Judgment :- 1. In this revision petition Mr. K.S. Paripoornan, learned counsel for the plaintiff in O.S. 41/1963 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge of Kottayam, who is the petitioner herein, challenges the order of the learned judge directing the petitioner to furnish security for costs of the defendants in the suit. 2. The application quite naturally must have been filed under 0.25, R.1, CPC. It was opposed by the plaintiff revision petitioner on two grounds, namely (1) that he having been allowed to institute the suit as pauper under 0.33, should not be called upon to furnish security for costs, and (2) that in the circumstances of the case there is no justification at all to call upon him to furnish security for costs. In this connection it may be stated that the 2nd defendant in the present suit, had filed a suit for declaration of his possession and also for an injunction to restrain the present plaintiff revision petitioner, who was the sole defendant in that action, from interfering with his possession of the properties. No doubt in that suit the trial court appears to have held against the present 2nd defendant and dismissed the suit. But he took it up in appeal, A.S. No. 50/1958 of the Kottayam District Court. The learned District Judge was prima facie inclined to accept even the title of the present 2nd defendant. But anyhow the learned judge, ultimately differing from the conclusions arrived at by the trial court, upheld the possession of the present 2nd defendant, who, as I mentioned earlier, was the sole plaintiff in that suit. Therefore the learned District Judge reversed the decree and judgment of the trial court, and after declaring the possession of the present 2nd defendant, granted the injunction asked for as against the present plaintiff, who was the sole defendant in that action. The decree passed by the learned District Judge in that appeal was challenged by the present plaintiff before this court in S.A. No. 1015/1958. No doubt the learned judge who dealt with that second appeal, felt considerable doubt on coming to a conclusion one way or other regarding the title to the properties either in the present plaintiff or in the present 2nd defendant. But ultimately the learned judge confirmed the decree passed by the learned District Judge in favour of the present 2nd defendant, in A.S. 50/1958. But ultimately the learned judge confirmed the decree passed by the learned District Judge in favour of the present 2nd defendant, in A.S. 50/1958. There can be no controversy that in those proceedings, the parties had to let in voluminous evidence in support of their case, and the 2nd defendant had to lead evidence to establish his possession, which, according to him, was based upon his title to the properties also. 3. In the present suit, the plaintiff revision petitioner has asked for declaration of his title to the suit properties and also for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession of the properties on the basis of title. That claim no doubt is being very strenuously controverted by the defendants. Pending suit, the defendants filed applications before the learned Subordinate Judge under 0.25, R.1, CPC. to direct the plaintiff to furnish security for costs. We have already indicated the stand that was taken by the revision petitioner in those applications. The learned Subordinate Judge has no doubt not directly considered in detail the question as to whether when a party has been allowed to institute a suit as pauper, he can ever be called upon to furnish security for costs either under 0.25, R.1 in a suit, or under 0.41, R.10 in an appeal. But on merits, the learned Subordinate Judge is of the view that the defendants should not be compelled to undergo the same ordeal as in the previous litigation; and according the learned Subordinate Judge, the present suit, which must be considered so to say a suit for declaration of title, is a vexatious suit filed by the present plaintiff. Therefore, the learned Subordinate judge, exercising his discretion under 0.25, R.1, CPC. has called upon the plaintiff to furnish security for costs of the suit. 4. In this Court also Mr. K.S. Paripoornan, learned counsel for the plaintiff revision petitioner, has urged the same contentions that were raised before the learned Subordinate Judge, namely that inasmuch as the plaintiff has been permitted to institute the suit as pauper under 0.33, and that permission having been granted by the court after prima facie coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff's grievance will have to be investigated by the court, there is no jurisdiction at all vested in the court under 0.25, R.1 to direct a pauper plaintiff to furnish security for costs. The learned counsel also urged that on merits there is absolutely no justification for calling upon his client to furnish security for costs. In this connection the learned counsel drew out attention to the views expressed by the Bombay, Calcutta and Rangoon High Courts on the one hand, holding that in cases where a party has been permitted to institute the suit as pauper or file an appeal as pauper, he should not be called upon to furnish security for costs at all; and the decisions of the Madras, Rangoon and Lahore High Courts on the other hand, holding that the mere