Judgment :- 1. The petitioner stands convicted by the Additional First Class Magistrate Trivandrum for an offence of criminal breach of trust under S.409 IPC. and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 11/2 years and to rigorous imprisonment for 6 months under S.477 A, IPC. The case against the accused was that in his capacity as cashier in the office of the Junior Engineer, South Sub-division, Trivandrum under the Kerala State Electricity Board, he committed criminal breach of trust in respect of a sum of Rs. 1,951.62 nP. entrusted to him by pw. 2, an employee of the Government Press, Trivandrum on 811958, that he omitted to enter the amount thus received in the cash book and thereby falsified the accounts. The accused contended that he was only a Bill Collector, that his duty was only to collect electricity charges from private consumers and not from Government buildings, that no amount was entrusted to him by pw. 2 and that he had not granted the receipt Ext. P 1. He denied the authorship of the entries in the cash book on 8 158 and also stated that the chalan Ext. P 10 was not in his handwriting. No witnesses were examined in his defence. The learned Magistrate on a consideration of the evidence found the accused guilty of the offences charged and convicted and sentenced him as stated above. In appeal the learned Sessions Judge of Trivandrum, on a reappraisal of the evidence, confirmed the conviction and sentence. Aggrieved with the order the accused has coma up in revision. 2. The accused was one of the cashiers in the office of the Junior Engineer. pw.1 was the Assistant Engineer and pw. 9 was the Junior Engineer during the relevant period. They have given evidence that the accused was the cashier at the BI counter, that it was his duty to accept the current charges from the consumers, issue prewritten receipts, credit the collections in the cash book then and there, total up the cash collections for the day and send up the original of the cash book to the Revenue unit, remit the collection into the treasury the next day under a chalan and send up the receipted chalan to the Revenue unit in the electricity office. As in the appellate court, here also learned counsel has not disputed the fact that accused was, in fact, the cashier in the BI counter. It was also not disputed that it was his duty to collect dues for the electricity consumed by the Government buildings including the Government Press, Trivandrum. The procedure of issuing demand notices to the consumers and the collection of the dues from them had been spoken to by the witnesses, and there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the procedure spoken to by them. The invoice and the receipt which are two parts of a single paper are prepared in the account section called the Billing Unit. Either the Chief Accountant or the Deputy Chief Accountant signs the invoice and the prewritten receipt. They are then sent to the office of the junior Engineer. The invoice is torn off from the receipt and is issued to the consumers. The receipts relating to the invoices issued are bundled up and entrusted to the respective cashiers and as when the consumers come and pay the amount along with the invoice, the cashier picks up the corresponding receipt and delivers it to the payee after initialling and putting the date in the receipt. The cashier then enters the payment in the cash register and remit the amount into the treasury. If consumer charges are paid by cheque the particulars must be entered in the cash book, the cheque should be got countersigned by the Junior Engineer and sent to the treasury and after intimation of receipt of money, pucca receipts are to be issued. 3. Now the question for decision is whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving entrustment of money to the accused. pw. 2 is the person who had brought the money for payment of the current charges of the Government Press. pw. 3 is the cashier of the Government Press. He has proved Ext. P. 2 the invoice for November 1957. For payment of the amount, a contingent bill was prepared and it was cashed on 31 58 and trie-amount was sent through pw. 2 on 8158. In token of having received the money Ext. P1 was got. This is seen from the entries in the contingent register Ext. P 5 and their cash book Ext. P6. It is true that the register would not show that the amount was sent through pw. 2 on 8158. In token of having received the money Ext. P1 was got. This is seen from the entries in the contingent register Ext. P 5 and their cash book Ext. P6. It is true that the register would not show that the amount was sent through pw. 2, but he has sworn that pw. 3 had entrusted him with Rs. 1,951.62 nP. for payment of electric charges for November 1957, that on the same day he went to the accused in the electricity office and paid him the amount and the accused in his presence initialled the receipt and handed over the same to him and he handed over the receipt Ext. P 1 to pw. 3. The receipt having been received in the Government Press, there can be no doubt that the money must have been handed over to the electricity office. It is not seriously disputed that the money had not been paid, but the, argument is that the evidence that it was paid to the accused and that it was he who actually issued Ext. P1 receipt cannot be believed. 