JUDGMENT 1. - This is an appeal by Shri Kumaranand under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act 1951, hereafter referred to as the Act, against the order of the learned Election Tribunal, Jaipur City, dated the 19th September, 1963. Shri Kumaranand contested the election to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly from the Beawar Constituency at the last general election held in February, 1962, and came out successfully, defeating his nearest rival, respondent Shri Brij Mohanlal, by a margin of 2,106 votes. Shri Brij Mohanlal challenged the election by means of an election petition, dated April 10, 1962, on several grounds. The learned Tribunal, on a trial of the election petition came to the conclusion that Shri Kumaranand was guilty of committing corrupt practices under section 123(4) of the Act in publishing the poem "Mang Raha Hoon Do Bhai Vote" containing some false statements, of facts relating to the personal character and conduct of the election petitioner which were highly prejudicial to his election prospects. Accordingly the Tribunal declared Shri Kumaranand's election to be void under section 100(1)(b) of the Act and set it aside, making a further direction that he shall pay half the costs of the election petitioner, including Rs. 500 as counsel's fee. It is against that order of the learned Tribunal that Shri Kumaranand has come up in appeal to this Court. 2. Two preliminary objections have been raised against the appeal. Firstly, it has been urged by the respondent that the appeal is barred by time inasmuch as the Tribunal's order in question was passed on September 19, 1963, whereas the appeal was filed on October 21, 1963, beyond the period of 30 days prescribed for its presentation under section 116A(3) of the Act. It has further been pointed out that no court fee was paid by the appellant when he presented the appeal on October 21, 1963 and that the deficiency was made good on October 28, 1963. Thus the first objection of the respondent is that the appeal is barred by time. The second preliminary objection is that the appellant has not fulfilled the requirement of section 119A of the Act inasmuch as the government treasury receipt enclosed by him with the memorandum of his appeal docs not show that a deposit of Rs. Thus the first objection of the respondent is that the appeal is barred by time. The second preliminary objection is that the appellant has not fulfilled the requirement of section 119A of the Act inasmuch as the government treasury receipt enclosed by him with the memorandum of his appeal docs not show that a deposit of Rs. 500 had been made by him in favour of the Election Commission as security for the costs of the appeal. 3. We shall deal with both these preliminary objections separately, and shall start with a consideration of the first objection about the presentation of appeal beyond the period of limitation prescribed for it under the law. 4. As has been stated, the learned Tribunal gave its Judgment on September 19, 1963. A copy of it was supplied to the appellant on the very next day. The appellant applied for a copy of the decree on October 1, 1963 and it was granted to him on October 21, 1963. The same day, the appellant filed the appeal in this court, but without the necessary court fee. A copy of the decree was thereafter filed in this Court on October 23, 1963, and the court fee was paid on October 28, 1963. There is no dispute about these basic facts. The controversy is that while the appellant claims that he is entitled to exclude the time spent by him in obtaining a copy of the decree, the respondent contends that this could not be done, for it was not at all necessary for the learned Tribunal to draw up a decree or for the appellant to file its copy with the memorandum of his appeal. Nonetheless, the respondent, who has personally argued his case before us, has conceded that if it could be shown that the appellant was entitled to exclude the period spent by him in obtaining a copy of the decree, both the defects-the one relating to the belated presentation of the appeal and the other about the failure to file the necessary court fee in respect of it-would be amply made good. We shall therefore proceed to consider the question whether the period spent by the appellant in obtaining a copy of the decree could be excluded under the law, and we need not consider the two objections regarding limitation and the deficiency in the court fee separately. 5. We shall therefore proceed to consider the question whether the period spent by the appellant in obtaining a copy of the decree could be excluded under the law, and we need not consider the two objections regarding limitation and the deficiency in the court fee separately. 