Sadruddin Suleman Jhaveri v. J. H. Patwardhan. — 1964 DIGILAW 41 (BOM)

judgment- Kotval, J. (1) In this Special Civil Application there are challenged two Notification under the Land Acquisition Act whereby the land of the petitioner has been taken by the State of Maharashtra the third respondent before us. On 24th January 1963 a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued under the signature of the Commissioner of Bombay Division, the first respondent before us. Since almost every paragraph of this Notifications argued before us it is worthwhile to reproduce the whole of this Notifications. It runs as follows :- ""No. LAQ-B - 7244-B- Whereas it appears to the Commissioner, Bombay Division, that the lands specified in the Schedule herein (hereinafter referred to as the said lands) are needed for a public purpose viz. for development and utilisation of lands as an industrial area. It is hereby notified under the provisions of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), that the said lands, are needed for the public purpose specified above. All persons interested in the said lands are hereby warned not to obstruct or interfere with any surveyors or other persons employed upon the said lands for the purpose of the said acquisition. Any contracts for the disposal of the said lands by sale, lease, mortgage, assignment, exchange or otherwise, or any outlay or improvement made therein without the sanction of the Collector, after the date of this notification, will under Section 24 (seventhly) of the said Act, be disregarded by the Officer assessing compensation for such parts of the said lands as may be finally acquired. And whereas the Commissioner, Bombay Division, is of the opinion that the said lands are waste or arable lands and that their acquisition is urgently necessary ; he is further pleased to direct under Sub-section (4) of Section of the said Act that the provisions of Section 5-A of the said Act, shall not apply in respect of the said lands. Under Clause (c) of Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Commissioner, Bombay Division, is pleased to appoint the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ulhas Valley Project, Thana, to perform the functions of a Collector under Section 4(1) of the said Act, in respect of the said lands. Under Clause (c) of Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Commissioner, Bombay Division, is pleased to appoint the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ulhas Valley Project, Thana, to perform the functions of a Collector under Section 4(1) of the said Act, in respect of the said lands. SCHEDULE District Thana, Taluka Thana, Village Pachpakhadi Block No. Survey No. Hissa No. Approximate area of the lands required A. g. a. 111 xxx xx xxx xxx xx xxx 373 1 7 32 0"" (2) It will be clear from this Notification that a plot of land admeasuring 7 acres and 32 gunthas belonging to the petitioner was sought to be acquired for a public purpose. The declaration in the Notification under Section 6 is ""for development and utilization of hands as an industrial area"". One of the several points that have been raised in this petition is that this does not constitute a public purpose and, therefore, the Notification is bad. In the Notification under Section 4 the Commissioner has stated that those lands were in his opinion waste or arable lands and their acquisition was urgently necessary. They were therefore taken without recourse to the provisions of Section 5-A of the said Act. This dispensation of the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act was by virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act. The Notification under Section 4 was followed by a Notification under Section 6 on 28th March 1963. Since the Notification under Section 4 had dispensed with the intermediate procedure provided by Section 5-A, Notification under Section 6 was issued without reference to that section. In the Notification under Section 6 the ""public purpose"" is specified in the Schedule as ""for the development and utilisation of lands as an industrial area"". (3) On 30th April 1963 the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ulhas Valley Project, served a Notice on the petitioner under Section 4 of the Act. that notice was actually dated 19th April 1963 but was served on the petitioner on 30th April 1963. It was followed by a notice to hand over possession on the 6th May 1963 because of the application of Section 17(4). that notice was actually dated 19th April 1963 but was served on the petitioner on 30th April 1963. It was followed by a notice to hand over possession on the 6th May 1963 because of the application of Section 17(4). It though dated 19th April 1963 and calling upon him to attend at the time of taking possession i.e. at 12 noon on 6th May 1963, was actually served on him on 7th May 1963 after possession was taken. On 30th April 1963 a further notice was served upon the petitioner by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the second respondent, to appear before him on that 15th of May 1963 and to lodge his claim for compensation. In the meanwhile, pursuant to the notice dated 19th April 1963 informing the petitioner that possession of the land would be taken on May 1963, the petitioners land was taken possession of on 6th May 1963. It also admitted that on the same day to the fourth respondent the Maharshtra State Industrial Development Corporation. All this was pointed out in a letter dated 14th May 1963 written by the petitioners attorneys complaining that the acquisition was illegal. The present petition was filed on 12th June 1963. (4) Now it is the petitioners case that the Notification under Section 4, 6 and 9 of the Land Acquisition Act are illegal. The grounds, briefly stated are as follows :- That the notification purport to have been signed by and issued under the authority of the first respondent Mr.J. H. Patwardhan, Commissioner of Bombay Division. Mr. Patwardhan purported to sign these Notifications by virtue of the authority conferred on him by an Amendment made in the Land Acquisition Act by a Notification issued by the State Government under Section 3(4) of the Bombay Commissioner of Divisions Act VIII of 1958 it has been argued before us that the power thus delegated to the Commissioner is improperly delegated and that the State Legislature which conferred the power by virtue of the Bombay Commissioners of Divisions Act, upon the State Government to amend by Notification the Land Acquisition Act did not make a valid delegation of its legislative power to the State Government. (5) Next if has been objected by the petitioner that on the merits the Notifications are had, because they do not comply with the requirements of the Land Acquisition Act, particularly Section 4 and 6 thereof which prescribe as an essential condition to the exercise of the power conferred by them three must be a ""public purpose"". The petitioner says that the Notifications do not disclose on the face of them any ""public purpose"" at all, but assuming that a purpose is there it does not amount to a public purpose as interpreted by several authorities. Even having regard to the definition in the Land Acquisition act contained in Section 3(f) (2) as locally amended there does not appear any public purpose upon the Notification, and, so the acquisition is bad. The further challenge was that definition of ""public purpose"" in Section 3(f) (2) which was amended so far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned by the Land Acquisition )Bombay Amendment) Act, 1953, is no ""public purpose"" as understood upon the authorities and in any case, the Bombay Amendment is illegal and void under articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Ipso facto the Notifications issued pursuant to the Powers given by the new definition would also be illegal. (6) An alternative objection against the three Notifications has been taken that in fact and in substance the acquisition in the present case is not all an acquisition for a public purpose but that having regard to the circumstances it was an acquisition for a Company viz., the Maharashtra State Industrial Development Corporation. As a result, it has been urged that two consequences follow, firstly that the Notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act declaring that the land is required for a public purpose are a mere colourable exercise of the power granted under those sections and secondly that the procedure followed for the acquisitions is vitiated. The correct procedure which ought to have been followed is that