JUDGMENT M.C. Desai, C.J. - This appeal has not been admitted yet and no notice of it has been sent to the respondent but he has appeared through counsel and applied that the appeal be dismissed because it is no longer maintainable on account of its being filed after the U.P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, No. XIV of 1962. The Act received the President's assent and came into force on 13-11-1962. It abolished appeals under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent read with Clause 17 of the Amalgamation Order but saved such appeals as were pending on 13-11-1962. The respondent's contention is that this appeal was not pending on that date and, therefore, cannot be entertained and must be dismissed. 2. The memorandum of appeal was presented before the Registrar on 9-7-1962 when this Court reopened after the vacation. The appeal was valued at Rs. 7251.50 nP. and court fee of Rs. 897.50 nP. was paid on the memorandum. The appeal is by the defendant against whom the suit has been decreed for a declaration that the respondent's reduction in rank was illegal, being against the provisions of Article 311, and for the recovery of Rs. 7251.50 nP on account of the arrears of the salary. The appellant paid court fee on the relief regarding the arrears of the salary but not on the relief regarding the declaration on which court-fee of Rs. 100/- was payable. A report from the Stamp Reporter was called for about the sufficiency of the court-fee paid on the memorandum and on 27-8-1962 he reported the deficiency of Rs. 100. The memorandum of appeal had been presented in Court on the appellants behalf by its Standing Counsel, who then was Sri Gopal Behari, an advocate of this Court. The case was listed before the Joint Registrar and notice of the listing was given in the cause list in which the name of Sri Gopal Behari was printed. The case was listed on 21-12-1962, 11-1-1963 and 21-1-1963 but nobody appeared on the appellants behalf before the Joint Registrar and the deficiency in court-fee was not made good. On 21-1-1963 the Joint Registrar ordered the memorandum of appeal to be laid before the Court because no one was appearing before him. The appellant changed the Standing Counsel and Sri R. L. Gulati was appointed as Standing Counsel sometime before 21-1-1963. On 21-1-1963 the Joint Registrar ordered the memorandum of appeal to be laid before the Court because no one was appearing before him. The appellant changed the Standing Counsel and Sri R. L. Gulati was appointed as Standing Counsel sometime before 21-1-1963. Sri Gulati did not however, file any memorandum of appearance in this appeal. On 31-1-1963 a clerk of this Court made a report on the appeal that the name of Sri Gulati had not been printed in the cause lists for 21-12-1962 and the other two dates. On 4-2-1963 the Joint Registrar recalled his order dated 21-1-1963 and allowed the deficiency to be made good within two weeks. It was made good on 18-2-1963. On 25-2-1963 the Joint Registrar asked for two copies of the memorandum of appeal required for the use of the Court from the appellant's counsel and they were supplied by 8-3-1963. Before the memorandum of appeal could be put up for admission of the appeal the respondent appeared and filed the application praying that it be rejected. The memorandum of appeal could not be put up for admission and the special appeal has not been admitted as yet. 3. The first question that arises is whether it could be said that the present appeal was pending on 13-11-1962 and we have no hesitation in saying that it was not. It was held in Lala Gyanchand v. Lila Rani, Sp. A. No. 565 of 1962 decided on 6-12-1962 that an appeal comes into existence only when a memorandum of appeal is admitted and registered. In the instant case there is only a memorandum of appeal before us and no appeal. In Lala Gyanchands case, Sp. A. No. 565 of 1962 we took notice of the default on the part of the Court on account of which the memorandum of appeal could not be laid before the Court for admission prior to 13-11-1962 and held that it must be deemed to have been admitted by the Court prior to 13-11-1962. There has been no such default in the instant case on account of which the memorandum of appeal could not have been admitted before 13-11-1962. It was insufficiently stamped and so long as the deficiency was not made good it could not be admitted at all. Sri Gulati contended that it was sufficiently stamped and that the Stamp Reporter's report was wrong. It was insufficiently stamped and so long as the deficiency was not made good it could not be admitted at all. Sri Gulati contended that it was sufficiently stamped and that the Stamp Reporter's report was wrong. There is no substance in the contention. The suit was for a declaration and for another relief which is said to be consequential relief under Section 7 (iv) in a suit to obtain a declaratory decree where consequential relief is prayed for, the court-fee is to be