5. It has been argued by the respondent that section 116A of the Act provides that an appeal shall lie from every 'order' made by the Tribunal under section 98 or section 99, and that there is no provision in that section regarding the filing of an appeal against a "decree" of the Election Tribunal. It has therefore been urged that it was not necessary for the appellant to obtain a copy of the decree, and so any period that he might have spent in that connection could not lawfully be excluded in deciding whether the appeal had been filed within the period of limitation prescribed under sub-section (3) of section 116A of the Act. It has been pointed out that, under that sub-section, an appeal has to be preferred within the prescribed period of 30 days from the date of the order of the Tribunal under section 98 or section 99. Further, it has been urged by the respondent that there is no requirement of the law for the preparation of a decree in pursuance of the Tribunal's judgment and that the appeal must therefore be held to be barred by limitation as the time requisite for obtaining a cony of the decree-sheet could not lawfully be excluded in computing the period of limitation. This contention has further been supported by a reference to Chapter XIV A of the Rules of this Court and it has been pointed out that while that Chapter contains special provisions relating to procedure in appeals from orders of Election Tribunals, it does not require the appellant to hie a copy of the decree along with the memorandum of the appeal. 6. 6. On the other hand, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that an appeal lies from every order made by a Tribunal under section 98 or 99 of the Act and that as the costs awarded to the respondent had not been specified in the Tribunal's judgment, dated September 19, 1963, it was necessary for him (appellant) to obtain a copy of that order under section 99 fixing the total amount of the costs which were payable by him under the Tribunal's order and then to hie a comprehensive appeal both in respect of the order declaring the election to be void as well as the order fixing the total amount of the cost which were payable to the respondent. It has also been contended that the learned Tribunal itself felt the necessity of passing a decree in pursuance of its judgment dated September 19, 1963 and that as the decree was drawn up only on October 21, 1963 and its copy was given to the appellant on that date in pursuance of his application therefor dated October 1, 1963, the intervening period must, by virtue of section 12 read with section 29 of the Limitation Act, be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal. 7. The provisions of the Act having a bearing on the controversy are these contained in sections 98(b), 99(1)(b) and 116A(1) and (3) of the Act. The relevant provision of section 98(b) is as follows:- "98. At the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the Tribunal shall make an order- (a) .................................................. (b) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void;" 8. Then there is the further provision of section 99(1)(b) to the following effect; - "99. (1) At the time of the making an order under section 98 the Tribunal shall also make an order- (a)..................................... (b) fixing the total amount of costs payable, and specifying the persons by and to whom costs shall be paid" (Then there is a proviso with which we are not concerned). 9. (1) At the time of the making an order under section 98 the Tribunal shall also make an order- (a)..................................... (b) fixing the total amount of costs payable, and specifying the persons by and to whom costs shall be paid" (Then there is a proviso with which we are not concerned). 9. Thus we think that it was incumbent on the Election Tribunal not only to make an order declaring the election of the appellant to be void, at the conclusion of the trial of the election petition, if the Tribunal thought such an order was justified, but it was also necessary for it, at the time of making that order, to make a further order fixing the total amount of the cost which were payable and specifying the persons by and to whom such costs were to be paid. The Tribunal however, made the following order on September 19, 1963 in paragraph 101 of its judgment:- "Hence the election petition of Shri Brij Mohan Lal is allowed and the election of respondent Swami Kumaranand from the Beawar Constituency to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly is declared void and set aside. I also direct the respondent to pay half the costs of the petitioner and bear his own costs. I fix Rs. 500 as counsel's fee." 10. Thus the Tribunal made an express order under section 98(b) declaring the election of the present appellant Shri Kumaranand to be void and also made the further order directing him to pay half the costs of the petitioner, fixing Rs. 500 as counsel's fee. This order did not, however, fix the total amount of the costs which were payable by the appellant, and it cannot therefore be said that he was unjustified in applying for a copy of the Tribunal's further order in that connection for the purpose of filing his appeal not only against the order declaring his election to be void but also against the other order regarding the costs which were payable by him to the respondent. As has been stated, it is not in dispute that the appellant applied for a copy of the decree on October 1, 1963 and the Tribunal actually drew up the decree on October 21, 1963, and granted it to him on that date. As has been stated, it is not in dispute that the appellant applied for a copy of the decree on October 1, 1963 and the Tribunal actually drew up the decree on October 21, 1963, and granted it to him on that date. It may be mentioned here that in the memorandum of his appeal the appellant not only prayed for the setting aside of the Tribunal's judgment, but also prayed for the dismissal of the election petition with costs throughout. Thus the appeal was directed against the order under section 98(b) declaring the appellant's election to be void and the further order under section 99(1)(b) in regard to the costs of