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1964 DIGILAW 40 (PAT)

Lilju Mandal v. Chandra Devi

1964-02-21

A.B.N.SINHA, S.C.MISRA

body1964
Judgment S.C.Misra, J. 1. These two appeals have been heard together. They arise out of a partition suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent for carving out of her share in the joint family properties. The appeal is by the defendants including Nos. 6 and 7 Ram Chandra Prasad and Bindeshwari Prasad. Miscellaneous Appeal No. 53 of 1960 is directed against the award filed by the arbitrators in the suit in which reference was made by the learned Subordinate Judge and the first Appeal No. 56 of 1960 is directed against a decree on the basis of the award. It is" not necessary to set out the facts of these appeals in detail because the appeals can be disposed of on one simple ground, which alone has been pressed before us by learned counsel for the appellants. 2. It has been contended that the reference to the arbitrators was made by the Court at the instance of the plaintiff and the defendants other than appellants 6 and 7 who were under the guardianship of Kadamlal Mandal appellant No. 4 their father. It is true that Kadamlal Mandal made the application for reference of the dispute between the parties to arbitration joining with other defendants and signed the petition for himself as also as guardian of his minor sons, defendants 6 and 7. But the learned Subordinate Judge did not pass any order for reference in compliance with the terms of Order 32 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, he did not apply his mind to the facts as to whether the reference to arbitration was for the benefit of the minors concerned. The point urged in support of the appeals and against the validity of the award as also of the decree is that the provisions of Order 32 Rule 7 are mandatory, and non-compliance with those provisions by the court making the reference) whose duty it is to look to the interest of the minors, vitiated the reference itself. If the reference, therefore, was bad in law, the award on the basis of the reference was also vitiated and in consequence non-existent. Further if the award was thus vitiated the decree passed upon the award would also automatically fall to the ground. 3. If the reference, therefore, was bad in law, the award on the basis of the reference was also vitiated and in consequence non-existent. Further if the award was thus vitiated the decree passed upon the award would also automatically fall to the ground. 3. In support of his contention learned Counsel for the appellants has drawn our attention to a number of decisions first of which is in the case of Chhabha Lal v. Kallu Lal, AIR 1946 PC 72. In that case their Lordships of the Judicial Committee laid down that Rule 7 of Order 32 of the Civil Procedure Code is imperative and its terms must be strictly complied with. It is true that the decision makes it clear that where the guardian signs the agreement without qualification, that is without specifying whether he is acting in his own capacity or as, guardian-ad-litem of the minors he must have taken to have signed in all capacities in which his signature is required, in the present case, it is conceded by learned counsel that Kadamlal had not only signed for himself but also stated that he was doing so as guardian of the minors. It has, however, been laid down further in that decision that where there was no formal application by the guardian-ad-litem for the leave of the Court for entering into the agreement for reference to arbitration, nor was any such leave formally given, or expressly recorded in the proceedings, the reference itself would be hit as bad in law. It was held that the policy of the law in regard to Order 32 Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure, was that the Judge making the reference must realise that he is dealing with the guardian-ad-litem of the minors and that the leave of the Court must be expressly recorded in the proceedings, so that it may become clear that the Judge has satisfied himself that the reference is for the benefit of the minors concerned. It may be stated that Mr. It may be stated that Mr. De appearing for the respondent has not challenged the position, except to this extent that the observation of Privy Council that where the award has been given by the arbitrators without the reference having been made in full compliance with Order 32 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the award is not a nullity, as was laid down in that case, but that it is merely an irregularity. In fairness to Mr. Jha for the appellants it must be stated that he has not pressed that part of the observation of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, which appears to have been slightly modified in the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bishudoeo Narain V/s. Seogeni Rai, AIR 1951 SC 280 and Kaushalya Devi V/s. Baijnath Sayal, AIR. 1961 SC 790. According to these two decisions, failure to comply with the formalities of Order 32 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not render the award itself a nullity but only makes Avoidable as against the minors concerned so that the minors should be at liberty to challenge the award in an appropriate proceeding. 