Judgment Tarkeshwar Nath, J. 1. This appeal, by the plaintiff, arises out of a suit for enforcing a simple mortgage bond dated the 10th August, 1943, executed by Girish Chandra Biswas and defendants 1 and 3 in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 2000. Girish Chandra Biswas had two sons, namely, Ratneshwar Biswas and Ramapati Biswas (defendants 2 and 1 respectively). Ratnashwar has four sons, Basanta (Defendant 3), Kalidas, Bamdas and Bankim, whereas Ramapati Biswas has a minor son Tapash Kumar. The plaintiffs case was that for the reclamation of gair-mazrue lands in village Banda belonging to the joint family of the defendants they approached the plaintiff-bank for an over-draft to the limit of Rs. 2000; and Girish Chandra Biswas and defendants 1 and 3 executed a simple mortgage deed on the 10th August, 1943, for the over-draft loan agreeing to pay the loan with interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum by the 31st December, 1944. Defendant 2 was a lunatic and was represented by his eldest brother, defendant 1, as curator and guardian. All the defendants were joint and Girish Chandra Biswas was the head member of his family. He died in 1950 (1949 ?) and after him deft. 1 became the head member of the said family. The loan was incurred for the benefit of the joint family, and the defendants were in possession of the assets left by Girish Chandra Biswas. The mortgage was in respect of a house with lands bearing holding No. 35 in the town of Hazaribagh. The defendants made few payments; and they were all noted in the account up to December, 1944, when the limit of the said over-draft was raised to Rs. 4000. For the extended limit the defendants assigned some of their life policies by way of security; and the plaintiff-bank adjusted a sum of Rs. 2,345/147- as surrender value of those policies pledged with the bank. The plaintiff further adjusted a sum of Rs. 1504/12/-, which was the amount of the Provident Fund belonging to defendant 1, as that, as welt, was pledged. Girish Chandra and defendants 1 and 3 executed a handnote as well on the 23rd December, 1944, for a sum of Rs. 2000 by way of additional security for the extended limit of the over draft. 1504/12/-, which was the amount of the Provident Fund belonging to defendant 1, as that, as welt, was pledged. Girish Chandra and defendants 1 and 3 executed a handnote as well on the 23rd December, 1944, for a sum of Rs. 2000 by way of additional security for the extended limit of the over draft. The advances having been made by way of over-drafts, the plaintiff was entitled to charge compound interest in respect of such advances according to the banking practice. According to the schedule of accounts given in the plaint, which contained the various debit and credit entries, the plaintiff claimed a sum of Rs. 5,239/9/8 in the present suit from the defendants; and the prayer was for a preliminary mortgage decree for this sum under Order 34, Civil Procedure Code, in respect of the house, which W2s the subject-matter of the mortgage bond. As the defendants failed to make any payment, the plaintiff instituted the suit, out of which this appeal arises, on the 2nd January, 1957. 2. Defendant 2 being a lunatic, his guardian filed a formal written statement; defendant 1 did not appear; and the real contest was by defendant 3. Defendant 3 contested the suit on grounds, inter alia, that it was barred by limitation; and the suit was bad for non-joinder of his three brothers who are necessary parties in this suit. According to him, the sums advanced were repaid long ago with interest upon them. There was no agreement for payment of compound interest. The family was not joint; and - defendant 1 was the youngest son of Girish Chandra Biswas; and not the eldest. Defendant 2 became a lunatic more than twenty years ago; and his whereabouts were not known. After the death of Girish Chandra Biswas in 1949, defendant 3 and his three brothers-inherited half share of the mortgaged house; and in 1950, all the four brothers got the entire mortgaged house in their share on the basis of an amicable partition with, defendant 1. After that partition, they had exclusive title in respect of the said house. He was not liable to pay the sum of Rs. 808 which was advanced before the. 10th August, 1943; and besides that there was no liability for the payment of Rs. 3552/11/9, which was drawn. In excess of Rs. 2,000. After that partition, they had exclusive title in respect of the said house. He was not liable to pay the sum of Rs. 808 which was advanced before the. 10th August, 1943; and besides that there was no liability for the payment of Rs. 3552/11/9, which was drawn. In excess of Rs. 2,000. The surrender value of the life, policies and the amount of Provident Fund adjusted by the plaintiff were very much less than their actual and real value. He further asserted that he did not derive any benefit from the loans in question; and the plaintiff was not entitled to make, any claim against him. 3. Issues 4, 5 and 6 were in the following terms: "4. Is the suit bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties? 5. Is the claim for compound interest valid and legal? 6. Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree and if so for what amount and against whom?" 4. The learned Subordinate Judge held that Kalidas Bamdas and Bankim, the three brothers of defendant 3, were necessary parties to the suit as they had a right to redeem but on that ground the suit was not liable to be dismissed; and it was still open to the plaintiff to get a mortgage decree in respect of the 10 annas share of defendants 1 and 3 in the mortgaged property. He further found that the plaintiff was entitled to get a decree, for a sum of Rs. 2000 only, inasmuch as the amount of loan advanced up to the 31st December, 1944, and up to the limit of Rs. 2,000 as principal money only was covered by the mortgage bond in question; and any amount advanced beyond the limit of Rs. 2,000 during the period of the mortgage or at any time thereafter could not be deemed to have been secured by the said mortgage bond. He refused the claim with regard to the compound interest and concluded that plaintiff was entitled to get a decree for Rs. 2000 as principal money besides simple interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum to be calculated on the advance up to Rs. 2,000 till the 31st December, 1944, and thereafter interest at the same rate on the principal amount of Rs. 2,000 from the 1st January, 1945, till the date of the suit. 2000 as principal money besides simple interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum to be calculated on the advance up to Rs. 2,000 till the 31st December, 1944, and thereafter interest at the same rate on the principal amount of Rs. 2,000 from the 1st January, 1945, till the date of the suit. Pendente lite interest as well was allowed at the same rate on the principal amount. The result was that he decreed the suit in part as against defendants 1 and 3 only but dismissed it against defendant 2 fixing three months time as the period of grace. Being aggrieved by this decree, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal, whereas defendants 1 and 3 have filed a cross-objection. 5. Learned counsel far the appellant contended that the Subordinate Judge was not right in passing a decree for 10 annas share only of the mortgaged property. He urged that Ratneshwar Biswas, defendant 2, being a lunatic, was disqualified from inheriting any share in the property, which belonged to Girish Chanda Biswas; and that being so, the four sons as well of defendant 2 were not entitled to any share in the properly of their grandfather, Girish Chandra Biswas. He thus pointed out that after the death of Girish Chandra Biswas, Ramapati (defendant 1) alone was entitled to the entire mortgaged house; and the Court below ought to have passed a mortgage decree in respect of the 16 annas share of that house. He referred to section 98 of the Principles of Hindu Law by D.F. Mulla, 12th Edition, where the learned author took note of the defects and diseases which exclude an heir from inheritance. Under that heading it has been mentioned in Clause (c) as follows: "Lunacy. This need not be congenital or incurable to exclude the heir from inheritance. It is enough if it exists at the time when the succession opens." The same appears to be the situation from the 11th Edition of Maynes Hindu Law and Usage; and the following passage at page 714 is relevant:- - "Manu states the following grounds of disqualification: Impotent persons and outcastes, persons born blind or deaf, the insane, idiots, and the dumb as well as those deficient in any organ (of action or sensation) receive no share" (Manu IX, 201). The evidence in the present case indicates that Girish Chandra Biswas died in 1949; and the case of defendant 3 himself was that Ratneshwar had become lunatic for the last twenty years. There can be thus no doubt that Ratneshwar was a lunatic at the time when the succession opened in 1949 after the death of Girish Chandra Biswas. Accordingly, Ratneshwar must be excluded from inheriting any share. The question, however, remains as to whether his four sons including defendant 3 were entitled to any share in the property which belonged to their grandfather, Girish Chandra Biswas, deceased. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that defendant 3 and his three brothers were not entitled to get any share in the property of their grandfather; and the only person, who was entitled to a share, was defendant 1, who was the son of Girish Chandra Biswas. He referred to Section 88 of the Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla 12th edition, where it has bean mentioned that the sapindas succeed in the following order:- - "1-3. Son, grandson and great-grandson" Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that according to this order, which related to succession according to Dayabhag school, so long as the son was alive, the grandson and the great-grandson were not entitled to get any share in the property of their grandfather and great-grandfather. He referred to Section 43 as well of the same book which dealt