the election petitioner. Then there is the further fact, which is of considerable importance and almost clinches the issue, that a formal decree was actually drawn up by the Election Tribunal in this case on October 21, 1963 in pursuance of its order, dated September 19, 1963. It may be that a decree as such was not really necessary, but the fact remains that a decree or, what we should prefer to call a formal order giving effect to the requirements of sections 98 and 99 bearing on the case was actually prepared containing the operative part of the Tribunal's order declaring the present appellant's election to be void and fixing precisely the amount of the costs which were payable by him. In these circumstances we think that the appellant should be held entitled to exclude, under section 12 of the Limitation Act, the time spent by him in obtaining a copy of that decree or formal order, as he actually directed his appeal against it. 11. We are fortified in this view by a number of decisions on the point. In these circumstances we think that the appellant should be held entitled to exclude, under section 12 of the Limitation Act, the time spent by him in obtaining a copy of that decree or formal order, as he actually directed his appeal against it. 11. We are fortified in this view by a number of decisions on the point. In Kamala Pasi v. Tarapada Mukerji, 14 Indian Cases 1006 , it has been held by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court that whether an appeal is preferred against a decree or an order, the memorandum of appeal ought to be accompanied by a copy of the judgment as also by a copy of the decree or order, as the case may be and that where there is a judgment stating the grounds of the decision, and a separate order is also drawn up embodying the formal expression of the decision, copies of both the documents ought to be attached to the memorandum, and that the appellant is entitled to a deduction of the time taken up in obtaining copies thereof. It has also been laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar, AIR 1928 Privy Council 103 , that in reckoning the time for presenting an appeal the time required for obtaining a copy of the decree and judgment must be excluded, even though by the rules of the Court it is not necessary to obtain such copies. A similar view has been taken in Sehat Ali Khan and another v. Abdul Qavi Khan and others, AIR 1956 Allahabad 273 , which is a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad Court. The same court has held in the State of U.P. and another v. Mahendra Pratap Pitamah and others, AIR 1956 Allahabad 585 , that even if it be taken for granted that the Rules of the Court do not require preparation of a decree, the preparation of a formal order is inevitable so as to embody the decision of the Court, and that such a formal document, if not a decree, must be a formal order, and the time spent in obtaining its copy can be excluded under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Johuram Bibi and others v. Howrah Jute Mills Co. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Johuram Bibi and others v. Howrah Jute Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1948 Calcutta 134 , is also to the effect that where there is a judgment stating the grounds of the decision and a separate order is also drawn up embodying the formal expression of that decision, copies of both the documents must be attached to the memorandum, and that the appellant is entitled to a deduction of the time taken up in obtaining copies thereof. So also, in Nahes Kant Chaudhury v. Ch. Ram Prasad Rai and other, 54 Indian Case 630 , it has been held by a Bench of the Patna High Court that in a case in which it is not necessary to prepare a decree but one is actually prepared, the time Occupied in obtaining a copy of the decree should be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act in computing the period of Limitation for the appeal. 12. For the reasons mentioned above, we are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case the appellant is entitled to exclude the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree (or formal order) of the Election Tribunal, dated October 21, 1963 in calculating the period of the limitation prescribed for the filing of his appeal. As we have pointed out, the respondent has frankly conceded that if this is done, the appeal would be well within the period of limitation prescribed for it under section 116A(3) of the Act and that the ether defect in regard to the belated filing of the court fee would also be of no consequence as that defect was undoubtedly rectified within the extended time limit for the presentation of the appeal. Thus the first preliminary objection is of no avail to the respondent and is overruled. 13. The second objection is that the appellant has failed to comply with the requirements of section 119A of the Act inasmuch as the government treasury receipt which he filed in connection with the memorandum of his appeal for a sum of Rs. 500 does not show that the deposit has been made in favour of the Election Commission as security for the costs of the appeal. 