4. It was argued that the cash book would show that on some days other cashiers in the office have made entries in the cash book, that this amount could as well have been received by one of the several cashiers in the office and that there is no sufficient proof to show that it was received by the accused and accused alone. pw. 2 has categorically stated that he has been going to the electricity office and paying the electric charges from the Government Press for the last six years and no questions have been asked to him whether he had on any one of these occasions paid the money to any other cashiers. If it had been brought out that on some other occasion Pw. 2 had handed over the electric charges to somebody other than the accused, it would have been open to the accused to contend that pw. 2 would not have remembered about this particular payment to the accused. pw. 2 has definitely stated that on that day he went to the accused and paid the amount and on receipt of the amount he took the receipt and in his presence he signed and dated the receipt Ext. 2 would not have remembered about this particular payment to the accused. pw. 2 has definitely stated that on that day he went to the accused and paid the amount and on receipt of the amount he took the receipt and in his presence he signed and dated the receipt Ext. P.1 and handed over the same to him and that he entrusted the same to the cashier of his office. It may be that pw. 2 may not be able to properly identity the signature or handwriting of the accused and he does not pretend to do so, but his case was that the receipt which he got had been initialled by the accused in his presence and handed over to him by the accused and accused alone. If really the money had been paid by him to any other person there is no reason why pw. 2 should have tried to fasten the guilt on the accused and tried to exonerate the really guilty person. Nothing had been suggested as to why pw. 2 should give false evidence. It was attempted to be argued that pw. 2 gives the money through the pigeon-hole and that pw. 2 would not have been able to identify the person who received the amount. All of us know that pigeon-holes are provided at the counters of cashiers of the banks and treasuries." The counter is not a closed wooden screen preventing the view of the cashier and that whoever pays the money to the. cashier will be able to see the person who receives the money. The courts below have concurrently accepted the truthfulness of the evidence of pw. 2. Sitting in revision I am bound by the concurrent findings unless the finding of fact is manifestly wrong and grossly and palpably unjust. I have scrutinised the evidence of pw. 2 and find no material to throw any the slightest doubt on the truth of his testimony. If, therefore, the evidence of pw. 2 is accepted then it follows that the accused was the person to whom this particular amount was entrusted and when admittedly he has failed to credit the amount in the accounts, criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts are clearly proved. 5. If, therefore, the evidence of pw. 2 is accepted then it follows that the accused was the person to whom this particular amount was entrusted and when admittedly he has failed to credit the amount in the accounts, criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts are clearly proved. 5. As stated already the defence has brought out from the evidence of pws.1, 5 & 9 that on some occasions other persons I have made entries in the cash book maintained by the accused, but it might be on occasions when the accused would have been absent from the office. Some entries on different dates had been pointed out to the witnesses to show that those entries are not in the handwriting of the accused, but it is significant that no questions were asked about the entries under date 8158. The prosecution evidence is that all the entries under date 8 158 are in the handwriting of the accused and there is no case for the defence that it is not in the handwriting of one and the same person. The accused has no case that he was absent from the office on that day. pws.1,5 &9 have attempted to prove the band-writing of the accused. The infirmities in their evidence have been pointed out and if the case had rested on their evidence alone there would have been something to be said for the accused, but when there is the clear evidence of pw. 2 which has been believed by the courts below it is futile to argue that the prosecution case is not proved. It would certainly have been better for the prosecution if they had got the disputed hand-writing examined by an expert or examined the other cashiers working in the office on that day to prove that the entries under date 811958 are not in the hand-writing of any one of them and that it is in the hand-writing of the accused. But that does not in any way affect the clear evidence of pw. 2 in proving that it was the accused who had received the money and committed breach of trust. Another circumstances that is brought out by the prosecution is the entry of having received a cheque No. 35/28 relating to the invoice and Ext. P.1 receipt under date 15 11958. This entry is marked as Ext. P3(b). 