4. The next point raised by Mr. Jha in support of the appeal is that the question whether failure to comply with the formalities of Order 32 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure has rendered the award a nullity or mad3 it merely voidable is irrelevant in the context of the present appeals inasmuch as these appeals have been preferred by the minors as well. 5. Mr. B. C. De has drawn our attention to a (SIC) sion of the Division Bench of this Court in Kedar Nath V/s. Basant Lal, AIR 1939 Pat 278. That case also lays down that where a minor is a party to the litigation, no effective reference to arbitration can be made by the parties, unless the next friend or the guardian-ad-litem first obtains leave of the Court to agree to any such reference, permission in general terms by the Court that the matter may be referred to arbitration is not sufficient. The Court must first be asked by the guardian of the minor for leave to permit him to agree to the reference to the arbitration and the Court must specifically record its reasons for giving or refusing such permission. The Court must first be asked by the guardian of the minor for leave to permit him to agree to the reference to the arbitration and the Court must specifically record its reasons for giving or refusing such permission. It is only after obtaining the leave of the Court that the guardian can agree to a reference to the arbitration. That is clearly laid down under Order 32 R, 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which also provides that the minor concerned can avoid the award or decree if there is no compliance with the requirements of this Rule. Mr. De, however, has laid stress upon the fact that the Judgment also proceeds to lay down that the minor alone can avoid the award or decree but the other parties to the reference cannot do so. This decision also, however, is of no assistance to learned counsel inasmuch as, as 1 have said above, this appeal has been preferred on behalf of defendants 6 and 7, who are minors and, therefore, the principle of this decision does hot staid in their way. 6. To get over this difficulty, Mr. De has urged that in any case attempt to avoid the award by the minors should have been made in the court of the Subordinate Judge, inasmuch as Article 158 of the Indian Limitation Act provides a period of thirty days for application by a party to an arbitration proceeding from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award for setting it aside or getting it remitted for reconsideration, and in no other circumstances can the award be set aside. In my opinion, however, the point raised cannot be accepted as valid. The power of the court of appeal in the matter of dealing with the objections to an award is coextensive with the power of the original court and it can exercise that power in the same manner as the court which makes the reference to arbitration. Mr. De has further urged that this must be subject to the period of limitation laid down under Art, 158 of the Limitation Act. Mr. De has further urged that this must be subject to the period of limitation laid down under Art, 158 of the Limitation Act. In my opinion, however, Art. 158 applies to a case where an award is to be avoided on grounds other than those contemplated under Order 32 Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure, for example, if the award is to be avoided for misconduct of the arbitrator, or failure to observe the rule of natural justice in recording the award without hearing the parties to the proceedings or exceeding the terms of reference etc. In that case Art. 158 would be invoked. Where, however, Order 32 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself lays down that when a reference is made without fulfilling the retirements of this rule of law it does not bind the minor and he can avoid it, the, position is entirely different. It is in the very foundation of that rule that there is no award whatsoever so far as the minor is concerned if this rule is not strictly complied with. Article 158 contemplates an award which is within jurisdiction and which would be binding upon the parties to the arbitration proceeding unless it Is avoided in accordance with the provisions of the said Article. The same cannot be said of an award in so far as it affects the interest of the minor where it is given on a reference of which the minor is not a party, In that view of the matter, Article 158 does not stand in the way of the appellants. 7. Apart from that, since the suit has not come to an end but it is continuing in the form of an appeal to a higher Tribunal, as in the present case, minors right to challenge it in terms of Order 32 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure continues in the same manner as it would do before the original court itself free from the limitation of time imposed upon a party under Art. 158 of the Limitation Act. This view was adopted by this Court in Gopa! Choudhary V/s. Mt. Sundari, AIR 1955 Pat 277 . The following observation covers the point completely : "In my opinion, the decisions cited by Mr. Varma cannot be of any assistance to his clients. This view was adopted by this Court in Gopa! Choudhary V/s. Mt. Sundari, AIR 1955 Pat 277 . The following observation covers the point completely : "In my opinion, the decisions cited by Mr. Varma cannot be of any assistance to his clients. The appeal before the lower appellate court was filed by one of the minors, namely, minor defendant 5. The attention of the superior court was thus drawn to the illegality committed by the trial court while making the order of reference, and once the appellate court was apprised of the illegality, it was not possible for that court to have shut its eyes as was held by Sarjoo Prosad J. in the case of Deo Narayan Singh V/s. Siabar Singh, AIR 1952 Pat 461 ". The contention of Mr. De, therefore, must be overruled so far his objection on the ground, of limitation is concerned. 8 In the result, First Appeal No. 56 of 1960 succeeds, the decree : passed by the Court below is set aside and the suit must now proceed in the ordinary course. Attention of the learned Subordinate Judge Is drawn to the fact that the suit has remained pending for a long time and as such it must be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. 9. So far as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 53 of 1960 is concerned, as I have already stated, it is directed against the award filed by the arbitrators leading to the passing of the decree, the subject matter of the First Appeal to this Court. Since the decree itself, upon which it is based, falls to the ground, this appeal also will have to be allowed. Even as it is, however, the award cannot be sustained because it purports to affect the interest of the minors, who were not parties to this. On this ground also this appeal must be allowed. The award is set aside. 10. So far as cost is concerned, in the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs. A.B.N.Sinha, J. 11 I agree.