500 does not show that the deposit has been made in favour of the Election Commission as security for the costs of the appeal. It has been argued that, in view of this defect, it cannot be said that the appellant substantially complied with the requirements of section 119A and that as such a compliance was necessary for the maintainability of his appeal, the appeal must be dismissed outright. On behalf of the appellant it has been urged, on the other hand, that the tender form as well as the cash challan in respect of the deposit of Rs. 500 are in order so that the money is at the disposal of the Election Commission of India in accordance with the requirements of section 119A of the Act. In the alternative, it has been argued that even if there was any defect in the making of the deposit under the appropriate head, it was due to an act of the Court inasmuch as the clerk concerned was responsible for the mistake, and so the appellant could not be penalised for it. It has also been argued that even if it is held that the appellant made a default in complying with the requirements of section 119A, it would not be open to this Court to dismiss the appeal for that reason because there is no such provision in the Act in respect of such a deposit. The learned counsel has placed reliance on Dhanraj Deshlehara v. Vishwanath Yadav Tamaskar and others, 15 E.L.R. 260 , Budhi Nath Jha v. Manilal Jadav, 22 E.L.R. 86 , Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haraia Das and others, 16 E.L.R. 405 , and K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar and others, 14 E.L.R. 270 , in support of his submissions. 14. In order to appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to reproduce the original tender under which the money was handed over by the appellant's learned counsel Mr. Vijay Chandra Mehta for deposit in connection with the present appeal. That tender reads as follows:- "ORIGINAL TENDER 771 21-10-63 R.R.D. No. 239 31-10-63 In the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at x Jodhpur Jaipur Bench Instruction to applicant Fill up accurately columns 1 to 4 1. Name of party one whose behalf the money is tendered Shri Kumaranand 2. Name of parties and number of the suit Kumaranad V. Brij Mohanlal D.B. Election appeal/63 3. Name of party one whose behalf the money is tendered Shri Kumaranand 2. Name of parties and number of the suit Kumaranad V. Brij Mohanlal D.B. Election appeal/63 3. Nature of payment Security Deposits. 4. Amount tendered Rs. 500/- Five hundred only. 5. Office report May be deposited. Sd/ Vijay Chandra Mehta Sd/ Illegible 21.10.63. STAMP Signature of actual Payer Signature of Cashier Dated Dated Receipt acknowledge in Register No. R.R.D. No. 239/31.10.63 only be credited. Dated to S.B. Ch. No. 157/64 21-10-63 Sd/- Mohammed Haji 31.10.63 Signature of Receiving Officers N.B. - To be filed with record. Sd/ Prem Haji 31-X- Signature of Accountant 15. It is therefore obvious from a perusal of the original tender that (I) the money was tendered for deposit in this Court, (ii) the name of Shri Kumaranand was mentioned as the party on whose behalf the money was tendered (iii) the names of the parties to the appeal were mentioned in that tender, with the further mention that the case related to an election appeal of the year 1963, (iv) the nature of the payment was disclosed to be by way of "Security Deposits", and (v) the amount tendered was stated to be Rs. 500 and Mr. Vijay Chandra Mehta signed the tender as the actual payer of the money. Now that requires to be carefully noticed is that the original tender made no mention of the fact that the deposit was at the disposal of the Election Commission or was to be utilised by it in the manner authorised by the law, or that it was under the Commission's control and was payable on a proper application being made in that behalf to the concerned authority. Further, the tender did not shown that the deposit was furnished by way of security for the costs of the appeal. Apart from that, the tender did not even make a mention of the particular election in respect of which the appeal had been filed, so that it was not possible to ascertain whether the election appeal related to an Assembly or a Parliamentary election or, for the matter of that, to a panchayat or a municipal election. The head of the account had not been mentioned in the tender either, and there was absolutely no indication in it to show that the payer wanted to place the money at the disposal of the Election Commission. The head of the account had not been mentioned in the tender either, and there was absolutely no indication in it to show that the payer wanted to place the money at the disposal of the Election Commission. On the other hand, the fact that the money had been tendered in the High Court shows that it had been placed at the disposal of this Court, to be dealt with in accordance with this Court's Rules governing such deposits. 16. It appears that a cost challan was drawn up on receipt of the original tender and the money from Mr. Vijay Chandra Mehta. In that challan, the name of Shri Vijay Chandra Mehta Advocate was mentioned in column No. 1 as the person tendering the money. Column No. 2 relating to the name and designation of the person on whose behalf the money was paid, was left blank, while in the column relating to the full particulars of the remittance and of the authority the title of the case (appeal) was mentioned, along with the further specification that the deposit related to a D.B. Election Appeal by way of a security deposit. In column No. 4, which related to the complete classification of the deposit and which column is sub-divided into (1) "Major and Minor Head" and (ii) "Detailed Head", it was mentioned that it was "Civil Court Deposit No. 120, Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur". Then