JUDGMENT Desai, C.J. - This is an appeal from an order passed by the Company Judge on an application by the Official Liquidator made to him under rule 176 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. The facts giving rise to it are as follows. The appellant, a creditor of a company under liquidation, filed a claim before the Official Liquidator for a sum of Rs. 11,000 and odd, which included compound interest on the principal. His case was that he had advanced loans on various dates between 1950 and 1953 to the company. The Official Liquidator admitted the claim as regards the principal, rejected the claim for compound interest and calculated simple interest ; thus he rejected the claim as regards the balance of interest. He did not enter into the question whether the claim was ti Ynebarred or not. The appellant being dissatisfied with this decision of the Liquidator appealed under rule 164 to the Company Judge and the learned Judge dismissed the appeal. There was a further appeal to a Bench of this Court and it also was dismissed. Subsequently the Liquidator applied to the Company Judge for expunction of the proof of the appellant's claim, which had been admitted by him, under rule 176 on the ground that it had been improperly or mistakenly Admitted. The learned Judge entertained the application, held that the appellant's claim even for the principal and simple interest had been barred by time before he filed it before the Liquidator and expunged the proof of it. This is the order against which this appeal has been preferred. 2. Sri Shukla contended that the decision in the appeals filed by the appellant under rule 164 against the rejection of his claim for compound interest operates as res judicafa and it was not now open to the learned Judge to expunge the proof of the entire claim. He argued that the decision of the Liquidator admitting the claim as regards the principal and simple interest merged in the order passed by this Court in the appeals under rule 164 and that the learned Judge had no power to review the order passed by him previously. The argument is that the whole order passed by the Liquidator admitting the claim as regards the principal and simple interest merged in the order passed by the learned Judge rejecting the claim for compound interest. The argument is that the whole order passed by the Liquidator admitting the claim as regards the principal and simple interest merged in the order passed by the learned Judge rejecting the claim for compound interest. We see no substance in any of these contentions. The dispute raised on the Liquidator's application under rule 176 is in respect of the principal and simple interest and not in respect of compound interest whereas the dispute raised in the appeal under rule 164 (and the special appeal from the order passed in that appeal ) was confined to the appellant's claim for compound interest only. The question whether the admission of the claim in respect of the principal and simple interest by the Liquidator was improper or under a mistake did not arise in the appeal under rule 164 and neither the learned Judge, who disposed of the appeal, nor this Court which disposed of the special appeal, entered into that question and decided it. The appellant's claim for compound interest could be rejected on two grounds, one that he was entitled to simple and not compound interest and the other that the whole claim was barred by time. The Liquidator rejected it on the first ground and not on the second ground. It is true that when he admitted the other claim (i.e., in respect of the principal and simple interest) it meant that that part was not barred by time but actually he rejected the former on the ground that the appellant was not entitled to compound interest. In the appeal under rule 164 and in the further appeal from the order passed in that appeal the only question before this Court was whether the appellant was entitled to cempourd interest or not. This Court could have dismissed the appeal without deciding that question on the ground that the whole claim was barred by time but was not bound to do so and could dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appellant was not entitled to compound interest. Its finding that he was not entitled to compound interest is not inconsistent with the finding now given by the learned Judge that the whole claim was barred by time. When a case can be dismissed on two grounds, its dismissal on one ground does not operate as res judicata in respect of the other ground. Its finding that he was not entitled to compound interest is not inconsistent with the finding now given by the learned Judge that the whole claim was barred by time. When a case can be dismissed on two grounds, its dismissal on one ground does not operate as res judicata in respect of the other ground. Therefore, the decisions of this Court in the appeals under rule 164 did not involve a decision that the appellant's claim was not barred by time and, therefore, there was no question of those decisions operating as res judicata in the present proceedings under rule 176, where the only question is whether the claim was barred by time or not. As regards the liquidators finding that the claim was not barred by time, rule 176 itself allowed him to raise the matter through an application to the Company Judge. The rule lays down that after the claim has been admitted he can move the Company Judge for expunction of the proof on the ground that the admission was improper or under a mistake. Consequently, there was no question of his being estopped by his finding that the appellant was entitled to the principal and simple interest from making an application under rule 176. 