with the order of succession among sapindas according to the Mitakshara school and pointed out a passage which reads thus:- - , "A son, a grandson whose father is dead, and a great-grandson whose father and grandfather are both dead, succeed simultaneously as a single heir to the separate or self acquired property of the deceased with rights of survivorship." He submitted that according to the Mitakshara school, the sort, the grandson and the great-grandson succeeded simultaneously, whereas, according to the Dhayabhag school these three heirs did not succeed simultaneously; and, on the other hand, the son being alive, be alone succeeded to his fathers property in its entirety. The passage in Sec. 43 relates only to the succession of a separate or self-acquired property; and in respect of that property that learned author mentioned that those heirs would succeed simultaneously as a single heir. The passage in Sec. 43 relates only to the succession of a separate or self-acquired property; and in respect of that property that learned author mentioned that those heirs would succeed simultaneously as a single heir. The position in respect, of joint family properties also was the same in the sense that the son, the grandson and the great-grandson were entitled to the properties by survivorship; but the learned author took the precaution of mentioning that those three heirs succeeded simultaneously as a single heir in respect of separate, or self-acquired property of the deceased as well. The order of succession mentioned in Section 88 does not mean that the son being alive the grandson end the great-grandson would not get any share in the property of the grandfather and the great-grandfather. "1-3. Son, grandson and great-grandson" have been mentioned in one line; and next to them comes the widow, who was mentioned in item 4. The point will be further clear by referring to Section 86 of the same book; and the following can be usefully quoted:- - "Principles governing precedence among sapindas. The order of succession among sapindas is governed by the following principles:-- (1) Those who offer a pinda to the deceased are preferred to these who accept it from the deceased. Thus, the son, grandson and great-grandson offer oblations to the deceased, and the father, grandfather and great-grand-father receive oblations from the deceased; therefore, the son, grandson, and great-grandson succeed before the lather, grand-father, etc. The son, grandson and great-grandson all inherit as one heir, for the oblations offered ny them are of equal spiritual value." The position thus is that the son, grandson and great-grandson are entitled to inharit as one heir the property of their father, grandfather and great-grandfather. Accordingly, when succession opened, after the death of Girish Chandra Biswas in 1949, defendant 3 and his three brothers as well were entitled to a share in the mortgaged property; and their share would be two annas each as calculated by the learned Subordinate Judge. I thus do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel that these four brothers were not entitled to any share and that the entire mortgaged property came to be owned by defendant 1 alone after the death of Girish Chandra Biswas. 6. I thus do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel that these four brothers were not entitled to any share and that the entire mortgaged property came to be owned by defendant 1 alone after the death of Girish Chandra Biswas. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant, in support of the contention mentioned above, relied on the decision in Kenchawa V/s. Girimallappa, AIR 1924 PC 209. According to the ganealogical table of that case, it appears that Hanmanna had two sons, Vadakappa and Ramanna and a daughter Basava. Vadakappa had two daughters, Kenchava and Gangava (defendants 1 and 2), and a son, Hanmapps. Basava had a son Girimalappa (plaintiff). Ramanna left a widow Chanbasava; and they had adopted Parappa as their son. Ramanna died some time in 1911 or 1912; and his widow, Chanbasava was murdered by Hanmappa in 1914. Parappa (adopted son) died one month after Ramanna, Hanmappa was sentenced to transportation for life for the murder of Chanbasava. The question arose as to who was entitled to succeed as heir to Parappas properties. Defendants 1 and 2 obtained possession of the properties; and thereupon the plaintiff sued claiming to have a better title. The defendants being in possession asserted their better title and also pressed that they had a real title through, the murderer, Hanmappa. A question arose as to whether the murderer Hanmappa could succeed; and if not, whether title could be claimed through him? Their Lordships affirmed the view of the High Court that on principles, of equity, justice and good conscience, the murderer should be excluded from inheriting any share the second question for decision was as to whether title could be claimed through the murderer; and their Lordships were of the opinion that the courts below were right in holding that the murderer should be treated as non-existant