Judgment :- 1. This is an application under S.3 of the Contempt of Courts Act - Central Act XXXII of 1952 - against the four respondents. First respondent being the writer of the impugned publication; the second respondent the Managing Editor; the third respondent the Chief Editor; and the fourth respondent the Printer and Publisher of the Malayalam daily newspaper'Malayali'. 2. In the issue of the paper dated 19th April, 1963 there appeared a publication under the heading ""IRD Ex. P-1 is the copy of the said publication. Kunchacko referred to therein is admitted to be the first respondent. 3. The facts leading up to the publication are as follows: The first respondent was served with a notice by the District Collector as Tax Recovery Officer, Alleppey calling upon him to appear and show cause why he should not be committed to civil prison in execution of the certificates for recovery of the arrears of income-tax. The first respondent then filed O.P. 819 of 1963 before the High Court praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ or direction to quash the notice marked Ex. R-1. The District Collector as Tax Recovery Officer was made a party to the original petition. There was also an application for interim injunction and an interim order was passed on 15th April 1963. When the case was thus pending in court, the first respondent who was the petitioner in the original petition made this publication making various allegations against the Collector and imputing personal spite and malice in the action taken by him. The Advocate General has moved this court for action to be taken against the respondents. It is stated that the impugned publication during the pendency of the original petition is calculated to prejudice the mind of the court against the District Collector and is likely to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the legal process of the court. It is further stated that this article would amount to scandalising the District Collector who as the Tax Recovery Officer conducting proceedings for the recovery of the tax is a court and a court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of initiating proceedings by way of contempt. 4. It is further stated that this article would amount to scandalising the District Collector who as the Tax Recovery Officer conducting proceedings for the recovery of the tax is a court and a court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of initiating proceedings by way of contempt. 4. In the counter filed by the first respondent it is contended that the District Collector in his capacity as Tax Recovery Officer is not a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of S.3(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act and it is also stated that in publishing the article there was no attempt to prejudice the court against the Tax Recovery Officer or to interfere or hamper with the administration of justice. The first respondent has, however, filed a statement expressing regret and tendering an unconditional apology for having made the publication. Respondents 2 to 4 also appeared in court and on their behalf their advocate has filed a statement tendering an unconditional apology. 5. The first question that we have to decide is whether the publication amounts to contempt. Now, it is well settled that abusing and vilifying parties to a pending proceeding in relation to the proceeding, amounts to contempt. In this connection we might refer to the dictum of Lord Hardwicke in Re Read and Huggonson (1742) 2 Atk. 469 where it was observed as follows: "Nothing is more incumbent upon courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented; nor is there anything of more pernicious consequence, than to prejudice the minds of the public against persons concerned as parties in the causes, before the cause is finally heard ... There may be...a contempt of this court in abusing parties who are concerned in causes here ...there cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters." 6. To the same effect is the decision in In re The William Thomas Shipping Co. (1930) 2 Ch. To the same effect is the decision in In re The William Thomas Shipping Co. (1930) 2 Ch. 368, where it was held that the publication of injurious misrepresentations concerning parties to proceedings, in relation to those proceedings, may amount to contempt of court, because it may cause those parties to discontinue or to compromise and because it may deter persons with good causes of action from coming to the court and it is thus likely to affect the course of justice. 7. In the decision in Demibai Gengji v. Rowji AIR. 1937 Bombay 305 at p. 306 Wadia, J., said: "Another proposition which has been well established is that all proceedings in suits pending in a court of justice are privileged, and any comment on the subject matter of the suit, and any abuse of the parties or holding them up to ridicule and contempt in the eyes of the public whilst the suit is pending are not allowed. - In my opinion, it would be simply disastrous for the due and proper administration of justice, if when a suit is still pending investigation in a court of law, that investigation was to be taken out of the hands of the court and practically left to the press. The object of proceedings in contempt is not so much to vindicate the dignity of the court or the person of the judge, as to ensure that every litigant in a court of justice has a fair and unprejudicial hearing at the trial on the merits of his case." 8. These decisions have been followed in the Division Bench ruling of this court in Damodaran v. Induchoodan 1960 KLJ.1140, where it was held that the law of contempt guards a party to the litigation against being misrepresented provided the misrepresentation be of the party in relation to the proceedings. 9. The fact that the writer did not desire or intend to prejudice the case is immaterial (except as to the extent of his punishment), if the court is satisfied that such was the obvious and necessary result of his words. If the publication is of such a nature calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice the person who published, will be guilty of contempt whatever be his intention in publishing the same. If the publication is of such a nature calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice the person who published, will be guilty of contempt whatever be his intention in publishing the same. It would, therefore, be contempt of court to publish in papers during the pendency of a case, matters derogatory to the parties which must necessarily prevent them from obtaining a fair trial of the action. It is no defence to a charge of contempt that the offensive article never reached the eyes of the court or that the court was not prevented from performing its duties fairly and properly or that the respondent had no disrespectful or contemptuous design of reflecting upon the dignity of the court, or that the respondent did not know the nature of the publication or that the articles published during the trial were true, and impartial statements of news and facts, or that they were published without intent to injure the parties or interfere with the administration of justice. 10. Judged in the light of these well settled principles we feel no doubt that the complaint against the respondents of abusing a litigant to a pending litigation in connection with the proceeding which is sub judice amounts to contempt of court. Having filed the writ petition challenging the proceedings of the District Collector as Tax Recovery Officer and inviting a decision on the matter, the first respondent cannot and ought not to have written and got the letter Ex. P-1 printed and published in the paper. The publication would, therefore, clearly amount to contempt of court. As the publication of the letter by respondent 1 constitutes contempt of court, respondents 2 to 4 who were in charge of the paper and responsible for the publication must be deemed to share the contempt. The press with all its freedom of expression must realise that it carries with it the responsibility of observing rules of law and should not by their action injure the cause of a party in a pending litigation by such publication and if they do so they would be guilty of contempt. In the view that we take, it is unnecessary to consider the further question whether the Collector as the Tax Recovery Officer under the Indian Income-tax Act would be a court subordinate to this court. 11. In the view that we take, it is unnecessary to consider the further question whether the Collector as the Tax Recovery Officer under the Indian Income-tax Act would be a court subordinate to this court. 11. The only question that remains is as to what action we must take against the respondents. The respondents have filed statements expressing regret and have tendered unconditional apology for their thoughtless conduct. It is true that apology should not be an empty formality made with a view to avoid or avert the consequences. But learned counsel appearing for the respondents have assured us that the apology tendered by the respondents is really an expression of genuine contrition and it is submitted that interests of justice do not call for any further action being taken against them. On a careful consideration of the matter we accept the apology and the assurance given by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents and in the hope that this may serve as a lesson to the respondents, we refrain from passing any sentence on them, even though we hold that they are guilty of contempt. There will be no order as to costs.