JUDGMENT T.K. Joseph, J. 1. The appellants are defendants 1 and 2 in the suit. The Civil miscellaneous appeal arises from an order of remand. 2. The suit was for a declaration that the plaintiffs were the nearest reversioners of one Kesava Pillai (deceased) and for setting aside an order in O. S. No. 288 of 1950 declaring defendants 1 and 2 as the legal representatives of Kesava Pillai. The trial court held that defendants 1 and 2 were the heirs of Kesava Pillai, being his widow and daughter, that the suit was not maintainable as the legal representatives of one Thanu Pillai -- one of the brothers of Kesava Pillai -- were not impleaded and that S.42 of the Specific Relief Act was a bar to the suit. The trial court accordingly dismissed the suit. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the lower appellate court set aside the decree and remanded the suit for fresh decision after impleading the heirs of Thanu Pillai. It was however observed by the learned District Judge that he would have agreed with the view that the suit was not maintainable under S.42 of the Specific Relief Act but for the order of remand he made. In the words of the learned Judge, the remand was ordered "in the interests of justice." 3. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that this was not a fit case for giving another opportunity for impleading the heirs of Thanu Pillai. The defendants contended in the written statement that the heirs of Thanu Pillai were necessary parties. The position taken by the plaintiffs was that Thanu Pillai had married his wife in the "sambandhom" form and that his children would not therefore acquire any right, as the parties are governed by Hindu Law as modified by custom. It was agreed by both sides in the court below that children by a marriage in "thalikettu" form alone would inherit. They adhered to this position until the suit was dismissed by the trial court. One of the grounds taken in appeal was that the children of Thanu Pillai could not be deemed to be his heirs. Another ground was that if it were held that they were heirs, an opportunity may be given to implead them. The question is whether it can be said that the trial court wrongly refused to implead these persons. 4. Another ground was that if it were held that they were heirs, an opportunity may be given to implead them. The question is whether it can be said that the trial court wrongly refused to implead these persons. 4. It is not as though the plaintiffs applied for impleading them and the court refused to grant the prayer. Following the decision of the Madras High Court in Naba Kumar v Ridhashayam Mahish (AIR 1923 Mad. 337) the Lahore High Court held in Raghbar Dayal v. Firm Piare Lal (AIR 1933 Lah. 93) that when the objection as to non joinder of necessary parties is taken at the very outset and the plaintiffs do not implead them, the suit must be dismissed. The learned District Judge observed: "I should think that the lower court did not do justice to the appellants in this case since they were not allowed to implead the proper parties before an adjudication as to the rival contentions raised in the suit." This does not appeal to be correct, as the plaintiffs did not want the proper parties to be impleaded. 5. As regards the bar under S.42 of the Specific Relief Act the learned Judge held: "The learned counsel of the respondents has stated that the suit is liable to be dismissed by virtue of provisions of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act since the appellants did not pray for any consequential relief in the suit and that the suit for mere declaration as such is not maintainable. I would have accepted the above contention if I do not propose to remand the suit to the lower court." This means that even if the children of Thanu Pillai are impleaded, the suit may not be maintainable in which case there is no justification for the remand. (As observed by Ramaswami J. in Ramakrishna v. Rangayya ( AIR 1954 Mad. 783 ) the use of the expression "in the interests of justice" will not make an order of remand legal where it is not justified in law. 6. This suit has been pending for nearly seven years, and there is no justification for giving it a further lease of life unless the lower appellate court comes to the definite conclusion that the decree of the trial court is wrong. 7. It follows that the order of remand has to be set aside. 6. This suit has been pending for nearly seven years, and there is no justification for giving it a further lease of life unless the lower appellate court comes to the definite conclusion that the decree of the trial court is wrong. 7. It follows that the order of remand has to be set aside. The civil miscellaneous appeal is accordingly allowed and the lower appellate court, is Directed to take the appeal back on file and dispose of it in accordance with law. The appellants will get their costs in this court from the plaintiffs respondents.