Judgment SARKAR, J. :- These appeals arise out of suits filed for recovery of money from the Government. The appellants were the plaintiffs and the respondent in each appeal is a State, the defendant in the suits. 2. In the years 1947 and 1948 there was rice scarcity in certain districts in Madras as it was then constituted. These districts are now in Andhra Pradesh. The Government of Madras took action under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 and passed various orders for the procurement and distribution of rice. Rice thereafter could be procured only by the Government or by the procuring agents appointed by it and disposed of according to the orders of the Government. Under these orders licensed wholesalers and retailers were also appointed. The appellants were procuring agents and wholesalers under this system. They entered into various agreements with the Government for the purpose. Their duty was to procure rice from specified areas at prices specified by the Government from time to time and to deliver it at prices so specified, to the Government or to persons nominated by it or to other licensed purchasers. The procurement price was in each case lower than the selling price and the procuring agents were under the contract entitled to the difference between the two prices. 3. During the period with which we are concerned, three successive orders were made by the Government specifying the prices and in each case there was an increase. The first increase in prices took effect on July 27, 1947, the second on or about December 6, 1947 and the third on November 21, 1948. On the dates on which each of these orders came into force, each appellant had lying with him in stock certain quality of rice. This had been procured by the agents earlier and, therefore, at the then prevailing lower purchase price. The appellants had to sell this rice at the new increased price and hence became automatically entitled to a larger sum than they were before the increase. The enhancement of the procuring agents profit was entirely due to the Government action in increasing the prices and the Government thought that they were not entitled to it and insisted that the excess sums should be paid to it by them. The enhancement of the procuring agents profit was entirely due to the Government action in increasing the prices and the Government thought that they were not entitled to it and insisted that the excess sums should be paid to it by them. The appellants paid these moneys to the Government under protest and it is for the recovery of the moneys so paid that, broadly speaking, the suits were filed. 4. Now various methods had been employed by the Government for realising these excess amounts which have been described in these proceedings as surcharges . Thus in some cases the procuring agents or wholesalers refusing to pay were threatened with cancellation of their licences and to avoid this they made the payments. In other cases, these surcharges were deducted from moneys payable by the Government to them for rice supplied by them. The third method which concerned the increase made in November 1948 was to requisition the stock of rice lying with the procuring agents on the day immediately preceding the coming into force of the increased price at the rate then obtaining and thereafter releasing such rice to the procuring agents only upon their paying the surcharge or on their executing an agreement to pay the same. 5. It is clear that if the Government was not entitled to the amount of the surcharge, it could not retain the moneys paid by the appellants to it on that account. The principal question is, Was the Government entitled to those moneys? In regard to the moneys collected except by the method of requisition and release, the Government s contention was that the appellants were its agents and that being so, any excess amount which was coming to them as a result of the orders was profit made by them in connection with the business of the agency for which they were liable to accounts to the Government. It was also said that if the appellants were not the Government s agents strictly speaking, they at least stood in a fiduciary relationship to it which made them liable to account for the extra profit. Mr. learned brother Ayyangar has dealt with this question and there is nothing that I have to add to that. It was also said that if the appellants were not the Government s agents strictly speaking, they at least stood in a fiduciary relationship to it which made them liable to account for the extra profit. Mr. learned brother Ayyangar has dealt with this question and there is nothing that I have to add to that. I am in full agreement with his view that no relationship of principal and agent or of a fiduciary character had ever come into existence between the appellants and the Government. I wish, however, to observe that I do not see how, even if the appellants were the Government s agents, Government was entitled to the extra profit. Admittedly under the contract between a procuring agent and the Government even if that contract was of agency, the procuring agent was to procure and sell rice at the prices fixed and prevailing at the time respectively of the procurement and sale. It is not disputed that the difference belonged to him. It was in fact said that was the commission to which he was entitled under the contract as an agent. If this is so, the procuring agent would under the contract be entitled to keep the larger difference caused by the selling price having been increased after his procurement. Hence it seems to me that under the contract, irrespective of whatever kind it was, the difference, even though it became larger, belonged to the procuring agent and the Government had no right to it. 6. Another question that arises in these appeals in regard to the moneys collected by the methods other than requisition and releases is whether the claims of the appellants for the refund were not barred. I agree with my brother Ayyangar that Art. 62 of the Limitation Act governed the case and the claims were not barred if the suits in respect of them were filed within the time there specified. With regard to the meaning of the words "Money received by the defendant, for the plaintiffs use" In that article, I think, as Ayyangar, J. pointed out, the correct view was taken in Mohomed Wahib v. Mahomed Ameer, ILR 32 Cal 527. The suits in ,which the claims arose in circumstances other than those described hereafter the question on limitation has to be decided under Art. 62 only. The suits in ,which the claims arose in circumstances other than those described hereafter the question on limitation has to be decided under Art. 62 only. I do not feel called upon on the present occasion to decide to what other cases, if any, Art. 62 might apply. 