circumstance that a party has been permitted to institute a suit as pauper or file an appeal as pauper is by itself no ground for the court not exercising its jurisdiction either under 0.25, R.1, or under 0.41, R.10, C.P.C., as the case may be. 5. The line of cases that have taken the view that when a party has been permitted to file a suit as pauper he cannot be called upon to furnish security for costs of the defendant, are to be found in the decisions of the Calcutta High Court reported in Mussamat Hafizan v. Abdul Karim (1908) 12 Calcutta Weekly Notes 163) and Nusseerooddeen Biswas v. Ujjul Biswas (1872) 17 Weekly Reporter 68), as well as of the Bombay High Court reported in Bai Laxmi v. Harjivan Nathu (1912) ILR. 36 Bombay 415). Those cases related to suits instituted by a plaintiff as pauper. A similar view has been taken in Kanchani Bewa v. Jadub Paramanik (AIR. 1918 Calcutta 618), Khemraj v. Kisanlala (AIR. 1917 Bombay 137), Nazim v. Abdul Hamid (AIR. 1922 Lahore 87), and Maung Yan Aung v. Oo Mu & Sons (AIR. 1936 Rangoon 178), wherein the learned judges have held that in cases where a person has been permitted to file an appeal as pauper, he cannot be called upon to furnish security for costs. The decisions to the contrary, which represent the other point of view, are those found in Seshayyangar v. Jainulavadin (ILR. 3 Madras 66), Ramaswamia Pillai v. Krishnammal (AIR. 1935 Madras 230), Arumugam v. Sevugan Chettiar (AIR. 1950 Madras 779), Nacharammal v. Varalakshmi Fund Ltd., (AIR. 1957 Madras 640), Har Kaur v. Chamba (AIR. 1928 Lahore 960), and Ma Saw v. Maung Shwe Gon (AIR. 1923 Rangoon 244). 3 Madras 66), Ramaswamia Pillai v. Krishnammal (AIR. 1935 Madras 230), Arumugam v. Sevugan Chettiar (AIR. 1950 Madras 779), Nacharammal v. Varalakshmi Fund Ltd., (AIR. 1957 Madras 640), Har Kaur v. Chamba (AIR. 1928 Lahore 960), and Ma Saw v. Maung Shwe Gon (AIR. 1923 Rangoon 244). This latter set of decisions have taken the view that there is jurisdiction in the Court, in proper cases, to call upon a plaintiff under 0.25, R.1, or an appellant under 0.41, R.10, CPC. to furnish security for costs. 6. The learned counsel for the defendant respondents, at whose instance the plaintiff in the present suit has been called upon to furnish security for costs, has urged for our acceptance the view expressed by the Madras, Lahore and Rangoon High Court in the latter set of cases, referred to above. Pausing here for a minute, it will be seen that the Lahore and Rangoon High Courts themselves have taken different views, because we have already referred to the decisions of the Lahore and Rangoon High Courts which have taken the view on one occasion that a pauper appellant cannot be called upon to furnish security for costs, whereas in the second group of cases we have also adverted to the decisions of the Lahore and Rangoon High Courts wherein the learned judges have taken a different view, namely that permission granted to a party to institute a suit as pauper does not take away the jurisdiction of the court in proper cases to call upon him to furnish security for costs. 7. 0.25, R.1, CPC. is as follows; 1. When security for costs may be required from plaintiff. (1) At any stage of the suit, the Court may, either of its own motion or on the application of any defendant order the plaintiff for reasons to be recorded, to give within the time fixed by it security for the payment of all costs incurred and likely to be incurred by any defendant: Provided that such an order shall be made in all cases in which it appears to the court that a sole plaintiff is, or (when there are more plaintiffs than one) that all the plaintiffs are, residing out of India and that such plaintiff does not possess or that no one of such plaintiffs possesses any sufficient immovable property within India other than the property in suit. xxxxx More or less identical provisions are to be found in 0.41, R.10 whereby the appellate court is given jurisdictional power to call upon a party to furnish security for costs not only of a suit but also of an appeal. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner before us is that when a party is permitted to institute a suit as pauper under D. 33, all the material circumstances indicated in R.5 of 0.33 are taken into account, and it is only after the court is prima facie satisfied, that leave to institute the suit as pauper is granted. Therefore the learned counsel urged that none of those circumstances can again be taken into account, in considering the question as to whether a pauper plaintiff should be called upon to furnish security for costs under 0.25, R.1. On the other hand, Mr. George, learned counsel for the defendant respondents, has pointed out that O.33, R.5 comes into play only for the purpose of considering whether an application to institute a suit as a pauper, filed by a pauper is to be rejected or not. At that stage, the learned counsel pointed out and, in our view, quite rightly - that the defence to the action of the plaintiff is not before the court; and the court is concerned only to find out whether one or other of the circumstances mentioned in the various sub-clauses, namely (a) to (e) of R.5 of O.33, exists for rejecting the application filed by the plaintiff to permit him to institute the suit as a pauper. The learned counsel