ORDER.- One Sepoy Chidambara Udayar was last owner of the suit property He left India for Malaya in 1930. Before leaving he mortgaged the property in favour of the defendant’s husband. At the same time, he granted a lease in favour of Karuppanna Udayar, who was his divided paternal uncle. He died in Malaya in 1932 without any issues. The plaintiff claiming to be the son of an undivided brother of Sepoy Chidambara Udayar came to India in 1958. He ascertained that Muthammal, the widow of Karuppanna Udayar, and her son, had sold the suit property to the husband of the first defendant, the mortgagee. The sale was in discharge of the mortgage executed by Sepoy Chidambara Udayar. The plaintiff, claiming that Muthammal was incompetent to sell the property, pleaded that the conveyance was void and not binding upon him. He alleged further that the sale was in breach of confidence and faith and that he came to know of the fraud only on his return to India, and on such averments claimed that the suit was not barred by limitation. The defendant contended that the plaintiff is not the son of the brother of Sepoy Chidambara Udayar. It was alleged that the defendant had prescribed for title to the suit property by virtue of long, undisturbed and open possession from 1935 onwards when the sale was executed in favour of her husband. The bar of limitation was also set up. It was denied that where was any entrustment of the property by Sepoy Chidambara Udayar to his uncle, the deceased Karuppanna Udayar. The trial Court accepted the relationship of the plaintiff to Sepoy Chidambara Udayar. Though it accepted the plea that Sepoy Chidambara Udayar had entrusted the property with his uncle Karuppanna Udayar to be looked after by him and thereby constituted him a trustee, it held that the right of the plaintiff could be agitated within twelve years from the date of the alienation by the trustee or his successor, failing which the title would be lost. The plaintiff was born only in 1940. Plaintiff’s father, Ramaswami Udayar, the undivided brother of Sepoy Chidambara Udayar, was however alive on the date of the impugned alienation. Limitation would start to run as against him from the date of the sale. The plaintiff was born only in 1940. Plaintiff’s father, Ramaswami Udayar, the undivided brother of Sepoy Chidambara Udayar, was however alive on the date of the impugned alienation. Limitation would start to run as against him from the date of the sale. If that should be the position, then the plaintiff cannot claim that he would under law be entitled to sue for relief within three years of attaining majority. He accordingly found that the plaintiff had no subsisting title and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge took a different view. The principal questions which the lower appellate Court had to decide were whether the appellant’s suit was in time and whether the respondent had acquired title by adverse possession. Before the lower appellate Court, the alleged fraud by the heirs of Karuppanna Udayar or entrustment of the property to that person was apparently given up. The lower appellate Court held that since the heirs of Karuppanna Udayar should be deemed to continue in possession only on the basis of a lessee’s interest, they could not convey anything more than that interest. It accordingly reached the conclusion that the tenancy never came to an end until 1958 when the plaintiff returned to India and demanded possession of the property. In the view of the lower appellate Court, the suit was not barred by Article 139 of the Limitation Act and the respondent did not acquire any title in the property by adverse possession. The appeal was allowed. The defendant in the suit prefers this second appeal. Mr. R. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, learned Counsel for the appellant, urges that on and after the termination of the lease, the heirs of the lessee Karuppanna Udayar cannot be regarded as lessees and it is open to them to acquire title by adverse possession. It cannot also be contended that these persons are tenants holding over, for that would require the assent of the landlord. The lease was granted in the year 1930 and was for a period of five years. Karuppanna Udayar, the lessee, died during that period. There can be no doubt that the heirs of the lessee are entitled to continue in possession till the lease expired by efflux of time. The lease was granted in the year 1930 and was for a period of five years. Karuppanna Udayar, the lessee, died during that period. There can be no doubt that the heirs of the lessee are entitled to continue in possession till the lease expired by efflux of time. The lower appellate Court thought that once they enter into possession as lessees, it was not open to them to set up any title hostile to the lessor until they surrendered possession of the land to the lessor, or until after the lease was terminated. In its view, such termination of the lease was only in 1958, when the plaintiff, after his return in India, demanded surrender of the land. It seems to me that this conclusion can hardly be supported in law. That a tenant is prevented from denying his landlord’s title during the tenancy of the lease and cannot also deny that the landlord had title at the inception of the lease is a well-accepted position. But, when once the lease came to an end by efflux of time merely because the tenant continues to be in possession of the land, the relationship of landlord and tenant