payable on the amount at which the declaratory relief sought, is valued in the memorandum of appeal and Sri Gulati contended that the court-fee was payable under this provision. But this provision was not applied by the respondent and even if it was applicable the court-fee would have been paid according to the amount at which the declaratory relief was valued and not according to the amount at which the consequential relief was valued. The appeal was both for declaration and money and as far as the appeal for money was concerned the memorandum had to be valued according to the amount claimed under Section 7 (i) of the Court Fees Act. If court-fee is paid according to the amount claimed (under Section 7(i)), it is a case not covered by Section 7(iv). In any case the appellant did not object to the stamp reporter's report and paid the deficiency in the court-fee, thereby admitting that the memorandum was deficiently stamped when presented on 9-7-1962. The Registrar's order of 21-1-1963 that it be laid before the Court amounted to refusing to extend the time for making good the deficiency, vide Chapter XI, Rule 13(3) of Rules of Court, and he had no jurisdiction to recall the order and to grant further time. Further, giving the information to Sri Gopal Behari about the deficiency was enough; he remained the appellant's counsel so long as he had not withdrawn himself and no information had been given to the Court that Sri Gulati had been appointed as counsel in his place. When the appellant changed its standing counsel it should have informed the Court of the fact so that all notices in future could be sent to the new counsel. When the appellant changed its standing counsel it should have informed the Court of the fact so that all notices in future could be sent to the new counsel. The effect of the deficiency made good on 18-2-1963 was just what it would have been if the appellant had taken back the memorandum and presented it again after removing the deficiency in the court-fee. The proviso to rule 13 of Chapter XI laid down that any time granted by the Registrar for making good a deficiency does not amount to extending the period of limitation. It furnishes an answer to the appellant's contention that when it removed the deficiency on 18-2-1963 it did so with retrospective effect from 9-7-1962. The memorandum of appeal must, therefore, be deemed to have been presented on 18-2-1963 on which date it was barred by time. The appellant has not applied for condoning the delay and the appeal as having been filed within time. In these circumstances the legal fiction that the appeal had been admitted prior to 13-11-1962 cannot be applied in the instant case. When the memorandum of appeal itself is deemed to have been presented on 18-2-1963 there could not have been any appeal pending on 13-11-1962 and this appeal is not saved by Section 3(2) of the U.P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act. 4. Sri Gulati next argued that the Registrar did not comply with Rules 12(1) and 13(1) of Chapter XI of Rules of Court. It is not known when he called for a report from the stamp reporter; under Rule 12 (1) his duty was to call for "an immediate office report" but the memorandum does not contain any order passed by him. The stamp reporter reported with a delay of more than a month and a half; considering that a large number of memorandum of appeals must have been presented on 9-7-1962 and sent to the stamp reporter for his reports we realise that the stamp reporter could not have given an immediate report on this memorandum but are not satisfied that all this delay was justified. Under Rule 13(1) his report ought to have been "shown without delay" to the appellant's counsel and he should have been asked to "initial it at once in token of his having been informed", but this was not done. Under Rule 13(1) his report ought to have been "shown without delay" to the appellant's counsel and he should have been asked to "initial it at once in token of his having been informed", but this was not done. The Registrar was responsible for the non-compliance with these provisions. Why no action was taken between 27-8-1962 and 21-12-1962 is not understood. It is also not known why the stamp reporter's report was not shown to Sri Gopal Behari and why instead it was listed for orders before the Joint Registrar. It would have been listed before the Joint Registrar only if Sri Gopal Behari had contested the stamp reporters report. But this failure to comply with the rules does not entitle the appellant to the legal fiction. We cannot say that if all the rules had been fully complied with the deficiency in the court-fee would have been made good and the appeal would have been admitted prior to 13-11-1962. Officers of the Court were certainly responsible for some delay but the primary responsibility was of the appellant itself in presenting an insufficiently stamped memorandum of appeal. 