Order:- This petition is to quash the order of the 3rd respondent allowing a revision petition of the 1st respondent and directing the variation of the route from Mettupalayam to Kempanaickenpalayam, as Mettupalayam to Karamadai. The proposal to vary would appear to have been notified by the 2nd respondent but this was not under section 57 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act but pursuant to a practice followed by the 2nd respondent, in view of certain directions of the State Government under section 43-A for reference by the 2nd respondent to the Transport Commissioner in matters of variation of routes. The petitioner filed his objections. After considering the application for variation and the objections of the petitioner, the 2nd respondent came to the conclusion that there was no real need for the variation and rejected the application. Thereafter, there was a notification under section 57 (3) of the proposal. This time the petitioner made no representations under section 57 (4). The 2nd respondent dismissed the application by making the following order: “ Applicant absent. The variation involves curtailment of terminal facilities at Mettupalayam, an important commercial centre. There is also no real need for this variation. The application for the grant of the variation is hence rejected.” The Tribunal, on a revision petition filed by the 1st respondent, reversed the order and directed the variation. The petitioner complains that it having been an objector in the initial proceedings on the first notification under section 47, the Tribunal’s order cannot be sustained as it was made without any notice to it. It is argued that although the initial notification of the proposal was not under section 57(3), and there is nothing in section 47 (3) itself requiring such notification, and since, as a matter of fact, the petitioner had filed its objections, this is an important fact and should have been regarded as a sufficient compliance of section 57 (4). On that basis, it is contended that the Tribunal was bound to give notice to the petitioner of the revision filed by the 1st respondent. In support of this contention, reliance for the petitioner is made on S. M. Transport v. Raman and Raman (P) Ltd.1. That case was not directly concerned with this question. On that basis, it is contended that the Tribunal was bound to give notice to the petitioner of the revision filed by the 1st respondent. In support of this contention, reliance for the petitioner is made on S. M. Transport v. Raman and Raman (P) Ltd.1. That case was not directly concerned with this question. What was decided by the Full Bench was whether the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution was a person aggrieved in order that he might be competent to maintain the petition. There, there was first a notification of the proposal to vary, which was cancelled. Then again there was a proposal which was notified and then a further notification under section 57 (3). Pursuant to the second notification under section 47, the petitioner before this Court had filed his representations. He was also heard by the Tribunal in revision. Dealing with the question as to whether the petitioner in that case was a person aggrieved, this Court observed: “ Even assuming that technically it was necessary for Raman and Raman to have made a representation at each stage with reference to each notification, there can be no doubt that substantially they did make a representation opposing the variation. This we think is the most material circumstance in deciding whether Raman and Raman could invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. In our opinion, Raman and Raman were certainly persons aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal sought to be quashed. They had not only filed a representation after the notification under section 47, they were even allowed to put forward their view before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The fact that they were heard by the Appellate Tribunal itself shows that they were treated as persons aggrieved.” This decision does not, therefore, help the petitioner. The 1st respondent here does not object to the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the petitioner is not a person aggrieved and is therefore not entitled to maintain it. But the petitioner argues that although the question is different, it is entitled to rely on the Full Bench judgment inasmuch as it held that the representations objecting to the variation at the stage of the notification under section 47 were substantial compliance with the requirements of section 57 (3). I am unable to accept this contention. But the petitioner argues that although the question is different, it is entitled to rely on the Full Bench judgment inasmuch as it held that the representations objecting to the variation at the stage of the notification under section 47 were substantial compliance with the requirements of section 57 (3). I am unable to accept this contention. I do not understand the Full Bench to have laid down that the proceedings notifying a proposal apart from section 57 (3) had any statutory basis. Nor do I understand the Full Bench to have ruled that if an objector to a variation had not made his representations as required by section 57 (4), he would, nevertheless, be entitled to be heard by the Tribunal. That was not the question the Full Bench had to decide. As a matter of fact, in that case the Tribunal had heard the petitioner before the High Court. While the representation made by the objector in that case at the stage of the first notification claiming to be under section 47 and the fact that the objector was heard by the Tribunal, were held to be sufficient compliance for the purpose of holding the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution to be an aggrieved person, that is not the test for deciding whether such a person would be entitled to be heard under section 57 (5), if he failed to make any representations pursuant to a notification under section 57 (3). That question directly was decided by the Supreme Court in C.A. No. 762 of 1963. It is true that case related to a permit and in the case of variation, there is no question of selection. Even so, the terms of section 57 (5) are clear and it is only the person who had made representations pursuant to the notification under section 57 (3) that would be entitled to be heard under section 57 (5). The question is not whether the action of the Tribunal in allowing an objector, who had made no representations, to be heard, would be legal. But the point, as I said, is whether where he had failed to do so, he could, as a matter of right, claim that he should have been heard. The question is not whether the action of the Tribunal in allowing an objector, who had made no representations, to be heard, would be legal. But the point, as I said, is whether where he had failed to do so, he could, as a matter of right, claim that he should have been heard. Unless he had such a right, it cannot be said that the Tribunal was bound to give the petitioner notice of the revision petition filed by the respondent. Learned Counsel for the petitioner suggested that if a suit was dismissed, notwithstanding the absence of the defendant and there was an appeal by the plaintiff, the appellate Court was bound to give notice to the defendant before disposing of the appeal and that the principle of this analogy should be applied to the facts of this case. But the analogy suggested by learned Counsel is quite inappropriate. The proceedings under section 57 (3) can in no sense be equated to the facts in the illustration. Lastly, it was contended for the petitioner that the principles of natural justice required that the petitioner having been an objector before the Regional Transport Authority at some stage, it should have been given notice by the Tribunal before allowing the revision petition. But natural justice is not an abstract rule but will take its pattern and colour from the relevant statute. If, under section 57 (5), the Tribunal was not bound to hear the petitioner and it was not entitled to be heard by the Tribunal as a matter of right, I do not see how any principle of natural justice is involved or violated. The petition is dismissed but with no costs. K.L.B. ------------ Petition dismissed.