can no longer subsist, and after the termination of the tenancy, the tenant’s right to set up title hostile to the landlord does not appear to be negatived by any decided case. In Vadappalh Narasimham v. Dronamraju Seetharamamurthi1, it was clearly laid down that in a suit by a lessor to recover possession from a tenant for a term of years, time begins to run under Article 139 of the Limitation Act from the expiry of the term when the tenancy is determined within the meaning of the Article. Dealing with the status of a tenant, after the expiry of the term, the learned Judges observed: "Assuming that Sanyasi held for three years and on the expiry of the term became a tenant at sufference, we think the view taken in the lower Courts is right. There is no evidence of any assent on the part of the landlord during Sanyasi’s life which could have converted him from a tenant at sufference into a tenant in the true sense of the term, either at will, or from year to year. At common Jaw, the landlord’s assent converted a tenant at sufference into a tenant at will.................... There is no evidence of any assent on the part of the landlord during Sanyasi’s life which could have converted him from a tenant at sufference into a tenant in the true sense of the term, either at will, or from year to year. At common Jaw, the landlord’s assent converted a tenant at sufference into a tenant at will.................... In Right v. Darby2, Lord Mansfield laid it down that if there be a lease for a year and by consent of both parties the tenant continues in possession, the law implies a tacit renovation of the contract, .......Under section 116, which, in our opinion, points out the rule which is prima facie applicable even in cases not coming under the Act, where a lessee holds over and the lessor or his representative accepts rent or otherwise assents to the tenant continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, renewed from year to year or month to month as the case may be. But, while at common law the lessor could, by his assent, convert a tenant by sufference into a tenant in the true sense of the term, he could not, by his mere assent, convert the representatives of a tenant by sufference, who are mere trespassers into tenants and without their own consent ; and section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act which enables the lessor or his representative by his assent to convert a tenant by sufference into a yearly or monthly tenant, does not enable him by his mere assent to convert the representatives of a tenant by sufference into such a tenant...................." Dealing with the question of limitation, they observe: "Although the possession of a tenant by sufference is not at common law adverse to the landlord, still as held in the two cases last mentioned, and according to the view expressed in Seshamma Shettat.v. Chickaya Hega,1 in a suit by a landlord to recover possession from a tenant for a term of years, time begins to run under Article 139 of the Limitation Act from the expiry of the term which must be held to be the time when the tenancy is determined within meaning of the Article, and the decision in Adimulam v. Pir Ravuthan2 can, in our opinion, be no longer treated as good law. Article 139 of the Limitation Act, however deals with suits to recover possession from a tenant, that is to say, a person who was a tenant until his tenancy determined. The representatives of a tenant by sufference who enter after his death cannot, in our opinion, be said to have ever been tenants within the meaning of Article 139, and a suit against them would appear to fall within Article 144." Two points are made clear by this decision. If Karuppanna Udayar had continued to live for the entire period of five years of the tenancy, a suit against him or his representatives for possession would be governed by Article 139. If he continued in possession after the expiry of the term and on his death his representatives came into possession, since those representatives could not be said to have been ever tenants, a suit against them would not be to recover the land from the possession of a tenant, in which event, the proper Article applicable would be Article 144. But, if the tenant died during the term, and his successors-in-interest continued in possession, since tenancy of land is a right in immovable property they must be regarded as the tenants during the remainder of the term and a suit to recover possession from them would appear to be governed by Article 139. Though the above decision appears to have been doubted in Sabraveti Ramayya v. Gundala Bamanna3 that was the case only in so far as the proper Article that would apply is concerned. The principle laid down by this decision would be clear from the following facts. One Kondanna became a lessee for a term certain. The lease was determined about the year 1891. Kondanna died sometime afterwards, but he was succeeded by his sons in the possession of the property. The tenancy having determined in 1891, if Article 139 is applicable, the suit would be barred. But, it was contended that the suit was not one to recover possession from a tenant. The argument was that though Kondanna was a tenant and a suit against him. after termination of the tenancy might be described as a suit against a tenant on account of his former tenancy, the suit against the sons cannot be described as one to recover possession from a tenant, for they were not tenants at any time. The argument