prescribed in Part VII of the said Act which deals with acquisitions for Companies or Chapter VI of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act which deals with acquisition for that Corporation. The correct procedure which ought to have been followed is that prescribed in Part VII of the said Act which deals with acquisitions for Companies or Chapter VI of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act which deals with acquisition for that Corporation. (7) Next attach was levelled against what has been concisely dubbed the ""urgency"" clause in the three Notifications whereby the respondent No.1 announced his intention to take the petitioners lands because they were ""waste or arable"" lands and their acquisition was ""urgently necessary"" under the powers vested in him under Sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act. By virtue of that sub-section the first respondent dispensed with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act and declared that it shall not apply to the said land. It is the petitioners case that thereby he was deprived of a very valuable right viz. the right take objections and try to persuade the authorities that there was no ""public purpose"" involved or that the land was not needed or likely to be needed for a contemplated public purpose. The petitioner was says that the urgency clause has, therefore, been wrongly applied on the ground that the petitioners land were neither ""waste"" nor ""arable"" lands and unless they were lands falling within those categories, Section 17(1) would be inapplicable. In reply to this point on behalf of the State it was argued that the question whether they are waste or arable lands under section 17(1) is a matter to be decided in the opinion of the authority concerned and that the Courts are precluded from considering on what basis such an opinion was formed. (8) It may be noted here that of the above please, which we have stated in brief, the Constitutional objections were not in the petition as originally filed but by an amendment permitted by this Court they were allowed to be incorporated as part of the petition. Similarly the objection that the powers under Section 17(4) read with Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act were wrongly exercised, was also incorporated by way of amendment. The petitioner originally relied upon the Notifications which are impugned in this petition and upon the document of the sale in his favour dated 17th September 1960 (Ex. A to the petition) to show his ownership. But later considerable developments took place, which it was said was a test case. The petitioner originally relied upon the Notifications which are impugned in this petition and upon the document of the sale in his favour dated 17th September 1960 (Ex. A to the petition) to show his ownership. But later considerable developments took place, which it was said was a test case. (9) In reply to the original petition the first respondent, the Commissioner of Bombay Division, filed a return on the 4th November 1963 and followed it up by a supplemental return on the 23rd April 1964 in order to meet the amendments in the petition. In this return the first respondent affirmed that in all the Notifications issued by him and impugned in the petition, there was a public purpose involved and that in any event the question whether there was a public purpose or not, was not open to be raised by the petitioner because of the provisions of Section 6(3) which makes the declaration of the public purpose conclusive evidence that the land sought to be acquired therein. In elaboration of this plea it was urged in the arguments before us that the Court is precluded from inquiring whether in fact there exists a public purpose or not. the respondent traversed the various constitutional grounds and urged that neither the Notifications nor the provisions of section 3(f) (2) as amended were liable to be set aside on the ground of unconstitutionality. The Commissioner also pointed out that he had issued the Notification under Section 4 after he had satisfied himself that the said lands were acquired for the purpose of ""developing and utilising the same as an industrial area"" and he asserted "" - I say that as the said lands were waste or arable lands and as their acquisition was urgently necessary I directed that the provisions of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act would not apply to the said acquisition"". He added that he was satisfied that the said lands were needed for the aforesaid public purpose before he issued the declaration under Section 6 and that he had similarly satisfied himself so to the requirements of Section 9(1) when he issued the Notification under that section. (10) In order to meet the point taken by the petitioner that the acquisition was for a Company viz. (10) In order to meet the point taken by the petitioner that the acquisition was for a Company viz. the Maharashtra State Industrial Development Corporation, the Commissioner stated in paragraph 10 of his return, ""I say that the said land is to be acquired from the funds of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation which is a Government of Maharashtra Undertaking financed by the State Government from Public funds and are intended to be developed from the said funds and to be subsequently dealt with by lease or sale in order to develop the said area as in industrial area"". We have reproduced this part of the pleading of the Commissioner here because it was the subject of most of the affidavits subsequently filed by way of amendment or elucidation. The amendment of the first respondents pleading resulted in the petitioner asking a number of particulars and being furnished with replies to those particulars and in the filing of a number of documents to prove whether the original statement was correct or otherwise. In subsequent affidavits filed by certain officers of the State, the said statement of the Commissioner has been dubbed as incorrect and further averments made which are contrary to the statement quoted above. (11) The Commissioner further stated that the object of acquiring lands for and developing industrial areas was to procure orderly and planned development of industries in and around Greater Bombay and elsewhere in the State and that such development was necessary not merely to encourage and remove the growth of industry but also in order to avoid future concentration of industry and to ameliorate (sic) the consequence of concentration of industry which has occurred in the past"". He alleged that the ""concentration led to congestion and consequently to bad conditions of housing, educational and medical facilities, etc., and that by laying out areas in a deliberately planned manner for development as an industrial area and by ensuring a proper development of such areas with space reserved for social services, recreational facilities, etc. all the disadvantages of haphazard and unplanned development"" would be avoided for the future. (12) In order to meet the plea taken by the petitioner that the lands were not waste or arable lands and, therefore, Section 17 (4) read with Section 5-A was not attracted, the Commissioner re-asserted that the lands were waste or arable and further stated in paragraph 13. (12) In order to meet the plea taken by the petitioner that the lands were not waste or arable lands and, therefore, Section 17 (4) read with Section 5-A was not attracted, the Commissioner re-asserted that the lands were waste or arable and further stated in paragraph 13. ""With reference to ground (d) contained in the said paragraph (para. 8) I say that the said lands are agricultural lands described as such in the Record of Rights. I say that the said lands are being assessed to land revenue as agricultural lands. I say that the said lands are waste or arable lands within the meaning of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. I am not aware of and do not admit the allegations that the petitioners land was fit for immediate use for non-agricultural industrial or building purposes or that the land had been surveyed or that plans had been prepared for construction thereon before the issue of the impugned Notifications"". He also asserted in answer to the point raised by the petitioner that he had satisfied himself after fully considering all the facts that the said lands were urgently required for development as an industrial area On the question of delegation of authority to the Commissioner, he stated that he himself acted under the legal and that he himself by Section 3(4) of the Bombay Commissioners Notification No. 1957 and the Government Notification No.IAQ - 2558 / V, dated 5th September 1958. The second affidavit with the Commissioner filed merely negatived all the pleas as to the unconstitutionality of the notifications as well as Section 3(f) (2) of the Land Acquisition Act as locally amended. (13) Matters stood at this, when on the 24th June 1964 an affidavit came to be filed by an Under Secretary in the Industries and Labour Department of the Government of Maharashtra, Mr. Hanumant Shrinivas Nargund. That affidavit purports on the face of it to have been filed ""in order to correct a mis-statement of fact occurring in the said affidavit filed in Court on 15th November 1963 sworn by the said Mr. Palwardhan"" In Paragraph 3 of his affidavit Mr.Nargund stated ""In paragraph 10 of the said affidavit, dated 4th October 1963 the date it is admitted is wrongly stated. Palwardhan"" In Paragraph 3 of his affidavit Mr.Nargund stated ""In paragraph 10 of the said affidavit, dated 4th October 1963 the date it is admitted is wrongly stated. It should be the affidavit filed on 15th November 1963), it has been stated the said land is to be acquired from the fund of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation I say that the said statement is incorrect and was made under a misapprehension of the true facts. I say that the said lands are being acquired by the State Government for the development of the lands as an industrial area and the compensation payable for the said lands was intended to be paid and is to be paid from public revenue out of the consolidated fund of the State of Maharashtra and the necessary provision therefore has been made in the Annual Budget Estimates of the Industries and Labour Department of the State Government"" Mr. Nargund further alleged that ""the sanctioned amount will be paid by the Government to the Special Land Acquisition Officer concerned for payment of compensation according to his Award to the interested persons"". Mr.Nargund also raised a point in paragraph 4 of this affidavit that after the acquisition of the said lands and their vesting in the State Government they would be placed at the disposal of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation was provided in Section 40 of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961. Along with this affidavit Mr. Nargund filed copies of extracts from the detailed estimates from the Budget for the year 1964-65. This affidavit filed by the Under Secretary set in motion a process which accounts for the bulk of the pleadings in this petition. It resulted in several affidavits being filed by the petitioner to counter the new stand taken and as we have said, in further affidavits being filed by various officers of the State and the M. I. D. C. and in the filing of a large number of documents by both the parties. It will be noticed that the stand taken in the affidavit of Mr. Nargund is in direct conflict with that taken by Mr. Patwar in direct conflict with that taken by Mr. Patwardhan in this first affidavit. We shall deal with the question raised upon the documents. It will be noticed that the stand taken in the affidavit of Mr. Nargund is in direct conflict with that taken by Mr. Patwar in direct conflict with that taken by Mr. Patwardhan in this first affidavit. We shall deal with the question raised upon the documents. (14) Before we proceed, therefore, to discuss the several points raised, it is necessary to say a word about the local amendments that have been effected in the Land Acquisition Act. They provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have been several times amended by local legislation. We are concerned in this petition with two such amendments. The first is the amendment made by Act XXXV of 1953 in the definition of ""public purpose"" contained in sub-section (f) of Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act. The definition as it stands after amendment is as follows. (f) of Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act. The definition as it stands after amendment is as follows: ""(f) the expression ""public purpose"" includes (1) the provision of village sites in districts in which the (Appropriate) Government shall have declared by notification in the official Gazette that it is customary for the Government to make such provisions (and it housing scheme as defined in the Land Acquisition (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1918: and (2) the acquisition of land for purposes of the development of areas from public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment, or sale, with the object of securing further development"". In this definition the word ""Appropriate"" before the word ""Government"" was added by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 and the following words in Sub-clause (1) of clasue (f) were added by the Land Acquisition (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948 (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948"". ""and a housing scheme as defined in the Land Acquisition (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948"". (15) The other amendment made was to add Sub-clause (2) to clause (f) of Section 3 containing the definition of ""public purpose"" as follows: ""(2) the acquisition of land for purposes of the development of areas from public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment, or sale, with the object of securing further development"". It is this definition of ""Public purpose"" as amended by the Bombay Act this is the subject of attach by the Bombay Act that is the subject of attach on the ground of unconstitutionality and other grounds. (16) The other amendment made which is material for our purpose was, as we have in passing indicated by the Bombay Commissioners of Divisions Act, 1957, Section 3(4), That sub-section - we shall presently advert to its detailed provisions-gave power to the State Government to ""confer and impose on Commissioner the powers and duties under any other enactment for the time being in force and for that purpose may, by a notification in the Official Gazette, add to or specify in the Schedule the necessary adaptations and modifications in the enactment to be amended"" and it was provided that upon such notification being issued every such enactment shall accordingly be amended and have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made and the Schedule to the Act shall be deemed to be amended by the inclusion therein of the said provision for amending the enactment. It appears that pursuant to this power the State Government issued the notification already referred to in the affidavit of Mr.Patwardhan viz. Government Notification, Revenue Department No. IAQ -2558/V dated the 5th September 1958. (17) We may also at this stage refer to the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and the law under which it was established. (18) The Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 (Act III of 1962) was brought into force on the 1st of March 1962. It applies to the whole of the State of Maharashtra but Sub-section (3) of Section 1 thereof provides that Chapter VI shall take effect in such area, from such date as the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in that behalf. Accordingly, the State Government has from time to time actually applied Chapter VI to several areas under its jurisdiction, but it is conceded on both sides that Chapter VI has not been brought into force so far as the area in which the lands in dispute are situated. Therefore, for the purposes of this petition Chapter VI does not apply at all. Therefore, for the purposes of this petition Chapter VI does not apply at all. The preamble of the Act recites that it is expedient to make special provision for securing the orderly establishment in industrial areas and industrial estates of industries in the State of Maharashtra, and to assist generally in the organisation thereof, and for that purpose to establish an Industrial Development Corporation, and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid. In Subsection (g) of Section 2 ""Industrial Area"" has been defined to mean an industrial area so declared by the State Government in the Official Gazette, which us to be developed and where industries are to be accommodated. Section 3 deals with the establishment and incorporation of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation. Sub-section (2) says that the Corporation shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal, and may sue and be sued in its corporate name, and shall be competent to acquire, hold and dispose of property both moveable and immoveable, and to contract, and do all things necessary for the purposes of the Act. Section 4 provides for the constitution of the Corporation. A perusal of the several categories of its members will indicate that excepting three members to be nominated by Government on the ground of certain special experience or ability they are all officers under the State Government or connected with one or more Boards established by the State Government. The Chairman of the Corporation and if it thinks fit a Vice-Chairman. The Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation is appointed under Section 12 (2). Sub-section (1) of Section 13 provides that the Corporation shall take over and employ such of the existing staff serving for the purposes of the Board of Industrial Development constituted by Government Resolution in the Industries and Labour Department No. IDL - 2360/140755-IND) 1, dated 1st October 1960, as the State Government may direct, and every person so taken over and employed shall be subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder. Then follow the provisions for the terms of employment of these persons. Then follow the provisions for the terms of employment of these persons. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 Provides that ""all obligations incurred, all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be done, before the first constitution of the Corporation, by, with or for the State Government or the Board of Industrial Development of industrial estates or industrial areas entrusted to the Corporation, shall be deemed to have been incurred, entered into or engaged to be done by, with or for the Corporation"" and the Sub-section further provides for suits and other legal proceedings which may be continued or instituted only against the Corporation. Sub-section (4) of Section 13 is somewhat important, because of the stand taken that the expenditure for the acquisition in the case was really an expenditure of the Corporation. Sub-section (4) says: ""All expenditure which the Board of Industrial Development may have incurred before the date of the coming into force of this Act in connection with any of the purposes of this Act shall deemed to be a loan advanced to the Corporation under Section 21 on that date, and all assets acquired by such expenditure shall vest in the Corporation"". It is also not in dispute that the erstwhile Board of Industrial Development which was a Board set up by Government itself was replaced by the Corporation on 1st August 1962 by a Notification No. IDC - 1062 - IND - 1 dated 1st August 1962 in the Official Gazette. Section 14 and 15 indicate the functions of the Corporation and its powers, Section 14 mentions the functions as follows:- ""14. The functions of the Corporation shall be (I) generally to promote and assist in the rapid and orderly establishment growth and development of industries in the State Maharashtra, and (ii) in particular, and without prejudicial to the generality of clause (I), to:- (a) establish and manage industrial estates at places selected by the State Government: (b) develop industrial areas selected by the State Government for the purpose and make them available for undertaking to establish themselves: (c) assist financially by loans industries to move their factories into such estates or areas; (d) undertake schemes or works, either jointly with other corporate bodies or institutions, or with Government or local authorities, or on an agency basis, in furtherance of the purposes for which the Corporation is established and all matters connected therewith"". Section 15 delineates its powers principally the power to acquire and hold properly and to dispose it of, to enter into agreement and take property on lease, to erect buildings and execute such other works as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out its duties and functions. Clause (j) of Section 15 gives power to the Corporation ""to enter into and perform all such contracts as it may consider necessary or expedient for carrying out any of its functions"". Section 18 lays done that the State Government may issue to the Corporation such general or special directions as of policy as it may think necessary or expedient for the purpose of carrying out the purposes of this Act, and the Corporation shall be bound to follow and act upon such directions. (19) Chapter IV deals with finance, accounts and audit and in this connection one point which was made in the arguments may be noted here, that the Corporation has to maintain its accounts not like any other company but in accordance with the public account rules, and they are to be audited by an auditor appointed by the State Government (Section 27 (2) in consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. these accounts moreover care to be laid before the House of the State Legislature annually (Section 27 (4). By virtue of Section 21 all moneys received by the Corporation from the State Government by way or grants, subventions, loans, advances or otherwise become part of the fund of the Corporation among other things. Chapter VI, which we have already said was not brought into force so far as the area which is the subject-matter of this petition is concerned, provides for acquisition and disposal of land. Having regard to this Chapter it is conceded that there is a special provision for acquisition of lands for this Corporation provided the Chapter is made applicable to the area in question. Having regard to this Chapter it is conceded that there is a special provision for acquisition of lands for this Corporation provided the Chapter is made applicable to the area in question. (20) In the affidavit made on behalf of the Commissioner a reference is to be found to Section 40 of the Act which gives power to the State Government upon such conditions as may be agreed upon between it and the Corporation to place at the disposal of the Corporation any lands vested in the State Government ""for the furtherance of the objects of this Act"" and that after such land has been developed by, or under the control and supervision of the Corporation, it shall be dealt with by the Corporation in accordance with the regulations made and directions given by the State Government. The affidavit averred that the petitioners land would be dealt with under Section 40, but obviously in view of the fact that Chapter VI has not be brought into force in the area in which this land is situated, that reference is irrelevant. The miscellaneous and supplemental provisions contained in Chapter supplemental provisions contained in Chapter VII amply indicate that the State Government has a very rigid control over the Corporation and it if so decides can even dissolve the Corporation itself (vide Section 58) subject to its being satisfied that its purposes have been substantially achieved. Despite this provision in the Corporation Act there has been no dispute raised here that the Maharashtra Industrial Corporation is a ""company"". It was conceded that it would be a company having regard to the definition in Section 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act as locally amended. The powers and functions of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation have a material bearing on the question whether the acquisition in the instant case was for a public purpose or for a company as stated in Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The powers and functions of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation have a material bearing on the question whether the acquisition in the instant case was for a public purpose or for a company as stated in Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. (21) The questions, therefore, which arise for determination in this Special Civil Application for broadly speaking as follows:- (1) Whether the delegation of the State Governments power to acquire Land particularly under Section 4, 6, 9 and 17, to the Commissioner first respondent by the local amendments effected by the Commissioners of Divisions Act, was in excess of the powers of the State Legislature and whether that delegation, which gives the State Government the power to bring into force any amendment of any Act by a notification is a valid delegation of authority ; If not, what would be the consequence upon the Notifications issued in this case under Section 4, 6 and 9 by the first respondent. (2) Whether Section 4 and 6 or any parts of those section read with the amendment made in Section 3(f) (2) of the Land Acquisition Act of the definition of ""public purpose"" by the local amendment, infringe Art. 31, 14 or 19 of the Constitution and whether therefore the notification under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act are bad. (3) Whether the acquisition in the instant case is not for a ""public purpose: in the context of Section 6 (1) and more particularly it proviso. (4) Whether the declaration in the notification under Section 6 of the existence of a public purpose is in the circumstances conclusive under section 6 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act. (5) Whether the acquisition is for a company within the meaning of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and if so the omission to follow the procedure laid down in that part would vitiate the acquisition proceedings. (6) Whether the petitioners lands were waste or arable lands and could be taken possession of without observance of the provisions of Section 5-A. If they cannot be so taken what is the effect on the notification under Section 4. (7) Whether the opinion of the authority under Section 17 would be merely a subjective opinion which the Court cannot scrutinise or whether it should be objectively proved that the requirements of Section 17 (1) have been fulfilled. (7) Whether the opinion of the authority under Section 17 would be merely a subjective opinion which the Court cannot scrutinise or whether it should be objectively proved that the requirements of Section 17 (1) have been fulfilled. (22) We may first of all dispose of the objections to the notification that the Commissioner could not promulgate them as he had no valid power. We have already indicated that the notifications under Section 4, 6 and 0 were all signed by Mr. J.H. Patwardha, the Commissioner of Bombay Division who is the first respondent. The first of these two notifications also contains the necessary declaration under Sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act, dispensing with the provisions of Section 5-A. In the Land Acquisition Act as it originally stood the power under each of the Section 4, 6, 9 and 17 was only entrusted to the Local Government. After the Constitution by the amendment made by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1959 instead of the word ""local"" the word ""appropriate"" was substituted. It was only the appropriate Government which could exercise all the relevant powers under the Act. A definition was added of the words 'appropriate Government"" in section 3 (ee) as follows:- ""The expression ""appropriate Government"" means, in relation to acquisition of land for the purpose of the Union, the Central Government, and in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government"". Thus, matters stood until by the local amendment the words ""or the Commissioner"" were added in Section 3(a), 4, 5, 6, 7, and 17 after the words ""appropriate Government"". This amendment was made under somewhat peculiar circumstances which give rise to the argument that there has been an excess of delegation. The amendment to the Land Acquisition Act was not directly made by any Legislature, What was amended was a local Act. Act VIII of 1958 viz. the Bombay Commissioner of Divisions Act, 1957. This Act was already in force since 1958 it was brought into force in order to provide for the offices of the Commissioners of Divisions in the State of Bombay and prescribing their powers and duties and to make ancillary provisions consequent upon a policy decision to resuscitate the office of Divisional Commissioner which had been abolished soon after Independence. In this Act provision was made by the Bombay Legislature for the amendment of several Acts. In this Act provision was made by the Bombay Legislature for the amendment of several Acts. Section 3, Sub-sections (1) and (4) provide as follows:- ""3(1) For the purpose of constituting offices of Commissioners of Divisions and conferring powers and imposing duties on Commissioners and for certain other purpose, the enactments specified in column 1 of the Schedule to this Act shall be amended in the manner and to the extent specified in column 2 thereof"".and Sub-section (4) thereof is as follows:- ""The State Government may confer and impose on the Commissioner powers and duties under any other enactment for the time being in force and for that purpose may, by a notification in the official gazette, add to or specify in the Schedule the necessary adaptations and modifications in that enactment by way of amendment and thereupon. (a) every such enactment shall accordingly be amended and have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made, and (b) the schedule to this Act shall be deemed to the amended by the inclusion therein of the said provision for amending the enactment"". It may be noticed at the outset that the Land Acquisition Act was not one of the Acts mentioned in the Schedule and the amendment of that Act could therefore be made only under Sub-section (4) Section 3 of the Commissioner of Divisions Act which says that ""the State Government may confer and impose on the Commissioner powers and duties under any other enactment for the time being in force... (23) Purporting to act under these powers the State Government issued a notification on the 5th September 1958, notification No. G.N. R.D. LAQ - 2558/V dated 5th September 1958 inserting the words ""or the Commissioner"" in the said section of the Land Acquisition Act in the then State of Bombay excluding the transferred territories under the Reorganisation of States Act. By virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 the Schedule to the Commissioners of Divisions Act accordingly stood amended and that in its turn incorporated those amendments in the Land Acquisition Act. (24) Now it has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that this was a very devious method of amending the Land Acquisition Act. By virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 the Schedule to the Commissioners of Divisions Act accordingly stood amended and that in its turn incorporated those amendments in the Land Acquisition Act. (24) Now it has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that this was a very devious method of amending the Land Acquisition Act. It is not disputed that the State Legislature could with the requisite assent of the President have directly legislated to amend the Land Acquisition Act to give the necessary powers to the Commissioners, It is also not in dispute that the Bombay Commissioners of Divisions Act has received the assent of the President and that would mean in the context of Section 3(4) that the President has assented to those powers being conferred upon and being entrusted to Commissioners in such enactments as are with in the competence of the State Legislature to enact What is argued, however, is that the State Legislature could not by enacting Section 3(4) delegate in this manner its legislative function to the State Government and give the State Government an omnibus power to amend any other enactment for the time being in force by a simple notification in the Official Gazette. That, it was argued, virtually amounts to entrusting to the Executive the whole function of the Legislature in the matter, and to that extent therefore, the delegation was bad. It was also urged that it was an excessive delegation for the reason that the State Government had been armed with the power to amend any and every Act and virtually to become a Legislature in itself. (25) On this question reference was made to In re Art. 143, Constitution of India and Delhi Laws Act (1912), 1951 SCR 747: ( AIR 1951 SC 332 ), and to the principles laid down therein by the highest Court upon which questions of delegated legislative authority must be judged. The subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in which that leading case was substantially summarised was also referred to namely Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, 1955-1-SCR 290l ( AIR 1954 SC 569 ). After the analysis of the opinions in the Delhi Laws Act case, 1951 SCR 747 : ( AIR 1951 SC 332 ), made in Rajnarain's case, 1955-1SCR 290: ( AIR 1954 SC 569 ), the principles are now well settled. After the analysis of the opinions in the Delhi Laws Act case, 1951 SCR 747 : ( AIR 1951 SC 332 ), made in Rajnarain's case, 1955-1SCR 290: ( AIR 1954 SC 569 ), the principles are now well settled. In dealing with the Delhi Laws Act case, 1951 SCR 747 :( AIR 1951 SC 332 ) Mr. Justice Bose made the following propositions in Rajnarayan Singh's case, 1955-1-SCR 290 at p. 298 : ( AIR 1954 SC 569 at