the column relating to the particulars of the Accounts Officer by whom the money was adjustable was left blank, but the last column contained a mention that the deposit was for a sum of Rs. 500. It is thus amply clear that there was no mention in the case challan as well that the money had been tendered so as to be at the disposal of the Election Commission to be utilised in the manner authorised by law or that it was under the Commission's control and was payable on a proper application being made in that behalf. So also, the challan did not show that the money had been deposited by way of security for the costs of the appeal, or that it related to any particular election. In fact the head of the account mentioned in that challan was admittedly the head of the account under which deposits are placed at the disposal of this Court. So also, the challan did not show that the money had been deposited by way of security for the costs of the appeal, or that it related to any particular election. In fact the head of the account mentioned in that challan was admittedly the head of the account under which deposits are placed at the disposal of this Court. It is also worthy of note that although the cash challan was presented by the appellant's learned counsel in this Court, the above mentioned defects were allowed to go unrectified and have not been corrected even though the respondent raised an objection on December 8, 1963 that the appellant had not carried out the requirements of section 119 of the Act. 17. The above facts leave no room for doubt that the deposit was not at the disposal of the Election Commission and that the Commission could not make any order in respect of it under section 121 of the Act which provides that the costs of an appeal are to be paid in full or so far as possible, out of the security deposit made by the party under section 199A, on an application made in writing in that behalf to the Commission by the person in whose favour the costs have been awarded. The deposit which the appellant made was clearly one under Chapter XXXV of the Rules of this Court. It was liable to disbursement under those Rules and the Election Commission had no domain over it. As a matter of fact, it could not even be said that the appellant had divested himself of all authority to withdraw the money, for he could claim its repayment under Court Rules 829 to 834 on the ground that he had erroneously made a deposit in this Court which he was not required to make and which was repayable to him for that reason. In all these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the appellant failed to comply with the requirement of section 119A of the Act. 18. It has next to be seen whether the default in the compliance could be said to be substantial. On this point we have an authority of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunja Thevar and others for our guidance, on which both the parties have placed reliance. 18. It has next to be seen whether the default in the compliance could be said to be substantial. On this point we have an authority of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunja Thevar and others for our guidance, on which both the parties have placed reliance. That case related to a deposit under section 117 of the Act in respect of an election petition but the provisions of that section are in all other respects similar to those of section 118A. In the group of cases decided with K. Kamaraja Nadar's case, one of the election petitioners made a deposit under section 117 but it was defective inasmuch as the proper and complete head of account had not been mentioned in the treasury receipt, nor had the deposit been made in favour of the Secretary, Election Commission, as laid down in that section. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the defect and laid down that there were the following three requirements of the section which had to be fulfilled; (i) The government treasury receipt must show that the deposit had been actually made in a Government treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India: (ii) the receipt must also show that the deposit had been so made in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission; and (iii) it must further show that it had been made as security for the costs of the petition. 19. Their Lordships however held that it would be absurd to imagine that a deposit made either in a Government treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India in favour of the Election Commission itself would not be sufficient, compliance with the provisions of section 117 and would involve a dismissal of the petition, and ruled that the words in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission used in section 117 are "directory and not mandatory in their character". They laid down that what is of the essence of the provision is that the petitioner should (i) furnish security for the cost of the petition (ii) enclose along with the petition a Government Treasury receipt showing that the deposit had been made in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India, (iii) place the deposit at the disposal of the Election Commission to be utilised by it in the manner authorised by law and that the deposit should be under the control of the Election Commission and be payable on a proper application being made in that behalf to the Election Commission or to any person duly authorised by it to receive the