JUDGMENT Ganjedragadkur. C.J.I.- l. This appeal by special leaves raises a short question about the correctness or propriety of the finding made by the High Court of Madhya Pradash in second appeal in respect of the claim made by appellant Deity Shri Radhakrishan, Jawahar Ganj, that it was entitled to evict the respondent the shop of Ramlal Brijlal on the ground that the premises lot out needed to the repaired and the said repairs could not be carried out without evicting the respondent, the litigation from which this appeal arises had had a somewhat protracted carreer. The appellant first applied to the Rent Controller under the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 for permission to give notice to the respondent for determining the lease in its favour. The respondent has been a tenant under the appellant in respect of a portion of the bulding bearing municipal number 761 in Lord Ganj, Jabalpur. The application made by the appellant for permission to serve notice on the respondent was allowed by the Rent Controller after he examined the merits of the contentionst raised before him. The respondent then preferred an appeal against the Rent Controller's order before the Deputy Commissioner, this appeal was dismissed. The appellant then served a notice on the respondent on April 6, 1956, calling upon him to vacate the premises by April 30, 1956, Since the respondent did not comly with this notice the present suit was filed by the appellant before the Civil Judge, Second Class, Jabalpur. In this suit it claimed a decree for ejectment and a money decree for Rs, 105/- which was the amount of rent fallen in arrears. The respondent resisted this claim on several grounds. It was urged that the suit was not properly framed, that the notice was invalid and some other pleas also were taken. The trial Judge held that the appellant was not entitled to get a decree for ejectment against the respondent and so that part of the suit was rejected. The trial Court found that the respondent was in arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 105/- but in view of the fact that the suit as it was framed was, according to the trial Court incompetent, a decree for Rs. 105/- was also not passed in favour of the appellant. 2. The trial Court found that the respondent was in arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 105/- but in view of the fact that the suit as it was framed was, according to the trial Court incompetent, a decree for Rs. 105/- was also not passed in favour of the appellant. 2. The appellant challenged this decree by preferring an appeal the appellant succeeded with the result that a decree was passed directing the respondent to deliver to the appellant vacant possession of the suit permises within a month from the date of the decree and to pay the appellant Rs. 105/- by way of an ears of rent. 3. The respondent then went in second appeal before the High Court. Meanwhile Act 23 of 1955 (The Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 23 of 1955) had been extended to the area and the High Court took the view that S 17 of the Act applied to the present proceedings. The lower appellate Court, while it passed a decree in favour of the appellant had taken a contrary view. Having held that the suit had to be tried in the light of the material provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Act 23 of 1955 the High Court delivered an interlocutary judgment and remanded the case to the trial Court. By interlocutary judgment parties were allowed to put in additional pleas, and the trial judge was required to permit the parties to lead evidence in support of the additional please and make his finding on the issues arising from them. 4. When the matter was thus remanded to the trial Court the appellant amended its plaint by the amendment the appellant made a claim for evicting the respondent under S. 4(1) and 4(m) of the Act. In support of its claim under S. 4(m) the appellant alleged that the entire house including the block occupied by the respondent was too old and in a dilapidated condition. The appellant further alleged that it required' major repairs which could not be done without evicting the tenants. Incidentally the plaint recited the fact that the other tenant, viz., Agarwal Hosiery Shop which occupied the adjoining block had already been ordered by the Civil Court in a suit between the appellant and the said tenant to vacate that block. The appellant further alleged that it required' major repairs which could not be done without evicting the tenants. Incidentally the plaint recited the fact that the other tenant, viz., Agarwal Hosiery Shop which occupied the adjoining block had already been ordered by the Civil Court in a suit between the appellant and the said tenant to vacate that block. In regard to its claim under S. 4(1) the appellant pleaded that the respondent had recently built a new palatial building in the same locality but instead of keeping it for himself he had let it out to another tenant at an exorbitant rent. The allegations thus made by the appellant by its amended pleading were denied by the respondent. It was alleged on his behalf that the suit house was not in a dilapidated condition and he called upon the appellant to specify the particular repairs which the appellant wanted to make. The pleas made under S. 4(1) was also disputed. 