JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - The suit which has given rise to this appeal relates to an Imambara, an Imam Chowk and a piece of vacant land all situate in Pura Bahlol, Mohalla Newada, district Azamgarh. The suit was filed by Mohammad and eight other persons in a representative capacity, and the defendants who were nine in number were, likewise, sued in a representative capacity. The case of the plaintiffs was that the property in suit had from time immemorial been in the management of the plaintiffs and their ancestors and that about twenty years ago Mohammad plaintiff No. 1 and Haji Abdul Rashid were put in charge of the property by the remaining plaintiffs and the resident of the locality and since then the said two persons had been managing the Imambara and keeping its key in their custody. The vacant land in suit was said to be appurtenant to the Imambara and it was alleged that it was being used for purposes connected with the Imambara and a Madarsa which adjoins it. It was stated that the plaintiffs started holding a Bazar on the vacant land for the benefit of the Imambara and the Madarsa and this was resented by the defendants who were interested in another Imambara situate at a short distance from the Imambara in suit and used to hold a similar Bazar near it. The resentment led to a dispute between the parties and it eventually gave rise to proceedings under Section 147, Cr. P. C. during which the police took in its custody the key of the Imambara. The proceedings terminated in favour of the defendants. The plaintiffs thereupon brought this suit for a declaration of their right of management of the property in suit, for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the exercise of that right and also for an injunction restraining the defendants from taking over the key of the Imambara from the police. Possession was also sought in the alternative. The defendants denied that the property in suit was ever under the management of the plaintiffs and claimed that the defendants and their ancestors had always been in-charge of its management. They also denied that the vacant land in suit had anything to do with the Madarsa and contended that the plaintiffs had no right to hold a Bazar thereon. The defendants denied that the property in suit was ever under the management of the plaintiffs and claimed that the defendants and their ancestors had always been in-charge of its management. They also denied that the vacant land in suit had anything to do with the Madarsa and contended that the plaintiffs had no right to hold a Bazar thereon. It was also alleged by them that the plaintiffs had wrongfully broken the lock of the Imambara and the defendants were, therefore, compelled to launch proceedings under Section 147, Cr. P C. 2. The trial court held that neither plaintiff No.1 nor the other plaintiffs had any right to the management of the property and dismissed the suit. On appeal by the plaintiffs, however, the learned Civil Judge disagreed with the finding of the trial court and came to the conclusion that plaintiff No. 1 is the de facto Mutwalli of the property and is entitled to retain its management in his hands till he is removed by a decree of the Court. He accordingly granted a declaration that plaintiff No.1 is the Mutwalli of the property in suit and also a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession and the management of plaintiff No. 1. Further, he directed the defendants to handover the key and the possession of the Imambara to plaintiff No. 1. Against the decree of the learned Civil Judge the defendants have preferred an appeal to this Court. 3. It is admitted that the entire property in suit, which will hereinafter be described as the Imambara, is waqf property and the only question to be determined is whether plaintiff No, 1 is the Mutwalli of the Imambara and is entitled to the decree which has been granted to him. The learned Civil Judge has believed the evidence of the plaintiffs to the effect that 15 or 20 years before the suit the residents of the locality decided to put Mohammad plaintiff No. 1 and Haji Abdul Rashid in charge of the management of the Imambara and the key of the Imambara was made over to them. The learned Civil Judge has believed the evidence of the plaintiffs to the effect that 15 or 20 years before the suit the residents of the locality decided to put Mohammad plaintiff No. 1 and Haji Abdul Rashid in charge of the management of the Imambara and the key of the Imambara was made over to them. He has further accepted the case of the plaintiffs that the Imambara was under the management of plaintiff No, 1 and Haji Abdul Rashid until the, death of the latter which took place 7 or 8 years before the suit and that the Imam-bara had thereafter been in the management of plaintiff No. 1 and he had been keeping its key. The evidence to the contrary led by the defendants was rejected by the learned Judge. 4. Mr. Gupta learned counsel for the defendants, has challenged the correctness of this finding on the ground that the learned Civil Judge misconstrued a piece of evidence in arriving at it. It appears that in a register maintained at the police station with regard to the religious functions of Hindus and Muslims Mohammad and Haji Abdul Rashid were shown as Taziadars of the Imambara in question. The learned Civil Judge held that the person shown in the said register as Taziadar along with Haji Abdul Rashid was Mohammad plaintiff No. 1 and relied on the entry in recording a finding in favour of the plaintiffs. The contention of Mr Gupta is that the entry refers to Mohammad defendant and not to Mohammad plaintiff No. 1. This contention appears to have been advanced before the learned Civil Judge as well but he rejected it on the ground that, according to the defend ants, Haji Abdul Rashid was never in charge of the management of the Imambara whereas'. according to the plaintiffs, Haji Abdul Rashid and Mohammad plaintiff No. 1 were jointly managing the Imambara until the death of Haji Abdul Rashid. The entry in the police register being in consonance. with the case of the plaintiffs and not with that of the defendants, the learned Civil Judge cannot be said to have been in error in holding that it was Mohammad plaintiff no. 1 and not Mohammad defendant who was shown as a Taziadar along with Haji Abdul Rashid, and it cannot be urged that the finding recorded by him is vitiated by misconstruction of evidence. 1 and not Mohammad defendant who was shown as a Taziadar along with Haji Abdul Rashid, and it cannot be urged that the finding recorded by him is vitiated by misconstruction of evidence. At any rate the question is only one of fact and the conclusion reached by the learned Civil Judge in regard to it has to be accepted in second appeal. 5. The next argument put forward by Mr. Gupta is that it is unlikely that plaintiff no. 1 was put in charge of the management of the Imambara because he admittedly, belongs to the Deobandi School of thought and Taziadari is condemned by it. The lower appellate court considered it unnecessary to enquire into the attitude of Deobandi School of thought towards Taziadari and did not record any finding on this question. Since however is has been laid by the learned counsel on this aspect of the case I propose to briefly deal with it. It is - to be noted that both the parties are Sunnis with only this difference that while plaintiff No. 1 and some other plaintiffs belong to what has been called the 'Deobandi School of thought'; the remaining plaintiffs and all the defendants belong to what has been called the 'Barailwi School of thought. The defendants certainly alleged that all the plaintiffs were Deobandi but in my opinion this cannot be said to have been proved. There is, however, no dispute that plaintiff no. 1 does belong to the Deobandi School of thought. In support of his contention that the Deobandi School of thought prohibits Taziadari, Mr. Gupta has not been able to refer to anything besides the vague and unsatisfactory statements of the defendants' witnesses which cannot form the basis of any finding in regard to this matter. No person belonging to the Deobandi School of thought has been examined by the defendants to prove the prohibition and the manner in which the defendants' witnesses claim to have derived their knowledge about it does not appear to be true and convincing. The witnesses examined by the plaintiffs state that Tazidari observed both by Deobandis and Barailwis and their evidence appears to be reliable and worthy of acceptance. It has to be borne in mind that the Deobandi School of thought and the Barailwi School of thought do not represent any sub-sects of the Sunni sect. The witnesses examined by the plaintiffs state that Tazidari observed both by Deobandis and Barailwis and their evidence appears to be reliable and worthy of acceptance. It has to be borne in mind that the Deobandi School of thought and the Barailwi School of thought do not represent any sub-sects of the Sunni sect. The schools admittedly derive their names from two cities of this State, Deoband and Bareilly. Haji Mohd. Saeed defendant no. 1 has stated that Hanafis have two Madarsas, one at Deoband and the other at Bareilly and that those who subscribe to the views of the Madarsa at Deoband are called Deobandis while those who subscribe to the views of the Ma darsa at Bareilly are called Barailwis. When questioned about the doctrinal difference between the two Schools of thought neither Haji Mohammad Syed nor the other witnesses produced by the defendants gave any clear and consistent idea. I t has then to be remembered that divergences in thought and practice even among people belonging to different sects or sub-sects, although such divergences might have been well defined in their origin, get blurred and fade away on account of passage of time or force of circumstances. Even if therefore orthodox Deobandi School of thought does not sanction or disapproves of some of those ceremonies which have gathered round the observance of Muharram in course of time, it cannot be urged on that basis that plaintiff no. 1 could not management of the Imambara and with the Taziadari connected with it. Whether, therefore, the management of the Imambara was made over to plaintiff No. 1 and he had been in charge of it had really to be decided on the evidence on record and the case of the plaintiffs could not have been thrown out on the basis of an a prior reason which does not appear to me to be sound. 