5. Sri Gulati referred to Mela Ram & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 29 ITR 607 in which the Supreme Court held that an order dismissing an appeal summarily as time-barred is an order on appeal within the meaning of Section 31(2) of the Income-tax Act. An appeal may come into existence at the moment when the memorandum of appeal is rejected as barred by time but it does not follow that it comes into existence earlier. If the memorandum of appeal in the instant case had been rejected as insufficiently stamped it could be said that order was an order on appeal and that consequently there was an appeal in existence at the time when it was passed. But that stage has not arrived yet. On 13-11-1962 there was no appeal but only a memorandum of appeal. The question whether an appeal is pending or not is a question different from the question whether an order is an order on appeal or not. 6. Sri Gulati vehemently contended that the U.P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act is unconstitutional because it infringes the guarantee of equal protection of laws contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. 6. Sri Gulati vehemently contended that the U.P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act is unconstitutional because it infringes the guarantee of equal protection of laws contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. His contention was that the Legislature divided those, in whom a right to special appeal had vested and was not lost by expiry of time, into two classes, (1) of those who had exercised it and whose appeals were pending on 13-11-1962 and (2) of others who had not exercised it and had not filed any appeal before that date and that this classification was irrational. Section 3(1) of the Act abolishes special appeals with effect from 13-11-1962 but sub-Section (2) of it saves the appeals that were pending on that date. The Legislature's power to pass the Act is not challenged before us nor its power to take away a vested right. It is not contended that it had no right to take away the right that had vested in litigants to file special appeals. It was not contended that sub-Section (1) of Section 3, if it had stood alone, would have been unconstitutional. What is contended is that sub-Section (1) read with sub-Section (2) gives rise to unconstitutionality, but the two sub-Sections are not so inextricably connected with each other that they must be read together and that sub-Section (1) cannot be read without sub-Section (2). The Legislature could have enacted sub-Section (1) alone; it would have been a valid intelligible provision fully capable of being complied with. Sub-Section (2) was not required either to render it valid or to make it effective. Therefore, each of the two provisions must be considered separately from the other. It is sub-Section (1) that hits the instant special appeal, rendering it unmaintainable. It is not entitled to the benefit conferred by sub-Section (2) because it was not pending on 13-11-1962 and the appellant's grievance is that sub-Section (2) was so worded that it deprived it of the benefit granted to those who had preferred special appeals prior to 13-11-1962. The only alternative to sub-Section (2) was to remove from the scope of sub-Section (1) not only the special appeals pending on 13-11-1962 but also others which had not become barred by time i.e. not to take away the vested right at all. The only alternative to sub-Section (2) was to remove from the scope of sub-Section (1) not only the special appeals pending on 13-11-1962 but also others which had not become barred by time i.e. not to take away the vested right at all. The Legislature was not bound by any provision of the Constitution not to take away the vested right. Having decided to abolish special appeals it had to consider with effect from what date they should be abolished. It selected 13-11-1962 as the date. Then the question arose before it about the appeals that had already been filed before, and were pending on that date (The question of other appeals, i.e. the appeals to be filed after that date, war no longer before it, it having decided to abolish them). This question was answered in favour of the appellants by allowing them to continue them and did so for very good reasons. Not only had they exercised the vested right but they had also incurred expenditure. They had paid court-fees on the memorandum of appeals, engaged counsel, paid them their fees and incurred other expenses. It was justifiable on the part of the Legislature to allow their appeals to go on. The only other answer to the question that arose before it was that they should also be abolished but this would not have helped the instant appellant at all. Its appeal was already barred by sub-Section (1) and it was not concerned with the question whether those appeals that were pending on 13-11-1962 should be abolished or should be allowed to go on. Even if the Legislature had not enacted sub-Section (2) its appeal would not have been