JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This is an application under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying, that the complaint filed by the opposite-party against the petitioners be quashed. 2. The petitioner no. 13 is one of the partners of a partnership firm known as Brijbasi General Motor & Finance Co., Delhi, the petitioners nos. 2, 4 and 5 are employees of the said firm and the petitioner no. 1 is a relation and associate of petitioner no. 3. 3. It appears that the aforesaid Finance Company let out on hire a truck (No. UPL 3456) to the opposite-party Sadho Ram and one Ishwar Das under a hire purchase agreement executed by these two gentlemen on 9-2-1961. A sum of Rs. 1,500/- was paid at the time of the execution of the agreement and balance was agreed to be paid in eighteen monthly instalments so as to make a total of Rs. 25,692.50nP. The instalments were payable by the fifteenth of each month and the last instalment was payable by August, 1962. 4. The petitioner's case is that the opposite party defaulted in the payment of the instalments and up to October 1963 paid only Rs. 16,942.5OnP. when the Finance Company realised that the opposite party will not pay the balance due the hire purchase agreement was terminated and the opposite party was asked to surrender the truck and on his failure to do so the second petitioner seized the truck on 12-1-1964. 5. Five days later, on 17-1-1964 Sadho Rain, one of the two persons who had executed the hire purchase agreement, filed a complaint in the Court of Judicial Officer, Varanasi purporting to be under Sections 392, 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. It was alleged that Sadho Ram, the complainant, was the owner of the truck and on the evening of 17-1-1964 the five petitioners forcibly took possession of the truck and in the process assaulted the complaint with fists and kicks. In the complaint there is no mention of any hire purchase agreement or of the fact that any amount was due payable by the complainant to the Finance Company in respect of the truck. 6. On 27-4-1964 the complainant Sadho Ram and two witnesses, Uma Shanker and Tek Chand, were examined by the Magistrate. In the complaint there is no mention of any hire purchase agreement or of the fact that any amount was due payable by the complainant to the Finance Company in respect of the truck. 6. On 27-4-1964 the complainant Sadho Ram and two witnesses, Uma Shanker and Tek Chand, were examined by the Magistrate. The complainant stated that he and Ishwar Das were the owners of the truck and that the truck had been taken on, instalment basis from Brijbasi Company for about Rs. 25,500/-. He stated that lie had paid Rs. 22,000/- and odd towards that amount. In cross-examination he stated that about, three instalments were still due. Tin petitioners had filed the hire purchase agreement in the Court of the Magistrate. It showed that Tek Chand was a guarantor thereunder. This Tek Chand was produced by the complainant as P. W. 3. He stated in the witness-box that he was the guarantor of the truck in question. He proved his own signatures and that of Sadho Ram and Ishwar Das on the hire purchase agreement. 7. The petitioners claim that from the prosecution evidence itself it is clear that the complainant had obtained the truck under the hire purchase agreement with the Finance Company; that the petitioners who are the accused are connected with the Finance Company and that at least three instalments of about Rs. 3,000/- were due payable when the petitioners seized the truck. The petitioners' contend that on these admitted facts no offence of robbery under Section 392, I. P. C. or under Sections 323 etc. is made out and that the proceedings consequent on the complaint amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and as such ought to be quashed. 8. The main question is whether any offence under Section 392, I. P. C, i.e. robbery, is made out. In all robberies, Section 390, I. P. C. says there is either theft or extortion The complaint does not profess to make out any case of extortion. There is no allegations that by use of force the complainant was induced to part with the truck. The case is that the petitioner seized the truck and wanted to take it away and when the complainant obstructed he was beaten and hurt was caused to him and the truck was forcibly taken away. There is no allegations that by use of force the complainant was induced to part with the truck. The case is that the petitioner seized the truck and wanted to take it away and when the complainant obstructed he was beaten and hurt was caused to him and the truck was forcibly taken away. The gravamen of the charge, therefore, is that theft was committed by the petitioners in a manner so as to make it robbery. Theft is committed when a person intends to take dishonestly movable property out of the possession of another Without his consent. In order to constitute the offence of theft it has to be established that there was an intention to take dishonestly and that the taking was without that person's consent. 9. 'Dishonestly' is defined by Section 24, I. P. C. which says that whosoever does any thing with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing dishonestly". Section 23 of the Indian penal Code explains what is wrongful gain and what is wrongful loss. "Wrongful gain" is gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled. "Wrongful loss" is the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled. This section further clarifies that a wrongful gain means both wrongful acquisition as well as wrongful retention and wrongful loss includes wrongful deprivation of property as well as being wrongfully kept out of any property. 