and not as one who formed the stock for a fresh line of descent. It should be noticed that in that case defendants 1 and 2 were claiming title through the murderer Hanmappa as being his sisters; and in that manner they wanted to have precedence over the plaintiffs claim, who was the cousin of Hanmappa. If a person claims title through a disqualified person, then certainly his claim has to be negatived. It should be noticed that in that case defendants 1 and 2 were claiming title through the murderer Hanmappa as being his sisters; and in that manner they wanted to have precedence over the plaintiffs claim, who was the cousin of Hanmappa. If a person claims title through a disqualified person, then certainly his claim has to be negatived. But this is not the position in the present appeal, inasmuch as defendant 3 and his three brothers are entitled to get a share after the death of their grandfather in his property. The next decision relied upon is in Mt. Budha Kuer V/s. Mt Sahodra Kuer, AIR 1931 Pat 367. The facts were like these Sheosaran Misra had two sons, Thag Misra and Mathura Misra. Plaintiff Sahodra Kuer was the widow of Thag Misra. Musammat Budha Kuer (defendant 1) was the widow of Sheosaran Misra. Defendant 1 executed a usufructuary mortgage bond in favour of defendant 2. Sheosaran Misra died leaving his widow (defendant 1) and his two sons. Mathura Misra died in 1918; and the revisional settlement took place in 1919. In the record of rights the name of defendant 1 along with Thag Misra came to be recorded in respect of the land belonging to Sheosaran Misra including the land in dispute. The plaintiffs case was that after the death of Mathura Misra, her husband Thag Misra succeeded to the properties of Sheosaran Misra and had been in possession thereof, but defendant 1 wrongfully got her name along with Thag Misra recorded in the revisional settlement records, and she was offering resistance to his possession. The plaintiff claimed declaration that she, as the heir of Thag Misra, was entitled to succeed to the properties. Defendant 1 contested the claim on the ground that Thag Misra was deaf and dumb from his birth; and, as such, he was excluded from the inheritance under the Hindu Law. Accordingly, the plaintiff (widow of Thag Misra) could not inherit the properties in dispute. It was held that Thag Misra, being deaf and dumb from his birth and his disease being incurable, was excluded from inheritance. It was further observed that Thag did not take anything and could not, therefore, transmit any share to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff (widow of Thag Misra) could not inherit the properties in dispute. It was held that Thag Misra, being deaf and dumb from his birth and his disease being incurable, was excluded from inheritance. It was further observed that Thag did not take anything and could not, therefore, transmit any share to the plaintiff. Here, as well, it is important to keep in view that Sahodra Kuer, the plaintiff of that suit, was claiming title to the properties through her husband, Thag Misra, who was deaf and dumb from his very birth. This is the main distinction so far as the facts of that case and the present appeal are concerned. The position in Mt. Jind Kuer V/s. Indar Singh, AIR 1922 Lah 293 referred to by learned counsel was similar, in that case Ram Singh was sentenced to death for the murder of Dayal Singh; and a question arose as to who was entitled to succeed to the estate of Dayal Singh. Indar Singh, one of the plaintiffs, was the son of Ram Singh. Dayal Singh had left two daughters, defendants 1 and 2. It was held that Indar Singh as the son of the murderer $6uld not be allowed to benefit by the murder committed by his father; and he was, therefore, debarred from succeeding to the estate of Dayal Singh. In other words, the murderers right in such a case was swept away and with it was carried away the right of every one who claimed through him. On this principle tnder Singh, the plaintiff of that case, could not claim a title through his father Ram Singh, who was the murderer. This decision as well has no application on the facts of the present case. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the three brothers of defendant 3 had six annas share and the plaintiff was not entitled to enforce the mortgage, in respect of that share. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant next contends that the trial court was not right in decreeing the suit for a sum of Rs. 2000 in respect of which the mortgage bond was executed; and, on the other hand, it should have granted a decree for the entire sum claimed in the suit. He mentioned certain events in this connection. On the 8th February, 1943, Girish Chandra. 