for the respondents in this connection also pointed out that jurisdiction conferred on the court either under O.25, R.1 or under O.41, R.10 is wider because that jurisdiction can be exercised at any stage of the suit. That means, that the court will have before it the written statement, as well as several other circumstances which can be taken into account by the court in considering whether the party has made out a fit case for calling upon either the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be, to furnish security for costs. That means, that the court will have before it the written statement, as well as several other circumstances which can be taken into account by the court in considering whether the party has made out a fit case for calling upon either the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be, to furnish security for costs. Even otherwise it will be seen that the limit or the extent to which relief granted to an applicant to institute a suit as pauper extends, is itself indicated in O.33, R.B. That rule itself clearly states that where the application is granted, it shall be deemed to be the plaint in the suit and "the suit shall proceed in all other respects as a suit instituted in the ordinary manner." Exception is also provided in the same rule, to the effect that the plaintiff shall not be liable to pay any court fees (other than fees payable for service of process) in respect of any petition, appointment of a pleader or other proceedings connected with the suit. Therefore the law makes it every clear that all the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply and in proper cases, be made applicable to cases where the party has been permitted to institute a suit as pauper. And, so far as we could see, there is absolutely no limitation placed either under O.25, R.1 or under O.41, R.10, because the expression used is 'plaintiff' in O.25, R.1, and 'appellant' in O.41, R.10). Therefore, in our opinion, the views expressed in the second group of cases referred to above, by the Madras, Lahore and Rangoon High Courts that the mere fact that a party may have been permitted to institute a suit or file an appeal as pauper is no bar to the court exercising in a proper case jurisdiction either under O.25, R.1 or under O.41, R.10, CPC. is the correct view. We are not inclined to accept the view taken in the first group of cases, namely that under no circumstances can a pauper plaintiff or a pauper appellant be called upon to furnish security for costs. Therefore the first contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner will have to be rejected. 9. is the correct view. We are not inclined to accept the view taken in the first group of cases, namely that under no circumstances can a pauper plaintiff or a pauper appellant be called upon to furnish security for costs. Therefore the first contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner will have to be rejected. 9. Then the question is as to whether in the circumstances of this case the trial court can be considered to have exercised its discretion properly in calling upon the plaintiff revision petitioner to furnish security for costs of the defendants in the suit, under O.25, R.1, CPC. No doubt, calling upon a party to furnish security for costs either in a suit or in an appeal, cannot be done automatically by the court. The court must have regard to various circumstances such as whether the plaintiff's suit or the appellant's appeal is bona fide, or whether the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be, is a tool in the hands of a third party, or whether the suit or appeal is a vexatious one. Similar other circumstances can certainly be taken into account by the court before exercising the discretion either under O.25, R.1 or under O.41, R.10, CPC. The circumstance that a party has already been permitted to institute a suit as pauper or file an appeal as pauper is also a relevant circumstance that can be taken into account by the court, having due regard to all the circumstances indicated above, to consider as to whether the party in question, must be called upon to furnish security for costs of the suit or appeal as the case may be. We have gone through the reasons given by the teamed Subordinate Judge in the order under attack; and notwithstanding the fact that the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that absolutely irrelevant considerations have been taken into account by the learned Subordinate Judge, we are not satisfied that the learned counsel has been able to sustain that plea. The claim of the defendants was that the present suit itself is a frivolous and vexatious one. The claim of the defendants was that the present suit itself is a frivolous and vexatious one. Though the learned Subordinate Judge has not expressed in that manner, in the concluding part of his order the reasoning of the learned judge leaves no room for doubt that according to the learned judge the suit must be considered to be vexatious, justifying calling upon the plaintiff to furnish security for costs in the suit. Therefore, in the circumstances, we do not see any reason to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Subordinate Judge. 10. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs in the revision petition. Dismissed.