6. It has next been contended that the appointment of plaintiff no. 1 as a Mutwalli cannot be recognised and given effect to by the court inasmuch as appointment of Mutwalli cannot in law be made by the residents of the locality. Appointment by the congregation is, however one of the recognised modes of appointment of a Mutwalli and there is weighty authority in support of it. In dealing with this question in Piran v. Abdool Karim, I.L.R. 19 Cal. Appointment by the congregation is, however one of the recognised modes of appointment of a Mutwalli and there is weighty authority in support of it. In dealing with this question in Piran v. Abdool Karim, I.L.R. 19 Cal. 203, Amir Ali, J. observed : "But as I understand the principle, those dicta refer to endowments of a public nature like a musjid-nama and similar institutions in which the public at large or the Mussulman public generally are interested. But when an institution is dedicated to the inhabitants of a particular locality or to a particular sect or fraternity the members of which are ascertainable, whatever might have been the case in ancient times, the modern Moslem Jurists have recognised the validity of an appointment by the congregation. The Fatawa-i-Alamgiri, after stating the old views concerning such appointments, says-'It is stated from Shaikul-Islam Abdul Hassan that all the mashaikhs (.jurists) declare that if they (the congregation) do appoint a mutwalli, it would be as valid as if the appointment was. made with the permission of the Kazi.' And in the Radd-ul-Alukhtar it is stated that the modern Mohammedan lawyers recognise the validity of an appointment by the congregation. So also in the Wajiz-ul-Muhit." 7. This was followed in Dinawar Husain v. Subhan Khan, A.I.R. 1931 Oudh 375 and Ghulam Muhammad v. Abdul Rashid' A.I.R. 1933 Lahore 905 and on the basis of the above decisions the law on the subject has been stated in the following terms by Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law: "In the case of an institution confined to a particular locality, such as a mosque and a grave-yard, the appointment of a Mutwalli may be made by the congregation of the locality." 8. The lower appellate court has found that the residents of the locality in which the Imambara in dispute is situate appointed Haji Abdul Rashid and plaintiff No. 1 as Mutwallis and the key of the Imambara was handed over to them. On the authorities mentioned above it is clear that the residents of the locality were competent to make the appointment and it had a legal sanction behind it. It is also clear that upon the death of Haji Abdul Rashid, which admittedly took place 7 or 8 years before the suit, plaintiff No. 1 became the sole Mutwalli by survivor ship-vide Abdul Razaq v. Ali Baksh, A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 163. 9. It is also clear that upon the death of Haji Abdul Rashid, which admittedly took place 7 or 8 years before the suit, plaintiff No. 1 became the sole Mutwalli by survivor ship-vide Abdul Razaq v. Ali Baksh, A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 163. 9. The other objection to the appointment of plaintiff no. 1 as Mutwalli raised by Mr. Gupta is that since under the Muslim Law a minor cannot be appointed Mutwalli, and plaintiff no. 1 was a minor at the time of his appointment, the appointment must be treated as a nullity. The contention that plaintiff no. 1 was a minor at the time of his alleged appointment is based on the fact that plaintiff no. 1 in his deposition gave his age as 34 years and stated that he was appointed a Mutwalli by the residents of the locality 15 or 20 years ago. It has been contended that the defendants are entitled to urge that the appointment should be regarded as having taken place 20 years before the statement of plaintiff No. 1 and on this computation plaintiff no. 1 was only 14 years of age at the time of his appointment. In my view this method of construing the statement of plaintiff No. 1 is not fair and proper and no conclusion affecting the validity of his appointment as a Mutwalli can be drawn from such a statement when the question of the age of plaintiff No. 1 at the time of his appointment was not in issue. 10. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that estimates as to age and time are very frequently inaccurate, and before an argument on a matter vitally affecting the rights of the parties and the result of a case can be founded on the basis of a statement made as to age or time by a party or a witness the question of age or time, as the case may be, should be specifically raised or at least brought into prominence so that a statement in regard to that matter may be made with care and sense of responsibility and such inaccuracy as may be due only to imperfect recollection or t mental indolence may be avoided. Even apart from this consideration, it cannot be contended on behalf of the defendants that the appointment of plaintiff no. 1 as Mutwalli took place 20 years before his statement. Even apart from this consideration, it cannot be contended on behalf of the defendants that the appointment of plaintiff no. 1 as Mutwalli took place 20 years before his statement. Surely, if a party or a witness states that a particular event took place 15 or 20 years ago the time of the happening of the event cannot be regarded as having been fixed with any definiteness. If the right to the subject matter of the suit depends upon the time when the event happened the person who has upon him the burden of making it definite either for establishing or for