maintainable. Once it is held that sub-Section (1) was valid nothing in sub-Section (2) rendered it invalid. Even if there was something wrong in sub-Section (2) the only effect of it would be to, strike it down but that would leave sub-Section (1), by which the appellant is governed, still intact. The appellant is hit by sub-Section (1), which does not make any invidious discrimination and the constitutionality of it is not assailed. Even if there was something wrong in sub-Section (2) the only effect of it would be to, strike it down but that would leave sub-Section (1), by which the appellant is governed, still intact. The appellant is hit by sub-Section (1), which does not make any invidious discrimination and the constitutionality of it is not assailed. The Legislature was not bound to allow every litigant in whom a right to special appeal had vested prior to 13-11-1962 to file an appeal; it could legitimately and rationally distinguish between those who had already exercised the vested right and others who had not and allow only the former to continue their appeals. It was not bound to allow ever litigant with a vested right to file an appeal and could allow prosecution of only the appeals already filed. 7. Sri Shanti Bhushan representing the Advocate General relied upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court. In Ramjilal v. Income-tax Officer, 1951 SCR 127 Das, J. observed at p. 135: - " . . .the provision that pending proceedings should be concluded according to the law applicable at the lime when the rights or liabilities accrued and the proceedings commenced is a reasonable law founded upon a reasonable classification of the assesses which is permissible under the equal protection clause ..." In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh, 1953 SCR 1188 Jagannadha Das, J. observed at p. 1197: - " . . . there is no reason, why pending proceedings cannot be treated by the legislature as a class by themselves having regard to the exigencies of the situation which such pendency itself calls for. There can arise no question as to such a saving provision infringing Article 14 so long as no scope is left for any further discrimination inter se as between persons affected by such pending matters." The provision impugned in that case was similar to the provision impugned in the instant case, it being a clause saving pending cases. There can arise no question as to such a saving provision infringing Article 14 so long as no scope is left for any further discrimination inter se as between persons affected by such pending matters." The provision impugned in that case was similar to the provision impugned in the instant case, it being a clause saving pending cases. In Sardar Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, 1957 SCR 605 the Supreme Court held that when a Governor issued an Ordinance to check the growing tendency on the part of landholders to eject tenants he had to decide from what date it should take effect and that it was a matter exclusively for him to determine and the propriety of the determination was not open to question in court. The last is Hatisingh Manufacturing Co. v. Union of India, 1960 (3) SCR 528 in which the Supreme Court upheld legislative discrimination between employers who closed their undertakings on or before 27-11-1956 and those who closed them after that date; Shah, J. observed at p. 543: - ". . . by enacting a law which applies generally to all persons who come within its ambit as from the date on which it becomes operative, no discrimination is practised. When Parliament enacts a law ... it evidently makes a distinction between those transactions which are covered by the Act and those which are not covered by the Act, because they were completed before the date on which the Act was enacted. This differentiation, however, does not amount to discrimination which is liable to be struck down under Article 14. If a statute creating a civil liability which is strictly prospective is not hit by Article 14, a law which imposes liability on transactions which have taken place before the date on which it was enacted, cannot also be hit by Article 14". 8. We, therefore, hold that there was nothing unconstitutional in Section 3 of the Act. 9. Sri Deoki Nandan appearing for the respondent contended that as the President had given his assent to the Act it was not open to the Union of India, the appellant, to challenge its constitutionality. Since we have found no substance in the challenge we do not propose to go into this matter. 10. 9. Sri Deoki Nandan appearing for the respondent contended that as the President had given his assent to the Act it was not open to the Union of India, the appellant, to challenge its constitutionality. Since we have found no substance in the challenge we do not propose to go into this matter. 10. In the result we hold that this special appeal is not maintainable after 13-11-1962 and reject the memorandum of appeal on this ground.