10. Therefore, before the offence of theft is made out it has to be established that : (1) the accused-petitioners were not legally entitled to the truck and that the complainant was wrongful - deprived of the truck, and (2) the means employed to take possession were unlawful, and (3) the taking was without the complainant's consent. 11. The complainant in the complaint as well as in his statement claims to be the owner of the truck. The accused-petitioners, on the other hand, state that they are the owners of the truck by virtue of the terms and conditions of the hire purchase agreement. The existence of hire purchase agreement between the complainant and the Finance Company being admitted the rights of the parties would be governed by it. The law relating to hire purchase is in a rudimentary state in this country. The existence of hire purchase agreement between the complainant and the Finance Company being admitted the rights of the parties would be governed by it. The law relating to hire purchase is in a rudimentary state in this country. There is yet no specific statute governing the rights and liabilities of parties to a transaction of hire purchase Section 1 of the Indian Contract Act provides that "nothing herein contained shall affect any incident of any contract not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." Chapter. IX of the Indian Contract Act deals with bailment. Bailment is a transaction quite distinct from that of hire purchase. Even the Chapter dealing with bailment does not shed any light on the problem arising under the hire purchase agreement. 12. The law leaves the parties to their own agreement in respect of various incidents of the hire purchase agreement. If the parties specifically provide in their agreement for certain situations and prescribe a particular procedure which they are to adopt and specify the means which they may use to resolve those situations, they are bound by those provisions in the agreement. Such provisions in the agreement, if they do not contravenes any provisions of the Indian Contract Act, are lawful. None of the parties can later on complain if the agreed means are used. 13. The hire purchase agreement speaks of the Finance Company as the owner and Sadho Ram and Ishwar Das as the hirer of the vehicle. The second condition of the agreement gives to the hirer an option to terminate the hiring by returning the vehicle at any time. The third clause of the agreement specifically states that until the entire amount is paid up the vehicle shall remain the property of the Finance Company and that the hirer shall have the option of purchasing the vehicle by paying the balance of the hire purchase at any time in one lump sum or after having paid all the instalments as agreed upon. It is thus clear that the agreement does not postulate the hirer, being the owner of the vehicle at any time prior to the payment in full of the amount due under the agreement. In the instant case some instalments are admittedly due. It is, therefore, not correct for, the complainant to allege that he was one of the owners of the truck. In the instant case some instalments are admittedly due. It is, therefore, not correct for, the complainant to allege that he was one of the owners of the truck. In truth and in the eye of law the Finance Company of which petitioner no. 3 is a partner continued to be the owner of the truck. 14. Mere ownership, however, does not solve the problem. It has to be seen whether the petitioners who represent the Finance Company were legally entitled to the vehicle and that the complainant who was the hirer was not so entitled at the point of time when the seizer took place. The hire purchase agreement resolves this problem also. The eighth condition of the agreement provides, inter alia, that if the monthly hire is in arrears, the owner may, with or without notice to the hirer, terminate the contract of hiring and forthwith take possession of the vehicle. Thus if the hirer is in arrears the Finance Company could terminate the contract. On termination of the contract it became legally entitled to take possession of the vehicle. Similarly as soon as the hirer comes to know that the contract has been terminated he is duty bound by agreement to return the vehicle to the owner. 15. The tenth condition of the agreement states that in the event the' agreement is terminated by the owners and the hirer fails to restore; possession of the vehicle or creates any opposition to its re-possession the hirer shall be liable criminally for misappropriation of the vehicle as he holds the vehicle in trust for the owners. After the termination of the contract the possession of the vehicle by the hirer is wrongful detention. The position is that on termination of the contract the owner i.e. the Finance Company is legally en titled and the complainant is not so l entitled to the vehicle. The first ingredient of the offence of theft is, therefore lacking. 