p. 573): ""The Court had before it the following problems. In each case, the Central Legislature had empowered an executive authority under its legislative control to apply at its discretion, laws to an area which was also under the legislative away of the Centre. The variations occur in the type of laws which the executive authority was authorised to select and in the modifications which it was empowered to make in them. The variations were as follows: (1) Where the executive authority was permitted, at it discretion, to apply without modification (save incidental changes such as name and place), the whole of any Central Act already in existence in any part of India under the Legislative sway of the Centre to the new area: This was upheld by a majority of six to one. (2) Where the executive authority was allowed to select and apply a Provincial Act in similar circumstances: This was also upheld, but this time by a majority of five to two. (3) Where the executive authority was permitted to select future Central laws and apply them in a similar way: This was upheld by give to two. (4) Where the authorisation was to select future Provincial laws and apply them as above: This was also upheld by five to two. (5) Where the authorisation was to repeal laws already in force in the area and either substitute nothing in the area and either substitute nothing in their places or substitute other laws, Central or Provincial, with or without modification: This was held to be ultra vires by a majority of four to three. (5) Where the authorisation was to repeal laws already in force in the area and either substitute nothing in the area and either substitute nothing in their places or substitute other laws, Central or Provincial, with or without modification: This was held to be ultra vires by a majority of four to three. (6) Where the authorisation was to apply existing laws, either Central or Provincial, with alterations and modifications : and (7) Where the authorisation was to app future laws under the same conditions : the views of the various members of the Bench were not as clear cut here as in the first five cases, so it will be necessary to analyse what each Judge said"". The authorisation under Section 3 (4) of the substance an authorisation to amend any other enactment with a view of confer powers and impose duties on Commissioners under those enactments. It would in our opinion properly fall within the sixth category in the passage quoted above. ""Where the authorisation was to apply existing laws, either Central or Provincial, with alterations and modifications"". (26) As to that category at p. 301 (of SCR) : (at p. 574 of AIR), of the Report Mr. Justice Bose summed up the result of the Delhi Laws Act Case, 1951 SCR 747 : ( AIR 1951 SC 332 ) as follows:- ""In our opinion, the majority view was that an executive authority can be authorised to modify either existing or future laws but not in any essential feature. Exactly what constitutes an essential feature cannot be enunciated in general terms, and there was some divergence of view about this in the former case, but this much is clear from the opinions set out above: it cannot include a change of policy"". Exactly what constitutes an essential feature cannot be enunciated in general terms, and there was some divergence of view about this in the former case, but this much is clear from the opinions set out above: it cannot include a change of policy"". In Rajnarain Singh's case, 1955-1 SCR 290 ( AIR 1954 SC 569 ), there were impugned two notifications issued under Sections 3(1) (f) and 5 of the Patna Administration Act of 1915 (Bihar and Orissa Act 1 of 1915) as amended in 1928 whereby the Local Government was empowered in effect: (1) con cancel or modify any existing municipal laws in the Patna Administration area: (2) to extend to this area all or any of the sections of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act of 1922 subject to such restrictions and modifications as it considered fit: (3) to add to the Patna Administration are other areas not already under Municipal control. What the State Government did was to add by a notification a new area to the Patna Administration area and bring the new area under municipal control. Besides it picked Section 104 out of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act of 1922, modified it and extended it in its modified form of the Patna Administration and the new areas. That Section was with regard to assessment of taxes and the petitioner in the case who was a resident of the new area contended that such a delegation was a delegation of an essential function of the Legislature and, therefore, the provisions of the Act which authorised such a delegation were void. It was held that the action of the Governor in subjecting a resident of the new area to municipal taxation without observing the formalities imposed by Section 4, 5 and 6 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922 cut across one of its essential feature touching a matter of policy and was bad to that extent, but so far as Section 3 (1) (f) of the Act which authorised the delegation of powers to the Government is concerned, it was a valid delegation. Dealing with that point the Supreme Court ruled in Rajnarain's Case 1955-1 SCR 290 at p. 303: ( AIR 1954 SC 569 at pp. Dealing with that point the Supreme Court ruled in Rajnarain's Case 1955-1 SCR 290 at p. 303: ( AIR 1954 SC 569 at pp. 574-575): ""Now the only difference between that case )the Delhi Laws Act case, 1951 SCR 747 : ( AIR 1951 SC 332 ) and this is that whereas in the former case the whole of an enactment, or a part of it could be extended, here, any Section can be picked out .................... It follows that when a Section of an Act is selected for application, whether it is modified or not, it must be done so as not to effect any change of policy, or any essential change in the Act regarded as whole. Subject to the Limitation we hold .................. that Section 3 (1) (f) is intra vires that is to say, we hold that any Section or Sections of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act of 1922 can be picked out and applied to ""Patna"" provided that does not effect any essential change in the Act or alter its policy"". (27) Judged in the light of this principle we are unable to find that any essential change was made or any change of policy effected when after the words ""Appropriate Government"" the words ""or the Commissioner"" were added in the several Sections of the Land Acquisition Act. The original policy of the Legislature remained untouched : the power originally conferred on the State Government remained in all its pristine plenitude : only the Commissioner was a subordinate of State Government and could always be controlled by it, the State Government's power was not affected. The Commissioner in his turn was a responsible officer and in normal course would always be consulted by Government when acquiring property in his division. Thus in fact he would always be influencing the decisions in the matter of acquisitions. This de facto state of affairs was legally recongnised by the amendment. It seems to us that the amendment was made only for administrative convenience and not for any change which can be termed essential much less in order to effect a change of policy. (28) In the case last cited reference, was made in the leading case of Queen v. Burah 5 Ind App 178 ( PC) . On the power of the State Legislature to effect an amendment of this kind that case is instructive. (28) In the case last cited reference, was made in the leading case of Queen v. Burah 5 Ind App 178 ( PC) . On the power of the State Legislature to effect an amendment of this kind that case is instructive. In that case an Act passed by the Indian Legislature (ACT XXII of 1869) which was a validly enacted piece of legislation by the then Governor-General in Council. It empowered an Executive authority viz. Lieutenant -Governor of Bengal to apply ""any law or any portion of any law now in force ................... or which may hereafter be enacted"" to a certain district of the then Province of Bengal at his discretion. It was urged that the Indian Legislature could not have thus delegated its own power of legislation to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and that in so far as it empowered the Lieutenant-Governor to determine whether the said laws or any part of them shall be applied in a certain district, the delegation of the legislative authority of the Governor-General in Council to the Lieutenant -Governor of Bengal was in excess of the Council. The