3. Sri Shukla referred us to Badri Narayan v. Kamdeo Prasadl,(1962) 1 S.C.J.63:(1962) 1 M.L.J.39:(1962)1 An.W.R.39:A.I.R.1962 S.C.338. in which Raghubar Dayal, J., observed at page 341 that : "The general principles of res judicata..........rest on the principle that a judgment is conclusive regarding the points decided between the same parties and that the parties should not be vexed twice over for the same cause ", 4. but they are not applicable to the facts of the instant case because the points decided in the appeals under rule 164 are different from the points that arose in the application under rule 176 ; the appeals related to the claim that was rejected whereas the application under rule 176 relates to the claim that was admitted. The decision in the appeals was not, and did not involve a finding, that the claim was not barred by time. Therefore, it cannot be said that the question that arises now has been decided earlier. Sri Shukla also referred us to Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co., (1956) 2 S.C.J.230: A.I.R.1963.S.C.1124. The decision in the appeals was not, and did not involve a finding, that the claim was not barred by time. Therefore, it cannot be said that the question that arises now has been decided earlier. Sri Shukla also referred us to Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co., (1956) 2 S.C.J.230: A.I.R.1963.S.C.1124. where it was observed by Wanchoo, J., at page 1126 that : "when once an order of the original authority is taken in appeal to the appellate authority.... it is the order of the latter authority which is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of ; and as the High Court cannot issue a writ against the appellate authority..........it would not be open to it to issue a writ to the original authority.......... 5. These observations were made in connection with the question of a High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against an order of a trial Court ; the Supreme Court held that if trial Court's order merges in the appellate Court's order it is the latter that is operative and that it is no use quashing by certiorari the former. No such question arises in the instant case. The admission of a part of the appellants claim by the Liquidator has been quashed by the learned Judge through the order under appeal but that part had never merged in any order of the Court. The appeals under rule 164 were in respect of the other part of the claim that had been rejected by the Liquidator and not in respect of the part that had been admitted by him. If the doctrine of merger applied at all it applied in this way that the order of the Liquidator rejecting the appellant's claim for compound interest merged in the orders of this Court passed in the appeals but in the present proceeding under rule 176 the Liquidator does not want the quashing of those orders or even any alteration in them. The orders passed by this Court in the appeals under rule 164 were in his favour and not in the appellant's favour ; under them the appellant's claim for compound interest remained rejected. Rejecting his other claim on the ground that it was barred by time does not involve any conflict with the orders passed by this Court in the appeals or any alterations in them. Rejecting his other claim on the ground that it was barred by time does not involve any conflict with the orders passed by this Court in the appeals or any alterations in them. There is no force in the contention that the entire order passed by the Liquidator in respect of the appellant's claim merged in the orders passed by this Court in the appeals under rule 164. Even if it were so the appellant would gain nothing because the orders passed by this Court in the appeals do not say anything about the-principal and simple interest. 6. In a winding up by the Court the Liquidator is required to file in Court a certificate in the prescribed form and the proofs with the memorandum of admission or rejection of the same in whole or in part as the case may be. The list as certified by him and filed in Court cannot be added to or varied except under orders of Court and in accordance with such order, vide rule 168. On the certificate being filed the Registrar of the Court is to notify the filing thereof on the Court notice board and the certificate, the list of creditors and the proof are open to inspection by every creditor or contributory on payment of a fee. On a date fixed by the Court and the notice of which is posted on the notice board the Court is required by rule 172 to consider the list of creditors and the affidavit verifying the same filed by the Liquidator. It may allow such of the debts and claims as in its opinion do not require further proof and require further proof of other debts and claims. It is required to fix a date for the adjudication of the claims which are to be proved and a notice of the date is to be given to the creditors concerned by the Liquidator. He is also required to give notice to the other creditors of the admission of their claims. Rule 174 lays down that on the date fixed or on any adjourned date the Court shall after hearing such evidence as may be tendered adjudicate upon the claims and settle the list of creditors and that the settlement shall