2000 in respect of which the mortgage bond was executed; and, on the other hand, it should have granted a decree for the entire sum claimed in the suit. He mentioned certain events in this connection. On the 8th February, 1943, Girish Chandra. Biswas and defendants 1 and 3 sent a letter Exhibit 5(i), to the plaintiff for accommodation up to Rs. 5,000 by way of an over draft in the current account with the bank. The bank, however, allowed an over draft to the extent of Rs. 800 initially. The first advance by the bank was on the 17th July, 1943, for a sum of Rs. 300; and a day prior to that there was a credit entry in respect of Rs. 10 only in the current account standing in the name of an "agricultural farm" to be operated upon either by Girish Chandra Biswas or by defendant 1 or 3. The total amount of loan up to the 29th July, 1943, came to Rs. 808/2/-. On the- 10th August, 1943, the mortgage bond, Exhibit 2, was executed by those three persons to secure the amount of loan to the extent of Rs. 2,000. On the 11th August, 1943, they applied to the plaintiff-bank to raise the limit of over draft up to Rs. 2,000, vide exhibit 5(d) and on the following date the limit was raised to that extent. On the 3rd October, 1944, defendants 1 and 3 applied, vide Exhibit 3, to raise the limit of the over-draft up to Rs. 5,000; and they offered to pledge three life policies and give in security the amount of the Provident Fund deposit as well. On the 18th December, 1944, the Board of Directors of the bank decided to raise the limit up to Rs. 4,000, vide exhibit 6, on the security of the house property, Provident Fund, life policies and crops. On the 22nd December, 1944, defendants 1 and 3 sent a letter Exhibit 5 (f), to the plaintiff for further advances in view of the fact that the limit of over draft had been extended to Rs. 4.000/-, and they promised to assign the life policies and execute a pronate as well. The bank sanctioned on the same date an over draft up to Rs. 4,000 subject to defendants 1 and 3 executing a pronote and assigning their policies. 4.000/-, and they promised to assign the life policies and execute a pronate as well. The bank sanctioned on the same date an over draft up to Rs. 4,000 subject to defendants 1 and 3 executing a pronote and assigning their policies. On the 23rd December, 1944, Girish Chandra Biswas and defendants 1 and 3 executed a handnote, Exhibit 4, for a sum of Rs. 2,000. Learned counsel pointed out from the statement of account, Exhibit 1 (a), that the advances were up to the 25th January, 1945, end, thereafter, the amount of the Provident Fund was adjusted on the 15th December, 1956. After the adjustment, a sum of Rs. 5239/9/8 was due; and that was claimed in the present suit by the plaintiff. Learned counsel submitted that the limit of over draft having been extended from time to time and the debtors having pledged their life policies and the amount of their Provident Fund, it should be held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the entire amount as claimed and the mortgage bond, Exhibit 2, was in respect of all the sums advanced from the beginning and right up the end of the transacttion. It is necessary to consider the recitals of the mortgage bond. Exhibit 2, itself, in order to ascertain the correct position. The relevant passage runs thus: "We, the executants, shall take and repay money under receipt under the said account up to the 31st December, 1944, subject to the following conditions under receipts, in ether words, we, the executants, entered into agreement with the Chotanagpur Banking Association Ltd., that at no time the balance of the principal amount due by us, the executants shall exceed Rs. 2,000, that is to say, Rs. 2,000 has been fixed as a limit of the principal amount of the said account. We shall repay in full whatever amount on account of principal and interest shall remain due from us on the 31st December, 1944. We shall pay interest at the rate of 7 per cent, per annum on the amount taken from the date of taking it until repayment. As a security for the said amount of Rs. We shall repay in full whatever amount on account of principal and interest shall remain due from us on the 31st December, 1944. We shall pay interest at the rate of 7 per cent, per annum on the amount taken from the date of taking it until repayment. As a security for the said amount of Rs. 2,000, principal, besides interest, under the said current account, we, the executants, mortgaged and hypothecated the brick built tile-roofed house as per boundaries given below situate at Mahalla Nawabganj, Hazaribagh, bearing holding No. 35.................." The limit of the over draft was fixed and it was not to exceed Rs. 2,000. The mortgage was only in respect of this amount and not in respect of all the advances. The terms and the recitals of the mort gage bond do not justify the plaintiffs claim for the en tire amount; and any amount advanced beyond the limit of Rs. 2,000 cannot be held to have been secured by this mortgage bond. Accordingly, the contention raised by learned counsel has no merit. 