JUDGMENT M.C. Desai, J. - The appellant filed a suit for ejectment of the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 under Section 183 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. Along with the U. P. Tenancy Act there was then in force the U. P. Agricultural Tenants Acquisition of Privileges (Amendment) and Misc. Provisions Act No. 7 of 1950 which provided that a suit under Section 175 of the U. P. Tenancy Act should re main stayed so long as the Act remained in force. The appellant was a sub-tenant and if the suit instituted by him against the respondent had been decreed and he was re stored to possession he would have at once become liable to be ejected under Section 175 but the suit for his ejectment, if filed, would have remained stayed under the provisions of the Acquisition of Privileges Act. Section 183 was subject to the proviso that no decree for possession could be passed where the plaintiff at the dime of the passing of the decree "liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of this Act within the current agricultural year." So the question arose in the appellant's suit whether he was liable to ejectment in accordance with the I provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act and his reply was that on account of the provisions of the Acquisition of Privileges Act he was not, since a suit under Section 175 brought for his ejectment would have been stayed during the enforcement of the Act. This reply was rejected by the Additional Commissioner, who held that the proviso to Section 183 applied because under the provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act he was liable to ejectment within the current agricultural year even though the suit for his ejectment would have remained stayed on account of the provisions of another Act. An appeal by the appellant from the Additional Commissioner's decision to the Board of Revenue failed because the two members differed from each other. 2. The question before the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue was whether the appellant was liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act or not and admittedly he was so liable because of Section 175 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. 2. The question before the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue was whether the appellant was liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act or not and admittedly he was so liable because of Section 175 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. It was on account of the provisions of another Act that a suit brought against him would have been stayed but it does not mean that he was not liable to ejectment at all under the U. P. Tenancy Act. The words "in accordance with the provisions of this Act" were riot superfluous or meaningless and full effect can be given to them only by saying that what the proviso required was liability to ejectment under the provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act and that if there was such a liability, it was enough. If there was such a liability it did not matter if under some other law that liability could not be enforced for some time. In order to determine whether such a liability existed or not the provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act only had to .be considered and if it arose under them nothing more was required to be considered. Further the Acquisition of Privileges Act did not take away the liability that existed under Section 175; on the other hand Section 10 of it, by requiring the suit to be stayed, recognised the existence of it. A suit under Section 175 could have been filed only if there was a liability to ejectment and the filing of a suit meant the existence of a liability. whether the liability could be enforced or not was an entirely different question; Section 10 of the Acquisition of Privileges Act only affected the enforcement of the liability by laying down that the suit to enforce it was to remain stayed. The provision that the suit was to remain stayed did not mean that the liability did not exist and that the proviso to Section 183 was not attracted. Moreover, the suit was to remain stayed only during the enforcement of the Acquisition of Privileges Act. There was nothing in its provisions to indicate that it was to remain in force luring the agricultural year in which the appellant's suit under Sec, 183 was instituted. Moreover, the suit was to remain stayed only during the enforcement of the Acquisition of Privileges Act. There was nothing in its provisions to indicate that it was to remain in force luring the agricultural year in which the appellant's suit under Sec, 183 was instituted. For all that was known when the question arose whether the Section 183 suit should be decreed or not was that the Act could be repealed before the end of the agricultural year and there would have been no ban on the passing of a decree it is a suit under Section 175 before the end of the agricultural year and the Section 183 suit could be decreed. Merely on account of the provision staying a suit under Section 175 for a period, which might end at any time, it could not be said that it could not be decreed within the agricultural year in which the suit under Section 183 had been instituted. The Additional Commissioner was right in holding that the proviso applied and that consequently the appellant could not get a decree in the suit under Section 183. 3. In any case the view taken by the Additional Commissioner cannot be said to be so manifestly wrong that it should be set aside by certiorari. If the appellant is aggrieved by the decision his remedy is to file an appeal to the Supreme Court with special leave. The Additional Commissioner passed the order within his jurisdiction and this Court is powerless to interfere with it even though it might consider erroneous. 4. The dismissal by the Board of the appeal from the judgment of the Additional Commissioner was correct in accordance with the rules governing it; when the members differed from each other the appeal was required to be dismissed. Even if they had dismissed it on merits there would have been no case for quashing their judgment by certiorari. 5. The special appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily.