ORDER D.P. Uniyal, J. - This is a Defendant's appeal and arises out of a suit for a mandatory injunction ordering the Defendants to close two doors and a drain, as well as for a perpetual injunction in restraining them from passing on to the Plaintiff's sahan through the doors in question. The Plaintiff alleged that his house was towards the east of the house of the Defendants. One of the doors of his house opened on his sahan in front of which was an old wall of the Defendants. That wall was demolished by the Defendants and in its place they built a new one. In the new wall they opened two doors opening towards the sahan of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff complained that the Defendants were infringing his right of using the sahan by opening the two doors on his sahan. 2. The Defendants denied the claim of the Plaintiff and alleged that the parties were close relations and their property was joint, and that the land in dispute was also joint property. In the alternative, they asserted that they had acquired a right of way over the passage by way of easement, and that the opening of the two doors in the Defendant's wall was legal and justified. 3. Both the courts below have found that the sahan lying in front of the house of the Plaintiff was his exclusive property and the Defendants had no manner of right to pass over it. The Defendants were accordingly restrained from passing over the land in dispute through the disputed doors and from allowing any water to flow on to the land of the Plaintiff through a drain. 4. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and it is contended that the findings are vitiated by error of law. The first contention on behalf of the Appellants was that the finding of the lower appellate court that the sahan was the exclusive property of the Plaintiff was based on inadmissible evidence. 5. It appears that there was an arbitration agreement between the parties some time previously for reference of their disputes to an arbitrator. The first contention on behalf of the Appellants was that the finding of the lower appellate court that the sahan was the exclusive property of the Plaintiff was based on inadmissible evidence. 5. It appears that there was an arbitration agreement between the parties some time previously for reference of their disputes to an arbitrator. Clause 2 of the agreement recited that one door of the house of each party opened on the disputed sahan and that in front of the house of the Plaintiff lay "sahan of the house of the Plaintiff Respondent". On the basis of the evidence of the parties, corroborated as it was by this document, the courts below came to the conclusion that the existence of the sahan of the Plaintiff has been admitted by the Appellants and it was no longer open to them to challenge the right of the Plaintiff to be the exclusive owner of the sahan. The argument of the learned Counsel was that this document was insufficiently stamped and, as such, was inadmissible in evidence u/s 35 of the Stamp Act. 6. The lower appellate court held that the existence of this document was admitted by the Appellants and no objection had been raised by them or. their counsel at the time of its admission under Order XIII, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure. u/s 326 of the Stamp Act, where an instrument has been admitted in evidence its admission shall not be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. It was, therefore, held that the statement contained in the arbitration agreement Ex. 5 was admissible against the Appellants. 7. The learned Counsel contended that the mere fact that this document has been exhibited by the court on 25.8.1956 was not sufficient for purposes of its being treated as evidence in the case, particularly as it was inadmissible by reason of its being insufficiently stamped. Reference was made to the observations of Desai, J. as he then was, in Mst(sic) Bibi v. Kuntu Lal (1) (A)(sic) All. 996, to the effect t(sic) mere fact that a document(sic) been exhibited in court(sic) preclude its inadmissibility (sic) dence. Reference was made to the observations of Desai, J. as he then was, in Mst(sic) Bibi v. Kuntu Lal (1) (A)(sic) All. 996, to the effect t(sic) mere fact that a document(sic) been exhibited in court(sic) preclude its inadmissibility (sic) dence. In this case the (sic) difference of opinion (sic) Dayal, J. and Desai, J. (sic) was, and the matter was (sic) to a third Judge for op(sic) third Judge (Brij Mohan(sic) agreed with the view of (sic) Dayal, J. and held that (sic) ment once admitted and (sic) could not be treated as (sic) ble in evidence at the (sic) stage. This ruling (sic) supporting the case of t(sic) lants goes to show that (sic) trial court has applied its (sic) a document and treat (sic) admissible in evidence (sic) matter cannot be question the appellate stage. (sic) therefore, that the counsel (sic) were right in treating t(sic) ment as admissible in (sic) and were, therefore, just (sic) placing reliance on it. 8. The next point u(sic) that inasmuch as the a(sic) had opened the doors in t(sic) wall after the old one had (sic) they were entitled to ex(sic) right of ingress and egress(sic) those doors by way of e(sic) This contention was nega(sic) the courts below and, in (sic) ion, rightly, because no ri(sic) easement, prescriptive or(sic) wise, could accrue to a(sic) respect of a construction(sic) had come into existence(sic) few months before the suit(sic) 9. This appeal is wh(sic) out merits and is dismis(sic) costs.