2 in proving that it was the accused who had received the money and committed breach of trust. Another circumstances that is brought out by the prosecution is the entry of having received a cheque No. 35/28 relating to the invoice and Ext. P.1 receipt under date 15 11958. This entry is marked as Ext. P3(b). It is proved to be in the hand-writing of the accused. This entry, if it is by the accused, would be a pointer to show that he had received money from the Government Press and failed to enter it in the cash register and he had intentionally made the bogus entry on 1511958 for the purpose of avoiding the misappropriation coming to the notice of the authorities. There is no case that any cheque had been received in the office. If the Government Press remittance is not seen received in the office there was possibility of a reminder being sent or the supply being cut off and it was to avoid the contingency that the false entry was made. Thus on a careful and anxious consideration of all this evidence I have no hesitation in holding that the offence has been clearly brought home to the accused. The conviction has only to be confirmed. 6. I may now deal with an argument raised by the learned counsel for the accused that in view of the acquittal of the accused for a similar offence in C. C, 202 of 1960 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's Court, Trivandrum the trial of this case is barred under the provisions of S.403 of the Criminal Procedure Code and even if technically the plea of autrefois acquit is not available the same principle should be applied and that it is extremely undesirable to make the accused to undergo the ordeal of a second trial for the same offence. What is argued is that 8.222 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, permitted the inclusion of a gross sum in respect of which the offence of criminal misappropriation has been committed within a period of one year, that as the prosecution could have preferred one consolidated charge in respect of the gross amount made up of several sums misappropriated by the accused, including the one which is the subject matter of the present charge it would be illegal to try the accused now for one of the items of misappropriation. S.403 Cr. P. C. as far as is relevant reads as follows: "(1) A person who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under S.236, or for which he might have been convicted under S.237. (2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under S.235 sub-section (1). X X X" The section itself thus recognises that where a person is so convicted or acquitted of any offence, he may afterwards be tried for any 'distinct offence' for which a separate charge might have been made against him in the former trial under S.235 sub-section (1). S.403 has no application to a case where the subsequent offence for which the accused was being tried did not form part of or had nothing to do with the offence for which he had already been tried, namely, where an accused person is alleged to have committed four distinct and separate acts of misappropriation for separate ascertained sums of money, it is open to the prosecution either to try three of them, if committed within the space of one year, at one trial and try the remaining charge at another trial or try each one of these charges separately. S.233 clearly lays down that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused of, there shall be a separate charge and that every such charge shall be tried separately. S.233 clearly lays down that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused of, there shall be a separate charge and that every such charge shall be tried separately. The principle of framing charges, is that unless otherwise indicated, every distinct offence should be subject matter of a separate charge and unless the case is covered by one or the other of the four sections quoted in S.233, there must necessarily be a separate trial in respect of each charge and that even in cases which fall within S.234, 235, 236, and 239, it would still be open to the prosecution to have these charges tried separately. The argument of the learned counsel is that S.222 (2) would imply that the prosecution is bound to charge the accused for the consolidated amount. The contention is clearly unsustainable for S.222 is only an enabling section and not a disabling one. It enables the prosecution, when they consider taking such a course as appropriate or convenient, or necessary, to put in a gross sum representing the total amount misappropriated by the accused, instead of framing a large number of separate charges in respect of small sums of money which go to make up the gross amount. Authority for this position may be had in the decisions in In re Osaman Ali (AIR. 1959 Andhra Pradesh 520); Kanakayya v. Emperor (AIR. 1930 Mad. 978) and Chintamanrao Balajirao v. Digram Badhuram (AIR. 1960 Madhya Pradesh 149). 