High Court held that the 9th Section of the Act of 1869 which purported to empower the Lieutenant-Governor to extend the Act to the Khasi and Jaintia districts was in excess of the Legislative powers of the Governor-General in Council Repelling this view, the judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed at p. 193: ""But their Lordships are of opinion that the doctrine of the majority of the Court is erroneous, and that it rests upon a mistaken view of the powers of the Indian Legislature, and indeed of the nature and principles of legislation. The Indian Legislature has empowers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and it can, of court, do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers. But, when acting within those limits, it is not in any sense an agent for delegate of the Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature, as those of Parliament itself. But, when acting within those limits, it is not in any sense an agent for delegate of the Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature, as those of Parliament itself. The established Courts of Justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of necessity determine that question : and the only way in which they can properly do so, it by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted. If what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in which category would, or course, be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any Court of justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions"". Here again the Judicial Committee stressed the point that where a delegation takes place what one has to see is whether looking to the terms of the Act granting legislative powers both in the extend of what it gives as well as what it restricts, any essential legislative power has been conferred or surrendered. (29) The judicial Committee also drew another distinction it distinguished between essential legislative function and the conditions attached to a legislation. They pointed out that so .long as the essential function is not delegated to the Executive a legislative authority can permit the Executive to fulfill any of the conditions attached to a legislation. The distinction was thus indicated by their Lordships:- ""Their Lordships agree that the Governor General in Council could not, by any form of enactment, create in India, and arm with general legislative authority, a new legislative power, not created or authorized by the Council's Act. Nothing of that kind has, in their Lordships' opinion, been done or attempted in the present case. What has been done is this. Nothing of that kind has, in their Lordships' opinion, been done or attempted in the present case. What has been done is this. The Governor-General in Council has determined, in the due and ordinary course of legislation, to remove a particular district from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts and offices, and to place it under new Courts and offices, to be appointed by and responsible to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal : leaving it to the Lieutenant-Governor to say at what time that change shall take place : and also enabling him, not to make what laws he pleases for that or any other district, but to apply by public notification to that district any law, or part of a law, which either already was, of from time to time might be, in force, by proper legislative authority. ""in the other territories subject to his Government"". The Legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place : but that it was expedient to leave the time and the manner, of carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor; and also, that the laws which were or might be in force in the other territories subject to the same Government were such as it might be fit and proper to apply to this district also; but that, as it was not certain that all those laws, and every part of them, could with equal convenience be so applied, it was expedient, on that point also, to entrust a discretion to the Lieutenant-Governor ...................... Their Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor (Large as they undoubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to any other legislative authority then that of the Governor-General in Council. Their whole operation is directly and immediately, under and by virtue of this Act (XXII of 1869) itself. The proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things. The conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation is now absolute. Where plenary powers of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in an imperial or in a provincial Legislature, they may in their Lordships' judgment be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally"". The conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation is now absolute. Where plenary powers of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in an imperial or in a provincial Legislature, they may in their Lordships' judgment be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally"". (30) Having regard to these principles and particularly the distinction adverted to between the delegation of essential legislative function and the delegation of powers of give effect to legislation on the fulfillment of certain conditions, we do not think that we can hold that what has been authorised in the instant case is in excess of the powers of the State Legislature. The State Legislature had the power to create offices under it and to say which of its officers shall perform which functions. That legislative determination or judgment is expressed in the very terms of sub-section (2) of Section 3 which it says that ""the Commissioner of division, appoint under the law relating to land revenue as amended by the said Schedule, shall exercise the powers and discharge the duties conferred and imposed on the Commissioner by any law for the time being in force, including the enactments referred to in Sub-section (1) as amended by the said Schedule"". By Sub-section (4) the further determination was made that ""the State Government may confer and impose on the Commissioner powers and duties under any other enactment for the time being in force"". In other words, the legislative determination consisted in this that the Legislature felt that powers under any other enactment could fittingly be conferred upon the Commissioner. That determination included in it a determination as to be authority on whom and the powers which were to be conferred, the purpose for which and the manner in which that authority would be conferred upon the Commissioner and the time when it was to be conferred. Once that legislative judgment was exercised the rest was, in our opinion, merely a matter of the conditions upon which the legislative determination was to take effect. Therefore, there was, in our opinion, no parting with the essential legislative functions in the instant case. (31) It was next argued that the amplitude of the language used in enacting this piece of legislation is so wide that the State Government can by a conceivable notification make amendments which may affect essential legislative functions. Therefore, there was, in our opinion, no parting with the essential legislative functions in the instant case. (31) It was next argued that the amplitude of the language used in enacting this piece of legislation is so wide that the State Government can by a conceivable notification make amendments which may affect essential legislative functions. It was urged, for instance, that the State Government could by notification amend the legislation taking away the power from the Courts. Wherever power of this kind is conferred, undoubtedly it is liable to be exceeded by those entrusted with it or for that matter even to be abused. But the argument does not amount to saying, therefore, that the power conferred in bad but that in the implementation of that power the authority is liable to exceed or overstep its delegated functions. That is a different question. It seems to us that it is not seriously argued here with in adding the words ""or the Commissioner"" in the several sections of the Land Acquisition Act the State Government has exceeded the powers conferred upon it but that the delegate may abuse those powers. The mere capability of its abuse or mis-use cannot after the nature of the power. In the instant case, we have already said that that power was only a power to give effect to the conditions attached to a legislation and did not amount to giving any power to make any