear that Chapter II, which is a very important chapter in the Act takes away from the ambit of that chapter leases of land or of buildings or of both specifically granted for industrial or commercial purposes. That is according to the learned counsel, the object of the statute is very clear from S.3 (iii) namely that it does not want to give such of a protection to persons holding land or buildings on lease for industrial or commercial purposes. That is according to the learned counsel, the object of the statute is very clear from S.3 (iii) namely that it does not want to give such of a protection to persons holding land or buildings on lease for industrial or commercial purposes. It is having due regard to that provision, the learned counsel urges, that this court must consider the special or particular provision made in S.106 of the Act. Having due regard to the provisions and particularly to the wording of S.106, the learned counsel urged that the said section will clearly show, that the only original lessee alone is intended to be given protection and sub-lessee does not come into the picture at all. The learned counsel also pointed out that wherever particular types of tenants were intended to be taken in or excluded from the provisions of the Act the statute itself has clearly indicated as per example S.3(v) of the Act dealing with a tenancy created by a mortgagee in possession or S.3(vi) dealing with tenancies created by life interest holders. 19. Therefore, having due regard to all these provisions, the learned counsel pointed out that S.106 appearing in Chapter IV must be restricted and confined to the particular protection that is sought to be conferred by the clear wording of S.106. We will advert to the provisions of the section immediately. 20. No doubt, Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer also pointed out that the object of the statute is very clear namely, to give protection to persons in possession of the property; and notwithstanding that generally lease for industrial and commercial purpose of land or building is taken away from the operation of Chapter II, under S.3(iii) of the Act, nevertheless when we come to S.106, it takes note of the lessee namely, the person in possession and the object of the statute is to see that he is not evicted from such land but at the same time making him liable to pay the rent under the contract of tenancy. 21. If we come to the provisions of sub-section (iii) of S.3, it is very clear that the Legislature does not intend to confer very much benefits upon lessees of land or buildings or of both who have taken those items for a commercial or industrial purpose. 21. If we come to the provisions of sub-section (iii) of S.3, it is very clear that the Legislature does not intend to confer very much benefits upon lessees of land or buildings or of both who have taken those items for a commercial or industrial purpose. No doubt, that section makes it very clear that to such leases, the provision of Chapter II will not apply. But Chapter IT, so far as we could see, is a very important chapter conferring fixity of tenure and very many valuable rights on tenants in possession of property. But coming to S.106 of the Act, it will be seen that the Legislature no doubt gives protection from eviction to a lessee who has constructed buildings for commercial or industrial purposes before 18th December 1957. No doubt in this case, if the appellants can be considered to have come within the scope of the expression 'lessee' occurring in S.106, it is needless to state that on the findings recorded by the two courts that they constructed buildings prior to 18th December 1957, we will have to hold that they will be entitled to protection. 22. But the provisions of the statute do not stop there; because sub-section (1) of S.106 also makes it clear in the latter part of the said sub-section two other matters namely (1) conferring a right of non eviction from the land and (2) placing a corresponding obligation to pay rent'under the contract of tenancy.' No doubt, the last part of sub-section (1) of S.106 provides for the rent being varied every twelve years on the motion of the lessor or lessee, in such manner as may be prescribed. 23. In our opinion, the expression, 'but shall be liable to pay rent under the contract of tenancy' is very significant and that gives an indication as to who exactly is the "lessee" referred to in the earlier part of sub-section (1) of S.106 and as to who is intended to be protected from eviction in the circumstances mentioned in the said sub-section. 24. 24. If we are to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the defendants 2 and 3, as persons in possession of the property, and who may be considered to be lessees who have constructed buildings for commercial or industrial purposes are to be protected, then the position will become anomalous as to under what "contract of tenancy" they will be liable to pay rent, which is obligatory under sub-section (1) of S.106. 25. Normally the legal position is well-settled that there is no privity of contract between the landlord and sub-tenant. In this case, having due regard to all these provisions in our view, the proper and natural interpretation that is to be placed on sub-section (1) of S.106, is that the "lessee" who is entitled to protection under S.106 must be a person who is liable to pay rent "under the contract of tenancy". 26. The expression "lessee" has no doubt not been defined in the Act. But the provision made under S.106(1) to the effect that "the lessee shall be liable to pay rent under the contract of tenancy" clearly indicates that he must be a person who is in direct relationship with the person who can ask for eviction and whose claim for eviction can be resisted under S.106, in the circumstances mentioned therein. It also gives an indication that the "lessee" must be a person who has entered into a contract of tenancy, with a person who may make a claim for eviction and to whom the lessee is liable to pay rent. These conditions can be considered to be satisfied in this case only as between the plaintiff and the first defendant. It is the first defendant who has entered into a contract of tenancy with the plaintiff, and who can successfully resist a claim for eviction, if made by the plaintiff, on the basis of S.106(1) of the Act and plead that he is liable to pay only rent at the rate fixed in the contract of tenancy. 27. We cannot find any such relationship as between the plaintiff and the appellants, who are not his lessees, but are only sub-tenants holding under the first defendant, the lessee of the plaintiff. Therefore, in our view, defendants 2 and 3 cannot be considered to be "lessees" under S.106(1) of the Act, so as to claim the protection conferred therein. 28. We cannot find any such relationship as between the plaintiff and the appellants, who are not his lessees, but are only sub-tenants holding under the first defendant, the lessee of the plaintiff. Therefore, in our view, defendants 2 and 3 cannot be considered to be "lessees" under S.106(1) of the Act, so as to claim the protection conferred therein. 28. In this case, the question as to what exactly will be the rights of the appellants so far as the first defendant is concerned do not at all arise for consideration, because the first defendant has accepted the decrees passed by the two courts directing his eviction from the property in question. Therefore in the view that we have expressed above, it follows that the appellants are not entitled to protection under S.106 of the Act. 29. Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer has made a request that his clients may be permitted to remove the superstructure on the land within a particular time. We think that we can accede to this reasonable request. Accordingly, while dismissing the appeal and confirming the decrees of both the courts, we make it clear that if the appellants remove the buildings within the time indicated below they will not be entitled to the value of improvements awarded by the lower appellate court. The appellants are at liberty to remove the buildings, if they so choose within six months from today. Parties will bear their own costs. Dismissed.