JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. The suit out of which these proceedings have arisen was by the respondent-landlord, to recover property from the appellant-tenant, with arrears of rent. A conditional decree was passed on the 24th December, 1953, the relevant part of which is in the following terms: That the 1st defendant do deposit in Court a sum of Rs. 1,615-3-0 being the balance of future rent for 1128 (1952-53) and 1129 (1953-54) and a sum of Rs. 192-8-0 being the costs of the suit with interest at 5 ½ per cent per annum from this date to the date of payment, on or before 24th May 1954, and that on such deposit being made, the suit do stand dismissed. That in case, the deposit as aforesaid is not made, the 1st defendant do surrender and put the plaintiff in quiet and peaceful possession of the plaint property with all improvements therein and free from all encumbrances created by him or any person claiming under him.� The Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1954 (Act V of 1954) which came into force on the 5th February, 1954, had by section 3, imposed a bar on the institution of suits and of applications for execution of decrees for the payment of money passed in suits for recovery of debts. That Act was superseded by the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Repayment) of Debts Act, 1955 (Act I of 1935) with effect from the 1st March, 1955, and it is principally with its provisions, that this appeal is concerned. This Act has by section 2 (b), defined the term debt as, Any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from an agriculturist on the 1st October, 1953 whether payable under a contract or decree or order of a Court, Civil or Revenue or otherwise, subject to exclusions of certain categories of liabilities. It is the admitted case of both parties, that only a sum of Rs. 710 As. 11 out of the sum of Rs. 1,615 As. 3 decreed came within the definition of debt. It is the admitted case of both parties, that only a sum of Rs. 710 As. 11 out of the sum of Rs. 1,615 As. 3 decreed came within the definition of debt. The respondent filed an execution petition on the 15th December, 1955, for eviction of the appellant relying on clause (2) of the extract of the decree made above, which has been referred to by the courts below and in argument of counsel, as a forfeiture clause, and without notice to the appellant, the property was delivered to the respondent. The appellant afterwards made an application to the execution court for redelivery of possession to him, on the ground that the delivery of possession from him was illegal in view of the provisions of Act I of 1955. While recognising, that part of the decree amount came within the definition of debt as defined in the Act, the two courts below have rejected the application on the ground, that the provisions of the Act have no impact whatever on the forfeiture clause in the decree, which must therefore be given, full scope and effect according to its apparent tenor. In second appeal, the appellant has challenged the correctness of this view and I am inclined to think that there is great force in his contention. Section 4 (1) of Act I of 1955 has conferred a right on an agriculturist debtor to discharge a debt as defined due from him, in instalments. It reads as follows: Notwithstanding any law, custom, contract, or decree of court to the contrary, an agriculturist shall be entitled to pay within four months of the commencement of this Act the interest due on any debt due by him up to the commencement of this Act and tone-eighth of the principal outstanding or one-fourth of the total amount outstanding, whichever is less, and the balance of the debt in three equal annual instalments on or before the 1st July of each of the succeeding three years with the interest due on such instalment up to that date. � It was not denied, that the appellant had made certain deposits to entitle him to claim the benefit of this section. The controversy was as to the effect of this section on the terms of the decree. � It was not denied, that the appellant had made certain deposits to entitle him to claim the benefit of this section. The controversy was as to the effect of this section on the terms of the decree. Under it, the appellant had no duty, notwithstanding the decree, to make immediate payment of the full amount of the rent for the year 1128 decreed, but he need pay only in instalments as prescribed. I do not share the view of the lower courts that this has no effect whatever on the forfeiture clause. To take an extreme case, had the liability under the decree been wholly a debt as defined, there could not be any doubt that a similar provision in the decree for forfeiture in the event of non-payment before a specified date, would be a decree to the contrary as contemplated by section 4(1), and would have to yield to it. So it is not correct to think, that a forfeiture clause like this in a decree, can under no circumstances be touched by section 4 (1) in the Act. It would be a logical extension to hold, that if the forfeiture clause is one and entire, and covers an amount which is partly a debt and partly not a debt, the integrity of the clause is not broken simply because part of the liability is not a debt; the clause in its entirety would be affected. This is exactly what has taken place in the present case. I cannot accept the view contended for, that forfeiture had necessarily been incurred, for the reason that the rent due for the year 1129 and costs had not been paid as decreed, irrespective of whether rent for the year 1128 was payable forthwith or not. In my judgment, the contention overlooks what is plain on the terms of the decree, that there is only one forfeiture clause for non-payment of the sum of Rs. 1,615 As. 3 and not for non-payment of the rent for 1129 and the costs decreed. In my judgment, the contention overlooks what is plain on the terms of the decree, that there is only one forfeiture clause for non-payment of the sum of Rs. 1,615 As. 3 and not for non-payment of the rent for 1129 and the costs decreed. The forfeiture ordered by the decree contemplated, or was dependent on, the existence of a liability to pay the aforesaid sum, but before the forfeiture was incurred that liability was removed on compliance with Act I of 1935 and so the forfeiture as decreed could not work, even though part of the liability did not fall within the purview of the Act. A somewhat analogous case was decided by this court in Balakrishnan Nair v. Bhaskaran Nair 1959 K.L.T. 544; that was a case of sale having taken place in execution of a decree for money, part of which alone was a debt within the meaning of Act 31 of 1958. It was held, that if the sale could not be supported in part it has necessarily to go in its entirety, and reliance was placed on the decision of the Travancore High Court in Kuruvila v. Cheriyan 1946 T.L.R. 467 in which also the sale held in execution of a decree for money, part of which alone was amenable to the provisions of the Debt Relief Act was set aside wholly. A distinction was drawn by learned counsel for the respondent that by the sale there has been a realisation of the debt itself, which was contrary to the terms of the statute. But the analogy consists in the forfeiture under the decree being lifted in entirety, even though a part alone of the liability was amenable to Act I of 1955, just as the sale was set aside wholly, though part of the liability alone was amenable to the provisions of the concerned statute. For the above reasons, differing from the lower courts, I am led to hold that the forfeiture clause in the decree did not take effect and that delivery of possession in execution was bad in law. As to what the future rights of the parties are, I do not propose to say anything. For the above reasons, differing from the lower courts, I am led to hold that the forfeiture clause in the decree did not take effect and that delivery of possession in execution was bad in law. As to what the future rights of the parties are, I do not propose to say anything. The orders of the two courts below are set aside, the application of the appellant for redelivery is granted, and this second appeal is allowed, but in the nature of the questions raised, I do not order costs here or in the courts below. The respondent counsel prayed for leave to appeal; leave granted.