7. In support of the contention raised by the learned counsel, reliance was sought to be placed on the decisions in Ramachandra Chetty v. State of Andhra (AIR. 1956 Andhra 102) & In re Godavarthy Bhashyakaracharyulu (AIR. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 164). In AIR. 1956 Andhra 102, the question of extending the principle underlying S.403 Cr. P. C., came up for decision. Reliance was placed in that decision to the case in Sidh Nath v. Emperor (AIR. 1929 Cal. 457). In that case it was laid down that it is not desirable that an accused should be tried as many times as he had committed offences when he could have been tried for all of them at one trial. This principle has been dissented from and overruled in the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case in Purnananda Das Gupta v. Emperor (AIR. 1939 Cal. This principle has been dissented from and overruled in the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case in Purnananda Das Gupta v. Emperor (AIR. 1939 Cal. 65), wherein their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court observed: "Mr. Roy when dealing with the particular case of Jiban Dhupi invited us to hold that in some way or other the principle laid down in S.403 could be extended and to give to Jiban Dhupi the benefit of the spirit underlying the provisions of that section rather than to apply the clear and precise words of the section itself. We are unable to take that view of the matter. We think the principles underlying the English Common law pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit have been embodied so far as this country is concerned within the limits, however narrow they may be or have been stated to be, of the language of the statute itself. In our view, it would be bewildering and indeed, might result in great injustice to the community at large were we to endeavour to stretch the language or extend the principles in the way we have been invited to do by Mr. Dinesh Ch. Roy. In the case in AIR. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 164 (cited supra) reliance was placed mainly on the decision in AIR. 1929 Cal. 457 (cited supra), which as stated already had been overruled. It is unfortunate that the later Full Bench decision was not brought to the notice of the learned judge who decided the case. In that case the accused who was an employee in a co-operative society was charged for misappropriation, falsification of accounts and forgery and was convicted. Earlier he had already been tried for a similar offence and convicted. The accused pleaded that on the analogy of S.403 Cr. P. C., he should be saved from the harassment of a second charge when the prosecution could have clubbed this charge along with the one where he was convicted. It was held that the plea of autrefois will not apply and that for the principle to have any bearing, there must have been a conviction in respect of the same offence and that it would be patent violation of the principle and a contravention of the terms of S.403 Cr. It was held that the plea of autrefois will not apply and that for the principle to have any bearing, there must have been a conviction in respect of the same offence and that it would be patent violation of the principle and a contravention of the terms of S.403 Cr. P. C., if the accused could ask for a relief on that principle because what he has been subsequently charged is for a different offence altogether. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the learned judge interfered under S.561-A and quashed the proceedings. 8. Here three separate charge sheets were filed in respect of three different items of misappropriation and falsification of accounts in respect of those items. One case was taken up and tried by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and on the facts of that case the accused was acquitted. The two other cases were then transferred to the Additional First Class Magistrate who tried the cases and convicted the accused. In the first place the accused could not have been tried for all these offences together in one trial because if it were done it would have been in direct contravention of S.234 Cr. P.C. S.403 bars a fresh trial for same offence or on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge might have been made under S.236 or for which he might have been convicted under S.237. Neither S.236 which deals with a case where there is a doubt as to which offence has been committed nor S.237 which enables the court to convict a person of an offence which he is shown to have committed although he was not charged with it would apply. The petitioner was not tried here for the same offence, but for a distinct offence as contemplated by sub-section (2) Vide the decision in Kunjilal v. The State of M. P. (AIR. 1955 SC. 280). No special circumstances have been urged at the hearing to show that this is a fit case in which the provisions of S.561 A should be invoked to prevent any abuse of the process of the court. There is, therefore, no merit in the objection raised. In the result the conviction and sentence are confirmed. The revision petition fails and it is dismissed. Dismissed.