8. The plaintiff here is faced with another difficulty. The suit was based on the mortgage bond itself; and the cause of action for the suit according to paragraph 8 of the plaint arose on the: 31st December, 1944, which was the stipulated date for payment as mentioned in the mortgage deed. The plaintiff wanted a preliminary mortgage decree on the basis of the bond itself. The suit was not on the basis of the current account; and the claim of the plaintiff has to be considered as disclosed in the plaint. Apart from this, the suit having been filed on the 2nd January, 1957, the claim in respect of other advances is obviously barred by time. The trial court was thus right in holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim any sum which was not secured by the mortgage bond, Exhibit 2. 9. Another grievance of learned counsel for the appellant is that the Court below was not right in refusing compound interest on the sums advanced from time to time. There was no stipulation in the mortgage bond for payment of compound interest; and the trial Court observed that there was no reliable evidence on record to justify the claim of compound interest on the basis of the alleged banking practice. There was no stipulation in the mortgage bond for payment of compound interest; and the trial Court observed that there was no reliable evidence on record to justify the claim of compound interest on the basis of the alleged banking practice. P. W. 1, the accountant of the plaintiff, made a general statement that compound interest was being charged according to the banking practice. But it appears from the cross-examination that he was not aware whether there was such a practice for charging compound interest in cases of loans which were advanced and secured by a mortgage bond stipulating simple interest. In these circumstances, the trial Court was right in not allowing compound interest. Learned counsel, however, pointed out that, according to the notification issued in accordance with the provisions of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, the plaintiff-bank could not be debarred from charging compound interest of sums advance ed by way of an over-draft. But that question need not be gone into, as the suit is for enforcing the mortgage bond, which does not authorise the plaintiff for charging compound interest. 10. Learned counsel further pointed that the decree prepared by the trial Court, was not in accordance with the judgment, inasmuch as the Court had held that the plaintiff was entitled to get a decree for Rs. 2,000 besides simple interest st the rate of 7 per cent, per annum; but while preparing the decree this direction was overlooked and the decree directed that the plaintiff was entitled "to get 10 annas share of the landed property, which comes to Rs. 3275". He submitted that as the Court had taken the view that the plaintiff was entitled to enforce the mortgage bond in respect of the -/10.00 annas share only of the house, it had reduced the total claim of Rs. 5,239/9/8 proportionately and arrived at a figure, Rs. 3,275; but this process was not correct, in view of the directions given in the judgment. I find great force in this contention. But the amount to which the plaintiff will be entitled in the present appeal will be hereinafter determined when I shall consider the cross-objection filed by defendants 1 and 3, inasmuch as they also have taken an objection that the decree prepared by the trial Court was wrong. I find great force in this contention. But the amount to which the plaintiff will be entitled in the present appeal will be hereinafter determined when I shall consider the cross-objection filed by defendants 1 and 3, inasmuch as they also have taken an objection that the decree prepared by the trial Court was wrong. These were the points urged in the appeal; but there is no merit in them except that the decree was not in accordance with the judgment. The latter objection, however, will not give any relief to the appellant, which will appear when I shall consider the cross-objection. 11. Defendants 1 and 3 together have filed a cross-objection. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that the cross-objection of defendant 1 was barred by time; but even then cross-objection of defendant 3 has to be considered on merits, Mr. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh for the cross-objector submitted that the three brothers of defendant 3 not having been made parties to this mortgage suit, the suit was not maintainable in their absences and it ought to have been dismissed. He, however, fairly conceded that the decision in Mt. Waleyatunnissa Begum V/s. Mt. Chalakhi, AIR 1931 Pat 164, was against his contention. It was held in that case that, as a general rule, ail persons, having the equity of redemption ought to be brought on the record; but the failure to bring any one of them on the record did not in every case necessitate the dismissal of the suit and that the combined effect of Order 1, Rule 9 and Order 34, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, in so far as mortgagees were concerned, was that all persons whose rights and interest may be adjudicated upon and determined in the suit ought to be added as parties, but failure to add one or more of such persons should not have the effect of defeating the suit, if the Court in their absence could deal with the matters in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. Learned counsel could not press