essential legislative determination. The delegation was therefore proper. (32) It was then urged that though, the Commissioner of Divisions Act has undoubtedly received the assent of the President, the subsequent amendments effected by the notifications of the State Government in the Land Acquisition Act as well as the other Acts were not assented to by the President and to that extent the subject of the Legislation which admittedly fell in list III of the Constitution would be bad, because it conflicts with an existing Central Law viz. the Land Acquisition Act. It was urged that the Central Law merely entrusted the functions under Section 4, 6, 9 and 17 to the State Government whereas the local legislation and that too by notifications of the State Government and the words ""or the Commissioner"" and to that extent is repugnant to a Central Law. the Land Acquisition Act. It was urged that the Central Law merely entrusted the functions under Section 4, 6, 9 and 17 to the State Government whereas the local legislation and that too by notifications of the State Government and the words ""or the Commissioner"" and to that extent is repugnant to a Central Law. The clear answer to the contention is, in our opinion, to be found in the provisions of Article 254, Sub-article (2) of the Constitution which runs as follows:- ""Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect of one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, the, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State"". The Bombay Commissioner of Divisions Act was passed in 1958 and the Land Acquisition Act was passed in 1894. Therefore, for the purposes of Sub-article (2) of Article 254 would be an ""existing law"" on the date of the Constitution. So far as the Bombay Commissioners of Divisions Act is concerned, it is not disputed that it has received the assent of the President and therefore, having received the assent it would prevail so far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned, even though it may, be repugnant to the provisions of the earlier law made by Parliament viz. the Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Act was an existing law having regard to the definition of the term in Article 366 (10) of the Constitution. We therefore, hold that the amendments effected in the Land Acquisition Act by the Bombay Commissioners of Divisions Act were valid amendments so far at least as this State is concerned We have already held that there was no excess of delegation of legislative authority by Section 3 of the Bombay Commissioners of Divisions Act. Similar instances of enactments held valid, though not identical with the present case are to be found into the State of Bombay v. Meman Santial Alreja, 53 Bom LR 837 at p. 850: (AIR 1952 Bom 16 at p. 21), Edward Mills Co. Similar instances of enactments held valid, though not identical with the present case are to be found into the State of Bombay v. Meman Santial Alreja, 53 Bom LR 837 at p. 850: (AIR 1952 Bom 16 at p. 21), Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer (1955) 1 SCR 735 : (S) AIR 1955 SC 25 ), Mohammad Hussain Gulam Mohammed v. State of Bombay, (1962) 2 SCR 659 . ( AIR 1962 SC 97 ), and Patna Improvement Trust v. Lakshmi Devi, AIR 1963 SC 1077 . (33) Next we turn to the challenge to the provisions the Land Acquisition Act and particularly to Section 6 thereof upon constitutional grounds. The provisions of Section 6, it has been said, are ultra vires of Article 19(1) (f) and (g), of Article 31 and of Article 14. So far as Articles 19(1) (f) and (g) are concerned, we may at once point out that the challenge to the Act on the ground of infringement of Article 19 has been answered by the highest Court in Somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 . At p. 160 in the same passage which we quote below the Supreme Court also repelled the argument that it infringed Article 31 of the Constitution. In paragraph 21 of the judgment, Mr. Justice. Mudholkar observed with reference to the Land Acquisition Act: ""The Act has been in operation since 1894. The validity of the law was challenged before this Court in Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, 1961-1 SCR 128: ( AIR 1960 SC 1203 ), on the ground that it infringes the provisions of Arts. 31(2) and 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. But this Court held that the law being a pre-Constitution law is protected from the operation of Art. 31(2) by the provisions of Art. 31 (5) (a). It also held, following the decision in the State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, 1955-1 SCR 777: (S) AIR 1955 SC (41), and that in Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, 1957 SCR 721 : ( (S) AIR 1957 SC 521 ), that the attach under Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution is futile"". It also held, following the decision in the State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, 1955-1 SCR 777: (S) AIR 1955 SC (41), and that in Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, 1957 SCR 721 : ( (S) AIR 1957 SC 521 ), that the attach under Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution is futile"". In Civil Appeal No.322 of 1961, D/- 1-12-1961 (SC), before the Supreme Court this view re-affirmed and a further point taken on the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kavalppara Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of Madras, (1960) 3 SCR 887 : ( AIR 1960 SC 1080 ), that the decision in Bhanji Munji's case, 1955-1- SCR 777: ( (S) AIR 1955 SC 41 ), must be deemed to have list its authority, was repelled. Mr.Justice Sarkar observed: ""The observation in Kavalappara Kochuni's case, (1960) 3 SCR 887 : ( AIR 1960 SC 1080 ) that Bhanji Munji's case, 1955-1 SCR 777) (S AIR 1955 SC 41 ), ""no longer hold the field"" has, therefore, to be understood as meaning that it no longer governs a case of deprivation of property by means other than requisition and acquisition by the State, Kavalappara Kochuni's case, 1960-3 SCR 887 : ( AIR 1960 SC 1080 ), was not concerned with a law of requisition or acquisition of property governed by Art. 31 (2), as it now stands, and did not decide that question"". (34) We may also say that Article 19 (1) (f) or (g) is no longer available to the petitioner having regard to the provisions of Article 358 of the Constitution and the proclamation of emergency recently made by the President in October 1962. The Article in terms says that ""While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, nothing in article 19 shall restrict the power of the State as defined in Part III to make any law or to take any executive action which the State would but for the provisions contained in the Part be competent to make or to take ......................."". We hold that neither Section 4 nor Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act can be held to infringe Article 19 of the Constitution. (35) So far as Article 31 is concerned, we have already referred to the decision in Somawanti's case, AIR 1963 SC 151 . In the passage no doubt Mr. We hold that neither Section 4 nor Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act can be held to infringe Article 19 of the Constitution. (35) So far as Article 31 is concerned, we have already referred to the decision in Somawanti's case, AIR 1963 SC 151 . In the passage no doubt Mr. Justice Mudholkar made it clear that the Supreme Court in that case were not concerned with a post-Constitution law, but a pre-Constitution law. Replying on these observations a distinction is sought to be drawn between that decision and the present case. It has been urged that so far as the definition of ""public purpose"" in Section 3(f) (2) of the Land Acquisition Act is concerned, it was added by the local amendment made by ACT XXXV of 1953 and, therefore, would be a post-Constitution law and not a pre-Constitution law as the rest of the Act would be. The conditions necessary to be fulfilled by Article 31 of the Constitution are that no property can be acquired compulsorily except for a public purpose and under authority of law. The law has been enacted and in our opinion is valid. The question then is whether in Sub-section (2) of Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act (as amended), the purposes mentioned can be held to be public purposes within the meaning of Article 31. We shall presently discuss this question as it arises also in connection with Sub-section (1) of Section 6. We may say here, however, that in our opinion, Sub-clause (2) of Section 3(f) added by the local amendment which includes certain purposes with"