negativing the right must do so. In the instant case it was for the defendants to plead that the appointment of plaintiff no. 1 as a Mutwalli was bad in law and ineffective inasmuch as he was a minor at the time of his alleged appointment and no plea to that effect having been taken by them, it is not possible for them to raise the question of the minority of plaintiff No. 1 at the time of his alleged appointment as a Mutwalli on the basis of the statement referred to above. At any rate the defend ants can succeed in establisihing the invalidity of the appointment on that score only by clear and definite evidence and not on the basis of an estimate of time which is so inconclusive that it may lead to one conclusion or the other, according as the upper or the lower limit of time given in the estimate is accepted. In these circumstances it cannot be held that plaintiff no. 1 was a minor at the time of his appointment. 11. It is also to be remembered that, according to the case of the plaintiffs, which has been accepted by the lower appellate court, Haji Abdul Rashid had been appointed as Co Mutwalli with plaintiff no. 1 and the appointment did not, therefore, suf fer from that defect which might otherwise have vitiated it. In Mst. Nabiunnisa v. Liaqat All, AIR 1928 Allahabad 508 the question involved was whether a waqf would fail on account of the appointment of a minor as a Mutwalli by the wagif and it was held that it would not. 1 and the appointment did not, therefore, suf fer from that defect which might otherwise have vitiated it. In Mst. Nabiunnisa v. Liaqat All, AIR 1928 Allahabad 508 the question involved was whether a waqf would fail on account of the appointment of a minor as a Mutwalli by the wagif and it was held that it would not. Reliance in that case was placed on the following passage in Amir Ali's book which is a quotation from Ruddul-Mukhtai : "If the waqif appoints a minor as mutwalli and no adult is associated with him the Qazi shall appoint some person to do the work until the minor attains majority. If there is an adult associated with the minor, the Qazi may appoint some person to represent the minor and act jointly with the co-mutwalli, or may empower the adult mutwalli to act for the minor." 12. The case did not certainly relate to appointment of Mutwalli by the congregation but appointment by the congregation being one of the recognised modes of appointment as a Mutwalli, the position of law stated above seems to be equally applicable to such an appointment. Where an adult has been associated as a Mutwalli with a minor in an appointment to that office made by the congregation, the minor would, in my opinion, become competent to function as a Mutwalli after attaining majority. It is not denied that plaintiff No. 1 attained majority long before the suit. According to the finding of the court below he had been acting as a Alutwalli and the only possible inference is that he had been allowed by the residents of the locality to enter upon and continue in charge of the management of the Irnambara. Even if, therefore, the plaintiff was a minor at the time of his appointment as a Co-Mutwalli along with Haji Abdul Rashid, the appointment cannot be regarded as having been a nullity and his right to act as a Mutwalli and to manage the Iniambara is not affected by that circumstance. I may here mention that the lower appellate court has observed that the Muslim Law does not require majority but puberty and under-standing for appointment as a Mutwalli and support for this view is to be found in the case of Hans Kuar Bai v. Lmam Ali, A.I.R. 1921 Nagpur 53. I may here mention that the lower appellate court has observed that the Muslim Law does not require majority but puberty and under-standing for appointment as a Mutwalli and support for this view is to be found in the case of Hans Kuar Bai v. Lmam Ali, A.I.R. 1921 Nagpur 53. I do not, however, consider it necessary to enter into this question because in my view it is not proved that plaintiff no. 1 was a minor at the time of his appointment and at any rate the fact that Haji Abdul Rashid was appointed as a Co-Mutwalli with him cured the defect which the appointment might otherwise have had. 13. The question of the validity of the appointment of plaintiff no. 1 as a Mutwalli is, however, relevant only for determining whether the plaintiff is a de jure Mutwalli. But that question has no bearing on the rights of plaintiff no. 1 as a de facto Mutwalli. On the finding of the court below plaintiff no. 1 is a de facto Mutwalli and for a considerable time before the suit he had been managing the Imambara and keeping its key in his custody. The right of a de facto Mutwalli to manage the endowment, to remain in possession of its properties as a manager, and to sue for the recovery of its properties or its dues, until he is displaced by a de jure Mutwalli, cannot be disputed and has always been recognised: Abdul Rahim Khan v. Ramzan, AIR 1929 Allahabad 519, Nazi Alalzoined Ibrahinm v. Sundarin Chettis, AIR 1926 Madras 666 and Mst. Moideem Bibi Ammal v. Rathnavelu Mudali, AIR 1927 Madras 769. 14. On the facts found in the case plaintiff no. 1 is, in my opinion, entitled to the reliefs which have been granted to him and the decree of the lower appellate court should, therefore, be affirmed. 15. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.