same, be he the Secretary to the Election Commission or any one else. Further Their Lordships laid down that if it could be shown by evidence led before the Election Tribunal that the Government treasury receipt or the challan which was obtained by the election petitioner and enclosed by him along with his election petition presented to the Election Commission was such that the Election Commission could be in a position to realise the amount for payment of the costs to the successful party, that would be sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 117. Applying these tests to the deposit which the appellant claims to have made under section 119 of the Acts, for both the sections have been couched in the same language and have the same purpose to fulfil, we have felt constrained to hold that the petitioner has not fulfilled some of these requirements. To say the least, the deposit was not made so as to be at the disposal of the Election Commission at all, and we find it impossible to hold that it could be utilised by it in the manner authorised by sections 121 on a proper application being made to it under that section. In fact, as we have pointed out, the deposit is completely under the control of this Court it is not impossible that the appellant might, have withdrawn it himself under the Rules of this Court. In fact, as we have pointed out, the deposit is completely under the control of this Court it is not impossible that the appellant might, have withdrawn it himself under the Rules of this Court. In reaching this conclusion, we have not thought it necessary to call for any evidence because the contents of the original tender as well as the cash challan, when read with the provisions of Chapter XXXV of the Rules of this Court, lead us to the irresistible conclusion the deposit has not been placed at the disposal of the. Election Commission inasmuch as even the head of the account under which the deposit has been made is the head prescribed for deposits of civil cases in this Court and the money so deposited is liable to disbursement by the authority of an officer of this Court in accordance with the provisions contained in that Chapter. 20. The question then is what would be the elicit of the default in making the deposit in accordance with the provisions of section 119A. As was laid down by Their Lordship of the Privy Council in Chene Moore v. Akesseh Tayee, AIR 1935 Privy Council 5 , all appeals exist merely by statute and unless the statutory conditions are fulfilled, no jurisdiction is given to any Court of justice to entertain them. 21. For us however, ample guidance is provided in this case by the decisions, of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. Kamaraja Nadar's case, referred to above. Judges by the tests laid down in that case, the appellant has not complied with some of the basic requirements of section 119A, and, that being so we feel we have no alternative but to dismiss the appeal. The important fact to remember is that in respect of a similar provision for a deposit under section 117 of the Act, it has been provided by the Legislature in section 85 that if the provision of that section are not complied with, the Election Commission shall dismiss the petition. T here is no reason why a similar penalty should not be imposed when a default is made in complying with the provisions for the making of a similar deposit in respect of an appeal under section 119. T here is no reason why a similar penalty should not be imposed when a default is made in complying with the provisions for the making of a similar deposit in respect of an appeal under section 119. It is true that the Act does not make a provision authorising the Election Commission to dismiss the appeal for non-compliance with the provisions of section 119A, because, under the scheme of the Act, the Commission is completely out of the picture so far as appeals to this Court arc concerned. It is, therefore, only natural that section 85, or, for the matter of that, any other section of the Act, could not have made a provision authorising the Commission to dismiss an appeal for want of compliance with the provisions of section 119A. The fact remains that the Legislature has unequivocally expressed its intention that the making of a deposit in respect of the costs of the opposite party under section 117 is a necessary requirement and that its non-compliance should be visited with a dismissal of the election petition outright, and it would therefore be reasonable to hold that a similar penalty should be imposed for non-compliance of the other corresponding requirement of section 119A in respect of an election appeal arising out of the order of the Election Tribunal. Any other view would render the provisions of section 119A nugatory. We would therefore hold that the petitioner's appeal must be dismissed for non-compliance with the provisions of section 119 of the Act. 22. Faced with such as eventuality, the appellant's learned counsel tried to argue that this junior partner Mr. Vijay Chandra Mehta was not aware of the particular head of account under which the security had to be deposited and that he therefore sought the help of this Court and prepared the above mentioned original tender and submitted it in the office of this Court and that it was the clerk incharge of election appeals who filled in the challan and passed it on to Mr. Vijay Chandra Mehta for deposit of the security in the State Bank of India and that the deposit