Prabhu Dayal v. Gaon Samaj, Tandarpore — 1964 DIGILAW 350 (ALL)

JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - Prabhu Dayal has filed this second appeal from the decision of the Fourth Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur confirming a decree of the trial Court dismissing his suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the Gaon Samaj of Tandarpore from taking any steps for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 600/- which was directed to be recovered from him by the Sub-Divisional Officer of Akbarpur under Rule 115-D of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules for an alleged act of cutting and removing certain trees belonging to the Gaon Samaj. The plaintiff alleged in his plaint that his father purchased nine mango trees and one sarsa tree for a sum of Rs. 50/- by a sale deed in the year 1899 A. D. that after his father's death he had inherited the title to these trees and had been in proprietary possession ever since; that he had been cutting the trees in this grove from time to time as they dried up, that a villager by the name of Jai Ram Singh maliciously and falsely laid information against the plaintiff that he had cut and sold 10 to 12 green neem, mango, and sarsa trees and caused the Government loss; that the Sub-Divisional Officer Akbarpur after calling a report from the Tahsildar passed an order directing the recovery of a sum of Rs. 600/- from the plaintiff for the alleged act of cutting and removing the trees; that the aforesaid order was invalid and without jurisdiction; that the mango trees and the sarsa tree belonged to him and he was not liable to pay anything for having cut trees which belonged to him; that he never cut any neem trees. The plaintiff asked for an injunction restraining the Gaon Samaj from issuing any process for the recovery of the sum of Rs. 600/- awarded by the Sub Divisional Officer. The Gaom Samaj resisted the suit and denied hat the mango trees and the sarsa tree belonged to the plaintiff. It also alleged that the plaintiff had in fact cut the neem trees and he was liable to pay the amount specified in the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. 2. The trial court held that the plaintiff had proved his title to the mango trees and the sarsa tree and further that he did not cut the neem trees. It also alleged that the plaintiff had in fact cut the neem trees and he was liable to pay the amount specified in the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. 2. The trial court held that the plaintiff had proved his title to the mango trees and the sarsa tree and further that he did not cut the neem trees. But it held that the suit was in competent because the plaintiff had not asked for any declaration of title and also because he could not ask for an injunction without asking for a declaration that the older of the Sub-Divisional Officer was illegal. Accordingly it dismissed the suit. The appellate Judge confirmed this decision and Prabhu Dayal has come to this Court in second Appeal. 3. In my opinion the view of the courts below is erroneous. I think it was not necessary for the Appellant to ask for a formal declaration of his title or for a declaration invalidating the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. In a suit for injunction, the plaintiff's right to.an injunction is based upon some title which he must establish to the satisfaction of the Court. It is not necessary for him to add a formal prayer for a declaration of his right, as a prayer for an injunction necessarily involves a declaration of title which is denied by the defendant in the suit. Sannasi Ambalagarau v. Venkatapathy Chetty, 2 Indian Cases 420, Muthavvan Swaminatha Sastrial v. S. Narayanaswami Sastrial, AIR 1936 Madras 936 and Fakirbhai v. Maganlal.,AIR 1951 Bombay 380 The view of this Court appears to be similar. In Azmat Ullah Khan v. Shiam Lal, A.I.R. 1947 Alld. 411, it was held that in a suit for perpetual injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession he must prove his title within twelve years of the date of suit. It follows that proof of title is necessary in a suit for injunction. The courts below erred in holding that a formal prayer for a declaration of title was necessary. 4. They also erred in holding that a suit for injunction was incompetent as long as the order of the sub-Divisional Officer was in force and the plaintiff should have challenged the legality of that order and impleaded the Sub-Divisional Officer as a party. 4. They also erred in holding that a suit for injunction was incompetent as long as the order of the sub-Divisional Officer was in force and the plaintiff should have challenged the legality of that order and impleaded the Sub-Divisional Officer as a party. They overlooked the provisions of Rule 115-H of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules which runs thus: "Nothing in Rules 115-D to 115-G shall debar any person from establishing his right in a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the law for the time being in force in respect of any matter for which any order under Section 122-B has been made by the Collector." 5. The language of this rule is very wide and enables a person affected by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer to establish his right in a civil court in respect of any matter decided by that officer. The rules does not say that the suit shall be confined to a declaration of title. I t provides in effect that if the decision of the Collector (which includes the S. D. O. for the purpose of Rule 115-H) affects the rights of any person, it. is subject to the decision of the civil court in a suit filed by that person. The matter was set at rest by the addition of Section 122-B to the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act which was given retrospectives effect. Sub-Sec. (4) of this Section provides, "The decision of the Collector under sub-Sec. (2), shall subject to the result of a suit by the aggrieved party before a court of competent jurisdiction, be final and conclusive, anything to the contrary contained in any other law notwithstanding." Thus the order of the Collector for the S. D. O. is made subject to the decision of the court if a suit is filed by a party aggrieved by that order, and in case of conflict between the two, the Court's decision prevails. 6. For these reasons, I think that the appellant's suit was competent and as he had established his right he was entitled to an injunction to restrain the respondent Gaon Samaj from issuing any process to recover the amount of Rs. 600/- from him. 6. For these reasons, I think that the appellant's suit was competent and as he had established his right he was entitled to an injunction to restrain the respondent Gaon Samaj from issuing any process to recover the amount of Rs. 600/- from him. I allow this appeal and set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and direct the issue of a permanent injunction to restrain the respondent, Gaon Samaj of Tondarpore, from issuing any process for the recovery of Rs. 600/- from the' appellant in pursuance of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The appellant shall have his costs from the respondent in all courts.