was that though Kondanna was a tenant and a suit against him. after termination of the tenancy might be described as a suit against a tenant on account of his former tenancy, the suit against the sons cannot be described as one to recover possession from a tenant, for they were not tenants at any time. Vadapalli Narasimhan v. Dronamaraju Seetharamamurthi4 was cited in support. But the learned Judges observe: "Kondanna remained in possession after the expiry of the term. The tenancy was determine of within the meaning of Article 139....................Time began to run therefore in Kondanna’s favour. He was succeeded by his sons in the possession of the property. They are entitled to tack on the time of their father’s possession after the determination of the tenancy to the period of their own possession. The time that had begun to run in favour of their father continues to run in favour of the sons. It seems to us therefore difficult to hold that Article 139, which should be applicable to the suit against Kondanna, ceases to be applicable because Kondanna is succeeded by his sons in the possession of the property...................." They also doubted whether it would make any distinction whether Article 139, or 144 applied in the circumstances of that case. Both of these cases were referred to in Sudalaimuthu Thevan v. Sappani Thevan5 in which the later case was followed and it was held that Article 139 applied. To the same effect is the decision in Veerayya v. Subbamma6. The learned Subordinate Judge appears to have thought that section 116 of the Evidence Act estopped the successors of the tenant, Karuppanna Udayar from questioning the landlord’s right. He observed: "It has been held in some decisions that a person who enters into possession of a particular property as a tenant cannot in any event prescribe for anything more than a tenancy". He refers to certain decisions which deal with section 116 of the Evidence Act. On a review of the case-law in Guruswami Nadar v. Renganathan1 the learned Judges observe that the principle of estoppel in section 116 of the Evidence Act does not extend to the derivative title of persons claiming from the landlord. He refers to certain decisions which deal with section 116 of the Evidence Act. On a review of the case-law in Guruswami Nadar v. Renganathan1 the learned Judges observe that the principle of estoppel in section 116 of the Evidence Act does not extend to the derivative title of persons claiming from the landlord. The head-note reads: “Though the section restricts the estoppel to the period during which the tenancy continues, the duration of the estoppel continues so long as the tenant has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord. But the estoppel is restricted to the denial of the title of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. It is therefore open to a tenant even without surrendering possession to show that since the date of the tenancy, the title of the landlord came to an end, or that he was evicted by a paramount title-holder, or that even though there was no actual eviction or dispossession from the property, under a threat of eviction he had attorned to the paramount title-holder and he can set up such threat of eviction by way of defence either to an action for rent or to a suit for ejectment”. But the question in the present case is not whether the representatives of the tenant set up a hostile title at all. It is more concerned with the question whether the plaintiff as the representative of the lessor is barred by the law of limitation front recovering the property. In the light of the above decisions, there seems to be no doubt that the plaintiff, if he is to succeed, must sue within twelve years after the termination of the tenancy, which termination was undoubtedly in 1935. Mr. Sarvabhuman, learned Counsel for the respondent, urges that Karuppanna. Udayar was in permissive possession. He argued that the circumstances of the case should show that though formally there was a lease deed executed, it was really a case where Karuppanna Udayar was asked to look after the property during the absence from India of Sepoy Chidambara Udayar. The theory of entrustment has been negatived by the Courts below. It was set up as positive case and was not established. The theory of entrustment has been negatived by the Courts below. It was set up as positive case and was not established. It is not therefore open to the learned Counsel to ask this Court sitting in second appeal to infer that the possession of Karuppanna Udayar must be construed as permissive in the circumstances alleged. Undoubtedly, in the light of the decisions that have been referred to, time began to run against the lessor from 1935. The plaintiff’s attempt to plead that he was a minor and he could bring the action within three years after attaining majority must fail, for, in 1935, the plaintiff was not even born. His father Ramaswami Udayar, the younger brother of Sepoy Chidambara Udayar, was alive and if he became entitled to the property by survivorship, time began to run against him, and it is common place that when once time begins to run, it will not stop. That, being so, the suit brought beyond twelve years from 1935 stands clearly barred. The view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge is erroneous. The appeal is allowed. The suit will stand dismissed. The defendant will be entitled to his costs throughout. No leave. V.K. ------------ Appeal allowed.