5. The learned Judge then recorded the evidence led by the parties in support of these pleas. He found that the claim made by the appellant under S.4 (1) could not be sustained. In regard to the appellant's claim under S. 4(1), however the learned Judge found in favour of the appellant. This finding was then submitted by him to the High Court. The High Court considered the evidence for itself and ultimately came to the conclusion that the finding recorded by the trial Court was erroneous and so it found that the appellant was, not justified in claiming the eviction of the respondent under S.4(m) of the Act. That is how the appeal preferred by the respondent before the High Court has been allowed and the appellant's suit for ejectment has been dismissed. While dismissing the appellants suit for ejectment the High Court has confirmed the decree passed by the lower appellate Court by which the respondent has been directed to pay Rs. 105 to the appellant by way of arrears of rent. It is against this decree that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave and the only point which arises for our decision is whether the High Court was right in corning to the conclusion that the appellant had failed to take out a case for the eviction of the respondent under S. 4(m) of the Act. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. Andley, for the appellant, attempted to argue that the High Court was in error in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, and in support of this plea Mr. Andley wanted to rely on the provisions of S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We are not impressed by this argument. It is true that when the High Court remanded the case to the trial Court by its interlocutory judgment it would have been more appropriate if the High Court had directed that the finding which the trial• Court would record after taking additional evidence should be submitted to the High Court through the first appellate Court. That is the course which is usually adopted in such cases. If that course had been adopted shen the finding of the trial Court would have been examined by the first appellate Court and it is the finding recorded by the first appellate Court which would have bound the parties under S. 100 of the Code. Since the High Court directed the learned trial Judge to forward his findings straight to the High Court we do not think it would be legitimate to hold that the principle of S. 100 would apply to such a case. The High Court was in substance dealing with the correctness of the said finding at the appellate stage for the first time and so the bar of S. 100 cannot be pleaded in respect of the course adopted by the High Court. 7. Mr. Andley then contended that the finding made by the High Court is patently erroneous. He has accordingly taken us through the whole of the evidence adduced by the parties on this point. The appellant has examined two witnesses Mishrilal and Rammurthi Sharma. Mishri Lal is the Managing Trustee of the appellant Trust. He swore that the house in suit was in a very dangerous condition. The suit house, according to him, is more than 100 years old. It had been shown to the engineer. The walls of the house stood depressed and the wooden pillars fixed in the verandah were decayed. This witness, however, stated that the roof of the house and the floor of the temple house had been decayed and that there were pits in the floor from which water dropped down. Above the shop which is occupied by the respondent stands the temple. This witness, however, stated that the roof of the house and the floor of the temple house had been decayed and that there were pits in the floor from which water dropped down. Above the shop which is occupied by the respondent stands the temple. Mishri Lal also swore that Agarwal Hosiery Shop who was a tenant of the adjoining block had been sued for ejectment and a decree had been passed in that behalf. In support of his case that the house needed repairs Mishri Lal produced (Ex. P-7), which is a letter of permission written by the Corporation sanctioning the repairs in question. 8. This evidence is materially supported by the evidence of Sharma who is an Overseer. M. E. S. Sharma stated that the house was about 100 years old, the condition of the roof, according to him was very bad, several wooden beams of the roof were lying hollow. The pillars of the Verandah had already moved from their place and the roof of the house was bent. According to him the house could fall any time. He stated categorically that the repairs of the house could not be done while the tenant was occupying it. In cross-examination Sharma stated that he had not seen the rooms of the suit house occupied by the respondent from in side because they were locked. It was also put to him whether plastering would afford enough protection, and he stated that plastering would not do any good because the house had already become very old and it shall have to be extensively, repaired. 9. The respondent himself gave evidence, and he stated that the floor below was very good and that the roof of the house was still in good condition. He, however, admitted that the two pillars i.e. to say the wooden pillars of the Verandah had decayed and the roof below the tin had decayed. In cross examination he further admitted that he had not gone Inside the temple for the last five or seven years and so he could not say what the condition of the temple building was. According to him the house was about 60 or 70 years old. On behalf of the respondent Indrajit also gave evidence. He said that he took contract for constructing houses in M. E. S. Jabalpur. According to him the house was about 60 or 70 years old. On behalf of the respondent Indrajit also gave evidence. He said that he took contract for constructing houses in M. E. S. Jabalpur. According to him the walls of the room of the house in suit were very strong and the floor of the room was in good condition. "There is ceiling also to the roof of the room", the witness said, and so he could not see the condition of the roof. It is on this evidence that the question as to whether the appellant has proved its case under S. 4, (m) has to be tested. 