was made by Mr. Vijay Chandra Mehta accordingly. Thus the learned counsel tried to set up the argument that it was a mistake of this Court which induced Mr. Vijay Chandra Mehta for deposit of the security in the State Bank of India and that the deposit was made by Mr. Vijay Chandra Mehta accordingly. Thus the learned counsel tried to set up the argument that it was a mistake of this Court which induced Mr. Vijay Chandra Mehta to make the incorrect deposit and this Court must therefore be deemed to have acquiesced in the defective deposit so that it could not now turn round and dismiss the appeal on the ground that the deposit was defective. The short answer to this contention of the appellant's learned counsel seems to us to be that the act of a ministerial employee of this Court cannot be said to be an act of the Court. Besides, there is the further fact that even the name of the clerk concerned has not been disclosed and it has also not been averred by the appellant that the original tender form was also filled by Mr. Vijay Chandra Mehta under the instructions of any ministerial employee of this Court. Once the tender form had been filled in and showed, in clear terms, that the deposit was made for purposes of this Court, it was only reasonable that a challan should have been drawn up in conformity therewith and the blame for filling in the challan cannot therefore be passed on to an employee of this Court. The challan being in accordance with the original tender, that blame squarely rests on the shoulders of the appellant's learned counsel and the argument to the contrary is therefore of no avail. The challan being in accordance with the original tender, that blame squarely rests on the shoulders of the appellant's learned counsel and the argument to the contrary is therefore of no avail. Sufficient guidance should, in our judgment, have been available to learned counsel for the appellant if only he or they as the case might be, should hate been careful enough to apply their mind to the provision contained in section 119A of the Act, and if that was not done the blame must lie where it should, and we are not prepared to accept that the mistake occurred because of any act of the Court as such or even that the junior counsel of the appellant was justified in presuming that a clerk of the Court whose name even has not been disclosed to us, but whoever he was, should have more knowledge about the correct requirements of a law in this connection than he could himself obtain with the help of the Act or of his senior partner which were both available to him but which for some reason best known to the party concerned were not availed of. Therefore, we see no substance in this plea and hereby reject it. 23. We may briefly deal with a few cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, to which a reference has been made above. Of these, Biswanath Upadhaya v. Haralal Das and others , was a case which was decided by Their Lordships of the Assam High Court before the law relating to deposits under section 117 of the Act was laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. Kamaraj Nadar's case and so it is hardly necessary to refer to that case separately. In Budhi Nath Jha's case, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court reiterated their earlier view in K. Kamaraj Nadar's case. It may be mentioned that it was not disputed in that case that the head of account mentioned in the deposit challan was sufficient to show that the deposit was at the disposal of the Election Commission and could be utilised by it for the purpose for which it was made. So that case is also of no avail to the appellant. This leaves the judgment of Their Lordships of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dhanraj Deshlehara's case for consideration. So that case is also of no avail to the appellant. This leaves the judgment of Their Lordships of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dhanraj Deshlehara's case for consideration. Their Lordships did not, it seems have the benefit of the pronouncement of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. Kamaraj Nadar's case for their guidance, because the decision in that case was given only five days earlier. It was, however, held in Dharaj Deshlehara's case that the requirement that the deposit under section 119A must be made in favour of the secretary to the Election Commission was a mandatory requirement, and commission to do so as a substantial non-compliance with the provisions section. Their Lordships, however, invoked the proviso to section 116A (3) to hold that if the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned, the defect in making the deposit could also be corrected, if the ends of justice required it, and observed that in such a case "the appeal may be deemed to be filed when the proper receipt is produced, and the delay in filling the appeal can be condoned under section 116A". With all respect, we arc unable to think that this could be the intent or the scope of the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 116A and we do not feel persuaded to allow any such opportunity to the appellant to rectify the defect. 24. For the reasons mentioned above, the preliminary objection about the appellant's failure to comply with the provisions of section 119A of the Act is correct and must be allowed. We would therefore dismiss the appeal but, in all the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.Appeal dismissed. *******