Judgment.- The third defendant, who had obtained a release of the rights of defendant’s 1, 2 and 4, is the appellant in the Second Appeal, which relates to three items of properties, originally situated in Arni Jagir which had been taken over under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act. One Sevugan Chettiar purchased these properties from defendants 1 to 4 under a sale-deed, Exhibit A-1 of the year 1928. In respect of these properties, there was some litigation, and, in pursuance of a decree for possession, Sevugan Chettiar took possession on 14th April, 1945, as evidenced by Exhibit A-6, Delivery Receipt. This Sevugan Chettiar sold the suit properties to the plaintiff under Exhibits A-7 on 24th January, 1957, who has filed the suit on 15th April, 1957, for declaration of title and for possession of the properties. The last date for filing of the suit would be 14th April, 1957, but that happened to be a Sunday, and it was, therefore, filed on the next day, i.e., on 15th April, 1957. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to all the facts of the case, as only two points were urged in the Second Appeal: (i) the effect of the combined operation of section 4 and section 28 of the Limitation Act and (2) the scope of section 64-C of the Estates Abolition Act. I shall first deal with the second point. After the Jagir was taken over, defendants 1 to 4 applied for patta, and patta was granted to the third defendant by the Settlement Officer. Mr. Vedantachari, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that, by reason of section 64-C of Madras Act XXVI of 1948, which provision was added by section 25 of Madras Act XLIV of 1956, the order that was passed by the Settlement Officer issuing patta in favour of the third defendant had become final and was not liable to be questioned in any Court of Law. The relevant rule made by the Government is by notification dated 17th October, 1955, conferring jurisdiction upon the Assistant Settlement Officer and the revisional authority, for issuing of patta under section 11. The relevant rule made by the Government is by notification dated 17th October, 1955, conferring jurisdiction upon the Assistant Settlement Officer and the revisional authority, for issuing of patta under section 11. Learned Counsel contends that the decisions of this Court, which has taken the view that, either before or after the repeal of section 56 in Act XXVI of 1948, the issue of patta, would not take away the jurisdiction of a civil Court to adjudicate upon competing titles, have not considered the scope of section 64-C. There is no substance in this contention. The principles laid down in the decisions of this Court in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan1, and Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar2, would clearly govern despite section 64-C. It is unnecessary to discuss those cases in detail, as the principle enunciated in those decisions is clear, i.e., only when the Revenue Authorities can grant a particular relief that their decisions would become final to that limited extent. But if the Revenue Authorities cannot grant a particular relief, namely, relief of possession and declaration of title or relief of injunction, the orders passed or the decisions rendered by the authorities concerned under section 64-C of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 cannot operate as a bar to the civil Court entertaining the suit and adjudicating upon such disputed questions which are out of the purview of the authorities functioning under the Act. If before the repeal of section 56, the position was that a party was entitled to file a suit for adjudication of his title, for possession and for injunction despite any order passed by the authorities under the Act, I do not see why section 64-G should have any higher operation than section 56, which also contained a similar provision. It is sufficient to refer to the following observations of the learned Judge (Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was) at page 200 in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan1: " In the instant case the relief claimed is one of possession. Neither the Settlement Officer nor the Tribunal has any jurisdiction to grant such a relief. It is sufficient to refer to the following observations of the learned Judge (Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was) at page 200 in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan1: " In the instant case the relief claimed is one of possession. Neither the Settlement Officer nor the Tribunal has any jurisdiction to grant such a relief. It may be that for the purpose of granting relief the question whether which of the parties had kudivaram rights may have to be incidentally decided but such incidental decision is only to give relief as to possession and cannot bind the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal when they have to decide that question under the Act. Section 3 (d) of the Act itself recognises that if a person is prima facie entitled to patta his possession should not be disturbed by the Government. A fortiori his, possession should be protected by the Courts as against others. Possessory title is well-known under the law. In Narayana Rao v. Dharmachar3, it was held that possession is good title against all but the true owner. In the case of a notified estate no question of title can arise as title would be with the Government till the grant of patta. The plaintiff if he proves possessory title should obtain possession against a trespasser without enabling the latter to acquire title by adverse possession. Similarly in a case where the plaintiff sues for injunction, relief can be given on the basis of possessory title and it would not be necessary to investigate the question of title so long as the defendant is not the owner. It may be that in such a case the question as regards the right to occupancy before the estate was taken over by the Government has to be investigated but such investigation as stated already is only incidental to the grant of relief. Bearing in mind the principle laid down by Ramaswami, J., in Pachai Ammal v. Anguswami Gramani4, that it is the substance of the plaint that has got to be looked into in deciding the question of jurisdiction I find that in the present case the substantial dispute is as regards possession, a relief which cannot be granted by the Tribunal under the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 and which could be granted only by the civil Court. Such being the case I am of opinion that the civil Court should entertain the suits. To hold otherwise would lead to certain practical difficulties. Let us take a case where the plaintiff is a lawful ryot but the defendant trespassed into the property. If the plaintiff’s suit for possession is not entertained by the civil Court and if he is asked to go and agitate his right to patta before the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal, it may be that by the time he gets his right to patta declared by those Tribunals, the claim for possession would have become barred by adverse possession by the defendant. I am therefore of opinion that the suit in the form in which it was laid in the present case is cognisable by the civil