16. The second necessary ingredient is that the means employed to take possession were unlawful. The eighth condition of the agreement says that for the purposes of repossession or attempted repossession of the vehicle leave and licence is given to the owners, their agents or any other persons employed or authorised by them to enter any building, premises of place where the vehicle may be and take possession of the same from the hirer. The eighth condition of the agreement says that for the purposes of repossession or attempted repossession of the vehicle leave and licence is given to the owners, their agents or any other persons employed or authorised by them to enter any building, premises of place where the vehicle may be and take possession of the same from the hirer. Between the two parties, therefore, this is the lawful means of taking possession. 17. The question still remains whether in aid of such taking force can be used or employed. The law recognises the principles of self-defence against injury to human body as well as against certain categories of offences committed against property. (Chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code). The law also recognises the principle of self redress or self help. The real justification for these principles of self-defence or self-redress is necessity of immediate action to save injury to person or property. If a person is compilable by law only to seek redress by a suit in a court of law for a violation of his right to immediate possession of moveable property, the remedy would be often worse than the mischief, and the law would aggravate the injury instead of redressing it. 18. If a person is in possession of some goods and a stranger comes and takes it against his will, it is well settled that the former has in law a right to use sufficient force to retake the goods. See Blades v. Higgs, 10 C.B.N.S. 713 There seems to be no substantial difference between such a case and the present one. Here the owner, having terminated the contract, is entitled to the possession of the vehicle and the hirer wrongfully detains it from the owner in spite of request; in the eye of law the owner has the possession and the hirer's wrongful detention would as much be a violation of the right of property of the owner as the taking it pay out of the actual possession of the owner. 19. Salmond in his Treatise on Torts (1951), 13th Ed. page 804, Article, 228) says: "Any person entitled to the possession of goods may retake the goods either peacefully or by the use of reasonable force from any person who has wrongfully taken or detained from him. Such a retaking, even though forcible, is neither a civil injury nor a criminal offence." 20. page 804, Article, 228) says: "Any person entitled to the possession of goods may retake the goods either peacefully or by the use of reasonable force from any person who has wrongfully taken or detained from him. Such a retaking, even though forcible, is neither a civil injury nor a criminal offence." 20. In Burns 'Justice of Peace' under the title "Forcible entry" the following passage occurs : "It seems certain that even at his day he who is wrongfully dispossessed of his goods may justify he retaking of them by force from the wrong doer if he refuses to re-deliver them. For the violence which happens through the resistance of Wrongful possessor, being originally owing to his own faults, gives him no just cause of complaint, inasmuch as he might have prevented it by doing as he ought" 21. It cannot, therefore, be alleged that means employed to take possession of the vehicle were unlawful because force was used or because violence resulted through the resistance of the complainant. The second ingredient is also not established. 22. The third constituent element of the offence of theft is that the taking is without consent. The re-levant consent in view of Explanation 5 to Section 378, I. P. C. may be express or implied. The eighth condition of the agreement grants leave and licence to the owner to take possession of the vehicle. This amounts to the hirer giving his consent to the removal of the truck. 23. It is said that the eighth condition gives only leave and licence. It is argued on the authority of Wood v. Lead Bitter, 1845 (11) M.W. 838 that a mere licence, not coupled with a grant or an interest, and which "only makes an action lawful which, without it, has been unlawful." Even though in writing and given for good consideration is revocable at the will of the licence. That being so, the complainant could prove that the licence was, in fact, revoked and so the complaint could not be quashed in limini. 24. The contention is plausible but does not bear a close scrutiny. That being so, the complainant could prove that the licence was, in fact, revoked and so the complaint could not be quashed in limini. 24. The contention is plausible but does not bear a close scrutiny. The eighth condition giving leave and licence to the owner to follow the truck and take it, does not create a mere personal obligation on the hirer; it confers a power or authority on the owner to do a particular thing, the doing of which gives hint some benefit. The Privy Council has enunciated the principle that where an agreement is entered into for a sufficient consideration, and it confers a power or authority on a party to do a particular thing, the doing of which leaves him some benefit, and the authority ceases when the benefit is reaped, the authority is irrevocable. See Frith v. Frith 1906 A.C. 254. 25. On principle as well as authority it seems clear that a licence given by a hirer to seize the vehicle is irrevocable. Such a licence is tantamount to hirer's consent to the owner taking the vehicle. Such taking cannot, in law, amount to taking without consent. The third element of the offence of theft has equally not been established. 