be recorded in a certificate signed by the Judge in the prescribed form. Rule 174 lays down that on the date fixed or on any adjourned date the Court shall after hearing such evidence as may be tendered adjudicate upon the claims and settle the list of creditors and that the settlement shall be recorded in a certificate signed by the Judge in the prescribed form. Rule 175 is to the effect that the list of creditors as settled and the proofs filed shall be open to the inspection of every creditor and contributory on payment of the fee. Then comes rule 176, which is in the following words : "(1) If after the admission of a proof, the Liquidator has reason to think that the proof has been improperly admitted or admitted by a mistake, he may apply to the Court upon notice to the creditor who made the proof, to expunge the proof or reduce its amount, as the case may be. (2) Any creditor or contributory may also apply to the Court to expunge a proof or reduce the amount thereof, if the Liquidator declines to move in the matter, and on such application, the Court may pass such orders as it may think just." 7. The right of a Liquidator to apply for expunction of a proof conferred by the above provision arises on the admission of the proof and is not restricted by any condition. The only condition required for the Liquidator's applying for expunction of a proof is that it has been admitted ; there is no provision laying down any other limit, as that of time within which he must apply. There is nothing in this rule or in any other rule suggesting that on the happening of a certain event his right to apply under this rule lapses or is extinguished. His right is similar to that of a creditor or a contributors right, and determines on the happening of a certain event. Under rule 175 every creditor and contributory is entitled to inspect the list of creditors as settled by the Court under rule 174 and the proofs and this right must have been conferred upon them for a certain object ; that object cannot be other than that he can apply for expunction of a proof or reduction in the amount under rule 176 (2). The juxtaposition of the rule conferring the right upon him and the rule giving him the right to apply for expunction of a proof or reduction of the amount shows that there is connection between the two. It follows that even though a list of creditors has been settled by the Court under rule 174 it is open to it on an application by a creditor or contributory to expunge a proof or to reduce its amount. As the Liquidator's right is exactly the same as that of a creditor or contributory a proof can be expunged at his instance even if the list has been settled under rule 175. Actually he has a stronger right than a creditor or contributory because the latters right is dependent upon his refusal to exercise his own right. If a creditor or contributory has a right it necessarily follows that the Liquidator also has a right. After all, a proof is expunged or an amount is reduced only on the Court's being satisfied that the proof was admitted improperly or by a mistake; there is no justification for retention of a proof improperly admitted or admitted by a mistake. It is because of the provision in rule 168 that the list as certified by the Liquidator cannot be added to or varied except under orders of Court, so there is provision in rule 176 for the Court's expunging a proof or reducing an amount. An order passed by the Court under rule 176 is an order contemplated by rule 168. It is not the fact in this case that the learned Judge called upon the appellant under rule 172 to produce further proof of his claim and that he adjudicated upon it under rule 174 and accepted it. It is, therefore, not possible to contend that the order passed by him under rule 176 conflicts with his own earlier order passed under rule 174. Even if the law does not contemplate that after an adjudication upon a claim under rule 174 the Court can pass a contrary order under rule 176, the facts in the instant case are different because the learned Judge never adjudicated upon this part of the appellant's claim under rule 174. Even if the law does not contemplate that after an adjudication upon a claim under rule 174 the Court can pass a contrary order under rule 176, the facts in the instant case are different because the learned Judge never adjudicated upon this part of the appellant's claim under rule 174. It sccros that while scrutinising the list filed by the Liquidator under rule 172 he did rot consider it necessary to require further proof from him in respect of the admitted part of the claim and therefore there was no occasion for him to adjudicate upon it. So the order passed by him under rule 176 does not conflict with any adjudication made by him under rule 164. 8. The view that we take is in conformity with Ex parte Harper, In re Tail, (1882) L.R.21 Ch.D.P.537, in which it was held that a proof admitted by a trustee in bankruptcy against the estate was liable to be expunged by the Court on the ground that it was wrongly admitted, at any time at the instance of the trustee, both according to rule 73 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, and the previous practice. 9. Coming to the merits, there is nothing wrong with the finding of the learned Judge that the appellant's claim was barred by time. No argument was advanced by Sri Shukla showing that the view taken by the learned Judge was wrong. 10. In the result we dismiss the appeal summarily.