Court. I, therefore, overrule this objection. Learned Counsel next contended that, by the expiry of 12 years’ period from 14th April, 1945, i.e., by 14th April, 1957, his client had acquired title by adverse possession and prescription by enjoyment for 12 years and the fact that the plaintiff could file the suit on the Monday following by reason of section 4 of the Limitation Act will not affect the title which the defendant had acquired by adverse possession. He contends that the principles applicable to the application of sections 12, 14 and 15, Limitation Act, are not applicable to a case governed by section 28 of the Limitation Act. For this, he relies upon the difference in the language employed in sections 12 to 15 and that in section 28. Learned Counsel drew my attention to the decision of the Privy Council in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap1, in which the Privy Council had to consider the scope of sections 14 and 4 of the Limitation Act. In that case, the mortgagee-decree-holder prosecuted certain proceedings for obtaining a final decree which became infructuous under circumstances entitling him to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act for excluding the time spent in prosecuting the said prior infructuous proceedings. At the same time, while the decree-holder was prosecuting the proceedings, summer vacation intervened, and, on behalf of the decree-holder it was contended that in addition to the exclusion of the time under section 14, he would also have the benefit of section 4. At the same time, while the decree-holder was prosecuting the proceedings, summer vacation intervened, and, on behalf of the decree-holder it was contended that in addition to the exclusion of the time under section 14, he would also have the benefit of section 4. The Privy Council rejected that argument, taking the view that the language of section 4 does not enlarge the period of limitation but that it merely enables the plaintiff to file the suit when the proper Court re-opened. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the following observations of the Privy Council, as supporting his present contention: “If the appellants were entitled to succeed in regard to the first period, that is, from 23rd December, 1920 to 8th November, 1921, having regard to the length of that period, that would be sufficient lor them. Their Lordships however are of opinion that the Courts in India were clearly right in the way they dealt with the point. It is impossible to say, apart from any other objection, that the aplication to obtain execution under the preliminary decree was an application for the same relief as the application to the Court for a final mortgage decree for sale in the suit. That being so, it is not permissible, on the basis of section 14 in computing the period of limitation prescribed to exclude that particular period. The second period is the period of the long vacation. In regard to that matter the appellants seem to their Lordships to be in a position which is in the nature of a dilemma. It is to be noted that there is a marked distinction in form between section 4 and section 14. The language employed in section 4 indicates that it has nothing to do with computing the prescribed period. What the section provides is that where the period prescribed expires on a day when the Court is closed, notwithstanding that fact, the application may be made on the day that the Court re-opens; so that there is nothing in the section which alters the length of the prescribed period ; whereas in section 14 and other sections of a similar nature in the Act, the direction begins with the words: In computing the period of limitation-prescribed for any application, certain periods shall be excluded. It therefore seems to their Lordships that, where there is ground for excluding certain periods under section 14, in order to ascertain what is the date of the expiration of the prescribed period, the days excluded from operating by way of limitation have to be added to what is primarily the prescribed period, that is to say, if the prescribed period is three years, and twenty days ought to be excluded in order to determine when the prescribed period expires, twenty days have to be added to the three years, and the date of the expiration of the prescribed period is thus ascertained.” Apart from this decision of the Privy Council and other cases which had dealt with the relative operation of section 4 and sections 12 to 15, Counsel on both sides have not drawn my attention to any case which has dealt with this question of the combined operation of sections 4 and 28 dealing with suits for possession of immovable property. The position is so obvious that none had raised the present objection. On a consideration of all the aspects of the matter, I am of the opinion that the principle of the decision of the Privy Council referred to above has no application to the instant case. Section 28 provides that at the termination of the period limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. Article 142 provides that the plaintiff must file the suit within 12 years from the date of dispossession, while Article 144 provides that the suit should be filed by the plaintiff within 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendant became adverse to the plaintiff. Mr. Vedantachari, learned Counsel, contends that under Article 144 the defendant’s possession became adverse on 14th April, 1945, and he had perfected his title on 14th April, 1957, and that the fact that the plaintiff may have a right to file the suit relying upon section 4, on the succeeding Monday cannot affect the right which had accrued to the defendant under Article 144. Learned Counsel for the respondent however contends that the combined operation of section 4 and section 28 is to preserve the right of the plaintiff till the plaintiff files the suit on the reopening day. Learned Counsel for the respondent however contends that the combined operation of section 4 and section 28 is to preserve the right of the plaintiff till the plaintiff files the suit on the reopening day. According to learned Counsel the time prescribed for filing the suit expired not on Sunday (14th April, 1957) but on Monday (15th April, 1957) by reason of section 4. He, therefore urges that, if his title had not been extinguished, but was subsisting he would undoubtedly be entitled to file the suit for possession. Under Article 142, he can file the suit within 12 years from the date of dispossession and that suit can be filed on 15th April, 1957, by reason of section 4. I think this is the correct position, as otherwise there will be this anomaly and absurd result that by reason of section 4 and section 28, the plaintiff will have a subsisting title and an undoubted right to file the suit for possession, while by reason of the expiry of 12 years, the defendant would have acquired title by adverse possession. In my opinion, all the provisions, section 4, section 28, Article 142 and Article 144 must be read together and applied. As the suit was filed on the last day as provided under the Schedule taken along with section 4, the suit would be in time. The appeal is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Leave granted. V.K. ------------- Appeal dismissed.