10. Section 4(m) provides that a suit can be filed by a landlord in a civil Court against a tanat for his eviction from the accommodation to which the Act applies if it is shown that the accommodation has become unsuitable or unsafe for human residence or it is required for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the eviction of the tenant. It is the latter part of S. 4 (m) with which we are concerned. Mr. Gupta, for the respondent, cotended before us that what S. 4 (m) provides is that the landlord can evict his tanant only if repairs are required to be made and they are of such a character that they cannot be carried out without the eviction of the tenant. According to Mr. Gupta S. 4(m) does not take in cases of reconstruction. We do not propose to decide this point in the present case. It may be that extensive repairs may, from a certain point of view, be loosely described as reconstruction; but what S. 4 (m) specifically provides is permission to the landlord to make repairs to the premises and he can evict his tenant if he shows that the repairs are genuinely required to be made and cannot be made without the eviction of the tenant. Therefore, the only question which falls for our decision is whether the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the repairs which were needed to be made in the suit premises could be carried out without the eviction of the tenant. 11. Therefore, the only question which falls for our decision is whether the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the repairs which were needed to be made in the suit premises could be carried out without the eviction of the tenant. 11. The High Court was apparently impressed by the fact that the plan of the repairs which had been sanctioned by the corporation did not appear to justify the appellants' claim. The High Court says that "the disputed shop is nut in such a dilapidated condition as to require it being pulled down or being rebuilt and that is clear from the plaintiff's own map sanctioned by the corporation which discloses the proposed constructions". We have ourselves looked at this map and it does appear that the repairs indicated in the map generally and by particular reference to the suit premises and the roof above them are of an extensive character. The High Court then examined oral evidence and thought that the evidence led on behalf of the appellant was rather vague. We had ourselves read the whole of the evidence and we do not see how the High Court fell justified in criticising the evidence or the appellant and its witnesses as vague. The High Court then found that it is no doubt true that there is some evidence to show that the floor of the upper storey above the disputed shop is in a bed way; and it thought that the said finding only meant that new floor has to be provided in the upper storey without demolishing the disputed shop. According to the High Court this could be done without ejecting the respondent. We are unable to see the logics or the reasonableness of this conclusion. Having actually considered the evidence led by both the parties are satisfied that the trial Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the suit premises needed repairs very badly and the repairs were of such a character as could not be carried out without the eviction of the respondent. In this connection it is signiticant that S. 19 (2) of the Act provides ample protection to the tenant in a case or this kind. This is not a case where the appellant is seeking to evict the respondent for the purpose of letting out the premises on a higher rent. In this connection it is signiticant that S. 19 (2) of the Act provides ample protection to the tenant in a case or this kind. This is not a case where the appellant is seeking to evict the respondent for the purpose of letting out the premises on a higher rent. Right up from the time when the appellant appelied to the Rent Controller its case consistently has been that the suit house is an old house and needs to be repaired. In fact on the first floor of the suit house is the temple and it is apprehended by the appellant that if the repairs are not immediately made even the temple and the visitors to the temple would be facing jeopardy. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court, was in error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had not made out a case under S. 4(m) or the Act. 12. Mr. Gupta no doubt strenuously attempted to argue that there were other points on which the respondent was entitled to succeed. He urged that the notice to quit which the appellant had served on the respondent was not a valid notice. It appears that the suit as it was originally framed showed the plaintiff as Temple Shri Radhakrishana and this frame of the suit met with the plea of the respondent that the plaintiff as described in the plaint was incompetent to bring the suit. Then an amendment was allowed to be made and the word deity was added. The High Court has held and rightly we think, that after the amendment no contention can be made about the incompetence of the plaint. Mr. Gupta raises the technical argument that even though the amendment may have been allowed to be made the description of the plaintiff under the amended plaint would not exactly correspond with the description of the party which gave notice prior to the institution of the suit. Apart from the fact that this argument is purely technical we do not think we would be justified in entertaining his argument at this state. It does appear that the Manager of the Temple was satisfied that repairs had to be made, and since we have accepted the findings of the trial Court that a case for evicting the respondent is made out under S. 4(m) we see no justification for allowing Mr. It does appear that the Manager of the Temple was satisfied that repairs had to be made, and since we have accepted the findings of the trial Court that a case for evicting the respondent is made out under S. 4(m) we see no justification for allowing Mr. Gupta to raise such a technical point before us at this stage. 13. The result is the appeal must be allowed, the decree passed by the High Court set aside and that of the Appellate Court restored. Parties to bear their own costs.