7. It remains to deal with the amounts realised by the method of requisitioning the rice in stock and releasing, it. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that this was really taxation by executive flat and was, therefore, an illegal levy of tax. I am unable to accept this contention. Support for it was sought by the appellants from Attorney-General v. Writs United Dairies, Ltd. (1922) 127 LT 822. It does not seem to me that that case furnishes any basis for the contention. There the Ministry of Food Production had granted a licence to a trader to buy milk on payment of a certain charge and it was held that the charge could not be levied except on the authority given by statute and that no such authority had been given. Another case to be considered in this connection is Attorney-General v. Homebush Flour Mills Ltd., 56 CLR 390. There it was held that a certain statute,which had been passed by the Parliament of New South Wales, though purporting to require payment upon the exercise of an option by a trader in fact left him no choice and compelled him to make the payment and, therefore, in reality imposed as excise duty which only the Commonwealth Parliament could impose and for this reason the statute was ultra vires the legislature. The last case on this point which I have to notice is Lower Mainland Dairy Products Sales Adjustment Committee v. Crystal Dairy, Ltd., 1933 AC 168. There the provincial legislature of British Columbia had passed an Act which authorised a committee constituted under it to impose a certain levy and it was held that the levy was a tax which the legislature had not power to impose. 8. The Australian case and the Canadian case were cases of levy under ultra vires statutes and the English case was of a charge made with out any statutory backing at all. It seems to me that the present case is not of any of these kinds. 8. The Australian case and the Canadian case were cases of levy under ultra vires statutes and the English case was of a charge made with out any statutory backing at all. It seems to me that the present case is not of any of these kinds. There is here no challenge to the legality of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act under which the requisition and release had been made. Nor was it contended that under the Act the Government could not requisition the stock of rice in the possession of a procuring agent at the price previously prevailing, nor that having done so, it could not sell the rice so requisitioned at the price subsequently fixed. If it could so sell the rice requisitioned to an outsider, it could equally sell it back to the procuring agent from whom it was taken. This is precisely what was done in this case. The Government s acts were perfectly within its statutory powers and legal. It is not a case where the appellants had been compelled to obtain the release on payment to avoid going but of trade as was held in the Australian case to have happened. The appellants were free not to pay and to obtain or not to obtain the release. If they had not, it has not been said that their trade would have stopped. The ratio decidendi of the Australian case that the trader had been compelled to pay which was why the payment was held to have amounted to a tax does not apply to the case in hand. 9. There is not the slightest doubt that the extra profit with which we are concerned had not come to the procuring agents by reason of any merit of their own; it had come into existence only because the exigencies of the circumstances prevailing had compelled the Government to increase the price. The Government had apparently felt doubtful its. earlier methods of realising the extra profits were legal and to avoid the consequently of any illegality, it followed this procedure and to the legality of it I find no objection. If the procedure was legal, as I think it was it could not have resulted in an illegal levy. The Government had apparently felt doubtful its. earlier methods of realising the extra profits were legal and to avoid the consequently of any illegality, it followed this procedure and to the legality of it I find no objection. If the procedure was legal, as I think it was it could not have resulted in an illegal levy. I would, therefore, hold that where as a result of the requisition and release the Government had obtained moneys from the appellants, the realisation had been legal and did not amount to unathorised levy of tax and the appellants are not entitled to recover them from the Government. For the same reason where in respect of such requisition and release the appellants had not paid money directly, but had entered into engagements to pay moneys, those engagements would be legal and enforceable. The question of payments and of agreements of this particular kind are involved in appeals Nos. 840,. 842, 845, 850, 853 and 855 of 1962. I would dismiss those appeals so far as they concern claim for the recovery of moneys realised by the Government by requisition and release and the enforceability of the agreements in respect of them. The other appeals except where the suits were barred as stated by Ayyangar, J. should be allowed. 10. AYYANGAR, J.: This batch of 44 appeals have been heard together because most of the points of law raised in them are common. They are before us by virtue of certificates of fitness granted for each appeal by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. 11. The facts leading to the suits out of which these appeals arise are briefly these: The appellants are powers or lessees of rice mills in the districts of West Godavari, East Godavari and Krishna. Their business consisted in purchasing paddy from producers, milling their purchase in their mills and in selling the rice so milled to wholesale dealers in rice and others. While so, in or about 1946-47 and even before, severe restrictions were imposed in the State of Madras on the trade in foodgrains in order to maintain their supplies and ensure their proper and equitable distribution to the community. Action in that behalf was taken in respect of two matters; (i) Procurement of paddy and rice, and (2) Dealing in them. Action in that behalf was taken in respect of two matters; (i) Procurement of paddy and rice, and (2) Dealing in them. For this purpose the power vested in the State Governm For Citation : AIR 1965 SC 1773 = 1965(2) SCA 252. Vikas Info Solutions Pvt. Ltd.