this point any further. His another objection was that defendant 3 was not liable for the dues inasmuch as the entire amount of loan was drawn by cheques issued by defendant 1 alone. Learned counsel could not press this point any further. His another objection was that defendant 3 was not liable for the dues inasmuch as the entire amount of loan was drawn by cheques issued by defendant 1 alone. The account was opened by Girish Chandra Biswas and defendants 1 and 3; end it was open to any one of them to operate on it. Besides this, the mortgage bond, Exhibit 2, was executed by defendant 3 as well. This being the position, it must be held that defendant 3 as well was liable; and the Court below was right in passing a decree against him as well. 12. Mr. Ghosh further submitted that the plaintiff-mortgagee net having impleaded the three brothers of defendant 3 in this suit, it was clear that the integrity of the mortgage was broken up by the mortgagee itself; and that being so, the mortgagee was not entitled to claiming entire sum from defendants 1 and 3. In other words, according to him, some of the persons interested in the mortgage security having been left out, the mortgages could not cast additional burden on the other mortgagors by claiming the entire sum from them alone. He suggested that as the plaintiff was entitled to enforce the mortgage bond in respect of 10 annas share only of defendants 1 and 3 in the mortgaged house, the mortgage amount also should be deduced proportionately. In support of this contention he relied on the very same case, AIR 1931 Pat 164. It was held there that a mortgage contract was no. doubt indivisible; and that every bit of mortgaged property stood as a security for the whole of the mortgage money; but it was always open to the mortgagee to release a portion of the mortgaged property from the mortgage lien and the mortgagors could not dispute his right to do so, provided that no additional burden was sast on any portion of the mortgaged premises. In that case, the parties were Mahomedans; and the share of each of the heirs of the original mortgagors was defined by law. In those circumstances, the mortgagee could give up his mortgage lien on the share of any one of the mortgagors by making a proportionate deduction of the mortgage money and enforce his mortgage for the balance as against the shares, of the other heirs who were on the record. In those circumstances, the mortgagee could give up his mortgage lien on the share of any one of the mortgagors by making a proportionate deduction of the mortgage money and enforce his mortgage for the balance as against the shares, of the other heirs who were on the record. I find great force in this contention; and it will be only just and equitable that when a mortgagee has omitted to implead a person who is a necessary party in a suit for enforcing the mortgage bond, he should not get a decree so far as the share of that person, if ascertainable, is concerned, and the claim as well should be reduced proportionately having regard to the share of the person not impleaded. On this basis, the liability of defendants 1 and 3 will be only in respect of 10 annas share. The mortgage bond, Exhibit 2, was in respect of Rs. 2,000; and after giving a proportionate deduction in respect of the liabilities of the three brothers of defendant 3, who are not parties to this suit, the liability of defendants 1 and 3 will be only for a sum of Rs. 1250 on the footing that, they had 10 annas share in the mortgaged property. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, in any event the plaintiff was entitled to interest from the 31st December, 1944, which was the date fixed for payment. He is right in this submission; and the plaintiff will get interest this amount of Rs. 1250 at the rate of 7 per cent; per annum from the 31st December, 1944, till the institution of the suit. 13. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The cross-objection of defendant 1 is dismissed, but that of defendant 3 is allowed in part; and the judgment and the decree of the trial Court are modified. The plaintiff is entitled to mortgage decree against defendants 1 and 3 in respect, of their 10 annas share in the mortgaged house for a sum1 of Rs. 1250, principal, besides interest at the rate of 7 per cent, per annum from the 31st December, 1944, till the date of the suit as mentioned above and also till the date now fixed for payment. A period of three months from today is fixed as the period of grace. 1250, principal, besides interest at the rate of 7 per cent, per annum from the 31st December, 1944, till the date of the suit as mentioned above and also till the date now fixed for payment. A period of three months from today is fixed as the period of grace. The plaintiff will be entitled to costs of both the Courts In proportion to its success. Subsequent interest on the aggregate of the principal, interest and costs is allowed at the rate of six per cent, per annum till the date of realization or actual payment. Let a preliminary decree be drawn up on these lines. H.Mahapatra, J. 14 I agree.