26. The materials on the record are manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code. In this situation the High Court can under Section 561A, Cr. P. C. interfere and quash the proceedings See R.P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866. 27. Learned counsel for the complainant has placed reliance on the case of Raza v. Emperors, A.I.R. 1934 Oudh 108. In that case the hirer resisted the seizure of the truck successfully. He was prosecuted for rioting under Section 147, 1. P. C. The Oudh Chief Court held that no offence had been committed as the hirer was defending his own possession. The case is thus distinguishable on facts. In the instant case the petitioners had actually taken possession of the truck when the complainant intervened and wanted to obstruct the taking away of the truck. The petitioners were successful in taking away the truck and overcoming the complainant's obstruction. We are thus not called upon to decide whether the complainant's action in causing obstruction was not justified. Here the petitioners have been prosecuted for committing robbery. The petitioners were successful in taking away the truck and overcoming the complainant's obstruction. We are thus not called upon to decide whether the complainant's action in causing obstruction was not justified. Here the petitioners have been prosecuted for committing robbery. In Apparao v. Lakshminarayana, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 586, the Supreme Court held that a bona fide claim of right can be a good defence to a prosecution for theft. The petitioners seized the truck under a claim of right and if no offence of theft is made out the charge of robbery fails. 28. The decision in H.G. Ranson v. Triloki Nath, A.I.R. 1942 Oudh 318 may also be noticed. Mr. Ranson obtained a truck on hire purchase but defaulted in payment. The dispute as to arrears was refer-1 red to arbitration. The award granted Rs. 2,606/11/6 to the Finance Company. The award was filed in Court. Mr. Ranson filed objections. At this t stage the Finance Company people t forcibly seized the truck. The Oudh Chief Court held that the legal possession of the truck was with the hirer and the Finance Company was 1 not entitled to recover possession; P the acquittal of the Company's men under Section 379, I. P. C. was set aside. 29. The case is of different facts. The Finance Company instead of terminating the contract had enforced it and obtained an award of money in satisfaction of all its claims under the agreement. The agreement having thus been satisfied, nothing was left to be terminated. The company did not become entitled to the truck. In our case the agreement was terminated before seizure of the truck. 30. Learned counsel for the opposite-party contended that the alleged hire purchase agreement was a forged agreement in the sense that though it was signed by the complainant and Ishwar Das the other entries therein have been recently made. The complainant thus admits that he did sign the agreement on 9-2-1961. The fact that the agreement came into existence about that time is also clear from the registration certificate of the truck dated 16-2-1961 which mentions that the vehicle is registered under the hire purchase agreement with Brijbasi General Motor and Finance Company Ltd. The agreement is on a printed form in which certain particulars and signatures have to be filed in. The allegation in the counter affidavit that the particulars have been recently filed in is vague. No such stand was taken by the complainant in his statement before the Magistrate. 31. Paragraph 11 of the affidavit filed in support of the present application clearly stated that the possession of vehicle was taken on 12-1-1964 and the opposite-party was told that the agreement had terminated and the owners had taken possession over e vehicle. In the counter-affidavit ere is no reply to this paragraph. The facts stated in this paragraph have therefore to be taken as correct. It is too late for the learned counsel to argue that the Finance Company had not terminated the agreement. 32. The petitioners have been prosecuted for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506, I. P. C. also. On the allegations made in the complaint and in view of the evidence led it cannot be said that on their face they do not constitute an offence under these sections. In order to decide Whether an offence under these sections has been established or not the question of appreciation of the evidence led arises. This is foreign to the scope of Section 561A, Cr. P. C. I am, therefore, not prepared to deal with the question whether any offence under Sees. 323, 504 or 506 has en established. That will be for the learned Magistrate to decide. 33. Learned counsel for the opposite party next argued that the complaint could not be quashed in part. That may be so. But no authority has been cited to support the proposition that the proceedings pending in the court of the Magistrate cannot be quashed in respect of some of the offences. 34. In the result, the petition succeeds in part. The proceedings pending in the Court of Special Magistrate First Class, Varanasi, in criminal case Sadho Ram v. Pooran Mal, in so far as they relate to the charge under Section 323, I. P. C. are quashed. The proceedings relating to the other charges shall however, continue and shall be decided in accordance with law.